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Stellingeu 
1. Future research on strategy making processes in subsidiaries of 
MNC's should take into account aspects of national culture, 
esp. the aspect of uncertainty avoidance and power distance 
(chapter 9 of this dissertation). 
2. Future research on the relationship between national culture 
and the strategy making process in subsidiaries of MNC's 
should test quantitatively the hypotheses about the influence of 
uncertainty avoidance and power distance by means of esp. 
multiple regression analysis and multiple discriminant analysis 
(chapter 10 of this dissertation). 
3. Future research on strategy making processes in subsidiaries of 
MNC's should investigate esp. the role of national cultures in 
the involvement of Headquarters and Regional Head Offices in 
these processes. 
4. Subsidiaries of a MNC from a country with a national culture 
resembling the Dutch national culture in terms of the five 
dimensions developed by Hofstede, can be expected to practice a 
strategy making process like the subsidiary of a Dutch MNC 
5. The results of the research reported in this dissertation should 
be part of the training of future international managers. 
6. The presence of subsidiaries of foreign MNC's in Thailand makes 
an essential contribution to the development of the Thai 
economy, esp. in terms of employment and well-being of Thai 
people. 
7. Strategy making processes in Dutch and Japanese companies in 
Thailand are the most appropriate contribution to the capture of 
the lion's share in Thai market (chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
8. In strategy making processes organisations as well as their 
managers have to consider that any strategy has only a limited 
time span of validity. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THIS STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
Thailand h a s already opened its economy to foreign investors for a long time. 
Foreign investment h a s for long taken par t in the development of Thai economy. These 
investors mainly come from Western Europe, North America and Eas t Asia. Thus , 
companies in Thailand are owned not only by Thai government and bus inessmen, b u t 
also by foreign investors. Most foreign-based companies in Thailand belong to world-
wide operating multinational corporations (MNCs). Dunn ing (1992) affirmed tha t 
MNCs h a d two distinctive features: (1) organised and co-ordinated multiple value-
adding activities across nat ional borders , and (2) internal ised cross-border m a r k e t s 
for t he in termediate p roduc ts ar is ing from these activities. Before expanding their 
activities across nat ional boundar ies , these MNCs normally s t a r t s u p their bus ines s 
in thei r count ry of origin. The country of origin regularly becomes their home 
count ry in which their headqua r t e r s or pa ren t companies usual ly are located. The 
count r ies in which these MNCs invest, operate and set u p their subsidiar ies are 
called hos t countr ies . Because mos t decision powers a n d financial resources lie in 
t he home country, these MNCs are merely na t ional companies with t r ansna t iona l 
opera t ions (Hu, 1992; Yip, J o h a n s s o n & Roos, 1997). 
Even if the subsidiaries of foreign-based companies have been registered a s 
foreign b ranches or representative offices tha t a re incorporated a s Thai companies, 
many Thai outs iders perceive them a s foreign companies. From their perception, 
observation and information of these companies, they usually compare these 
subsidiaries on the bas is of their home-country nationalities with Thai companies and 
notice differences after comparison. In addition, al though Thai executives r u n most of 
these companies a t operational levels, Thai staff of these subsidiaries often experience 
alien characteristics, such a s foreign management , behaviours and procedures. The 
display of foreign management in the overseas subsidiaries may reflect home-country 
national characterist ics including national cul ture. One way to compare the foreign 
management in these subsidiaries is us ing the national cul ture to explain the 
difference in their strategy-making process (SMP) a s one of their managerial behaviour. 
This s tudy will compare three Dutch and three J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thailand in te rms of SMP. All six companies are the subsidiaries of globally well-
known Dutch and J a p a n e s e MNCs. All of them are also well-known in Thailand. 
These companies are chosen from three industries, namely consumer electronics, 
banking sector and airline industr ies . 
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1.2 Problem statement 
This s tudy is aimed a t compar ing SMPs in t he subsidiar ies of MNCs from 
different home count r ies to discover whe ther and to w h a t extent home country 's 
nat ional cu l tu re m a k e s a difference to t he SMPs of subs id iar ies in a given hos t 
country . The compar ison be tween MNCs' subsidiar ies from different home count r ies 
in different hos t countr ies , s u c h a s a comparison be tween Dutch companies in 
F rance a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Germany is no t sensible . To exclude t he 
influence of the hos t country , t h e subsidiar ies from two home count r ies a re chosen 
to compare in a given country. To create a neu t ra l background cu l ture for both 
groups of subsidiar ies , th i s s t udy a s s u m e s t h a t the hos t -count ry cu l ture h a s the 
s a m e influence on the SMPs in t he subsidiar ies of MNCs a s suggested by Kelly and 
Worthley (1981) and Kelly, Whatley and Worthley (1987). However, t he compar isons 
of SMPs in the overseas subs id iar ies of MNCs from the different home countr ies h a s 
led to inconclusive resul t s , because of the following shor tcomings: 
1) The theoretical development for comparing the SMPs in MNCs from 
different home countr ies in a given host country is still weak (Bhatt & 
Miller, 1983; Miller, 1984; Fukuda; 1988; Heller, 1988; Nowak, 1989; 
Redding, 1994; Chen, 1995). 
2) Because mos t researchers tend to use a simplistic research design, 
especially the quanti tat ive survey for gathering da ta excessively, their 
research resu l t s a re likely to generate has ty generalisation and prediction 
from the incoherently observed phenomena in various countr ies (Bhatt & 
Miller, 1983; Tung, 1986; Fukuda , 1988; Nowak, 1989; Redding, 1994; 
Chen, 1995; Early & Singh, 1995; Cray & Mallory, 1998). To solve the 
methodological shor tcomings of this problem, some researchers called for 
the more u s e of qualitative research (Nath, 1986, 1988; Heller, 1988; Khin, 
1988; Yeh, 1989; Redding, 1994; d'Iribarne, 1997); o thers asked for the 
more sophisticated analysis of quantitative research (Hofstede, 1984c; 
Miller, 1984; Tung, 1986). 
3) Because t he definitions of cul ture and SMP are insufficiently clear, mos t 
r e sea rche r s face difficulty in unde r s t and ing which pa r t of SMP is 
dependen t on a n d which p a r t of SMP is independent of t he nat ional 
cu l tu re of home count r ies (Miller, 1984; Heller, 1988; Serror, 1988; 
Nowak. 1989; Earley & Singh, 1995; Cray & Mallory, 1998). 
4) Most r e sea rche r s t end to locate their s tudies in industr ia l ised countr ies . 
The location of s tud ies in a developing count ry like Thai land is 
under represen ted (Fukuda, 1988; Chen, 1995). 
5) Because mos t r e sea rchers from Western Europe, North America and 
J a p a n , where the home countr ies of m a n y MNCs are, conduc t most 
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research into the compar ison of SMPs, non-western , n o n - J a p a n e s e and 
hos t -count ry outlooks a re often ignored (Bhatt & Miller, 1983; Kiggundu, 
Jo rgensen & Hafsi, 1983; Miller, 1984; Khin, 1988; Orum, Feagin & 
Sjoberg, 1991; Neuman, 1997). 
6) Even though the envi ronment both within a n d outs ide MNCs a r o u n d the 
world becomes more mul t icul tura l , few internat ional m a n a g e r s a n d 
expatr ia tes are aware of cul tura l difference between home a n d hos t 
countr ies . They often underes t ima te the cul tura l influence on SMP in 
their count r ies . 
7) Thai employees often th ink and feel t h a t strategic behaviours in foreign-
based companies in Thai land are alien to themselves, b u t they lack 
knowledge of cul tura l difference and foreign character is t ics in these 
companies . Even if they are aware of th i s difference, they do no t 
u n d e r s t a n d how nat ional cu l ture in MNCs* home country influences the 
foreign companies they are working for. 
1.3 General purpose of the study 
This s tudy is m e a n t to cont r ibute to the development of a strategic 
m a n a g e m e n t theory a n d research methodology with respect to the sys temat ic 
compar ison of SMPs in companies originated from two or more count r ies . To 
investigate the impact of nat ional cul ture in MNCs' home countries on their overseas 
subsidiaries in t e rms of SMP, th is s tudy chooses Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thailand a s the research sites. To compare SMPs in Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies 
by taking the national cu l tures of the Netherlands and J a p a n into account , a synthesis 
of Hofstede's model (1984a) of nat ional cul ture and Wheelen and Hunger 's descriptive 
model (1995) of SMP is developed a s a reference model for this comparative study. To 
come u p with a valid conclusion, th is s tudy develops a n embedded mult iple-case 
s tudy design within a comparat ive framework. 
This s tudy is also aimed a t helping scholars, practitioners, international 
managers , expatriates and local workforce to unde r s t and the cultural influence on 
strategic behaviours in MNCs. To formulate a be t te r strategy, top executives in these 
p a r e n t companies have to u n d e r s t a n d the SMP in subsidiar ies from a hos t -count ry 
perspective. The in ternat ional m a n a g e r s and expatr ia tes need to u n d e r s t a n d th is 
cul tura l influence in order to improve their s t rategy for their overseas subsidiar ies . 
The local workforce will have t he r o a d m a p for working with t he foreign companies in 
thei r country. 
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1.4 Scope of the study 
This s t udy employs a hos t -country approach by compar ing the SMPs of 
Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thailand. Thai land is chosen a s t he hos t 
count ry for th i s s tudy, because the a u t h o r is familiar with t he u n i q u e n e s s of Thai 
cu l ture . Thai cu l tu re is a s s u m e d to have t he s a m e influence t h roughou t bo th Du tch 
a n d J a p a n e s e subsidiar ies . This s tudy is restr ic ted to t h e n u m b e r of researchable 
organisa t ions . To e n h a n c e generalisability t h rough diversified organisat ions , Du tch 
a n d J a p a n e s e companies are selected from th ree indus t r i es compris ing c o n s u m e r 
electronics, b a n k i n g a n d airl ines. The information in these indus t r ies is a b u n d a n t . 
The a u t h o r can gain a n access to key informants and other gatekeepers in both 
Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in these indus t r ies . 
Foreign companies in Thai land comprise Western Europe-based, North 
America-based a n d Eas t Asia-based subsidiar ies . North American affiliates are 
excluded from th i s s tudy, because there have already been a lot of comparat ive 
s tud ies a b o u t t h e m in Thai land. Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies a re selected on the 
bas is of (1) theoretical argument , (2) the ranking in foreign direct investment in 
Thailand and (3) their success in Thai market . The national cul tures of the 
Nether lands and J a p a n are in opposition to each other in every dimension according to 
Hofstede's (1984a, 1991) model of nat ional cul ture (See Table 3.1 in section 3.4 and 
Table 6.1 in section 6.4). The national cul tures of other European countr ies such as 
the UK, France a n d Germany are not contrast ing to the national cul ture of J a p a n in 
every dimension. 
In t e rms of foreign direct investment, bo th J a p a n and the Netherlands are the 
n u m b e r one and two foreign investors in Thailand respectively for the pas t few years 
(See Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: Foreign direct investment from top-6 major countries in terms of 
investment approved by Thailand's Board of Investment (Unit: Million Baht) 
Country 1998 1999 2000 (Jan-Jul) Total 
J a p a n 54 ,113 27,042 58,446 139,601 
The Netherlands 88,066 22,481 3,478 114,025 
USA 18,646 46,351 16,096 81 ,093 
UK 31,380 3,919 3,557 38,856 
Taiwan 10,029 7,910 13,068 31,007 
Singapore 10,647 7,003 8,763 26,413 
S o u r c e : a d a p t e d from T h a i l a n d ' s B o a r d of I n v e s t m e n t ( 2 0 0 0 ) 
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Since ABN-AMRO Bank took over Bank of Asia in Thai land in 1998, Dutch 
inves tment h a s raised its s h a r e in Thai bank ing sector. Likewise, Dutch retailing 
companies , especially SHV Holding (Makro) and Royal Ahold (Top supermarket ) have 
aggressively expanded their b u s i n e s s in Thailand recently. Owing to t he increasing 
inves tment in bo th sectors, t he Nether lands h a s recently become the second largest 
foreign investor in Thai land. Meanwhile, J a p a n e s e MNCs have long been the major 
source of inves tment in Thai land for a lmost four decades . J a p a n is still t he largest 
foreign investor in Thai land. 
To u n d e r s t a n d why both Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies are so successful 
in Thai land despite their completely different nat ional cul ture, Du tch and J a p a n e s e 
cu l tu res will be compared on the bas i s of five d imensions in Hofstede's model in 
Chapter 3. Using Wheelen and Hunger ' s model a s a reference model, the 
comparison between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e SMPs u n d e r the influence of t he nat ional 
cu l tu res of the Nether lands a n d J a p a n will be d iscussed in Chapte r 4. The findings 
from the compar ison between the SMPs of Dutch a n d of J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thai land will be d iscussed in Chapte r 9. 
1.5 Major research questions 
Explicit s t rategy mak ing originates in the US four decades ago. The 
evolution of s t ra tegy making t h roughou t the world s tar ted from a n inward-looking 
approach w h e n the global economic s i tuat ion w a s quite s table after t h e Second 
World War to a n outward-looking approach w h e n the new envi ronment is more 
volatile. Strategy mak ing within m a n y big US firms h a s evolved th rough four s tages 
from basic financial p lann ing to strategic m a n a g e m e n t (See Wheelen & Hunger, 
1995, p 4). In m a n y big J a p a n e s e firms, s trategy mak ing h a s developed th rough six 
p h a s e s from individual project p lann ing to long-term vision dur ing the las t 50 years 
(See Kono, 1992, p 36-39). Nonetheless, m a n y large Dutch firms s ta r ted adopt ing 
the concept of corporate s t ra tegy since 1980 (See section 4.2 in Chapte r 4). Wheelen 
and Hunger ' s model is easy to u n d e r s t a n d and to apply to the compar ison of SMPs 
between firms from different countr ies . 
From t h e above discussion, the central research quest ion of th i s s tudy is: 
To w h a t extent do t he nat ional cu l tu res of Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs' pa ren t 
companies in thei r home count r ies intervene in SMPs of their Thai subsidiar ies? 
The m a i n research quest ion is divided into t he following four resea rch 
ques t ions , according to t he p h a s e s of SMP in t he reference model: 
1) From the perspective of the national cul ture of the Netherlands and J a p a n , 
how do the top executives in Dutch or J a p a n e s e companies scan the 
environment differently from their counterpar t s in J a p a n e s e or Dutch 
companies in Thailand? 
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2) From the perspective of the national cul ture of the Netherlands and J a p a n , 
how does the strategy formulation of Dutch or J a p a n e s e companies differ 
from tha t of J a p a n e s e or Dutch companies in Thai land? 
3) According to the national cul ture of the Netherlands and J a p a n , how does 
the strategy implementation of Dutch or J a p a n e s e companies differ from 
tha t of J a p a n e s e or Dutch companies in Thai land? 
4) According to the national cul ture of the Netherlands and J a p a n , how do the 
Dutch or J a p a n e s e companies evaluate their own performance differently 
from their J a p a n e s e or Dutch counterpar ts in Thai land? 
1.6 Significance of the problem and the justification for this investigation 
To unde r s t and why SMPs in the overseas subsidiaries of MNCs from different 
home countr ies varies is the theoretical aims. To take par t in the call for more and 
more comparative managemen t s tudies into MNCs is the methodological aim. To help 
researchers , practit ioners, international managers , expatriates and local workforce to 
unde r s t and the cultural influence on strategic behaviours in MNCs is the practical 
a im. The comparative approach can contribute to the sensitivity to and the 
appreciation towards global diversity through unders tanding the un iqueness of 
culture, belief and sys tems (Nath, 1988). The outcome of th is s tudy is expected to 
m a k e a contribution to: 
1) Developing the model of t he comparat ive analys is of SMPs in MNCs' 
subs id iar ies w h e n tak ing nat ional cu l tu re of MNCs' home countr ies a s an 
influencing factor into account . 
2) Collecting comprehensive da ta from a qualitative approach . This is a 
reply to the call for more u se s of qualitative approaches or a combination 
of m a n y research me thods (Kiggundu et al, 1983; Hofstede, 1984a, 1991; 
Nath, 1986, 1988; Fukuda , 1988; Heller, 1988; Khin, 1988; Yeh, 1989; 
Redding, 1994; Chen, 1995; Chapman , 1997; d'Iribarne, 1997). 
3) Improving the clarity of the definitions of cu l tu re and SMP. The research 
findings will be helpful in unde r s t and ing which par t of SMP is dependent 
on a n d which pa r t of SMP is independent of t he nat ional cu l ture of 
MNCs' home count r ies for further in-depth investigations into the 
compar i sons of SMPs in MNCs from different home countr ies . 
4) Counterpois ing a tendency to p u r s u e research in industr ial ised 
count r ies . This comparat ive research will explain how Dutch a n d 
J a p a n e s e companies develop their corporate strategy in a n 
industr ia l is ing country, such a s Thai land. It is expected to generate 
addit ional da ta from a developing country. 
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5) Adding a non-western insight from a hos t count ry like Thai land. Both 
researchers and pract i t ioners in Western Europe, North America and 
J a p a n , where the home countr ies of m a n y MNCs are, might bet ter 
u n d e r s t a n d comparat ive and strategic m a n a g e m e n t from th is 
perspective. 
6) E n h a n c i n g the awareness of cul tura l difference among MNCs' top 
executives, in ternat ional m a n a g e r s and expatr ia tes . The top executives 
a n d corporate s t ra tegis ts in MNCs' h e a d q u a r t e r s a round the world might 
gain a n insight into their own operat ions in industr ia l is ing count r ies . 
7) Enhanc ing knowledge of cul tural difference among Thai employees. The 
findings of th i s s tudy are expected to help Thai employees to u n d e r s t a n d 
how nat ional cu l ture of MNCs' home count r ies influences the foreign 
companies they are working for, so t h a t they can adjus t themselves to 
the work in these companies . 
1.7 The body and procedure of this study 
The organisat ion of th is disser tat ion is character ised in Figure 1.1. The 
disser ta t ion s t a r t s with a n introduct ion to the investigation with the research 
ques t ions a n d the significance of t he investigation in Chapte r 1. A survey into t he 
state-of-the-art theoretical i s sues of SMP, corporate performance a n d cu l tu re is 
conducted in Chap te r 2 . This survey also covers bo th t he causal i ty be tween 
nat ional cu l tu re a n d SMP a n d the re la t ionship be tween SMP a n d corporate 
performance. The integrat ion of Hofstede's (1984a, 1991) model of na t ional cul ture , 
Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s (1995) prescriptive model of strategic m a n a g e m e n t a n d 
Quinn a n d Rohrbaugh ' s (1983) compet ing value model (CVM) is u sed to depict t he 
impact of na t ional cu l ture on SMP in the s ame chapter . As the reference model in 
th i s s tudy, th i s integrated conceptual framework becomes a comparat ive strategic 
m a n a g e m e n t model on t he bas i s of t he three theoretical i s sues , namely SMP, cul ture 
a n d performance. Chapte r 3 compares Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tu res on the bas i s of 
the five d imens ions in Hofstede's model with t he suppor t of ex tan t l i terature on 
Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cul tures . Chap te r 4 genera tes conceptual proposi t ions on the 
bas i s of the review on Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t which relate na t ional 
cu l tu res a n d SMP. 
The rat ionale beh ind methodological development a n d the cri teria for 
justifying the quality of research findings for comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t is ment ioned 
in Chapte r 5. Chapter 6 describes t he comparat ive case s tudy with embedded 
mult iple-case design a s a research strategy. To a s se r t generalisat ion, the selection 
of cases u s e s the mos t diverse case designs a s suggested by Ragin (1987) on the 
bas i s of MNCs' home countr ies and comparable indus t r ies . Chosen are Dutch and 
7 
J a p a n e s e companies from three indus t r ies : (1) consumer electronics, (2) bank ing 
a n d (3) air l ines. 
Figure 1.1: The structure and procedure of this investigation 
Reviewing 
secondary data 
on SMP in 
Dutch and 
Japanese MNCs 
Chanter 1 Defining research questions and 
their significance 
T 
ChaDter 2 Identifying variables and their 
relationship from literature review and 
constructing conceptual framework to 
guide data collection and analysis 
f 
Chapter 3 Compai 
Japanese cultural 
extant literature 
-ing Dutch and 
settings on the basis of 
Chapter 4 Comparing Dutch and Japanese 
strategy process to formulate conceptual 
propositions 
Conceptual 
propositions 
Chapter 5 Ensuring quality of research 
design from exploring the possible 
methodological strengths and weaknesses 
Chapter 6 Developing an embedded 
multiple-case research design with case 
protocol, interview schedule and 
analytical scheme, selecting cases on the 
basis of theory and culture 
Factual 
research 
design 
Chapter 7 Combining within-case and 
cross-case analyses within Dutch culture 
with the literature on Dutch MNCs 
Chapter 8 Combining within-case and 
cross-case analyses within Japanese 
culture with the literature on Japanese 
MNCs 
Chapter 9 Comparing the results from 
Chapter 7 and 8 to find the empirical 
propositions, comparing these 
propositions with the conceptual 
propositions to shape the propositions for 
further research 
Empirical 
propositions 
Chapter 10 Discussing implication and 
suggestion for future research 
Reshaped 
propositions <— 
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To detect t he commonali t ies a n d differences among Dutch companies u n d e r 
investigation, the resu l t s of cross-case analysis within Dutch cu l ture is combined 
with the l i terature on Dutch MNCs after the da ta captured from Dutch companies in 
Thai land are analysed in within-case analysis for each Dutch company in Chapter 7. 
So a re those of cross-case analysis within J a p a n e s e cul ture in Chapte r 8. The 
resu l t s from bo th Chap te r 7 a n d Chapte r 8 are compared on the bas i s of bo th the 
reference model in Chapte r 2 a n d the pa t t e rn ma tch ing with replication logic for 
cross-cul tural , c ross-case analysis in order to formulate the empirical proposi t ions 
in Chapte r 9. 
To formulate propositions for the future research, these empirical propositions 
are compared with the conceptual propositions derived from the review on Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e SMPs in the light of nat ional cul ture in Chapter 4. The proposition 
formulation is used to refine the reference model. This refined model becomes a 
comparative strategic management model for comparing the SMPs in MNCs' 
subsidiaries in the future research. Chapter 10 discusses the significance of the 
integrative model for comparing SMPs developed from the interaction between the 
reference model and empirical evidence in Chapter 9. This chapter also discusses the 
possible application of the model to the future research, the validity of the model and 
theoretical and practical implications for the research findings. Finally, th i s chapter 
recognises the limitations of the s tudy and make a recommendation for conducting the 
future research from these limitations. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
The comparison between the strategy-making processes (SMPs) of MNCs from 
two or more home countr ies h a s become increasingly popular since the 1980s, because 
both researchers and practi t ioners in the field of international bus iness have gained a 
lot of insights from these comparative analyses. This s tudy employs a host-country 
approach by investigating the SMPs of Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in Thailand. In 
response to the theoretical deficiencies in comparative research on SMPs in the pas t 
(ie, Capon, Christodoulou, Farley & Hulbert, 1987; Kotabe & Omura, 1989; Kotabe, 
1990; Kotabe & Okoroafo, 1990; Krieger & Solomon, 1992; Morris & Pitt, 1993; Doyle, 
S a u n d e r & Wong, 1995; Murray, 1996), this s tudy develops a reference model for 
comparing SMPs in MNCs' subsidiaries when taking the national cul ture of MNCs' 
home countr ies into consideration. This s tudy is also aimed a t building const ructs 
t h a t can reduce difficulties with conceptualising and operationalising cul ture and SMP 
for comparing SMPs across cul tures . 
To build a reference model for investigating t he impact of the national cul tures 
of t he Nether lands a n d J a p a n on the SMPs in Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thailand, th is chapter d iscusses three main theoretical const ructs : (1) SMP, (2) 
corporate performance and (3) cul ture. Section 2.2 deals with diverse theoretical and 
methodological orientat ions towards SMP, the alternative between prescriptive strategy 
content and descriptive strategy process and the reference model used to define 
strategy. A comprehensive survey of l i terature on strategic m a n a g e m e n t is 
impossible. Many models of SMP might escape from th is review unintent ional ly. As 
a reference model t h a t can cover common strategic activities in a firm, Wheelen and 
Hunger ' s (1995) prescriptive model of strategy mainly is used to describe the SMP. 
This section also explores t he concepts of performance in te rms of definitions; 
appropr ia teness and choices on the bas i s of Competing Value Model (CVM) developed 
by Quinn a n d Rohrbaugh (1983). It finally explains the relationship between SMP and 
corporate performance. Section 2.3 inquires into the concept of cul ture and the 
justification for choosing national cul ture for th is investigation. As the mos t popular 
model of delineating national culture, Hofstede's (1984a) five dimensions are explored 
to find t he possibility of the relationship between nat ional cul ture and SMP. Section 
2.4 examines the impact of national cul ture on SMP. The survey on the application of 
Hofstede's model to research into the cul tura l impact on SMP is conducted . After 
reviewing the th ree main conceptual cons t ruc ts , section 2.5 integrates t h e m into t he 
reference model of th i s s tudy. This model comprises five dimensions of Hofstede's 
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model, four s teps in SMP of Wheelen and Hunger 's model and the explanation of 
performance unde r the CVM. Section 2.6 draws a conclusion. 
2.2 Strategy making process (SMP) 
To u n d e r s t a n d s t ra tegy-making process (SMP) in t he Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies in Thai land u n d e r th i s s tudy, the theoretical concepts of SMP are 
d iscussed in t e rms of approaches to SMP, corporate performance a n d the impact of 
SMP on corporate performance. The discussion on diverse theoretical approaches to 
SMP leads to t he selection of t he reference model for th is s tudy. The explanation of 
corporate performance br ings about unde r s t and i ng the impor tance of performance 
in SMP. The relat ionship between SMP and corporate performance is discussed 
accordingly. 
2.2.1 The approach to SMP Since Ansoff (1965) began to articulate the need 
for corporate strategy; the notion of strategy h a s been a focal point of the field of 
strategic management since its inception. Corporate strategy h a s long been regarded 
a s a linkage between firms and their environment. It nowadays h a s a central place in 
the way in which top executives think of themselves, their firms and their role in their 
firms in the long r u n with respect to their environment (Knight & Morgan, 1991). 
Because the raison d'etre of corporate strategy is the firms' continuity a n d growth, 
mos t top executives regard strategy a s the capstone of managerial activities where they 
play a n important role in determining the firm's direction. 
The word 'strategy' originates from the Greek 'strategos (the a r t of general)'. 
Because of th is origin, l i terature on strategic management commonly u s e s military 
terminology to depict organisational manoeuvres (Noorderhaven, 1995; Schneider & 
Barsoux, 1997). Owing to the difference between warfare and bus iness , military te rms 
are not applicable to corporate strategy in every situation. Soldiers u s e strategy for the 
decisive and ult imate conquest when their enemies a re destroyed, subdued or 
surrendered. Firms cannot use strategy in this way. The mos t widely accepted notion 
of corporate strategy is an alignment between corporate internal distinctive 
competencies and external environments, the process by which top executives develop 
and define the competitive strategy, organisational s t ruc ture and long-term goals (Hitt 
& Ireland, 1985; Rhyne, 1986; Nath, 1988; S u m m e r et al, 1990; Snow & Thomas, 
1994; Noorderhaven, 1995; Camillus, 1997; Calori, 1998; Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu, 
1999). 
As th is field h a s grown for a lmost four decades , the newly developed models 
have become more complex a n d diversified. Without a unifying parad igm and 
underdeveloped theory building, strategic m a n a g e m e n t h a s not yet achieved a 
scientific s t a t u s (Shrivastava 6k Lim, 1989; S u m m e r et al, 1990; Thomas & Pruett , 
1993; Sanchez 6k Heene, 1997; Calori, 1998). Owing to diverse theoretical a n d 
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methodological approaches towards strategic managemen t , a n exhaust ive survey of 
l i tera ture on th is field is impossible. Because strategic m a n a g e m e n t theories s t em 
from m a n y disciplines inheri ted with thei r own specific paradigms, u n i t s of analysis , 
a s s u m p t i o n s a n d research b iases (Snow & Thomas , 1994), Mintzberg, Ahls t rand a n d 
Lampel (1998) classified strategic m a n a g e m e n t theories into ten schools of t hough t 
(See Table 2.1) 
Table 2.1: Ten schools of strategic management 
Schools of 
thought 
Assumptions Basic paradigm Unit of analysis Research biases 
Design Process of 
conception 
None Case study, 
Individual firm 
Universality of best 
practice 
Planning Formal process Engineering Strategic planning Predictability 
Positioning Analytical 
process 
Industrial 
Organisation 
Industry, Economic 
marketplace 
Market position of 
the firm 
Entrepreneurial Visionary 
process 
Economics Personalised visions Grand vision, 
leadership, charisma 
Cognitive Mental process Psychology Strategist's mind Personal conception 
of strategy 
Learning Emergent 
process 
Psychology and 
education 
Organisation 
learning 
Incrementalism 
Power Process of 
negotiation 
Political Science Conflicting groups 
in organisation or 
organisation 
Organisational 
politics and conflicts 
Cultural Collective 
process 
Anthropology Collective and co-
operative behaviour 
Entrenched 
continuity and 
organisational 
uniqueness 
Environmental Reactive 
process 
Biology and political 
sociology 
Ecological variables Passitivity and 
adaptiveness 
Configuration Process of 
transformation 
History Organisational 
biography 
Corporate biography 
S o u r c e : a d a p t e d from Mintzberg e t al ( 1 9 9 8 ) 
From Table 2 . 1 , th i s classification does not clearly represent all models of 
strategic managemen t . Some models do no t fit any of these ten schools. Because 
these t en schools are inheri ted with certain a s s u m p t i o n s a n d research biases , they 
canno t be u sed a s a general reference model for compar ing SMPs in MNCs from two 
or more different home countr ies . To focus on the approaches to SMP more 
narrowly, t h e inquir ies into th i s a r e n a fall into two dimensions : (1) con ten t a n d 
process a n d (2) prescr ipt ion a n d description. Strategy con ten t descr ibes w h a t 
strategic a n d manager ia l decisions a re t aken . Strategy process descr ibes how these 
decisions a re made . Prescription deals with how strategy should be made . 
Description focuses on how strategy is made . Since the beginning of the 1990s the 
research into this a rena h a s shifted its focus on strategy from the prescriptive content 
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to the descriptive process because of the four following reasons (Mintzberg, 1990; 
Knight & Morgan, 1991; Rajagopalan, Rasheed 6k Dat ta , 1993; Noorderhaven, 1995; 
Schwenk, 1995; Schneider & Barsoux, 1997; Calori, 1998; Mintzberg et al, 1998): 
1. Descriptive process models can cap tu re the dynamic n a t u r e of 
environment . An increasingly dynamic envi ronment h a s m a d e prescriptive content 
models difficult to cope with t h e real-world s i tua t ion in t he 1990s. The envi ronment 
changes frequently. So do s t reng ths , weaknesses , opportuni t ies a n d th rea t s . 
Strategy with a n overemphas is on conten t canno t account for t h e errat ic celerity a n d 
t h e direction of change (Knight & Morgan, 1991; Camillus, 1997). 
2. Descriptive process models can grasp the complexity of t he real-world 
s i tuat ion. Prescriptive conten t models canno t help corporate p l anne r s to grasp the 
real s i tuat ion compris ing complicated and intertwined variables. Fur thermore , 
information is limited for s t ra tegis ts ' comprehensive analysis of t he environment a n d 
a n exhaust ive exploration of all al ternative s t rategies is impossible. As embedded in 
t he classical model, the inclination towards a process of conception r a the r t h a n a 
process of learning causes th i s pitfall (Mintzberg, 1990; Rajagopolan et al, 1993; 
Bowman & Asch, 1987; Noorderhaven, 1995). 
3 . Descriptive process models can scrut in ise both the conten t a n d process 
s ides of s t ra tegy concurrent ly . The separa t ion of corporate p l anne r s from line 
m a n a g e r s is equal to t he d e t a c h m e n t of formulation (content) from implementa t ion 
(process). Strategy wi thout implementa t ion is no t a strategy. Because s t ra tegy is a n 
interrelat ion between th inking a n d action, t he separa t ion of th i s interrelat ion into 
formulation a n d implementat ion is illogical. Strategy behaves no t a s a set of 
de tached s teps , b u t a s a fluid of interrelated act ions . The descriptive process model 
can depict the flow of and the interrelation between th inking a n d action in 
formulating a n d implement ing strategy, b u t t he prescriptive con ten t models canno t 
do (Bowman & Asch, 1987; Mintzberg, 1990; Thomas & Pruett , 1993). 
4 . Descriptive process models can explain t he rat ionale beh ind the choice of 
strategies a n d strategic behaviours in firms before top executives m a k e a choice. 
The final decision canno t demons t ra te how the decision is made . To know why 
some strategies are more successful t h a n o thers are , how strategy process is done 
m u s t be known (Wright, Lane 6k Beamish, 1988). Strategy process media tes 
between the firms a n d their envi ronment a n d thereby influencing t h e resul t . This is 
t he way to improve the SMP in the firms. Prescriptive conten t models do no t 
describe the real process in t he organisat ions . 
As a general reference model to describe SMP in firms, Wheelen a n d Hunger 
(1995) developed a prescriptive process model of strategic m a n a g e m e n t for teaching 
a s a textbook. They originally intended to u s e th i s model to t each how strategic 
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m a n a g e m e n t should be done, not w h a t is actually done in m a n y firms. They divided 
SMP into four following bas ic e lements : (1) environmenta l scanning, (2) s trategy 
formulation, (3) s t ra tegy implementat ion, and (4) evaluation and control (See Figure 
2.1). 
Figure 2.1: Strategy-making process loop 
Evaluation & 
Control 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Strategy 
Formulation 
Strategy 
Implementation 
S o u r c e : a d a p t e d from W h e e l e n a n d H u n g e r ( 1 9 9 5 , p 9) 
Environmental scanning is the first s tep of SMP. Its main t a sk is to find 
t he relevant strategic i ssues . Both external agencies a n d firms can scan the 
envi ronment . Before formulating any corporate strategy, top executives s can these 
s trategic i s s u e s within their firms' envi ronment both internally a n d externally 
according to thei r va lues . This activity is a psychological process of h u m a n being. 
How they formulate their corporate s trategy depends on how they interpret , 
d iagnose a n d categorise these strategic i s sues (Dutton & Duncan , 1987; Dut ton & 
J a c k s o n , 1987; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990; Thomas , Clark 6k Gioia, 1993). 
Consequent ly, top executives' va lues a r e likely to influence their s cann ing process. 
External envi ronment cons is ts of both t a sk a n d societal envi ronments outs ide the 
firms a n d is no t u n d e r the shor t - run control of t he top executives. Internal 
envi ronment cons t i tu tes strategic i s sues inside the firms a n d is u n d e r their short -
r u n control. They have to collect the strategic i s sues a n d analyse t h e m accordingly. 
As a resul t , they often categorise these external s trategic i s sues into ' t h rea t s ' and 
'oppor tuni t ies ' according to the i ssues ' positive or negative connota t ions (Jackson 6k 
Dut ton , 1988). On the s ame bas is , they frequently classify internal s trategic i s sues 
into ' s t rengths ' a n d "weaknesses*. This classification needs criteria. 
Strategy formulation is t he development of long-range p lans for t he 
effective m a n a g e m e n t of environmental opportuni t ies a n d th rea t s in t he light of 
corporate s t reng th a n d weaknesses (Wheelen 6k Hunger, 1995). This is t he second 
s tep after t he environmenta l scanning . Top executives define the focus of their 
s t ra tegy formulation. They have to set t he goals for thei r firms before finding a 
m e a n to achieve these goals. Because s trategy is the aggregate of n u m e r o u s 
strategic decisions, its formulation is a decis ion-making process. In th i s s tep, 
corporate elites a n d s t ra tegis ts generate and evaluate possible al ternatives, m a k e 
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decisions from these al ternat ives a n d then integrate all the decisions into firm's 
s trategy (Fredrickson, 1986). This integration is the process of s trategy formulation. 
Sometimes, these decisions need the legitimisation from other par t ies , s u c h a s 
employees. 
Strategy implementation is the mechanics of pu t t ing s t rategies a n d 
policies into practice t h rough the development of p rogrammes , budgets , a n d 
procedures (Wheelen 6k Hunger , 1995). This s tep comes after t he firms' s t rategy is 
formulated. Strategy canno t achieve its goals wi thout implementat ion. It can be 
implemented th rough the operat ion of bus iness functions and the allocation of the 
firms' internal resources . This allocation mostly m e a n s budget sett ing. Because the 
firms' strategy and s t ruc tu re are interrelated, the s t ruc tu re somet imes m u s t be 
res t ruc tured in accordance with t he strategy, and functional policies and 
p rogrammes m u s t be drawn u p to facilitate s trategy implementat ion. The firms 
have to set ru les and procedures . To p u t all s t rategies a n d policies into effect, the 
h u m a n resource managemen t , s u c h a s rec ru i tment a n d t ra ining and workforce 
mobilisation is needed. Strategy wi thout the execution carried ou t by people 
achieves nothing. 
Evaluation and control a re t he comparison of the firms' activities between 
their ac tua l performance a n d desired performance (Wheelen 6k Hunger, 1995). 
Without th i s comparison, the re is n o bas i s for judging the firms' performance. Top 
executives m u s t es tabl ish cri teria for evaluation a n d control. These criteria m u s t be 
cons is ten t with t h e firms' s trategy. They might be qualitative, quant i ta t ive, pas t -
oriented a n d future-oriented. They a re used for corrective action and problem 
solving. The process of evaluation a n d control cons is t s of measu r ing the firms' 
performance, s u c h a s profitability, r e tu rn on inves tment and so on. Some firms 
b e n c h m a r k their performance aga ins t other firms' performance. 
The four s tages in th i s model are not only t he s teps t h a t every firm is 
expected to do, b u t also t he s t eps t h a t many large firms th roughou t the world, 
especially MNCs are doing in the real-world s i tuat ion. After all, each firm carr ies on 
each s tep uniquely. The details of each s tep are varied from count ry to county, 
because each firm h a s the different se ts of th rea t s , opportuni t ies , s t r eng ths a n d 
weaknesses . Even so, t he division of SMP into these four s teps facilitates t he 
comprehens ion of how strategy is m a d e in the several types of firm. 
Hence, th i s s tudy u s e s Wheelen and Hunger ' s model a s a b e n c h m a r k to 
compare t he SMPs in t he subsidiar ies of MNCs from different home countr ies . It will 
no t prescribe how Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies should formulate their s trategy 
for Thai operat ions, b u t it will depict how SMPs will be done in both of them. It will 
no t u s e the model prescriptively because of two main weaknesses of prescription: 
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1. The prescriptive models a s s u m e t h a t m a n a g e r s choose opt ions a n d act ions 
from their sensible analysis . The par t icular viewpoint of these m a n a g e r s is 
ambiguous . Their j u d g e m e n t alone canno t explicate all the rat ionale 
behind a decision, because their emotions also play a considerable role in 
mak ing a decision. The prescriptive models often overlook t h e emotional 
p a r t of SMP (Brunsson, 1982; Knight 6k Morgan, 1991; Rajagopolan et al, 
1993; Schoemaker , 1993; Noorderhaven, 1995; Camillus, 1997; Calori, 
1998). 
2 . The prescriptive models m a k e an effort to predict a scenario in order to p lan 
accordingly. The prediction about future is extremely difficult. Unless the 
s i tuat ion is foreseeable, corporate p lanners migh t t ake more t ime to find 
out t he bes t strategy. In effect, they canno t do so because the 
environmental change is occasionally d i scon t inuous and perplexing. The 
prescriptive models canno t cope with unforeseen i s sues a n d discontinuit ies 
(Noorderhaven, 1995; Camillus, 1997). Uncer ta inty often affects strategic 
behaviours , because top m a n a g e m e n t h a s to deal with the unpredictabil i ty 
of the envi ronment by formulating strategy. 
In conclusion, Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s model is n o t merely t h e suggestion how 
corporate s t ra tegy should be made , b u t also t he descript ion of w h a t corporate 
s t ra tegy is exactly m a d e in t he real world. Therefore, it c a n be a reference model for 
compar ing t h e SMPs of Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land in reality. 
2.2.2. Corporate performance A firm a s a n organisat ion is a purposeful 
sys tem. Each firm needs to a t t a in certain goals. The concept of corporate 
performance is t h e focus of strategic managemen t (Venkatraman 6k Ramanujam, 
1986), because corporate performance is the way to identify w h a t a firm w a n t s to 
achieve. The conceptual isat ion a n d m e a s u r e m e n t of corporate performance h a s still 
been controversial because research into SMP defines corporate performance from 
different perspectives (Chakravarthy, 1986; Lubatkin 6k Shrieves, 1986; 
V e n k a t r a m a n 6k Ramanujam, 1986). This definition a n d m e a s u r e m e n t t e n d s to be 
un ique to each firm (Buenger, Daft, Conlon 6k Austin, 1996). 
Qu inn a n d Rohrbaugh (1983) developed t h e Competing Values Model (CVM) 
covering bo th t he complexity of choices encounter ing m a n a g e r s a n d t h e 
consequence of concern ac ross organisat ions concurrent ly after they found the two 
major d imens ions unde rp inn ing t h e notion of organisat ional effectiveness on the 
bas i s of conflicting goals a n d tens ions . The first d imension is a tension between a n 
in ternal focus on the well-being a n d development of i ts staffs in the organisat ion and 
a n external focus on the well-being a n d development according to the outs ide 
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environment . In ternal focus is orientated towards t he ma in tenance of the socio-
technical system, whereas external focus is orientated towards t he competitive 
position of the overall sys t ems (Pounder, 1999). The second dimension 
dis t inguishes organisat ional preference for s t ruc tu re and reflects a contradict ion 
between control a n d flexibility. Flexibility is related to decentral isat ion a n d 
differentiation, a n d control is related to central isat ion a n d integration (Pounder, 
1999). 
When these two d imens ions a re p u t together, a spat ial model emerges from a 
mul t id imensional scaling analysis with four q u a d r a n t s represent ing the four value 
sys tems: (1) h u m a n relat ions model, (2) open system model, (3) internal process 
model and (4) rat ional goal model (See Figure2.2). 
Figure 2.2: Competing Value Model (CVM) 
Human Relations Model 
Means: Cohesion; 
morale 
Ends: Human 
resource development; 
value of human 
resources; quality 
Towards 
Decentralisation, 
Differentiation 
Flexibility 
Towards 
Maintenance of 
the Socio-
technical 
system 
Internal focus 
- / Output Y 
[ Quality ) 
Open System Model 
Means: Flexibility; 
readiness; external 
evaluation 
Ends: Growth; 
interaction with 
environment 
External focus 
Towards 
Competitive 
Position of 
the Overall 
System 
Means: Information 
management; 
communication 
Ends: Stability; 
control 
Internal Process Model Control 
Means: Planning-
goal-setting 
Ends: Productivity; 
efficiency, 
profitability 
Rational Goal Model 
Towards 
Centralisation 
Integration 
Source: adapted from Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983) and Pounder (1999) 
The h u m a n relation model emphas i ses in ternal flexibility in order to develop 
staffs' solidarity a n d morale. The open system model highl ights external flexibility 
a n d depends on read iness a n d adaptabi l i ty in order to gain growth. The in ternal 
process model accen tua t e s in ternal stability a n d u s e information managemen t , 
information process ing and communica t ion for stability and control. The rat ional 
goals model underscores external control and depends on p lanning a n d goal set t ing 
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in order to gain productivity a n d efficiency (Quinn 6k Rohrbaugh, 1983; Buenger et 
al, 1996; Pounder , 1999). 
From the above four models, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) listed 17 i tems of 
m e a s u r i n g organisat ional effectiveness a s follows: 
Productivity: This aspec t of corporate performance deals with behaviour 
t h a t reflects t he extent to which it is concerned with t he quant i ty or volume of w h a t 
a firm produces . 
Efficiency: This aspec t of corporate performance deals with behaviour t h a t 
reflects t h e extent to which it is concerned with a firm's cost of operat ion. 
Quality: This aspect of corporate performance deals with behaviour t ha t 
reflects t he extent to which it is concerned with the quality of w h a t a firm produces . 
Conflict-cohesion: This aspec t of corporate performance deals with 
behaviour t h a t reflects the extent to which it is concerned with interpersonal 
re la t ionships , teamwork and sense of belonging in a firm. 
Morale: This aspect of corporate performance deals with behaviour t h a t 
reflects t he extent to which it is concerned with staffs* morale in a firm. 
Flexibility-adaptation to environment and innovation: This aspect of 
corporate performance deals with behaviour t h a t reflects the extent of a firm's ability 
to readily al ter or adap t i ts s t ruc tu re in response to changing d e m a n d s . 
Readiness: This aspec t of corporate performance deals with behaviour t h a t 
reflects t h e extent of a firm's read iness to a d a p t to change . 
Information management-communication: This aspect of corporate 
performance deals with behaviour t h a t reflects the extent of a firm's ability to 
d is t r ibute timely a n d accura te information needed by i ts member s to do their jobs . 
Growth: This aspect of corporate performance deals with behaviour t h a t 
reflects t h e extent of a firm's ability to secure external support , acquire resources 
a n d increase i t s capabilit ies. 
Planning-goal Setting: This aspec t of corporate performance deals with 
behaviour t h a t reflects the extent of a firm's ability to set goals and objectives a n d 
systematical ly p lan for the future. 
Human resource development: This aspec t of corporate performance deals 
with behaviour t h a t reflects t he extent to which a firm is responsive to t he individual 
needs of i t s staff. It also deals with t he extent to which t he inst i tut ion facilitates 
par t ic ipat ion in decision-making. Likewise, t h i s aspec t is concerned with behaviour 
relat ing to recru i tment , t ra in ing a n d development of staff in a firm. 
Stability: This aspect of corporate performance deals with behaviour t h a t 
reflects t he extent of a firm's ability to ma in ta in i ts continuity, especially u n d e r 
periods of p r e s su re or threat . 
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Control: This aspec t of corporate performance deals with behaviour t h a t 
reflects t he extent of a firm's ability to control t he flow of work a n d direct the 
behaviour of i ts member s . 
Interaction with the environment: This aspec t of corporate performance 
deals with behaviour t h a t reflects t he extent of a firm's ability to acquire scarce 
resources a n d influence t he environment . 
External evaluation: This aspec t of corporate performance deals with 
behaviour t h a t reflects t he extent of a firm's ability to main ta in external legitimacy 
th rough a ne twork of external contac ts a n d co-operation with o ther firms. 
Values of human resources: This aspect of corporate performance deals 
with behaviour t h a t reflects the extent of a firm's concern for its staff, s u c h a s 
developing individual p lans , part icipation, empowerment , l istening a n d being 
support ive a n d feedback to individual and groups. 
Profitability: This aspect of corporate performance deals with behaviour t h a t 
reflects the extent of a firm's ability to maximise i ts profit. 
Thus , corporate performance is a complicated concept with these 17 
operat ional isat ions. Most firms in the world canno t or have never measu red their 
corporate performance by all t hese 17 i tems. 
The issue of the corporate performance of Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thailand is even more complicated. The concept of corporate performance in MNCs' 
subsidiaries differs from t h a t in au tonomous firms because the subsidiaries have 
relat ionships with their pa ren t companies . Subsidiary performance depends on w h a t 
the pa ren t companies wan t to at tain. Generally speaking, MNCs have their different 
goals in establishing subsidiaries in different hos t countr ies . Their pa ren t companies 
usually measu re their subsidiary performance against these goals. They may assess 
their newly established subsidiaries on the basis of growth or marke t sha re and its 
well-established one on the bas is of ROI (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995; Andersson, 
Forsgren & Pedersen, 2001). Thus , it is impossible to compare the performance of 
Dutch companies with tha t of J a p a n e s e companies in Thailand from a home-country 
perspective. From a host-country perspective, this comparison might be difficult if 
these Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies do not intend to compete with each other. 
2.2.3 The impact qfSMP on corporate performance Regardless of the 
economy's general level of efficiency, the enhancement of corporate performance is the 
aim of strategic management . A good SMP presumably enhances corporate 
performance for a firm's continuity (Hrebiniak & Snow, 1982; Venka t raman & 
Ramanujam, 1986; Rajagopalan et al, 1993). The effort to demonst ra te the linkage 
between SMP and performance h a s long been the dominant research agenda in 
strategic management . Generally, mos t research concludes tha t the firms employing 
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some k inds of strategic managemen t often outperform those t h a t do not (Rhyne, 1986; 
Wheelen & Hunger, 1995). Hence, the relationship between SMP and corporate 
performance does exist. 
However, mos t research can only identify w h a t types a n d or ientat ions of 
s trategy affect corporate performance (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980; Hitt & Ireland, 
1985; Smith , Guthr ie & Chen, 1989). These s tudies c a n only confirm t h a t s t ra tegy 
con ten t a s a resu l t of SMP certainly de termines corporate performance, b u t c a n n o t 
identify the direct re la t ionship between SMP a n d corporate performance. Even so, 
th i s relat ionship implies t h a t t he linkage between SMP a n d corporate performance 
does exist a s demons t ra ted in Figure 2 .3 . 
Figure 2.3: The relationship between SMP and corporate performance 
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2.3 Approaches to culture 
The concept of cu l tu re h a s been used ac ross var ious disciplines of social 
science, s u c h a s sociology, anthropology, ethnology, psychology a n d management . 
No resea rch in these fields h a s been able to reach a c o n s e n s u s on defining the 
concept s ince t he genesis of social science. Thus , cu l ture is a t e rm of practically 
indefinite application t h a t originally might be comprehended to m e a n everything a s 
p roduc t s of h u m a n beings a s dist inct from all t h a t is a pa r t of n a t u r e . Fur thermore , 
cu l tu re itself normally affects the researchers who define it. So far, the concept h a s 
been the m o s t problematic one in m a n y s tudies of cu l ture itself (Ronen, 1986; 
Hofstede, 1991; Nasif, Al-Daeaj, Ebrahimi & Thibodeaux, 1991; Berry, Poortinga, 
Segall & Dasen , 1992; Boyacigiller, Kleinberg, Phillips & S a c k m a n n , 1996: Brannen , 
1996; Payne, 1996; Zander, 1997). 
Because t he concept of cu l ture is complicated, t he more reviews on th is 
notion, the more approaches , concepts a n d definitions will be discovered (Pot, 1998). 
After Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) reviewed l i terature on the concept of cul ture , 
they listed 162 definitions a n d added their own definition t h a t 'cul ture consis ts of 
20 
pa t t e rns , explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and t ransmi t t ed by 
symbols, const i tu t ing t he distinctive achievement of h u m a n groups, including their 
embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of cu l ture consis ts of tradit ional (ie, 
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their a t tached values; cu l ture 
sys t ems may, on t he one hand , be considered a s p roduc t s of action, on t he other, a s 
condit ioning e lement of future action' (p 181). Plenty of researchers have added 
more definitions of a n d perspectives on cul ture every single day since t he above 
review. Even if t he definition of cu l ture is unclear , mos t m a n a g e m e n t researchers 
u s e cul ture a s explanatory or independent var iables in their explication of 
manager ia l a n d strategic behaviours . 
To define cul ture more precisely. Berry et al (1992) suggested the three 
following criteria: (1) cu l ture should not be confined only to the concrete or tangible 
p roduc t s of h u m a n life, (2) cu l ture is no t civilisation, and (3) cu l ture is no t the s ame 
a s society. Hofstede (1984a) gave t h e bes t definition of cul ture t h a t satisfies these 
criteria. He defined cu l ture a s ' the collective programming of mind dis t inguishing 
the member of one h u m a n group from ano ther (p 21)' and 'cul ture is a h u m a n 
collectivity a n d personali ty is a h u m a n individuality (p 21)'. He believed t h a t no rm 
w a s rarely changed by direct adoption of outs ide values, b u t r a the r th rough a shift 
in ecological condit ions: technological, economical a n d hygienic (p 23). His model of 
nat ional cu l tu re is by far t he mos t popular parad igm applied to m a n y invest igations 
into t h e re la t ionship between nat ional cu l tu re a n d SMP. Yates a n d Culter (1996) 
reviewed articles in the ma in international academic journals . They discovered tha t 
since 1980 more a n d more researchers have applied Hofstede's model a s a conceptual 
framework to their investigations into the relationship between cul ture and 
management . According to their review of articles, th is model is distinctive because of 
i ts simplicity, quanti tat ive evaluation, dimensional independence, applicability from 
macro to micro levels of analysis, and validity across a heterogeneous array of subjects. 
Hofstede (1984a) developed h is model from the large-scale survey with 
116,000 ques t ionnai res of worldwide IBM in 53 countr ies dur ing the 1970s. This 
survey is regarded a s a seminal work in t he field of in ternat ional managemen t . The 
ques t ionna i res from th is survey became Value Survey Module (VSM) afterwards. 
Initially, h e found t h e four d imens ions from a n exploratory factor analysis . Later, in 
collaboration with Bond (Bond & Hofstede, 1988; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Franke , 
Hofstede & Bond, 1991; Hofstede, 1991), t he fifth dimension w a s added to th i s 
model a n d VSM w a s modified accordingly. According to th i s model, na t ional cu l tu re 
can be decomposed into t he five following d imensions . 
Individualism-collectivism is a m e a s u r e of the extent to which the 
m e m b e r s of a society identify themselves a s ei ther a n individual or a member of a 
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group . Unlike in a n individualistic society, social re lat ions are likely to be more 
profound, more perpetual a n d more involuntary in a collectivistic society (Triandis, 
Bontempo, Villareal, Asai 6k Lucca, 1988). The discrimination between an in-group 
a n d a n ou t -group is clearer in t he collectivistic society t h a n in the individualistic 
one . The top executives from the collectivistic society t end to be more comfortable 
wi th sha r ing information with thei r peers t h a n their coun te rpa r t s from t h e 
individualist ic society (Chow, Harr ison, McKinnon & Wu, 1999). The top executives 
from t h e collectivistic society tend to prefer mak ing a decision more collectively t h a n 
their coun te rpa r t s from the individualistic society (Butler, 1991; Haiss , 1991; 
Harr ison, McKinnon, Panchapakesan & Leung, 1994; J ackson , 2000). 
Power distance is a measu re of the extent to which the m e m b e r s of a 
society accept t h a t power in ins t i tu t ions and organisa t ions is dis t r ibuted equally 
(Hofstede, 1985b; Merchant , Chow & Wu, 1995). Whereas a large power d i s t an t 
society t e n d s to keep hierarchy a n d power concent ra t ion intact , a small power 
d i s t an t society is likely to approve equality a n d power distr ibution a m o n g its 
m e m b e r s . The central isat ion of author i ty in the companies from the large power 
d i s t an t society is high (Haiss, 1991; Harr ison et al, 1994; Wong 6k Birnbaum-More, 
1994; J a i n & Tucker, 1995; Builtjens & Noorderhaven, 1996). The firms in t he large 
power d i s t an t society tend to central ise thei r decis ion-making authori ty , 
formalisation a n d operat ions, whereas their coun te rpa r t s in the small power d i s t an t 
society t end to decentral ise these activities. Power d is tance is also positively related 
to t h e respec t for author i ty a n d h ierarchy in a n organisat ion. Unlike their 
coun t e rpa r t s from the small power d i s t an t society, the manage r s from the large 
power d i s t an t society are unlikely to sha re information with their subord ina tes 
(Chow et al, 1999), a n d they tend to u s e thei r personal author i ty to m a n a g e a n d 
motivate thei r subord ina tes (Chow, Kato 6k Merchant , 1996; Offermann 6k Hel lmann, 
1997; Sche rmerho rn 6k Bond, 1997). 
Uncertainty avoidance is a m e a s u r e of t he degree to which the m e m b e r s of 
a society feel comfortable with uncer ta in ty a n d ambigui ty (Hofstede, 1991). People 
in a s t rong uncertainty-avoiding society are likely to be anxious when they face 
u n s t r u c t u r e d , equivocal or errat ic s i tuat ions , b u t people in a weak uncer ta in ty-
avoiding one t end to feel relatively comfortable in s u c h s i tuat ions . Unlike their 
coun te rpa r t s from the weak uncertainty-avoiding society, the top executives from 
t h e s t rong uncer ta inty-avoiding society tend to be pessimist ic when facing the 
unce r t a in s i tuat ion (Schneider 6k De Meyer, 1991; J a i n 6k Tucker, 1995) a n d to be 
conservative w h e n choosing a new direction for thei r firms (Shane, 1995; 
Geletkanycz, 1997). The top executives from the weak uncertainty-avoiding society 
tend to be more optimistic a n d open-minded for a new idea. 
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Masculinity-femininity is a measu re of the degree to which the member s of 
a society are orientated towards either the role of m e n or t ha t of women (Hofstede, 
1991, 2001). Masculinity reflects male general character is t ics , s u c h a s 
asser t iveness , ambit ion, competi t iveness and performance. Femininity r epresen t s 
female common personali t ies , s u c h a s sympathy, concern for quality of life, jea lousy 
a n d nu r tu r ing . The m a n a g e r s from a mascu l ine society tend to s t r ess performance 
appraisa l a n d reward sys tem a n d base rewards on performance. These m a n a g e r s 
are supposed to encourage their subord ina tes to work ha rde r a n d u s e coercion 
r a the r t h a n persuas ion for motivating their subord ina tes . In contras t , the manage r s 
from the feminine society tend to emphas i se job enr ichment a n d to improve the 
working environment and to b a s e reward allocation on needs . These m a n a g e r s are 
supposed to sympath ise with their subord ina tes and prefer pe r suas ion to coercion 
for motivating their subord ina tes . 
Long-term v short-term orientation is a m e a s u r e of the degree to which 
the member s of a society a re orientated towards ei ther shor t - te rm or long-term goals 
on Confucian principle (Bond & Hofstede, 1988; Hofstede 6k Bond, 1988). People in 
a long-term-oriented society tend to be thrifty, indus t r ious and educat ion-
orientated. People in a short - term-oriented society tend to be generous , relaxed a n d 
face-saving. The financial performance of a firm is more related to shor t - term 
performance, whereas top executives' rat ing of corporate success is more related to 
long-term performance (Farmer 6k Richman, 1965; Hrebiniak 6k Snow, 1982; 
Chakravarthy, 1986). The m a n a g e r s from the short - term-oriented society tend to 
under l ine financial performance, s u c h a s profitability a s their pr imary goal a n d their 
criterion for evaluation a n d control (Harrison et al, 1994; Merchant et al 1995). 
They tend to consider loss-making a s a n immediate concern. On the other hand , 
the m a n a g e r s from the long-term oriented count ry are a s sumed to b a s e their 
corporate success on cus tomer a n d employee satisfaction, ma rke t share , growth, 
a n d the quali ty of p roduc ts a n d service in their companies . They are unlikely to 
consider loss-making as a n immediate concern for their success in the long run . 
Schwartz ' s (1992) a n d Trompenaars ' models (1993) are al ternat ive models for 
investigating t he relat ionship between nat ional cu l tu re and SMP. Some d imens ions 
in both models are correlated with cer tain d imens ions in Hofstede's model. Unlike 
Hofstede's model based on a posteriori cons t ruc t s , a priori s t r uc tu re s of Schwartz ' s 
and Trompenaar s ' models are unsuccessful ly replicated despite having more 
d imensions . In spite of i ts long-time existence a n d frequent application, some 
researchers still have criticised the Hofstede's model. These critiques are the following 
seven misapprehensions: 
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1. The conceptualisation of the dimensions is too poor to explicate a cultural 
Context. Some definitions of these dimensions are inadequately conceptualised, such 
a s Confucian dynamism or long-term v short- term orientation. These dimensions 
m u s t depict t he cul tural context more explicitly. Some other dimensions may not be 
found for the t ime being (Yeh, 1989; Mead, 1990; Smith, 1996; J o h n s o n & 
Lenartowicz, 1998). This scepticism about the conceptualisation h a s been brought u p 
with the possibility to modify th is model with t he potential dimensions in the future 
research when long-term orientation dimension h a s been found from Chinese Value 
Survey (CVS) (Hofstede, 1991). Hofstede (1998b) himself appreciated any candidates 
for the new dimensions tha t may enrich the delineation of the cultural context. 
2. Some dimensions may correlate with each other (Yeh & Lawrence, 1995; 
J o h n s o n & Lenartowicz, 1998). At this moment it is too soon to confirm this 
precaution. Many countr ies are still excluded from the survey tha t cons t ruc ts th is 
model. The further investigations into the leftover countries will confirm whether th is 
correlation exists or not. 
3 . The nar rowness of h is work's population of IBM employees m e a n s the score 
might not be generalisable to whole population. The research design and the 
m e a s u r e m e n t of dimensional indices might be inadequate . The respondents in the 
IBM survey belong not only to the middle class of their respective societies ra ther t h a n 
the upper , working or peasan t classes, b u t also to a single MNC with a single corporate 
cul ture in a single indust ry (Jaeger, 1986; Yeh, 1989; Mead, 1990; S0ndergaard, 1994; 
Smith, 1996; Todeva, 1999). This critique is unjustified because the several successful 
replications of t he survey with different samples asser t t he model's generalisability 
(Shackleton & Ali, 1990; Hoppe, 1993; see Sendergaard, 1994; Lowe, 1996; Smith & 
Schwartz, 1997). Some kinds of sub-group within a country, such a s ages, professions 
and educational levels do not affect the generalisability. The purpose of th i s 
na r rowness is to ma tch sample on the bas is of cross-culturally functional equivalence 
(Lowe & Oswick, 1996; Hofstede, 1998b). 
4 . The indices of t he five d imens ions of the count r ies unde r Hofstede's survey 
ignore the effect of in t ra-cul tura l variat ion. Subgroups within a country, such a s 
regions a n d e thnic groups a re likely to affect the scores ' variat ion within the count ry 
(Singh, 1990; Huo & Randall , 1991; Au, 1997; Cray & Mallory, 1998). This 
suspicion can be el iminated by applying th is model to a s tudy of different s u b -
cul tura l g roups within the country . The resul t from these s tud ies will b e used to 
es tabl ish t he indices of the five d imens ions represent ing these sub-groups . If a 
count ry is very ethnically homogenous , t he scores in t he model a re highly likely to 
represen t t he centra l tendency of t he majority of people's behaviours a n d values in 
t h a t country . 
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5. The model is most firmly based on a s t ruc tura l functionalist paradigm. This 
misconception is a major advantage, ra ther t han a disadvantage of th is model, because 
the indices in the model can be operationalised a s the independent variables in 
investigations into the association between culture and other dependent variables. The 
dimensions appear to have some predictive capability, so t ha t the model is applicable 
to causality (Westwood & Everett, 1987; Soeters 6k Schreuder, 1988; Harrison, 1992, 
1993: Cray 6k Mallory, 1998). 
6. Because VSM might be based on inferred values, the meaning of each factor 
m u s t be checked independently in each country. The survey resul ts usually cannot 
interpret some cultural contexts. The survey ought not to be the only way. Qualitative 
research methods, especially ethnography and case s tudy research can delve into the 
context of the survey findings for the bet ter interpretation of these dimensions (Yeh, 
1989; Sondergaard, 1994; Lowe 6k Oswick, 1996; Chapman , 1997; d'Iribarne, 1997; 
Hofstede, 1998b). 
7. The dimensions may be artefacts of period between 1968-1973 when his 
da ta were analysed. Because the scores are now more t h a n 25 years old and many 
cul tures have changed since then, the scores may change and have an invalid numeric 
ranking (Sondergaard, 1994; Smith, 1996; Earley 6k Gibson. 1998). The several 
successful replications of t he survey make th is a rgument invalid despite their long-
time existence (Shackleton 6k Ali, 1990; Hoppe, 1993; see Sondergaard, 1994; Shane , 
1995; Lowe, 1996; Smith 6k Schwartz, 1997; Hofstede, 1998b). 
Apart from nat ional cul ture , corporate, b u s i n e s s a n d professional cu l tu res 
may be a n al ternative independent variable for depicting strategic behaviours in 
both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. If na t ional cu l tu re is ' the 
collective programming of mind which dis t inguishes t he m e m b e r s of one nat ion from 
another ' , corporate cu l tu re is ' the collective programming of mind which 
dis t inguishes t he m e m b e r s of one organisat ion from ano the r (Hofstede, 1991, p 
262)'. In t he s ame veins, b u s i n e s s cul ture can be defined a s ' the collective 
programming of mind which dis t inguishes the member s working in one indus t ry 
from another ' , while professional cu l ture can be defined a s ' the collective 
programming of mind which dis t inguishes the m e m b e r s of one profession from 
another ' . 
Corporate cu l ture is t he sha red perception of pract ices among the pe r sons 
who work in t he s a m e company. With regard to MNCs, it is supposed to e n s u r e all 
employees' men ta l uniformity t h roughou t these MNCs' world-wide operat ion. To 
main ta in both corporate identity and internal consistency, corporate cu l ture s u c h a s 
practices, perspectives, rituals, symbols a n d heroes is likely to be instilled into all 
employees a t their adul thood. These MNCs tend to inculcate corporate cu l ture into 
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their employees t h rough h u m a n resource m a n a g e m e n t (HRM) policy, s u c h a s the 
careful selection of recrui ts and the socialisation of thei r recrui ts . If t hese recrui ts 
fit t he company, the process of their socialisation is easier. The va lues of corporate 
founders t end to become the values of all corporate m e m b e r s in these MNCs th rough 
the socialisation. Corporate cu l tu re is p rone to be crystallised a s the miss ion 
s t a t e m e n t of these MNCs (Hofstede, 1985b, 1991 , 1998a, 1998b, 1999; Laurent , 
1986; Kirkbride & Shae , 1987; Schneider, 1988; Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohavy & 
Sande r s , 1990; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Hofstede, Bond & Luk, 1993; Rosenzweig 
&Nohr ia , 1994). 
Each company h a s different corporate cu l ture because of the role of the 
founders , t he s t rong leaders who change firms' direction, the adminis trat ive heri tage 
of each company, the s tages of corporate development a n d the n a t u r e of the produc t 
(Schneider & Barsoux, 1997). The personal va lues of t h e corporate founders are 
likely to be driven by the nat ional cu l tu res of these founders . These va lues usual ly 
become a pa r t of corporate cul ture . Thus , nat ional cu l tu re shapes corporate 
cul ture . German or J a p a n e s e companies tend to s h a r e some similarities according 
to their na t ional cu l tu re to some degree even if t hese companies have their own 
idiosyncrasy according to thei r corporate cu l ture (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997). 
However, nat ional cu l tu re is more embedded in values , whereas corporate cul ture is 
more embedded in pract ices (Hofstede, 1985b, 1991, 1998a, 1998b, 2001). T h u s , 
na t ional cu l tu re is more deep-rooted t h a n corporate cu l ture . 
Bus ines s cu l ture is the common pract ices widely unders tood among the 
pe r sons who work in the s ame indus t ry according to t he certain condit ions t h a t 
each indus t ry h a s . These condit ions comprise t he n a t u r e of decision-making in 
s u c h indus t ry , p roduc t a n d marke t character is t ics , regulation and technology 
(Schneider & Barsoux, 1997). MNCs operat ing in t he s a m e bus ine s s tend to carry 
out some similar s t rategies a n d policies to a cer tain degree unde r these condit ions. 
Advertising is cultural ly different from bank ing (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997). Every 
advert is ing firm emphas i ses creativity, whereas every b a n k under l ines p rudence and 
conservat i sm in dealing with r i sks . A person obta ins bus ine s s cul ture w h e n he or 
s h e works in a par t icular indus t ry and h a s to comply with i ts industr ia l n o r m s . 
Even if b u s i n e s s cul ture t ends to be un ique to the s a m e industry, it is un ique 
ne i ther to different companies within t he s a m e indust ry , nor to different professions 
within t he s a m e indus t ry . Bus ines s cul ture is also driven by nat ional cu l ture 
(Schneider & Barsoux, 1997). For MNCs operat ing in t h e same industry , nat ional 
cu l tu re explicates t he u n i q u e n e s s of each count ry of origin. Corporate cul ture 
depicts each company for i ts individuality. Professional cul ture del ineates each 
function a n d occupat ion for i ts norm. 
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Professional cu l ture is a se t of sha red values , n o r m s a n d perspectives among 
a group of people who consider themselves to be engaged in the s ame occupation, 
s u c h a s accoun tan t s , soldiers, physic ians (Hofstede, 2001). Doctor may learn to be 
met icu lous in surgery, whereas lawyers may learn to be aggressive a t leas t in cour t 
(Schneider 6k Barsoux, 1997). People can differ on their values a n d beliefs by 
profession. There a re m a n y professional cu l tu res even within t he s a m e company 
according to i ts corporate funct ions. Professional cu l tu re can be a sub- se t of 
corporate cu l ture . People who work in different depa r tmen t s can have professional 
conflicts with each other, s u c h a s t he conflict between marke t ing and product ion 
depar tment . Market ing d e p a r t m e n t w a n t s more p roduc t designs to satisfy 
cus tomers ' need, b u t product ion depa r tmen t w a n t s fewer designs to save costs . An 
individual acquires professional cu l tu re th rough the socialisation in the school, 
apprent iceship or universi ty a n d t ra ining in the company (Raelin, 1986; Schneider 6k 
Barsoux, 1997; Hofstede, 2001). Some countr ies a re closely linked with par t icu lar 
professions, whereas some indus t r ies value cer tain professions (Schneider 6k 
Barsoux, 1997). For ins tance , the US is famous for MBA gradua tes , t he UK for 
a c c o u n t a n t s a n d Germany for engineers . Health care indus t ry va lues doctors, b u t 
pharmaceu t ica l indus t ry va lues scient is ts . T h u s , professional cu l ture can be varied 
from company to company according to corporate cul ture , from count ry to count ry 
according to na t ional cu l tu re a n d from indus t ry to indus t ry according to b u s i n e s s 
cu l ture . Raelin (1986) considered professional cu l tu re a s t he opposite of factors t h a t 
a re t h e awkward by-products of corporate cul ture . They can be unified with the 
va lues of na t ional cul ture . 
It is difficult to separa te nat ional , corporate, b u s i n e s s a n d professional 
cu l tu res from each other. When a person s t a r t s to work with a company, h e or s h e 
is socialised with corporate cu l ture according to the company, b u s i n e s s cul ture 
according to t he indus t ry where t he company opera tes and professional cu l tu re 
according to h i s or he r job (Raelin, 1986). These three cu l tu res also t end to be 
combined with t he nat ional cu l tu re of th is person. Hence, nat ional , bus ines s , 
professional a n d corporate cu l tu res are interrelated a n d overlapped with each other 
a s expressed in Figure 2.4. However, corporate, b u s i n e s s and professional cu l tu res 
a re no t the choice for explicating the SMPs in th i s s tudy because of t he th ree 
r easons . 
Firstly, from a hos t count ry perspective, t he difference in SMP a m o n g 
foreign-based companies according to nationali ty or home count ry is ment ioned a s 
t he in teres t ing research objective in several comparat ive inquir ies into SMPs 
between MNCs from two or more different home count r ies in their subsidiar ies in a 
given thi rd count ry (Capon et al, 1987; Kotabe 6k Omura , 1989; Kotabe, 1990; 
Kotabe 6k Okoroafo, 1990; Doyle, S a u n d e r 6k Wong, 1995; Murray, 1996), when one 
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recognises t h a t the top executives of MNCs' subsidiar ies are not always t he nat ives 
of the home countr ies . 
Secondly, young people by their educat ion and upbr inging are indoctr inated 
with va lues according to the nat ional cu l ture of their country first a t their earliest 
age. Also a t la ter s tages in thei r life development, they still a re confronted with 
na t iona l cu l tura l condi t ions (eg jo in t he a rmy a s a soldier). 
Thirdly, corporate, b u s i n e s s a n d professional cu l tures , a s a consequence of 
t h e socialisation a t t he adolescence a n d adul thood canno t uproot t he na t ional 
cu l tu re of home countr ies a s a resu l t of the indoctr inat ion from the childhood t h a t is 
a s s u m e d to be pers i s ten t for a longer t ime (Laurent, 1986; Hofstede et al, 1990; 
Hofstede, 1984a, 1991, 1998a, 1998b; d'Iribarne, 1994). 
Figure 2.4: The diagram of overlapping cultures 
Values may be changed in form, such a s the t ransformation of social 
ins t i tu t ions , b u t not changed in essence, especially a t sub-consc ious level. Values 
reflect a n unobservable pa r t of h u m a n behaviour, whereas pract ices are a n 
observable one, so they are not subject to anyone 's plan, b u t subject to their own 
logic. Sorod (1991) confirmed t h a t nat ional cu l tu re exerted more influence on 
manager ia l va lues t h a n corporate cu l ture did from her s tudy of American companies 
in Thai land. 
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2.4 The impact of national culture on SMP 
SMP is subject to both rationality and irrationality of the persons who 
manage companies . In tu rn , rationality is subject to cul tura l logic and irrationality 
is subject to cul tura l subjectivity. Because SMP is subject to the cul tura l logic of 
t he decis ion-makers or corporate s t ra tegis ts in the companies , t he concept of SMP 
being dynamic is more sui table for unde r s t and i ng the impact of na t ional cu l tu re on 
such SMP per se. 
SMP could be be t te r unders tood a s cul tura l subjectivity when taking nat ional 
cu l ture into account (Faucheux, 1977; Horovitz, 1978; Redding, 1982; Schneider, 
1989; Schneider & Barsoux. 1997). National cu l tu re may influence country-specific 
advantages t h a t lead to the competitive advantages of s trategy (Shan & Hamilton, 
1991; Van den Bosch 6k Van Prooijen, 1992). In h i s several articles, Hofstede 
(1984b, 1987a, 1987b, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996) affirmed t h a t both m a n a g e m e n t 
theories and SMP were not universally applicable, b u t culturally const ra ined. When 
s tudying both theories a n d the strategies, the nat ional cul ture of the theor is ts and 
s t ra tegis ts m u s t be considered as their b iases . 
The national cul ture of MNC's country of origin is prone to have a certain 
influence on their overseas subsidiaries globally. Many s tudy based on Hofstede's 
model confirmed t h a t MNCs' subsidiaries still have the organisational s t ruc ture and 
behaviour similar to their headquar te r s (HQs) (Soeters 6k Schreuder, 1988; Yeh, 1991; 
Wong 6k Birnbaum-More, 1994; Lau 6k Ngo, 1995). To prove t h a t t he na t ional cu l tu re 
of MNCs' home count ry influences t he strategic behaviours of s u c h MNCs, some 
researchers have applied th is model to their empirical inquir ies into the impact of 
nat ional cu l tu re on SMP. These inquiries are shown in Table 2 .2 . 
Table 2.2: The application of Hofstede's model to strategy process 
Literature Description Findings 
Wong-
Birnbaum-More 
(1994) 
An inquiry into culture, context and 
structure in Hong Kong banks 
Power distance is positively related to 
centralisation and formalisation 
Jain and Tucker 
(1995) 
An inquiry into the impact of national 
culture on strategic constructs in North 
American and Japanese MNCs 
Power distance and Uncertainty 
avoidance is positively related to 
concentration of key functional decision. 
Uncertainty avoidance is positively 
related to long-term performance 
measures . 
Builtjen and 
Noorderhaven 
(1996) 
An Inquiry into the impact of national 
culture on strategic decision-making in 
the Netherlands and the Philippines 
Power distance is positively related to the 
level of final decision authorisation. Long-
term orientation Is positively related to 
the duration of decision process. 
Chow et al 
(1996) 
An inquiry into the use of organisational 
control and their effect on data 
manipulation in Japan and the US 
Uncertainty avoidance is positively 
related to tight procedural controls. 
To character ise the relat ionship between nat ional cu l ture a n d SMP, the 
linkage between the five dimensions , namely power dis tance, individualism-
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collectivism, unce r t a in ty avoidance, masculinity-femininity a n d long-term v short -
t e rm orientat ion, a n d the four s teps of SMP consis t ing of environmental scanning, 
s t ra tegy formulation, s t ra tegy implementat ion a n d evaluation and control. 
2.4.1 Environmental scanning. As nat ional firms with in ternat ional 
operat ions , MNCs h a d to encoun te r their typical problems unde r the influence of 
thei r h o m e count r ies before thei r overseas expansion. The nat ional cu l tu res of 
MNCs' h o m e count r ies influence t he in terpreta t ion and perception of social 
in teract ion a n d strategic i s sues among MNCs' top executives in the HQs and the 
expatriates in overseas subsidiaries when seeking m a r k e t s across borders (Sallivan & 
Nonaka. 1988; Schneider. 1989; Haiss, 1991; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991; Hu, 1992; 
J a i n & Tucker, 1995; Yip et al, 1997; Ebrahimi, 2000). 
The m a i n objective of environmental s cann ing activities is to collect and 
classify unce r t a in ty a n d risk a s strategic i s sues into t h r ea t s and opportuni t ies 
(Dutton 6k Duncan , 1987; Dut ton 6k J ackson , 1987; J a c k s o n 6k Dut ton , 1988; 
Wheelen 6k Hunger , 1995). Because strategic i s sues comprise t he unpredictabil i ty 
a n d fluctuation of t he envi ronment u n d e r which decision-making t akes place (Haiss, 
1991), top executives need to s can the environment . In relation to t he perception of 
unce r t a in ty a n d strategic i ssues , uncer ta in ty avoidance is likely to be associated 
with envi ronmenta l scanning . 'Manager in different count r ies differ in thei r 
percept ion of uncer ta in ty (Schneider 6k De Meyer, 1991 , p 310)'. With regard to 
uncer ta in , uncontrollable and problematic environment, t he m a n a g e r s from a s t rong 
uncer ta inty-avoiding country a re p rone to interpret strategic i ssues a s threa ts , b u t 
their counterpar t from a weak uncertainty-avoiding count ry are p rone to in terpret 
s trategic i s sue a s opportuni t ies (Sallivan 6k Nonaka, 1988; Schneider 6k De Meyer, 
1991; J a i n 6k Tucker, 1995). To cope with pess imism abou t u n s t r u c t u r e d s i tuat ions, 
the m a n a g e r s from the s t rong uncertainty-avoiding count ry tend to have the more 
clear-cut cri teria for classifying a n d s t ruc tu r ing information, a n d inst i tut ionalise 
a n d rout in ise the i r environmental s cann ing unl ike their coun te rpa r t s from the weak 
uncer ta inty-avoiding count ry (Hofstede, 1984b; De Wit 6k Meyer, 1999). 
Power d is tance is likely to be related to the information sha r ing between the 
top executives a n d their subord ina tes in a company. The m a n a g e r s from a large 
power d i s t an t count ry tend to sha re information with thei r subord ina tes , b u t their 
coun t e rpa r t s from a small power d i s t an t count ry are unlikely to do so (Chow et al, 
1999). The subord ina te s in t he large power-dis tant count ry a re p rone to expect 
thei r super ior to consu l t t h e m before mak ing a decision, b u t their coun te rpa r t s in 
t h e small power-dis tant count ry a re not. 
Individualism-collectivism is also likely to be associated to t he extent to 
which the top executives in MNCs tend to s h a r e more information with other part ies, 
s u c h a s employees, pa r tne r s , suppliers , cus tomers a n d even competi tors (Chow et 
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al, 1999). The companies from a collectivistic count ry tend to rely on their network 
of relat ionship for gather ing information m u c h more t h a n their coun te rpa r t s from a n 
individualistic count ry do. Difference in perception and interpretation brings about 
different strategy formulation (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990), because the top executives 
need to respond to all strategic i ssues they perceive by making a strategic decision. 
2.4.2 Strategy formulation. To solve their domestic problems, MNCs' top 
executives and corporate s t ra tegis ts a s h u m a n adopted a par t icular viewpoint after 
they perceive a n d interpret strategic i s sues u n d e r t he influence of their nat ional 
cu l ture . They tend to develop b u s i n e s s strategy before their in ternat ional expansion 
u n d e r t he influence of societal contexts and some k inds of social interact ion in their 
home countr ies . The nat ional cu l ture of MNCs' home countr ies is likely to influence 
MNCs' top executives' priority in response to the environment they perceive and 
interpret for their strategy formulation. They tend to carry on their problem-solving 
style to their world-wide operation (O'Connell & Zimmerman, 1979; Erez & Earley, 
1987; Tse, Lee, Vert insky & Wehrung , 1988; Ali, 1989, 1993; Axlesson, Cray, 
Mallory & Wilson, 1991; Haiss , 1991; Hu, 1992; Ralston, Gustafson, E lsass , Cheung 
&Terps t ra , 1992; Ralston, Gustafson, Cheung & Terpstra , 1993; Hitt, Dacin, Tyler 
& Park. 1997; Yip et al, 1997). 
Individualism-collectivism might describe t he extent to which top executives 
prefer to m a k e a decision on their own, in conjunction with their colleagues and 
subord ina tes or in conformity with a group expectation (Butler, 1991; De Wit & 
Meyer, 1999). The strategic behav iours in t he companies from a collectivistic 
count ry might seem insensible and unfa thomable to those who a re b rough t u p in a n 
individualistic count ry where self-interest is the u t m o s t motivation (Hofstede, 
1984b; Haiss , 1991; Smith, 1992). The m a n a g e r s from the collectivistic count ry 
tend to m a k e a decision u n d e r the influence of their peer group a n d subord ina tes , 
b u t their coun te rpa r t s from the individualistic country tend to do so u n d e r t he 
influence of their self-interest (Harrison et al, 1994; J ackson , 2000). This dimension 
may explain how decisions a re m a d e either collectively or individually. Thus , 
individualism might be positively related to the degree of individual responsibility for 
a mak ing strategic decision in a company. Collectivism, in contrast , might be 
positively related to t he degree of collective responsibility for making a strategic 
decision in a company. 
Hofstede (1984a, 1991) tried to u s e power d is tance to describe t he degree of 
central isat ion a n d h ierarchy in a company. He believes t h a t the company from a 
large power d i s t an t society t ends to be more hierarchical a n d central ised t h a n the 
one from a small power-dis tant society. Several empirical s tudies confirmed t h a t 
power d is tance is positively related to the central isat ion of decis ion-making 
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au thor i ty a n d the level of formalisation in a company (Jain & Tucker, 1995; Builtjen 
6k Noorderhaven, 1996). 
Long-term v short- term orientation affected the way top executives and 
corporate s t rategists th ink about strategy (De Wit 6k Meyer, 1999; Hofstede, 2001). The 
corporate s t rategists from a short-term-oriented cul ture tend to p lan for the foreseeable 
future, set shor t - te rm goals such a s profit and prefer predictability, whereas their 
counte rpar t s from a long-term-oriented cul ture do not (Harrison et al, 1994). As a 
pr imary goal, the corporate strategists from the short-term-oriented cul ture tend to 
emphas ise profit from the past-oriented or cur ren t projection. On the other hand , the 
corporate s trategists from the long-term-culture tend to plan for the corporate survival 
in the long run . They are unlikely to emphas ise profit a s a primary goal. They tend to 
u s e future oriented projection for the strategy formulation. 
2.4.3 Strategy implementation. When MNCs expand their operation 
abroads, they often welds an influence on their overseas subsidiaries by introducing 
some home country practices to hos t countries regardless of local conditions according 
to their world-wide problem solving and strategy. Under their strategy, they have to 
organise their world-wide s t ruc tu re to determine t he relat ionship between their HQs 
and subs id iar ies . They have a broad policy framework for its HQs and subsidiaries in 
order to formulate appropriate strategy as their world-wide reaction to the force of 
local marke t s . The u s e of expatriates, especially from the home countr ies t ends to 
reinforce th is influence. These expatriates tend to br ing the home-country practices to 
the subsidiaries when they take u p their overseas ass ignment . (Hofstede, 1984a; 
Ronen, 1986; Mead, 1994; Calori, Lubatkin, Very 6k Veiga, 1997; Yip et al, 1997; 
Tregaskis, 1998; Todeva, 1999). 
Power d i s tance is positively related to t he central isat ion of operation in a 
company (Harrison et al, 1994; Wong 6k Birnbaum-More, 1994). This central isat ion 
de te rmines t he organisat ional s t ruc tu re (Hofstede, 1991). The firms from a large 
power-dis tant count ry tend to central ise their operat ion with a hierarchical 
s t ruc tu re . The firms from a small power-dis tant count ry tend to decentral ise their 
operat ion with a flat organisat ional s t ruc tu re . Hofstede (1984a, 1991) argued tha t 
power d is tance is positively correlated with respect for hierarchy. The companies 
from the large power-dis tant count ry tend to develop new employees th rough the 
vertical re la t ionship in their corporate h ierarchy unl ike their coun te rpa r t s from the 
smal l power-dis tant country . The m a n a g e r s from the large power-dis tant country 
tend to u s e thei r personal au thor i ty to mobilise their subord ina tes th rough the 
vertical re la t ionship in t he corporate hierarchy, whereas their coun te rpa r t s from the 
small power-dis tant count ry tend to u s e a discussion to do so (Chow et al, 1996; 
Offermann 6k Hel lmann, 1997; Schermerhorn 6k Bond, 1997). 
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Uncer ta inty avoidance is positively associated with the extent to which a 
company chooses a n d develops i ts p roduc ts and m a r k e t s carefully (Shane, 1993, 
1995). Unlike their coun te rpa r t s from a weak uncer ta in ty avoiding cul ture , the top 
executives a n d corporate s t ra tegis ts from a s t rong uncer ta in ty avoiding cu l ture tend 
to refrain from unconvent ional ideas when formulating strategy a n d developing 
p roduc t s a n d marke t s . Uncer ta inty avoidance is also positively related to t h e top 
executives' commi tment to t h e status quo (Geletkanycz, 1997). The m a n a g e r s from 
the s t rong uncertainty-avoiding count ry tend to be more averse to novelty a n d less 
open to experimentat ion with new or un tes ted initiatives, whereas their coun te rpa r t s 
from the weak uncertainty-avoiding country do not. 
2.4.4 Evaluation and control. The national cul ture of MNCs' home countries 
is prone to influence MNCs world-wide planning processes and control sys tems 
(Hofstede, 1984a; Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988). The 
r andomness of the long-term future m u s t be admitted and familiarised. In fact, long-
term v short- term orientation can predict a tendency to emphasise the short- term or 
long-term performance measuremen t for evaluation and control (Harrison et al, 1994; 
Merchant et al, 1995). Unlike their counterpar ts from a short-term-oriented country, 
the managers from a long-term-oriented country are unlikely to be pressurised to 
a t ta in short- term results , such a s profit and other financial goals. Unlike their 
counterpar ts from the short-term-oriented country, t he managers from the long-term 
oriented country tend to base their main criterion for evaluation and control on a 
future-oriented projection, s u c h a s future sales, marke t share . They are unlikely to 
emphasise profit a s the main criteria for evaluation and control. 
Power d is tance is positively related to t he degree of us ing personal author i ty 
th rough the vertical relat ionship in the corporate h ierarchy for evaluation a n d 
control in a company. In t e rms of respect for corporate hierarchy, the m a n a g e r s 
from a large power-dis tant society tend to use their personal author i ty for corrective 
action, b u t thei r coun te rpa r t s from a small power-dis tant society are prone to u s e a 
discussion for corrective m e a s u r e s (Chow et al, 1996; Offermann & Hellmann, 1997; 
Schermerhorn & Bond, 1997). 
From the above discussion, the relationship between national cul ture in the five 
dimensions and SMP in the four s teps is i l lustrated in Figure 2 .5 . This relationship 
paves the way for the application of Hofstede's model to investigating the impact of 
nat ional cul ture on SMP. To build the reference model for th is s tudy in Figure 2.6, th is 
relationship will be integrated with the relationship in Figure 2 .3 . 
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Figure 2.5: The relationship between national culture and SMP 
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2.5 The reference model for this study 
Although m a n y inquir ies into the re la t ionship a m o n g nat ional cul ture , SMP 
and corporate performance do exist, they suffer from t h e inconsis tent 
conceptual isa t ion a n d the controversial empirical findings. A variety of strategic 
m a n a g e m e n t models provide no bas i s for bo th compar ing SMPs in MNCs from two 
or more h o m e count r ies a n d inquir ing into t he behavioura l var iables t h a t have a n 
impac t on strategic variables . The couple of t he models of na t ional cu l tu re canno t 
provide a concrete bas i s for predict ing the re la t ionship between na t iona l cu l tu re a n d 
SMP alone. They simply compare nat ional cu l tu res , ne i ther strategic nor manager ia l 
behaviours u n d e r the influence of different na t ional cu l tures . Corporate 
performance alone h a s no mean ing un less it is related to SMP. To compare t he 
SMPs of t h e Dutch a n d the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land in the light of t he 
na t ional cu l tu res of the Nether lands a n d J a p a n , t he model combining the impact of 
nat ional cu l tu re on SMP a n d the impact of SMP on corporate performance is needed. 
The reference model for th i s s tudy needs to include a model of nat ional 
cul ture , a model of strategic managemen t a n d a model of corporate performance. To 
solve the problem of conceptual is ing nat ional cul ture , Hofstede's model is chosen a s 
the mos t widely accepted model for s tudying the relat ionship between cul ture a n d 
t h e aspec t s of managemen t . Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s model is selected a s a 
b e n c h m a r k for compar ing the SMPs of Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land 
in the four s teps . Most firms a round the world widely recognise these four 
fundamenta l s t eps w h e n they are dealing with s trategic management . CVM provides 
the quite extensive lists of corporate performance. 
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Figure 2.6: An integrated model for comparing SMPs 
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A combinat ion of t h e two l inkages in Figure 2 .3 and Figure 2.5 become the 
integrated model for compar ing SMPs is shown in Figure 2.6. This reference model 
is used to compare both ex tan t l i terature on Du tch managemen t and t h a t on 
J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t in Chapte r 4 a n d to collect evidence of t he Dutch a n d the 
J a p a n e s e cases in Chapte r 7, 8 and 9. 
2.6 Conclusion 
After reviewing l i terature on SMP, corporate performance a n d cul ture , th i s 
chap te r e n d s u p with t he reference model for investigating the impact of nat ional 
cu l ture on the SMPs of t he Dutch and the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. As t he 
focus of th i s s tudy, the theories of SMP can be classified into t en schools of though 
on the bas i s of different theoretical and methodological perspectives. Approaches to 
SMP fall into two d imens ions (1) content and process , and (2) descript ion a n d 
prescription. This s tudy u s e s the prescriptive model of strategic m a n a g e m e n t 
(Wheelen & Hunger , 1995) to describe the SMPs of the Dutch a n d the J a p a n e s e 
companies in Thai land in t e rms of cul tura l subjectivity. This model can be used a s 
a b e n c h m a r k for t he compar ison between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e SMPs because mos t 
companies a r o u n d the world regardless of their nationali ty nowadays adopt t he four 
s t eps of SMPs. The m e a s u r e s of corporate performance appraisa l a re d iscussed on 
the bas i s of Competing Value Model (CVM) of Qu inn a n d Rohrbaugh (1983). In 
general, a good strategy m u s t genera te good corporate performance. 
SMP a s strategic behaviours a re not essentially objective, b u t cultural ly 
constra ined by the subjective perception and the interpretat ion of the top executives 
and the m a n a g e r s who grew u p in the par t icular cul tura l set t ings. After d iscuss ing 
some definitions of cul ture t h a t are frequently used in comparative m a n a g e m e n t 
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research , Hofstede's definition of na t ional cu l ture is chosen because of i ts concise 
a n d precise mean ings . The concepts of corporate, bus iness and professional cul tures 
are not chosen because they are not significant in a host-country approach even if they 
are overlapped with nat ional culture. To s tudy the cul tural differences in SMPs 
between MNCs from the Netherlands a n d those from J a p a n , Hofstede's model of the 
five cul tural d imensions is selected on the ground t h a t it is the mos t rigorous way to 
examine the cul tural impact on SMP. This model suggests such a relationship with t he 
suppor t of t he subsequen t empirical findings in Table 2.2. Many researchers have 
succeeded in us ing th is model to predict some strategic behaviour. 
The resul t of a synthesis of Hofstede's model of national culture, Wheelen and 
Hunger 's model of SMP, and Quinn and Rohrbaugh's CVM becomes the integrated 
reference model for comparing the SMPs of Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in general 
in Chapter 4. This comparison will be used for formulating the conceptual 
proposit ions in th is s tudy. This s tudy will ba se t he comparison between the impact 
of D u t c h cu l tu re on SMP in Dutch companies in Thai land and t h a t of J a p a n e s e 
cu l tu re on SMP in J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land on the reference model for 
pa t t e rn -ma tch ing logic in t he within-cul ture , cross-case analysis in both Chapter 7 
for Dutch cu l tu re and Chap te r 8 for J a p a n e s e cul ture , a n d in the cross-cul tural , 
c ross-case ana lys is in Chapte r 9. Nonetheless, because no t all dimensions in 
nat ional cu l ture can predict the four s tages of SMP, only the relevant dimensions are 
used to describe the SMPs of each Dutch company in Chapter 7 and of each J a p a n e s e 
company in Chapter 8 before a comparison of SMPs between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN DUTCH AND JAPANESE CULTURAL SETTINGS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chap te r d i scusses both Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tu res th rough a 
nat ional character is t ic approach before character is ing t h e m in t e rms of t he five 
d imens ions in Hofstede's model, namely individualism-collectivism, power dis tance, 
uncer ta in ty avoidance, masculinity-femininity and long-term v shor t - te rm 
orientation. To discover the possibility of the model 's prediction, both cul tures , 
then, a re compared on the bas i s of the five d imens ions . This discussion, 
character isa t ion a n d comparison are based on ex tan t l i terature on both Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e cu l tures and managemen t . 
Section 3.2 d i scusses the history of the Nether lands in the light of the 
influence of t he seas , m e r c h a n t t radi t ions, Calvinism, consensus and verzuiling. 
These five influences are interrelated and combined to be the m a i n s t r e a m Dutch 
nat ional character is t ics in section 3 .3 . These Dutch character is t ics a re used to 
depict Dutch cu l ture in t he five d imens ions according to Hofstede's model in section 
3.4. Section 3.5 examines t he his tory of J a p a n in the light of t he influence of t he 
rice cul ture , feudalism, bushido, a n d neo-Confucianism. These five influences a re 
intertwined a n d integrated to be t he typical J a p a n e s e nat ional character is t ics in 
section 3.6. These J a p a n e s e character is t ics a re u sed to delineate J a p a n e s e cul ture 
in the five d imensions according to Hofstede's model in section 3.7. 
Section 3.8 is the compar ison between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res in all 
five d imens ions with corroboration from extant l i terature on Dutch and J a p a n e s e 
cu l tu res a n d managemen t . The character isa t ion of bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
cu l tu res on the bas i s of Hofstede's model provides the possibility of each dimension 
to predict the SMPs of the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land with the 
criteria for the formulation of the conceptual proposi t ions in section 4.4 when 
compar ing t he SMPs in Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies u n d e r the guidance of the 
reference model from section 2 .5 . To find th is possibility, the character isa t ion of 
both cu l tu res is based on l i terature on the impact of nat ional cu l ture on SMP a s 
d iscussed in section 2.4. Section 3.9 arrives a t a conclusion. 
The characterisat ion of Dutch cul ture in th is chapter will be applied a s the 
criteria for predicting the tentative SMP of Dutch companies in Thailand in Chapter 7. 
The characterisat ion of J a p a n e s e cul ture will be applied a s the criteria for predicting 
the tentative SMP of J a p a n e s e companies in Thailand in Chapter 8. Only the pert inent 
dimensions will be used for this prediction with respect to environmental scanning, 
strategy formulation, strategy implementation, and evaluation and control. 
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3.2 Dutch historical context 
A good D u t c h m a n , a t least, intuitively u n d e r s t a n d s t he inst i tut ional densi ty 
of t he Nether lands , b u t h e or s h e does not appreciate any a t t empt by foreigners to 
learn Dutch cu l ture a n d language (Lawrence, 1991). The Dutch are very protective 
of thei r cu l ture , society a n d ins t i tu t ions t ha t reflect the 'Dutchness ' . The s u b s t a n c e 
of t he D u t c h psyche is incomprehensib le wi thout t he acknowledgement of Dutch 
his tory charac ter i sed by the four major intertwined factors: the seas , m e r c h a n t 
t radi t ions , Calvinism a n d verzuiling. 
The seas defined t he Nether lands a s a t rading nat ion. As a t r a n s h i p m e n t 
place, overseas t r ade b rough t t he Nether lands i ts prosperity and the Golden Age in 
the seventeenth century. However, the seas also b rough t the Nether lands i ts 
th rea t s , too. Because the Nether lands h a s reclaimed l ands from the s e a s for 
centur ies , t h e Dutch have to fight the danger of inunda t ion perennially. To build 
dykes, they h a d to organise co-operation among heterogeneous groups with the 
development of a decentral ised s t ruc tu re . Neither absolut is t ru le rs nor bureaucra t i c 
mites , b u t peer g roups m a d e a collective effort to contain t he inundat ion . This effort 
needed a lot of compromises . Even if the government nowadays is responsible for 
inundat ion , t he consensua l spiri t from the effort to protect the Dutch by building 
the dykes r e m a i n s prevalent in t h e Dutch society (Lawrence, 1991; van I terson & 
Olie, 1992; Olie, 1996; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000). 
The Nether lands h a s been liberated from feudalism since the twelfth cen tury 
long before mos t countr ies in Europe (van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000). Because 
t he Dutch ar is tocracy h a s lost m u c h influence a n d kept low profile for a long time, 
t he class of m e r c h a n t s or t he bourgeoisie h a d dominated polity in the Nether lands 
m u c h earlier t h a n their coun te rpa r t s in other European na t ions . The wes tern pa r t 
of t he Nether lands where m a n y Dutch ports have long been s i tuated is still the 
economic h u b nowadays . The Nether lands unde rwen t t he industr ia l revolution 
relatively late a round 1880 a n d its industr ia l gap with other European countr ies w a s 
closing by 1914 (Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie, 1992). Before 1880, only 
banking, i n su rance and finance h a d been flourished in t he Nether lands (van Iterson 
& Olie, 1992; De Goey, 1999). Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC—Dutch 
United E a s t Indies) had dominated t he Dutch overseas t r ade from the seventeenth 
cen tury unt i l it was liquidated in 1793 (van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b; De Goey, 1999). 
Even after 1914, t he Nether lands h a s retained i ts original s t r eng ths in logistic 
bus ines s , t r ade finance and agr icul ture (Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie, 1992). 
Calvinism h a s been bo th t h e religious a n d ideological corners tone of t he 
Dutch society when the Nether lands (then 'United Seven Provinces') fought agains t 
t he Catholic Span i sh court in the Eighty-Year War (1568-1648). The leader of th is 
revolt, Willem the first is the primus inter pares, not the absolute ruler . This 
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principle later applied to t he head of VOC. Calvinism inspired th is struggle for 
sovereignty a n d religious freedom, and promoted m e r c h a n t tradit ion a t the s ame 
t ime. It underscores thrift, sobriety, tolerance and reality while refraining from 
glamour and splendour . Nowadays, it is still the core of Dutch cul ture and exerts a 
lot of influence on Dutch everyday life (Hofstede, 1983a; d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 
1991; van I terson & Olie, 1992; Olie, 1996; Pot, 1998). 
Even if Calvinism emerged a s t he dominan t religion after t he revolt, it never 
h a d the sole s t a t u s a s a s ta te religion. Separat ion of c h u r c h a n d s ta te is essent ial 
according to Calvinism. Because Calvinism preaches religious tolerance, it existed 
and competed side-by-side with Roman Catholic and other several Pro tes tan t 
denominat ions . To protect themselves a s collective actors , many Dutch inst i tut ions, 
such a s political par t ies , t r ade un ions , schools and professional associa t ions have 
been organised along the formal religious (Roman Catholic, several Pro tes tan t 
denominat ions , humanis t ic) a n d ideological (liberal, socialist, communis t ) 
allegiances. This phenomenon is called Verzuiling (pillarisation) Verzuiling h a s h a d a 
s t rong influence on both t he ins t i tu t ions a n d the a spec t s of Dutch social life unti l 
recently when some pillars merged with each other in order to gain more bargaining 
power, such a s t he merger between Catholic a n d Pro tes tan t par t ies . Verzuiling h a s 
lost m u c h of i ts rud imen ta ry sense because of these mergers . This phenomenon is 
called Ontzuiling (depillarisation). However, Ontzutlingrjust r educes t h e n u m b e r of 
pillars a n d coincide with t h e secular isat ion of t he D u t c h society. In t he pas t , each 
pillar did no t co-operate with o thers . Because t h e Du tch cu r r en t pa t t e rn of 
segregation of g roups a t t he bot tom a n d coalitions of el i tes a t t he top between 
different doctr inal lines, t he Dutch society h a s still been s t ruc tu red vertically, no t 
horizontally. These coalitions need a compromise a n d reinforce Dutch consensua l 
spirit. From the above phenomena , t he Dutch do no t tend to adhe re to a rigid 
s t andpoin t (Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie, 1992; King, 1993; Hampden-Turner 
& Trompenaars , 1994; Olie, 1996; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000). 
3.3 Dutch national characteristics 
The seas h a d a n influence on Dutch m e r c h a n t t radi t ions and consensua l 
spirit. Because t he Dutch h a d to protect themselves from inunda t ion by bui lding 
dykes, they needed to have a consensua l spirit a n d care for each other, for especially 
t he weaker. Without a n y absolute ruler, t he decentral isat ion of t he society, co-
operat ion and egali tarian n o r m s are developed (van I terson & Olie, 1992; v a n 
Iterson. 1997a, 1997b, 2000). 
Merchan t t radi t ions m a k e the Dutch respect t he difference between pe r sons 
when bargaining for a n accord. To reach a consensus , the Dutch like to convince 
each o ther by facts a n d figures in t he process of bargain ing a n d exchanging 
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information a m o n g several part ies . The relat ionship between employees a n d 
employers is bus iness- l ike and economically calculative in the Nether lands . Ei ther 
par ty can t e rmina te s u c h a relat ionship if ei ther one finds a bet ter deal elsewhere on 
t h e bas i s of a reciprocal advantage. These t radi t ions lead to lack of personal 
au thor i ty a n d loyalty in the Nether lands . The emphas i s on equality c a u s e s 
informality to be impor tan t a s well a s formality. Because t he m e r c h a n t s have long 
domina ted t he Nether lands since i ts foundation, the Dutch tend to emphas i se 
egal i tar ianism a n d respect for differences between pe r sons unl ike o ther f euda l i s t s 
count r ies in medieval Europe . These t radi t ions in the Nether lands cause the Dutch 
to be more flexible. To sus ta in thei r commercial in teres ts , the Dutch try to avoid 
conflicts a t all cos t s (Hofstede, 1983a; d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-
T u m e r & Trompenaa r s , 1994; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Keizer, 
Noorderhaven, Benders & S tam, 2000). 
Because of Calvinistic vir tue, the Dutch normally u n d e r s t a n d individuality in 
t e rms of individual accountabil i ty a n d contr ibut ion to the society wi thout t he sense 
of scintillation, self-importance, self-interest a n d eccentricity according to their well-
defined posi t ions in t he society. Under the influence of Calvinism, conformity is 
more impor t an t t h a n individual excellence in the Nether lands , so it often cons t ra ins 
creativity, spon tane i ty a n d inspirat ion. Because the Du tch prefer conformity to 
dist inct ion a m o n g people, they believe in nei ther individual nor inst i tut ional 
excellence. Personal ambit ion is normally expressed th rough chari ty (Hofstede, 
1985a; Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie, 1992; King, 1993; Hampden-Turner & 
Trompenaa r s , 1994). 
Because of verzuiling, the Du tch society is vertically s t ruc tu red and 
minimally hierarchical . The coexistence of different doctrinal l ines leads to t he 
consensua l spiri t in the Dutch society. For uni ty th rough diversity, a m u t u a l 
accommodat ion a n d a comprehension among different confessional pillars in the 
society require a lengthy process of decis ion-making w h e n a consensus among these 
pillars is crucial . As long a s such a n idea a n d s u c h a way do not cause any conflicts 
in the society, the Dutch are likely to tolerate different ideas and ways of life. The 
Dutch can readily accept the coexistence of the new sys tem with the old one. 
Because t h e Du tch a re aware of the co-existence of religious allegiances in their 
society, they a re ready to admi t t h a t several t r u t h s may coexists. Tolerance of both 
dissimilar opinions a n d a long process for reaching a c o n s e n s u s is impor tan t for t h e 
social un i ty (d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; van I terson & Olie, 1992; Hampden-
Turne r & Trompenaa r s , 1994). 
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3.4 Dutch culture in the five dimensions 
Under the influence of the seas , m e r c h a n t t radi t ions, Calvinism, and 
verzuiling, Dutch cul ture can be classified into the five d imensions of Hofstede's 
model, namely individualism-collectivism, power dis tance, uncer ta in ty avoidance, 
masculinity-femininity a n d shor t - te rm v long-term orientation. 
3.4.1 Individualism-collectivism. As well a s o ther Western cu l tures , 
Du tch cul ture is inclining towards individualism. The affirmation is s t rong th rough 
m a n y aspec t s of Dutch life u n d e r t he influence of Calvinism. The Du tch tend to 
evaluate a person on the bas i s of individual accountabil i ty and justify a person for 
his or her work in and contr ibut ion to the society a s an individual, separa te t ha t 
person from h is or her deed and not to confuse th ings with t ha t person. They tend 
to respect differences between persons . The sense of 'us ' (insider) aga ins t ' them' 
(outsider) is weak and lack of a personal opinion is a sign of a weak charac te r in the 
Nether lands . Despite verzuiling in the Nether lands, the Dutch have not got a s t rong 
a n d emotional sense of t he affiliation to their confessional lines (Hofstede, 1983a; 
d ' l r ibarne, 1989; Keizer et al, 2000). 
Dutch bus ine s s cu l ture does not presuppose friendship a n d tr ies to separa te 
work from private life. Everyday in te rdepar tmenta l conversat ion dur ing the 
execution of projects a m o n g employees a t t he s a m e level is u n c o m m o n in mos t 
Dutch companies . The relat ionship between employees a n d employers is bus ines s -
like a n d economically calculative in t he Nether lands . Ei ther par ty can te rmina te 
s u c h a relat ionship if ei ther one finds a bet ter deal elsewhere on t he bas i s of a 
reciprocal advantage . Loyalty to a company in the Nether lands e m a n a t e s from 
perquis i tes or fringe benefits, job securi ty and career pa th , no t from emotional t ies 
with the company. Generally, the Dutch companies do not need employees ' 
allegiance (Hofstede, 1983a; d ' lr ibarne, 1989; van Iterson & Olie, 1992; Hampden-
T u r n e r & Trompenaars , 1994; Keizer et al, 2000). 
To reach a consensus , t he Dutch like to convince each o ther by facts and 
figures in a process of bargaining and exchanging information among several par t ies 
a n d respect differences between persons . Still, Du tch c o n s e n s u s requires only one 
person to m a k e or take a decision when a difference of opinion becomes a deadlock 
in a discussion. This person h a s to be responsible for h i s or he r own decision. The 
decis ion-making author i ty and responsibili ty a re clear in mos t Du tch companies 
(Hofstede, 1983a; d ' l r ibarne, 1989; Keizer et al, 2000). 
3.4.2 Power distance. Du tch cu l ture is predisposed towards small power 
d is tance . The asser t ion of equality is s t rong th rough m a n y aspec t s of Dutch life. 
Because the Nether lands is the only country in Western Europe t h a t h a s long been 
u n d e r t he minimal influence of feudalism, i ts social c lass division is no t evident and 
i ts egalitarian va lues have prevailed since i ts foundation. Under t he influence of 
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verzuiling, t he Dutch society is minimally hierarchical a n d horizontally s t ruc tu red . 
Both inequali ty a n d respect for au thor i ty a re unacceptable in the Nether lands . The 
Du tch tend to dislike both s t a t u s difference a n d vertical relat ionship, often equa te 
power difference with power a b u s e and try to minimise all dispari ty in daily life. 
Social s t a t u s s t ems from achievement , no t ascription in t h e Nether lands . The Dutch 
a re likely to negatively a s s e s s age a n d have n o respect for older pe r sons reflecting 
equality, n o t s t a t u s difference. There is a lmost no personal au thor i ty a n d loyalty in 
t h e Nether lands (Hofstede, 1983a; d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-
Turne r & Trompenaars , 1994; v a n Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000). 
Most Dutch firms tend to decentral ise their decision-making author i ty and 
operat ion. Most Dutch m a n a g e r s tend to devolve their author i ty on their 
subord ina tes . Most Dutch firms are unlikely to develop their new employees 
th rough the vertical re lat ionship in the corporate hierarchy. Most Dutch manage r s 
a re unlikely to have personal au thor i ty and loyalty from their subord ina tes . 
Because mos t Dutch bosses a n d subord ina tes can d i scuss with each o ther a s 
equa ls no ma t t e r w h a t posi t ions they are in the corporate hierarchy, Most Dutch top 
executives t end to u s e a d iscuss ion to convince their subord ina tes for mobilisation 
a n d corrective action. Most Du tch manage r s canno t guide a c o n s e n s u s into the way 
they w a n t (Hofstede, 1983a; d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie, 
1992; Hampden-Turne r & Trompenaars , 1994; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b; Keizere t 
al. 2000). 
3.4.3 Uncertainty avoidance Du tch cul ture is leaning towards weak 
unce r t a in ty avoidance. The need for order a n d cer t i tude is weak in t he Nether lands 
where t he coexistence of different doctrinal allegiances is the fact of life. The Dutch 
a re likely to tolerate different opinions in the society a n d accept t he concept of uni ty 
th rough diversity readily. They can accept t h e coexistence of t he new sys tem with 
t he old one, a n d admi t t h a t several t r u t h s may exist side by side (Hofstede, 1983a; 
d 'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; Keizer et al, 2000). 
Du tch c o n s e n s u s is based on a lengthy process of bargaining a n d 
exchanging information. The Dutch tend to be familiar a n d comfortable with 
u n s t r u c t u r e d s i tua t ions dur ing their lengthy negotiation for an agreement . When 
the Dutch executives encoun te r the u n s t r u c t u r e d s i tuat ions , they are unlikely to 
classify information a n d inst i tut ional ise a da ta -ga ther ing procedure for their 
companies . Most Du tch companies t end to admi t to unconvent ional ideas when 
they formulate corporate s t ra tegy a n d develop new m a r k e t s a n d p roduc t s (Hofstede, 
1983a; d 'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; Keizer et al, 2000). 
3.4.4 Masculinity-femininity. The Nether lands tend to be a feminine 
count ry because i ts citizens tend to be modest , sympathet ic for the weaker a n d 
conscious of life quali ty a n d environment . The Nether lands is a moderately 
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competitive society. Assert iveness, s t rong ambition, competit iveness a n d the idea of 
'a winner t akes all' a re somewhat socially unacceptable . Sex role segregation is 
weak. The expression of macho or aggression s t and ing for manl iness is offensive. 
Both condemnat ion a n d swearing are socially inadmissible in the Nether lands . 
Hence, t he Du tch always res t ra in thei r emotional expression if no t necessary 
(Hofstede, 1983a, 1985a; Lawrence, 1991; King, 1993; Hampden-Turner & 
Trompenaars , 1994). 
Owing to t he Dutch n o r m s of sympa thy for t he weaker, mos t Dutch 
companies rarely d i smiss or lay off their employees on the ground of improving 
themselves, b u t they prefer to be reorganised ins tead. The Dutch bosses are 
supposed to sympath i se with their subord ina tes . They prefer a persuas ion to 
coercion for motivating their subord ina tes . They often hes i ta te to justify and 
compare their subord ina tes ' performance. Most Dutch companies are often hes i t an t 
to develop a t ra in ing p rogramme for high-flyers, to identify rec ru i tment criteria and 
to t ra in people for a job, b u t they prefer to implant t he va lues of solidarity, equality, 
relat ionship motivation, humility, low profile of the country, compromise a n d team 
job enr ichment into their employees. Dutch reward sys tems are usual ly based on 
posit ions r a the r t h a n on performance (Hofstede, 1983a; d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 
1991; King, 1993; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars , 1994). 
The Du tch work to live. They scarcely express their ambit ion a n d t end to 
overlook their career planning, m a n a g e m e n t development and demand for improving 
remunera t ion . The Dutch a re unen thus i a s t i c to work overtime for addit ional 
ea rn ings a n d to accept any professional a s s ignment beyond their normal job 
descript ion even if s u c h a work is well paid. If they have no th ing to do a t t he office, 
they go home (Hofstede, 1983a; d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; King, 1993; 
Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars , 1994; Keizer et al, 2000). Du tch cu l ture in 
general a n d Dutch b u s i n e s s cul ture in par t icular subt ly signifies femininity. 
3.4.5 Long-term v short-term orientation. The Dutch approach to 
b u s i n e s s is more short - term-oriented. The Dutch predilection for shor t - te rm 
orientat ion may reflect in their proclivity for ' re turn on investment ' r a the r t h a n 
' re turn on favours' . The Dutch objective of doing bus ine s s is to reach a n acceptable 
resul t by a n optimally efficient course . The relat ionship among m o s t Du tch firms 
does no t cover a diversity of t ransac t ion a n d the marke t relat ions a m o n g these firms 
tend to be shor t - te rm. The relat ionship between m o s t Dutch firms a n d their 
p a r t n e r s is p rone to be uns tab le , shor t - te rm a n d equivocal (Hofstede, 1983a; van 
I terson & Olie, 1992; Keizer e t al, 2000). 
Under t he influence of th i s dimension, mos t Dutch top executives t end to 
expect a n immediate resul t from the strategy implementat ion. Most Dutch firms 
tend to set goals on the bas i s of a past-or iented projection. Dutch firms tend to base 
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thei r performance m e a s u r e s on past-or iented goals, s u c h a s profit a n d other 
financial goals (Weimer, 1995). 
3.5 Japanese historical context 
Most J a p a n e s e firmly believe t h a t their country is cultural ly un ique , so only 
t h e two g roups of people exist in t he world: (1) ware ware nihonjin (we, J apanese ) 
a n d (2) gaikoku-jin (foreigners). A good J a p a n e s e perceptively u n d e r s t a n d s t he 
cul tura l idiosyncrasy a n d the rigidity of t he country, so h e or she h a s a s t rong 
conviction t h a t foreigners have never fully comprehended J a p a n e s e people a n d 
cul ture . The essence of the J a p a n e s e psyche is unfa thomable wi thout t he 
recognition of J a p a n e s e history, especially dur ing Tokugawa regime (1603-1868) 
when m o s t J a p a n e s e n o r m s a n d value sys tem were fully developed. J a p a n e s e 
his tory is charac ter i sed by ancient agrar ian t radi t ions (rice culture), feudalism, 
bushido (the way of the warriors) and neo-Confucianism, a syncretist ic amalgam of 
Confucianism, Zen B u d d h i s m a n d Shintoism, and (Fukuda, 1988; Whitehill, 1991; 
Hill, 1995; Lewis, 1996). 
Rice cu l tu re w a s imported from China and Korea to J a p a n a round 100 BC. 
Since then , rice paddy cultivation demanded collective action to ha rves t the rice 
crops . The in t imate collaboration among these families for th i s act ion in t he village 
w a s impor tan t . The social c lasses of landowners and p e a s a n t s also s ta r ted to evolve 
in th i s period. W h e n the landowner became more influential, the p e a s a n t s became 
serfs u n d e r the i r ru les . Unlike m o s t count r ies in Eas t Asia, J a p a n h a d undergone a 
long period of feudalism before Meiji Restorat ion in 1868. To protect thei r fiefs, they 
s ta r ted to employ military specialists t h a t became samurai (warriors) in 1016. 
Moreover, to protect t he c lans of landowners ' wealth, a s t rong tradi t ion of ie 
(household) w a s developed. Ie w a s not restr icted to consanguini ty in these clans, 
b u t it embraced competent m e m b e r s th rough adoption a n d marr iage . The c lans 
u sed competence a s a criterion for adopt ing outs iders . This implies t he high value 
of individual competence in J a p a n . When Minamoto Yorimoto establ ished the first 
J a p a n e s e Shoguna t e in Kamakura in 1192, the military class stood a t the top of the 
social hierarchy, except the royal and aristocrat ic families in t he imperial cour t in 
Kyoto. These s a m u r a i seized control of l ands from the landowners a n d became the 
feudal lords themselves in J a p a n . This military c lass compris ing m a n y c lans often 
fought to seize control of l ands a n d power. A shogun became t h e head of 
government . Even if these c lans were very powerful, they were nominally 
submiss ive to t h e Emperor . Dur ing t he warr ing s t a tes in J a p a n (1467-1573), t he 
new feudal lords called Daimyo emerged. These daimyo were finally b rough t u n d e r 
t he t ight control of Tokugawa Shoguna te in 1603 with t he neo-Confucian ideology. 
The t ight control kept on and s t rengthened tradit ional dependence on collectivity, 
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group identification and the hierarchical society. For t ax collection, every five 
families in t he village were organised a s a gonin-gumi for co-operative t a s k s dur ing 
t h e regime. Under th is system, the well-being of each person relied on both the 
solidarity and the affluence of the family, in tu rn , both of them rested on other 
families (Fukuda, 1988; Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 1992; Chen, 1995; G a n n o n e t a l , 
1996). 
A samura i w a s supposed to conform to hagakure or the Code of Bushido. He 
h a d to be loyal to h i s lord wi thout quest ion unti l he died. He w a s supposed to 
demons t ra te mascu l ine asser t iveness and honour . When a s a m u r a i lost in a bat t le 
in the past , he preferred dea th to humiliat ion. Hara-kiri was his way to express 
honour (Hofstede, 1983b; Whitehill, 1991; Sullivan, 1992; Hill, 1995). Dur ing the 
Tokugawa period, a s amura i who w a s competent would be promoted to a higher 
r a n k in both central and local governments depending on to which fiefs h e belonged 
fWhitley, 1992). Because t he s a m u r a i were the highest class outs ide the imperial 
court , they were supposed to se t a n example for the respectful and the ethical 
behaviours to the lower classes , s u c h a s peasan t s , m e r c h a n t s and so on. Because 
this role model permeated though all c lasses in J a p a n , kata, the unwri t ten code of 
conduct , h a s been developed within the J a p a n e s e hierarchical society where 
everybody is expected to play a proper role (bun) according to their s t a t u s e s a n d 
ages, s u c h a s t he way of eating, proper a t t i res a n d so on (Hofstede, 1983b; Misawa, 
1987; Namiki & Sethi , 1988; Whitehill, 1991; G a n n o n et al, 1996). 
To sus t a in t he central ised hierarchical s t ruc tu re , Tokugawa regime 
introduced neo-Confucianism from China to be a s ta te ideology. The J a p a n e s e 
version of neo-Confucianism b lends Shintoism, Zen Buddh i sm a n d Confucianism 
reinforced hagakure and the vertical relat ionship in J a p a n . Filial piety is t he core of 
t he Confucian doctr ines compris ing du ty and deference between father a n d son, 
h u s b a n d and wife a n d among older and younger siblings. According to Shintoism, 
t he J a p a n e s e used to believe t h a t they were all descendan t s from J i m m u Tenno, the 
First Emperor of J a p a n who w a s the son of the S u n Goddess. The concept of filial 
piety could readily be broadened to the loyalty to village headmen , daimyo. The 
Shogun, The Emperor and ult imately J a p a n . Unlike t he Chinese filial piety to 
family, the J a p a n e s e one h a d to be deferential to the loyalty to t he broader groups 
respectively with t he concept of Kazokushugi (familism) (Fukuda, 1988; Whitehill, 
1991; Sullivan, 1992; Hill, 1995; G a n n o n et al, 1996). 
J a p a n became a n industr ia l ised count ry relatively late a round 1880s when 
the government t ransferred big companies to Zaibatsu (a group of family-owned 
holding companies) . Its indust r ia l gap with the West w a s closing a round 1930s. 
Many pre- industr ia l J a p a n e s e character is t ics are prevailing nowadays (Whitehill, 
1991; Whitley, 1992; Chen, 1995). 
45 
3.6 Japanese national characteristics 
Ancient agrar ian t radi t ions h a d an influence on J a p a n e s e group formation 
a n d consensua l spirit. J a p a n e s e feudalism evolved out of these t radi t ions . When 
the landowners s ta r ted waging war aga ins t each other, t he military c lass emerged 
with bushido a n d the c lass sys tem. To reinforce th is c lass distinction, Tokugawa 
regime in t roduced neo-Confucianism a s a s ta te ideology (Whitehill, 1991; G a n n o n e t 
al, 1996). 
Agrarian t radi t ions m a k e t he J a p a n e s e have a s t rong commi tmen t to the 
group with a s t rong sense of ' u s ' aga ins t ' them'. To reach a consensus , t he 
J a p a n e s e like to have all group m e m b e r s sha re both goals and information. They 
tend to u s e a peer p re s su re to convince each other. The relat ionship between 
employers a n d employees is cordial and collectively emotional in J a p a n . Both 
par t ies a re unlikely to te rmina te s u c h a relat ionship even if ei ther one finds a be t te r 
deal elsewhere (Fukuda, 1988; Namiki & Sethi, 1988; d'Iribarne, 1989; Whitehill, 
1991; Hill, 1995). 
Amae, a feeling of dependence , is the essence of J a p a n e s e spirit. Because of 
amae, t he J a p a n e s e generally have a s t rong desire to be bo th passively loved a n d 
safeguarded from the real-world s i tuat ion. The J a p a n e s e have to fulfil any 
obligation because the amae-based relat ions m a k e t h e m carry b u r d e n s of obligation. 
With th i s s t rong sense of m u t u a l obligation, the J a p a n e s e abide by ' r e tu rn on 
favour'. The obligation comprises on, giri a n d raryo. On reinforces t he hierarchical 
re la t ionships in J a p a n . When a super ior bes tows a n invaluable favour for h i s or he r 
inferior, t he recipient of th i s favour will have debt of gra t i tude {gin). In o ther words, 
t he recipient h a s to carry the obligation t ha t m u s t be repaid (on). From the 
s t andpo in t of t he inferior, th i s obligation (on) will have never been completely repaid 
for t he recipient 's life because it is a heavy debt (gtrQ. On no t simply w a s a bas i s for 
t he oyabun-kobun (father-son-like) relat ionship dur ing Tokugawa period, b u t also is 
t h e one for t he senpai-kohai re lat ionship between bosses a s men to r s a n d 
subord ina tes in mos t J a p a n e s e companies nowadays . The author i ty of J a p a n e s e 
leaders or bosses s t ems from on-girt However, within collectivity, giri is a shared 
a n d reciprocal obligation t h a t m u s t be repaid sooner or later with a mathemat ica l 
equivalence to t he received favour. It is a m u t u a l obligation among equals . Ninjo 
m e a n s h u m a n feelings' going beyond a combinat ion of sympathy a n d empathy . 
These h u m a n feelings are extemporaneously occurred in the in t imate relat ionship, 
a n d can be only felt a n d unders tood by the percept iveness of involved persons . On, 
giri a n d ninjo a re interrelated concepts based on amae. A failure to fulfil on, giri and 
ninjo can u n d e r m i n e t he social integrity of the offender (Fukuda, 1988; Namiki & 
Sethi , 1988: Whitehill, 1991; Chen, 1995; Hill, 1995). 
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Feudal ism h a d character ised J a p a n for a t h o u s a n d years . The emphas i s on 
hierarchy causes formality and ri tual to be impor tant . Social mobility in Tokugawa 
J a p a n was less fluid t h a n in their contemporary China and Korea. This feudalism 
causes the J a p a n e s e to be procedure-oriented by conforming to kata and bun and 
emphas i ses conformity. The J a p a n e s e are unlikely to tolerate deviant behaviours 
and ways of life. They are cau t ious to avoid t he new sys tem replacing t he old one 
together (Whitley, 1992; Gannon et al, 1996; ICT, Inc. 2000). 
Bushido reinforces kata and bun for proper roles in the society according to 
different social c lasses , ages, s t a t u s e s and sexes. It c a u s e s m a n y J a p a n e s e men to 
show their asser t iveness , competence, machismo, cour tesy and self-discipline. They 
are supposed to be loyal to their boss . Bushido s t r eng thens social hierarchy, 
conformity and loyalty in J a p a n (Hofstede, 1983; Whitehill, 1991; Gannon et al, 
1996). Neo-Confucianism reinforces mu tua l obligations in agrar ian t radi t ions, 
social h ierarchy in Tokugawa J a p a n and loyalty in hagakure. Under the influence of 
neo-Confucianism. the J a p a n e s e tend to be dutiful. They tend to have a s t rong 
commitment to their society, organisat ion and family. They are obedient and 
cour teous . A sense of individuality a n d privacy is often subservient to a sense of 
belonging to a group (Fukuda, 1988; Namiki 6k Sethi , 1988; Whitehill, 1991; G a n n o n 
e t a l , 1996) 
3.7 Japanese culture in the five dimensions 
Under t h e influence of anc ien t agrar ian t radi t ions (rice culture), feudalism, 
bushido (the way of the warriors) a n d neo-Confucianism, a syncretist ic amalgam of 
Confucianism, Zen Buddh i sm a n d Shintoism, J a p a n e s e cu l ture can be decomposed 
into the five d imens ions of Hofstede's model, namely individualism-collectivism, 
power dis tance, uncer ta in ty avoidance, masculinity-femininity a n d shor t - te rm v 
long-term orientation. 
3.7.1 Individualism-collectivism. J a p a n e s e cu l ture is inclining towards 
collectivism. The emphas i s on allegiance to a group is solid through m a n y facets of 
J a p a n e s e life. The J a p a n e s e tend to evaluate a person on the principle of collective 
responsibility a n d justify he or she a s a member of a group for his or her work in or 
contr ibut ion to t he society. It is difficult to differentiate between personal a n d 
collective contr ibut ions in J a p a n . The J a p a n e s e tend to ostracise a person who 
deviates from t h e other m e m b e r s in t he group. The sense of 'us ' (insiders) aga ins t 
' them' (outsiders) is very s t rong in J a p a n . Lack of a personal opinion is no t a sign of 
a weak charac te r in J a p a n where s u c h a n opinion is no t supposed to deviate from 
the collective opinion. The J a p a n e s e tend to have a s t rong and emotional sense of 
affiliation to their group, such a s the c lassmates in t he s ame school or universi ty or 
the colleagues in t he s a m e section or depa r tmen t (Hofstede, 1983b; Fukuda , 1988; 
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Namiki & Sethi , 1988; Misawa, 1989; Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 1992; Chen, 1995; 
Hill, 1995). 
The relat ionship between employees and employers is cordial a n d collectively 
emotional in J a p a n . Ei ther par ty is unlikely to t e rmina te s u c h a relat ionship even if 
e i ther one finds a bet ter deal elsewhere. Most J a p a n e s e companies need employees ' 
commi tmen t on t he bas i s of a m u t u a l obligation. The J a p a n e s e a re supposed to give 
priority to thei r in-groups in bus ine s s . Loyalty to a company in J a p a n s t ems no t 
only from career advancement , job securi ty a n d perquis i tes or fringe benefits, b u t 
also from emotional t ies with t he company (Hofstede, 1983b; Fukuda , 1988; Namiki 
& Sethi , 1988; Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 1992; Chen, 1995; Hill. 1995). 
Most J a p a n e s e companies tend to rely on their network of relat ionship for 
ga ther ing information. J a p a n e s e b u s i n e s s cu l ture p r e s u m e s friendship a n d often 
mixes work with private life. Most J a p a n e s e top executives tend to s h a r e 
information with o ther par t ies a s a pa r t of their personal life. Everyday 
in te rdepar tmenta l conversat ions among employees a t t he s ame level dur ing the 
execution of projects a re common in mos t J a p a n e s e firms. J a p a n e s e consensus is 
based on sha r ing bo th goals and information among group members . It requires all 
pe r sons in a group to t ake a decision with collective responsibility. The decision-
mak ing au thor i ty a n d responsibil i ty are vague a n d sha red in mos t J a p a n e s e firms 
(d'Iribarne, 1989; Keizer et al, 2000). 
3.7.2 Power distance J a p a n e s e cul ture is orientated towards modera te 
power d is tance . The venerat ion of h ierarchy and author i ty is solid th rough m a n y 
facets of J a p a n e s e life. J a p a n is t he only country in E a s t Asia t h a t h a d undergone a 
long period of feudalism u n d e r t he s t rong influence of neo-Confucianism. J a p a n is 
a hierarchical ly s t ruc tu red society where inequality a n d respect for au thor i ty is 
accepted. Even though social s t a t u s in J a p a n e m a n a t e s from a combinat ion of 
m a n y factors, t h e J a p a n e s e always respect older a n d h igher - s ta tus pe r sons 
(Hofstede, 1983b; Fukuda , 1988; Namiki & Sethi, 1988; Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 
1992; Chen, 1995). 
Most J a p a n e s e companies tend to central ise thei r decis ion-making author i ty 
a n d operation because of the co-existence of t he venerat ion of author i ty a n d the 
consul ta t ion with subord ina tes in t he corporate h ierarchy th rough consensua l 
decision-making. Most J a p a n e s e m a n a g e r s are unlikely to delegate thei r author i ty 
to thei r subord ina tes . Most J a p a n e s e firms tend to develop their new employees 
th rough the vertical re lat ionship in t he corporate hierarchy. Most J a p a n e s e 
m a n a g e r s a n d their subord ina tes t end to respect t he corporate hierarchy. Most 
J a p a n e s e top executives tend to u s e thei r personal author i ty to mobilise their 
subord ina tes to work a n d take corrective action (Hofstede, 1983b; Namiki & Sethi, 
1988; Whitehill, 1991; Keizer et al, 2000). 
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3.7.3 Uncertainty avoidance J a p a n e s e cu l ture is leaning towards s t rong 
uncer ta in ty avoidance. The need for order and cer t i tude is s t rong in J a p a n where 
everything is tied u p with procedures . Under kata, the unwri t ten code of conduct , 
the J a p a n e s e do not tolerate personal deviation from the n o r m s of the society. 
J a p a n is one of t he mos t homogenous societies in the world. It is ha r d for t he 
J a p a n e s e to accept t he concept of uni ty th rough diversity. To avoid d is turb ing 
ha rmony in the society, the J a p a n e s e are c i rcumspect abou t both the new sys tem 
replacing t he old one altogether and a quick admiss ion of t he new t ru th . When the 
new idea is introduced to t he society, it h a s to undergo a compatibility test . If 
proven to be beneficial, it would gradually gain acceptance among the J a p a n e s e . If 
not, it would be gradually discarded (Hofstede, 1983b; Namiki & Sethi, 1988; ICT, 
Inc, 2000; Keizer et al, 2000). 
J a p a n e s e c o n s e n s u s is tied u p with procedures . Most J a p a n e s e executives 
tend to be pessimist ic abou t and uncomfortable with uns t ruc tu r ed information. 
They are likely to classify information and inst i tut ionalise a da ta-ga ther ing 
procedure for their companies . Most J a p a n e s e companies a re unlikely to admi t 
unconvent ional ideas when they formulate strategy and develop news p roduc t s and 
marke t s (Hofstede, 1983b, 1991; Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 1992). 
3.7.4 Masculinity-femininity Under t he influence of bushido, J a p a n e s e 
society t ends to be mascul ine . J a p a n is a n extremely competitive society where the 
J a p a n e s e believe in inst i tut ional excellence. Under hagakure, t he s a m u r a i were 
supposed to demons t ra t e thei r mascul ine asser t iveness a n d h o n o u r t h a t created 
ideal sex role segregation a n d extreme masculini ty. The expression of man l iness is 
appreciative in J a p a n . Hara-kiri was the way to express honour when a s a m u r a i or 
soldiers lost in a bat t le in the pas t . Most J a p a n e s e pa ren t s often p ressur i se their 
chi ldren to s tudy ha rd for a p lacement in prest igious universi t ies . When these 
children fail a n en t rance examinat ion for such a placement , some of t h e m 
somet imes commit suicide (Hofstede, 1983b; Whitehill, 1991). 
In spite of the emphas i s on group a n d collective responsibility, individual 
performance is highly appreciated. During Tokugawa period, if a s a m u r a i w a s 
competent , he would be promoted to a higher r a n k in both central a n d local 
governments depending on to which fiefs he belonged. In pu r su i t of collective goals, 
ability to co-operate, services to t he group and competence are criteria for individual 
evaluation. E a c h group member is supposed to p ressur i se each o ther for be t te r 
resu l t s (Whitley, 1992; Chen, 1995; Hill, 1995; Keizer et al, 2000). 
Because of t h e s t rong appreciat ion of individual performance in J a p a n , Most 
J a p a n e s e bosses usual ly do no t sympath ise with their subord ina tes whose failure 
seems to th rea ten the group welfare. To discipline their subord ina tes , they can 
enforce their author i ty th rough their posit ions. To motivate their subord ina tes , they 
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t end to u s e ei ther coercion or p re s su re ra ther t h a n a persuas ion . They often expect 
a long working day from their subord ina tes . They are supposed to encourage their 
subord ina t e s to work harder . In p u r s u i t of corporate goals, the J a p a n e s e evaluate 
thei r subord ina tes ' performance and often p ressur i se their colleagues for be t te r 
decision. To find their future leader, Most J a p a n e s e companies u s e the leadership 
in thei r un ion en terpr i ses (Whitehill, 1991; Hill, 1995). 
The J a p a n e s e live to work, n o t work to live. They do not care m u c h abou t 
thei r quali ty of life. Some of t h e m work too ha r d a n d die of overwork or karoshi. 
Many J a p a n e s e see work a s a process of fulfilling a n obligation to t he society and to 
oneself a s a social being, so they are in bus ines s not only to make money, b u t also 
to serve the society. To fulfil th i s obligation, they are compelled to work overtime. 
According to Zen Buddhism, work is moral act a n d ha r d work is a n end in itself 
fWhitehill, 1991; Sullivan, 1992). 
3.7.5 Long-term v short-term orientation. The J a p a n e s e approach to 
b u s i n e s s is more long-term-oriented. The J a p a n e s e proclivity for long-term 
orientat ion may reflect in their preference for ' re turn on favour' over ' r e turn on 
investment ' . The J a p a n e s e objective of doing b u s i n e s s is to reach a n optimal resul t 
by a n acceptable course . The relat ionship among mos t J a p a n e s e firms covers a 
diversity of t ransac t ion a n d the marke t re la t ions a m o n g these firms tend to be long-
term. The rela t ionship between m o s t J a p a n e s e firms a n d their pa r tne r s t e n d s to be 
s table a n d long-s tanding (Fukuda, 1988; Whitehill, 1991; Kono, 1992; Keizer et al, 
2000). 
Because t he J a p a n e s e have a future-orientated t ime span , Most J a p a n e s e 
companies usual ly a s s e s s their scheme in t e rms of tentat ive future benefits a s a 
resu l t of t he cu r r en t implementat ion and do not often expect immediate resul t s . 
Most J a p a n e s e firms t end to set goals on t he bas i s of a future-oriented projection. 
They tend to b a s e their performance m e a s u r e s on future-oriented goals, such a s 
future sales, ma rke t sha re fWhitehill, 1991; Kono, 1992). 
3.8 The comparison between Dutch and Japanese cultures in the five 
dimensions 
The s u b s t a n c e of the Dutch mental i ty e m a n a t e s from the seas , m e r c h a n t 
t radi t ions, Calvinism, verzuiling on the one h a n d . The essence of t h e J a p a n e s e 
psyche s t e m s from anc ien t agrar ian t radi t ions, feudalism, bushido a n d neo-
Confucianism on the other h a n d (Hofstede, 1983a; Fukuda , 1988; Namiki & Sethi, 
1988; Whitehill, 1991; Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars , 1994; 
Hill, 1995; Lewis, 1996; Olie, 1996; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000). The 
compar ison between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res can be done on the bas i s of the 
five d imens ions in Hofstede's model, namely individualism-collectivism, power 
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dis tance, uncer ta in ty avoidance, masculinity-femininity and long-term v shor t - te rm 
orientat ion. Derived from different cul tura l roots, bo th Dutch and J a p a n e s e 
cu l tu res are in opposition to each other in all five d imensions . Whereas Dutch 
cu l tu re is inclining towards individualism, small power dis tance, weak uncer ta in ty 
avoidance, femininity a n d shor t - te rm orientat ion, J a p a n e s e cu l ture is leaning 
towards collectivism, medium-to- large power dis tance, s t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance, 
mascul in i ty a n d long-term orientat ion. The scores in Table 3.1 demons t r a t e the 
inclination of bo th cu l tures . 
Table 3.1: Hofstede's scores of the Netherlands and Japan 
Country IDV PDI UAI MAS LTO 
The Nether lands 80 38 53 14 44 
J a p a n 46 54 92 95 80 
S o u r c e : a d a p t e d from H o f s t e d e (1991) 
3.8.1 Individualism-collectivism The affirmation of individuals is s t rong 
th rough m a n y aspec t s of Dutch life whereas the emphas i s on allegiance to t he group 
is solid th rough m a n y facets of J a p a n e s e life. Under the influence of Calvinism, the 
Dutch usual ly justify a person for h i s or he r work in and contr ibut ion to t h e society 
a s a n individual. In contras t , the J a p a n e s e justify a person a s a m e m b e r of a group 
for h i s or he r work in a n d contr ibut ion to t h e society. It is difficult to differentiate 
between personal a n d collective contr ibut ions in J a p a n . The Dutch respec t 
differences between persons , b u t the J a p a n e s e often ostracise a person who deviates 
from the other m e m b e r s in the group. The Dutch evaluate a person on the bas i s of 
individual accountabili ty, b u t the J a p a n e s e do so on the principle of collective 
responsibility. The sense of 'us ' (insiders) aga ins t ' them' (outsiders) is very s t rong in 
J a p a n , b u t no t in t he Nether lands . Lack of personal opinion is a sign of a weak 
charac te r in t he Nether lands, b u t not in J a p a n where a personal opinion is no t 
supposed to deviate from the collective opinion. Despite verzuiling in t he 
Nether lands , t he Dutch have not got a s t rong and emotional sense of affiliation to 
their confessional lines, b u t the J a p a n e s e generally have a s t rong a n d emotional 
s ense of affiliation to their group, s u c h a s t he c lassmates in the s a m e school or 
universi ty or t h e colleagues in the s a m e section or depa r tmen t (Hofstede, 1983a, 
1983b; F u k u d a , 1988; Namiki & Sethi, 1988; d'Iribarne, 1989; Misawa, 1989; 
Lawrence, 1991; Whitehill, 1991; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars , 1994; Warner , 
1994; Hill, 1995; Keizer et al, 2000). 
Collectivism is likely to be positively related to the extent to which top 
executives tend to sha re more information with each other and other part ies , such 
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a s employees, pa r tne r s , suppliers , cus tomers a n d even competi tors (Chow et al, 
1999). Most J a p a n e s e companies tend to rely on their network of re la t ionship for 
ga ther ing information, b u t mos t Dutch companies do not . The Dutch decision-
making process is based on bargain ing and exchanging information a m o n g several 
par t ies , whe reas the J a p a n e s e one is based on sha r ing bo th information a n d goals 
a m o n g t h e group member s (d'Iribarne, 1989; Whitehill, 1991; Hedlund & Nonaka, 
1993; Keizer et al, 2000). Individualism-collectivism is likely to affect t he top 
executives ' preference for mak ing a decision either collectively or individually 
(Hofstede, 1984b; Butler, 1991; Haiss , 1991; Smith, 1992; Harr ison et al, 1994; 
J a c k s o n , 2000). The decis ion-making author i ty and responsibili ty are clear in mos t 
Dutch firms where t he person who makes a decision is individually responsible, b u t 
vague a n d sha red in mos t J a p a n e s e firms where all involved persons m a k e a 
decision with collective responsibili ty (d'Iribarne, 1989; Keizer et al, 2000). 
3.8.2 Power distance The asser t ion of equality is s t rong th rough m a n y 
aspec t s of Dutch life, whereas t he venerat ion of h ierarchy and author i ty is solid 
th rough m a n y facets of J a p a n e s e life. Because the Nether lands is the only count ry 
in Western Europe t h a t h a s long been unde r the minimal influence of feudalism, the 
Dutch society is vertically s t ruc tu red with verzuiling a n d minimally hierarchical . In 
contras t , b ecause J a p a n is t he only country in Eas t Asia t h a t had undergone a long 
period of feudalism u n d e r t h e s t rong influence of neo-Confucianism, t he J a p a n e s e 
society is hierarchically s t ruc tu red . Both inequality a n d respect for author i ty is 
accepted in J a p a n , b u t no t in t he Nether lands . The Dutch like ne i ther s t a t u s 
difference no r vertical re lat ionship. Social s t a t u s s t ems from achievement in t he 
Nether lands , b u t no t in J a p a n where it emana t e s from a combinat ion of m a n y 
factors. The J a p a n e s e have to respect to older or h igher - s ta tus pe r sons whereas t he 
Dutch often a s s e s s ages negatively and have n o respect for older pe r sons (Hofstede, 
1983a, 1983b; Fukuda , 1988; Namiki & Sethi, 1988; d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 
1991; Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 1992; Hampden-Turner 6k Trompenaars , 1994; 
Chen, 1995). 
Large power d is tance is positively related to the degree of the central isat ion 
and the formalisation in a company (Harrison et al, 1994; Wong 6k Birnbaum-More, 
1994; J a i n 6k Tucker, 1995; Builtjen 6k Noorderhaven, 1996). The central isat ion 
mainly deals with the decision-making author i ty a n d t h e operation. Most Dutch top 
executives t end to devolve their au thor i ty on their subord ina tes , whereas their 
J a p a n e s e coun te rpa r t s a re unlikely to do so (Namiki 6k Sethi , 1988; Keizer et al, 
2000). Most Dutch firms tend to decentral ise thei r decis ion-making author i ty a n d 
operation, b u t mos t J a p a n e s e firms tend to central ise bo th of them. 
Large power dis tance is positively related with the degree of respect for 
h ierarchy in a company, b u t negatively related with the degree of egali tarianism 
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(Chow et al, 1996; Offermann 6k Hellmann, 1997; Schermerhorn & Bond, 1997). 
Most Dutch m a n a g e r s and their subord ina tes can d i scuss with each o ther a s 
equals , b u t mos t J a p a n e s e manage r s and their subord ina tes have to respect the 
corporate hierarchy (Hofstede, 1983b; Namiki & Sethi , 1988; Lawrence, 1991; 
Whitehill, 1991; Keizer et al, 2000). Most Dutch top executives tend to u s e a 
discussion to convince their subord ina tes for mobilisation and corrective action, 
whereas mos t J a p a n e s e top executives tend to u s e their personal au thor i ty to 
mobilise their subord ina tes to work a n d take corrective action. 
3.8.3 Uncertainty avoidance The need for order and cert i tude is s t rong in 
J a p a n , b u t not in t he Nether lands where the coexistence of different doctrinal 
allegiances is the fact of life. Because of th is coexistence, the Dutch readily tolerate 
different opinions in the society. In contrast , Under kata, the unwri t ten code of 
conduct in J a p a n , the J a p a n e s e do not tolerate personal deviation from the no rms 
in the society. Because of their cognisance of difference among pe r sons or 
ins t i tu t ions , t he Dutch can easily accept the concept of uni ty th rough diversity. On 
the o ther hand , because J a p a n is one of t he mos t homogenous countr ies in t he 
world, the J a p a n e s e are ha rd to accept the concept of uni ty th rough diversity. The 
s t rong m e r c h a n t t radi t ions in the Nether lands cause the Dutch to be more flexible 
a n d tolerant. The Dutch a re ready both to accept t he coexistence of t he new system 
and the old one a n d to admi t t h a t several t r u t h s may coexist. In contras t , to avoid 
d is turbing h a r m o n y in t he society, t he J a p a n e s e are c i rcumspect abou t both the 
new sys tem replacing the old one al together a n d a quick admiss ion of t he new t r u t h 
(Hofstede, 1983a, 1983b; Namiki 6k Sethi, 1988; d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; 
ICT, Inc. 2000; Keizer et al, 2000). 
S t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related with anxiety with 
u n s t r u c t u r e d s i tuat ion a n d pess imism mos t top executives perceive from the 
envi ronment (Schneider 6k De Meyer, 1991; J a i n 6k Tucker, 1995). Because mos t 
Dutch m a n a g e r s t end to be more optimistic and comfortable with such u n s t r u c t u r e d 
s i tua t ions (Keizer et al, 2000), they are unlikely to s t ruc tu re information and 
inst i tut ionalise a da ta -ga ther ing procedures for mos t Dutch companies (Pahud 6k 
Mortange 6k Aller, 1996). In contras t , mos t J a p a n e s e m a n a g e r s tend to be more 
pessimist ic abou t a n d uncomfortable with u n s t r u c t u r e d information (Keizer et al, 
2000). They a r e a s s u m e d to classify information a n d inst i tut ionalise a da ta -
gather ing procedure for mos t J a p a n e s e companies (Kono, 1984, 1992). 
S t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively associated with t he extent to 
which top executives a n d corporate s t ra tegis ts refrain from unconvent ional ideas 
when formulating corporate s trategy and developing produc ts and m a r k e t s (Shane, 
1993, 1995; Geletkanwycz, 1997). Most Dutch companies tend to admi t the new 
ideas a n d sys tem t h a t a re unconvent ional when they develop produc ts a n d marke t s , 
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b u t m o s t J a p a n e s e companies a re unlikely to do so. Most J a p a n e s e companies tend 
to have a s t ronger commi tment to the status quo t h a n m o s t Dutch companies . 
3.8.4 Masculinity-femininity The Dutch society is leaning towards 
n u r t u r i n g a n d car ing the others , whereas the J a p a n e s e one is inclined towards 
asser t iveness a n d competi t iveness. The Dutch are always sympathe t ic towards t he 
weaker , b u t t he J a p a n e s e a re no t sympathet ic towards th i s weaker if h i s or he r 
w e a k n e s s t h r e a t e n s the group 's welfare. Sex role segregation is s t rong in J a p a n 
u n d e r t he influence of bushido b u t it is weak in t he Nether lands . The expression of 
man l ines s is offensive in t he Nether lands , b u t appreciative in J a p a n . The Dutch 
believe in ne i ther individual nor inst i tut ional excellence, b u t the J a p a n e s e believe in 
inst i tut ional excellence. The J a p a n e s e are happy if their children can s tudy in a 
prest igious university, b u t the Dutch are indifferent to t he s a m e event (Hofstede, 
1983a, 1983b, 1985a; Lawrence, 1991; Whitehill, 1991; King, 1993; Hampden-
T u r n e r & Trompenaa r s , 1994). 
The Nether lands is a moderately competitive society whereas J a p a n is a n 
extremely competitive society t h a t no weak people can survive. The Dutch work to 
live b e c a u s e they are, a t least, conscious of their life quality, b u t the J a p a n e s e live to 
work because they do not seem to care abou t their life quality. The Du tch are 
unwilling to work overtime for addit ional earn ings b u t the J a p a n e s e a re compelled to 
work overtime a s a process of fulfilling a n obligation to t h e society (Hofstede, 1983a; 
d 'Ir ibarne. 1989; Lawrence, 1991; Whitehill, 1991; Sullivan, 1992; King, 1993; 
Hampden-Turne r & Trompenaars , 1994; Keizer et al, 2000). 
Most Du tch companies a re often hes i t an t to develop a t ra ining programme 
for high-flyers, b u t their J a p a n e s e coun te rpa r t s u s e the leadership in their own 
enterpr ise u n i o n s to find their future leaders . The Dutch m a n a g e r s a re supposed to 
sympa th i se with their subord ina tes a n d prefer a pe rsuas ion to coercion for 
motivat ing the i r subord ina tes , b u t their J a p a n e s e coun te rpa r t s a re supposed to 
encourage their subord ina tes to work ha rde r a n d u s e more coercion t h a n 
pe r suas ion for motivating their subord ina tes . Most Dutch m a n a g e r s often hesi ta te 
to justify a n d compare their subord ina tes ' performance, whereas thei r J a p a n e s e 
coun te rpa r t s evaluate their subord ina tes ' performance in pu r su i t of collective goals. 
In general , t he Dutch do not p ressur i se their colleagues for a bet ter decision, b u t t he 
J a p a n e s e do. Consequently, Du tch cu l ture is orientated towards femininity, 
whereas J a p a n e s e one is predisposed towards masculini ty. This a r g u m e n t affirms 
the scores of bo th Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tu res in Hofstede's model (Hofstede, 
1983a, 1985a; Lawrence, 1991; Whitehill, 1991; King, 1993; Hampden-Turner & 
Trompenaa r s , 1994; Hill, 1995). 
This dimension does no t justify delineating SMP because it is mainly dealing 
with in terpersonal re la t ionships in a company. It bet ter explains the acceptable 
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pract ices and capability t h a n w h a t a n individual manage r should u s e to solve 
conflicts a n d motivate h i s or her subord ina tes to work. This dimension is no t 
ge rmane to devising strategy for the company. 
3.8.5 Long-term v short-term orientation In their approach to bus ines s , 
t he Dutch are more short- term-oriented, whereas t he J a p a n e s e a re more long-term-
oriented. The Dutch prefer ' re turn on investment ' to ' r e turn on favour', b u t t he 
J a p a n e s e prefer the other way round . The Dutch objective of doing b u s i n e s s is to 
reach a n acceptable resul t by a n optimally efficient course, whereas t he J a p a n e s e 
one is to reach an optimal resul t by a n acceptable course . The Dutch expect more 
immediate resu l t s from the policy implementat ion t h a n the J a p a n e s e do. The 
relat ionship among mos t Dutch firms does not cover a diversity of t r ansac t ion a n d 
the marke t relat ions among these firms tend to be shor t - te rm a n d equivocal. In 
contras t , the relat ionship among mos t J a p a n e s e firms covers a diversity of 
t ransac t ion and the marke t relat ions among these firms tend to be steady, s table 
and longstanding. T h u s , Dutch cul ture is leaning towards shor t - t e rm orientation, 
b u t J a p a n e s e cul ture is inclining towards long-term one. This d iscuss ion suppor t s 
the scores of both Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tures in Hofstede's model (Hofstede, 
1983a; Fukuda , 1988; Whitehill. 1991; Kono. 1992; van I terson & Olie, 1992; Keizer 
et al, 2000). 
Long-term v shor t - te rm orientat ion is likely to be related with t he way top 
executives a n d corporate s t ra tegis ts th ink abou t the expectation from the s t ra tegy 
implementat ion w h e n they formulate corporate s trategy (Harrison et al, 1994; De 
Wit & Meyer, 1999; Hofstede, 2001). Most Dutch top executives are likely to expect 
a n immediate resu l t from the policy implementat ion (Weimer, 1995; Yamada, 1999). 
Most Dutch firms tend to se t goals on t he bas i s of a past-or iented projection. In 
contras t , mos t J a p a n e s e top executives are likely to expect a long-term resu l t from 
the policy implementat ion (Kono. 1984, 1992; Chen, 1995). Most J a p a n e s e firms 
tend to set goals on the bas i s of a future-oriented projection. 
Long-term v short- term orientation is likely to affect the tendency to emphas ise 
short- term or long-term performance measures (Harrison et al, 1994; Merchant et al, 
1995). Under the influence of th is dimension, J a p a n e s e companies tend to base their 
performance measures on a future-oriented projection, such a s future sales, marke t 
share . In contrast , most Dutch companies tend to be pressurised to at tained short-
term results , such a s profit and other financial goals for their performance measures . 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chap te r s t a r t s with the character isa t ion of Dutch cul ture from the 
his tory of the Nether lands. Because of the Nether lands ' location nea r t he seas , 
overseas t rade h a s been vital for the Dutch economy for centur ies . Merchant 
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t radi t ions became dominan t in the early Dutch history. Because t he Nether lands 
h a s reclaimed t he l ands from the s e a s for centur ies , t he Dutch h a s h a d to p u t a lot 
of effort to build dykes to protect themselves . This effort required a consensua l 
spirit. When t h e Dutch revolted aga ins t the Span i sh ru le in 1568, they adopted 
Calvinism for thei r l iberation. Calvinism reinforced t he m e r c h a n t t rad i t ions a n d 
preached t h e tolerance of different doctr inal allegiances. This tolerance led to 
segregation of t he society along t h e confessional l ines. This vertical segregation is 
called verzuiling. The influence of t h e seas , m e r c h a n t t radi t ions, Calvinism a n d 
verzuiling a re interrelated and combined to be Dutch nat ional character is t ics , s u c h 
a s c o n s e n s u s , compromise, conflict avoidance, procedural ism, thrift, flexibility, 
tolerance, conformity, egali tarianism, individualism, sympa thy for weakers , uni ty 
th rough diversity and modesty. According to Hofstede's model, Dutch nat ional 
character is t ics a re or ientated towards individualism, small power d is tance , weak 
uncer ta in ty avoidance, femininity a n d shor t - te rm orientat ion. 
From the his tory of J a p a n , J a p a n e s e cul ture is character ised by rice cu l ture 
imported from China and Korea. The feudalism in J a p a n had evolved ou t of t he 
anc ien t agra r ian society. After undergoing several civil wa r s for centur ies , t he 
military c lass or samurai emerged with the code of bushido or hagakure. Hagakuge 
s t reng thened t he hierarchical s t ruc tu re of the J a p a n e s e feudalistic society a n d 
J a p a n became a competence-oriented society with s t rong differentiation of sex role. 
The stratification of t he social c lasses in J a p a n created kata, t he unwr i t t en code of 
conduc t a n d bun t h a t have governed t he proper role of t he J a p a n e s e according to 
their different ages, s t a t u s e s a n d genders for centur ies . To sus ta in a n d to central ise 
thei r regime, Tokugawa Shoguna te in t roduced neo-Confucianism to J a p a n a s a s ta te 
ideology. Neo-Confucianism reinforced hagakure and the hierarchical society in 
J a p a n . The influence of the anc ien t agrar ian t radi t ions, feudalism, bushido a n d 
neo-Confucianism are inter twined a n d integrated to be J a p a n e s e na t ional 
character is t ics , s u c h a s loyalty to t he group, consensus , compromise, conflict 
avoidance, p rocedure orientation, intolerance, conformity, hierarchy, competence, 
ambit ion a n d asser t iveness . J a p a n e s e nat ional character is t ics a re predisposed 
towards collectivism, large power dis tance, s t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance and long-
t e rm orientat ion. 
To find their possible l inkages with SMP in t he four s tages, namely 
envi ronmenta l scanning , s trategy formulation, s trategy implementat ion a n d 
evaluation a n d control in Chapte r 4 , bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res a re 
compared in t e r m s of the five d imens ions in Hofstede's model namely, power 
dis tance, individualism-collectivism, uncer ta in ty avoidance, masculinity-femininity 
a n d long-term v shor t - te rm orientation. Literature on Dutch and J a p a n e s e 
m a n a g e m e n t a n d cu l tu res corroborates th is possibility. The character is t ics of both 
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D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res fit t he description t h a t bo th cu l tu res a re in opposit ion 
to each o ther in t e r m s of t he five d imensions . 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE FORMULATION OF CONCEPTUAL PROPOSITIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
After t he reference model w a s developed from t h e integrat ion of Hofstede's 
(1984a) model of na t iona l cu l ture , Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s (1995) reference model of 
s trategic m a n a g e m e n t a n d Qu inn a n d Rohrbaugh ' s (1983) Compet ing Value Model 
(CVM) in Chap te r 2, t h e extent to which bo th D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res have a n 
impac t on strategy mak ing process (SMP) in bo th D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thai land in general is scrut in ised a n d compared on the bas i s of t he model in th i s 
chapter . The conceptual proposi t ions for th i s s t udy a r e formulated on t h e bas i s of 
t h e model with corroborat ion from existing l i terature on Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
cu l tu res in Chapte r 3 . As a n interact ion between theory a n d evidence, these 
conceptua l proposi t ions will be u sed for the analogy, t he falsification a n d the 
corroborat ion with t h e s u b s e q u e n t empirical proposi t ions emerging from the 
compar ison between t h e evidence collected from the Du tch a n d t h a t from the 
J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land in Chapte r 9. The resu l t of th i s in teract ion will 
become a refined model for depicting t he extent to which the na t ional cu l tu res of t he 
Nether lands a n d J a p a n have a n influence on the SMPs of the Dutch a n d the 
J a p a n e s e companies u n d e r th i s s tudy. This formulation is p re sumed to be a l inkage 
between the nat ional cu l tu res of the Nether lands a n d J a p a n a n d the SMP of Dutch 
and J a p a n e s e MNCs. The presumpt ion of th is linkage u n d e r the model is d iscussed 
in th i s chapter . 
According to Hofstede's model, the nat ional cu l ture is decomposed into 
individualism-collectivism, power dis tance, uncer ta in ty avoidance, masculini ty-
femininity a n d long-term v shor t - te rm orientation. All t he five d imensions are used 
to predict SMP concerning environmental scanning, s trategy formulation, s t rategy 
implementat ion, and evaluation and control according to Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s 
model. Each dimension of Dutch cul ture is used to predict each s tep of the SMP of 
the Dutch MNCs in section 4.2. By the s ame token, each dimension of J a p a n e s e 
cu l ture is used to depict each s tage of the SMP of J a p a n e s e MNCs in section 4 .3 . To 
find the possibility of t he per t inent predictions of the SMPs of both Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e MNCs, the SMPs in both cul tura l set t ings are compared in section 4 .4 . 
For t he depiction of the SMPs of Dutch MNCs in section 4.2 a n d t h a t of 
J a p a n e s e MNCs in section 4 .3 and the comparison between both of t h e m in section 
4.4 according to Wheelen a n d Hunger 's model, environmental scann ing is explicated 
in t e rms of strategic i s sues and information-gathering, environmental analysis , 
cri teria to justify strategic i ssues into opportunit ies , th rea t s , s t rengths a n d 
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weaknes se s . St ra tegy formulation is depict with regard to focus, goal-setting, 
a l ternat ive generat ion, s trategic decision-making, legitimisation of s u c h a decision 
a n d s t rategic p lanning . St ra tegy implementa t ion is delineated with respec t to 
programme-se t t ing , policy-making, budget-set t ing, corporate ru les a n d procedures , 
organis ing, staffing a n d workforce mobilisation. Evaluat ion a n d control is explained 
wi th reference to cri teria es tab l i shment , performance a s s e s s m e n t a n d corrective 
act ion. This compar i son becomes a bas i s for formulating t he conceptua l 
proposi t ions in th i s chap te r . The predict ions become a p r e s u m e d l inkage between 
na t iona l cu l tu re a n d SMP in t he form of the conceptual proposi t ions . Section 4 .5 
r eaches a conclusion. 
4.2 SMP in Dutch MNCs 
After t he Second World War, mos t Dutch MNCs paid little a t ten t ion to the 
American concept of corporate p lann ing even dur ing the oil shock in 1973. They 
flourished du r ing t h e 1960s a n d 1970s simply because of pos t -war high growth ra te 
ins tead of efficiency a n d professionalism. The concept of corporate s t ra tegy h a s 
become accepted in the Nether lands since the 1980s, b u t t he Du tch version is 
slightly different from the US one owing to two following r ea sons . Initially, because 
of t h e Work Council Act of 1971 enti t les the work council [PR-Ondernemingsraad) to 
have t h e four r ights , to consent , to consult , to know information a n d to initiate a 
proposal , The Du tch top executives need to take t h e OR's opinion into consideration. 
Under th i s law, t he co-determinat ion between top executives a n d employees in a 
company is a m u s t . Secondly, because the Dutch Civil Code compels both 
supervisory a n d executive boards to consider the interes ts of the company 's all 
s takeholders , the top executives of most Dutch MNCs usual ly take more factors into 
accoun t before making a strategic decision or formulating strategy (Lammers, 
Meurs , Mijs, 1987; Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars , 1994). 
Because the Dutch MNCs are embedded a n d originated in the Netherlands, 
Dutch cul ture h a s an impact on the SMP of most Dutch MNCs inevitably. The SMP 
of mos t Dutch MNCs can be assessed in te rms of environmental scanning, strategy 
formulation, and evaluation a n d control. Dutch cul ture p resumably h a s a n 
influence on these strategic e lements . 
4.2.1 Environmental scanning Albeit the Dutch law st ipulates the 
compulsory co-determination between the Dutch top executives and the OR, the 
manager ia l discretion in mos t Dutch MNCs remains high. However, the Dutch top 
executives m u s t consider the interes t of their firms' all s takeholders . Because the 
Dutch MNCs have to give priority to employees, their top executives only scan the 
possible sensitive i ssues and the tentative resul ts of intended strategies and policies 
when encounter ing employees (Teulings, 1987; Lawrence, 1991). 
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Most Du tch top executives ga ther s trategic i s sues a n d information by 
themselves . Most Du tch MNCs do no t have t he p lann ing depa r tmen t or pres ident ' s 
office to s c a n the envi ronment separately. Their inst i tut ional isat ion of 
envi ronmenta l s cann ing is generally weak. To compensa te for t he top executives ' 
subjectivity a n d the i r weak inst i tut ional isat ion, they t end to employ external 
c o n s u l t a n t s in addi t ion to thei r own envi ronmenta l a s se s smen t . They t end to a s s e s s 
t h e external env i ronments in a n a d hoc fashion; for example, w h e n a n e w 
inves tment is u n d e r considerat ion, or w h e n a menac ing political event occurs . They 
do no t develop information sha r ing a m o n g their depa r tmen t s , b u t develop a ne twork 
of individual informal con tac t s t h r o u g h o u t their companies . They do n o t s h a r e 
information with thei r pa r tne r s , suppl iers , cus tomers a n d competi tors (Teulings, 
1987; Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-Turne r 6k Trompenaa r s , 1994; P a h u d de 
Mortanges 6k Allers, 1996). 
To ana lyse t h e environment , mos t Dutch top executives often rely on 
subjective m e t h o d s a n d common sense , especially u n s t r u c t u r e d quali tat ive m e t h o d s 
for s cann ing the envi ronment (Lawrence, 1991; Pahud de Mortange 6k Aller, 1996). 
Their criteria for categorising the strategic i s sues into th rea t s , oppor tuni t ies , 
s t r eng ths a n d weaknesse s are unclear . 
Most Du tch MNCs a re hes i t an t to ana lyse t he envi ronment cont inuous ly a n d 
to include their appra i sa l s in t he strategic decis ion-making process . Their decision 
to a s s e s s t he envi ronment is usual ly motivated by ei ther a proposal for a new 
inves tment or a looming political threa t . In th i s case, they, sometimes, employ 
external consu l t an t s and researchers to analyse the s i tuat ion for t h e m (Pahud de 
Mortange 6k Aller, 1996). 
4.2.2 Strategy formulation Under the Dutch Civil Code, the supervisory 
board of the Dutch MNCs can make a strategic decision in the company crisis or 
when the executive board h a s a problem of legitimacy. The final decision is usual ly 
the responsibili ty of the executive board because the intervention of the supervisory 
board is minimal . Despite having the high discretion from the supervisory board, 
shareholders , government, banks , ins t i tu t ions investors, the executive board canno t 
formulate s trategy on the basis of self-interest and arrogance. The executive board 
h a s to adap t the strategy to the form and the timing of the implementat ion for 
reconciliation with employees' demand owing to the Dutch no rms of c o n s e n s u s a n d 
the legal s t ipulat ion. In spite of the enforcement of the Work Council Act of 1971, 
rank-and-file employees contr ibute little to the strategic decisions (Teulings, 1987; 
d'Iribarne, 1989, 1997; Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson 6k Olie, 1992; Olie, 1996; van 
Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Keizer et al. 2000). 
To set corporate goals, the Dutch top executives try to orientate t he decision-
making process in their companies towards workable a n d satisfactory solut ions a n d 
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set objectives for operat ional p lann ing a s realistic a s possible. In American view 
from a mascu l ine society, m o s t Du tch MNCs' goals for thei r s t ra tegy look modes t 
(Teulings, 1987; See Hofstede, 1991; Lawrence, 1991). Because no confrontat ion is 
welcomed in t h e boa rds ' meeting, t he inner circle of t he directors r eaches a 
compromise internal ly (Teulings, 1987; d'Iribarne, 1989, 1997; Olie, 1996: P a h u d de 
Mortanges 6k Allers, 1996; v a n Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Keizer e t al. 2000). The 
goal-set t ing in m o s t D u t c h MNCs is past -or iented because t he h igher t h e p a s t 
profitability, t he greater impor tance is ass igned to t he a t t a i n m e n t of t h a t goal. They 
usua l ly de te rmine their goals on t h e bas i s of t he c u r r e n t a n d projected environment . 
Because of t he preference for a c o n s e n s u s in m o s t Du tch MNCs, mos t Du tch top 
executives w a n t to arrive a t a c o n s e n s u s on the goal they desire to a t t a in in the 
following yea r s (Lawrence, 1991; Weimer, 1995; P a h u d de Mortanges 6k Allers, 
1996). Before a meet ing with t he OR, the executive directors have to barga in among 
themselves for t he goals a n d the s t rategies internally (Teulings, 1987; d'Iribarne, 
1989, 1997; Olie, 1996; P a h u d de Mortanges 6k Allers, 1996; van Iterson, 1997a, 
1997b, 2000; Keizer et al. 2000). 
To genera te tentat ive solutions, the executive directors a rgue for a n d agains t 
these solut ions t h rough t h e in ternal bargaining. The board m u s t come u p with the 
m o s t favourite solut ion t h a t will be p u t into a formal p lan or a proposed decision. 
To minimise t h e employees ' a n d public opposition a n d maximise social legitimacy, 
s u c h a proposal will embrace t he employees' a n d public benefits (Teulings, 1987; 
d 'Iribarne, 1989, 1997; Lawrence, 1991; Olie, 1994, 1996; van Iterson, 1997a, 
1997b, 2000). 
In mos t Dutch MNCs, the decision-making author i ty is decentral ised. 
Individual responsibili ty for making a decision is clear and a person in charge m u s t 
take a decision. Because the executive board is responsible for making a strategic 
decision, mos t strategic decisions are taken in the boardrooms ra ther t h a n on the 
work floor. The pres ident of the executive boards seldom use s his or her ul t imate 
power to make a decision agains t the will of o ther directors. He or she is j u s t primus 
inter pares. Even if the OR h a s the right to initiate a proposal, Most Dutch top 
executives do not encourage their middle manager s to take the initiative for a new 
project th rough the OR. The OR itself seldom init iates the proposal to reorganise the 
companies (Teulings, 1987; d'Iribarne. 1989, 1997; Lawrence, 1991; Olie, 1996; 
Pahud de Mortanges 6k Allers, 1996; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Keizer et al, 
2000). 
To legitimise their strategic decisions, the Dutch top executives have to 
accommodate the employees' demand. Because the n a t u r e of the top-down 
disseminat ion of corporate goals and decisions th roughout the company contradicts 
the Dutch n o r m s of consensus and participative management , the executive board 
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h a s to duly Inform, consu l t and , if necessary, soothe t he employees in t h e meet ing 
with the OR. As prepar ing g rounds for the fur ther process of exchanging ideas a n d 
information a n d a s a preventive way of legitimising their s trategic decisions, t h e 
executive directors have to p re sen t thei r decisions a n d goals to t h e employees in t he 
meet ing (Teulings, 1987; d 'Ir ibarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; Olie, 1994; P a h u d de 
Mor tanges 6k Allers, 1996; v a n I terson, 1997a). 
The confrontation be tween the top m a n a g e m e n t a n d the employees 
represented by the OR c a n bo th damage the legitimacy of t he top m a n a g e m e n t a n d 
i n c u r t he cos ts of s toppage dur ing the decis ion-making process . Fur the rmore , t he 
OR c a n s tep legally in t h e strategic decis ion-making process of t he companies 
(Teulings, 1987; Lawrence, 1991). With regard to the s t ra tegy formulat ion in m o s t 
D u t c h MNCs, m o s t Dutch top executives dislike a bit of sober concent ra t ion o n 
significant detai ls of marke t ing a n d strategy, performance moni tor ing a n d 
accountabi l i ty for devising strategy. They prefer their common sense to t he rat ionale 
beh ind the s t ra tegy formulation. They tend to avoid the top-down n a t u r e a n d the 
sobriety of SMP unreal is t ic to a s s u r e corporate success (d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 
1991; v a n Iterson, 1997b). 
4.2.3 Strategy implementation After mak ing a strategic decision a n d 
se t t ing corporate goals, each d e p a r t m e n t or division h a s to achieve t he common 
goals with i ts own accountabil i ty in mos t Dutch MNCs, because everybody h a s a 
well-defined position in mos t Dutch companies . This position should b e respected 
(Teulings, 1987; Keizer et al, 2000). When mos t Dutch top executives encoun te r 
external reprehension, non-compliance a n d unforeseen outcomes, their response is 
to alter s t rategy implementat ion. Most Dutch MNCs p u r s u e cost leadership a s a 
main s t ra tegy w h e n operat ing globally for the economies of scale. They choose and 
develop p roduc t s or marke t less carefully because they a re less afraid of the r isk of 
failure. They prefer acquisit ion to green-field investment . Most of t h e m except 
Dutch b a n k s tend to p u r s u e mult inat ional s trategy with a mult i -domest ic s t ruc tu re 
(Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-Turner 6k Trompenaars , 1994). 
Recrui tment and selection, performance appraisal and remunera t ion , and 
t ra ining a n d development are the key components of Dutch HRM. As far a s 
rec ru i tment a n d selection are concerned, to mould their employees into their 
complex corporate s t ruc ture , most Dutch MNCs often recrui t new g radua tes from 
bo th universi t ies a n d HBOs (Higher Educat ional Institutions) en bloc. They 
normally prefer in ternal promotion to external recru i tment from other companies . 
To recrui t new employees, they often employ psychological and ap t i tude tes t s a n d 
prefer the bes t and the br ightes t despite their pride in their egali tarianism. Dutch 
prefer technical to personal criteria for recru i tment and do not th ink of new recrui ts 
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beyond several yea r s (Lawrence, 1991; King, 1993; Heijltjes, Witteloostuijn & Sorge, 
1996). 
The Du tch MNCs somet imes recrui t employees with a few years ' experience 
from the smaller firms. Under th is c i rcumstance , general is t m a n a g e r s c a n n o t be 
easily developed in t h e smal l firms. T h u s , only t he D u t c h MNCs c a n ro ta te their 
workforce bo th geographically a n d internat ional ly in order to develop general is t 
m a n a g e r s (Lawrence, 1991; King, 1993; Heijltjes et al, 1996). 
Training is seen a s personal development because t he Du tch do no t like to be 
different. H u m a n resource m a n a g e r s in mos t Dutch MNCs prefer a c o n s e n s u s 
s t ra tegy to a leadership quali ty for t ra in ing their recru i t s . Most Dutch MNCs prefer 
to t ake a long t ime to t ra in thei r newcomers , b u t they do not develop their new 
employees th rough the vertical re lat ionship in the corporate h ierarchy (Lawrence, 
1991; King, 1993; Heijltjes e t al, 1996). 
Employee development, notably a n in-house t ra ining p rogramme plays a 
crucial role in m o s t Dutch MNCs because the executives in these Dutch MNCs 
believe t h a t t he Du tch government 's vocational educat ion sys tem does no t suffice 
their d e m a n d s . The t ra in ing p rogramme is orientated towards specialists even if 
some general is ts c a n be found a t middle a n d top levels in the company. By vir tue of 
D u t c h managemen t , general ism is more appa ren t a m o n g m o s t Du tch senior 
m a n a g e r s . However, t he in-house t ra in ing p rogramme is p rone to be company-
specific (Lawrence, 1991; King, 1993; Heijltjes et al, 1996). 
To mobilise their workforce, mos t Dutch manage r s are re luc tan t to appraise 
employees' performance. Both the m a n a g e r s and subord ina tes in the Dutch MNCs 
m u s t get ready to explain and justify their behaviours a s equals . Most Dutch 
subord ina tes like to be consulted by their boss . The Dutch manage r s a t all levels 
a re supposed to be problem-solving and task-oriented b u t considerate and 
n u r t u r i n g a t the s a m e time. They are presumably nei ther decisive nor self-
consciously resolute. They m u s t achieve their different goals through bargaining, 
persuas ion and a light of touch. Because they tend to be more restrained and 
conditional and prefer to convince and persuade their subordina tes , persuas ion 
power and expertise are pr imary bases for their authori ty . Most Dutch managers 
are unlikely to pressur i se their subordina tes for bet ter resul ts in the decision-
making process (d'Iribarne, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; Olie, 1994; Heijltjes et al, 1996; 
van Iterson, 1997b; Vunder ink & Hofstede, 1998; Keizer et al, 2000). It can be said 
in Dutch h i j is handig ' for the good quality of the Dutch manager s (Lawrence, 1991; 
van Iterson & Olie, 1992; King, 1993; Olie, 1996). 
4.2.4 Evaluation and control To establish the criteria for evaluation and 
control, the top executives and managers in most Dutch MNCs lay a relatively high 
emphas i s on book value-based and profitability-related financial goals for evaluation 
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a n d control . The goal-sett ing in m o s t Dutch MNCs is past -or iented b e c a u s e t h e 
higher the p a s t profitability, t he greater impor tance is ass igned to t h e a t t a i n m e n t of 
their goal in the c u r r e n t year. Because m o s t Dutch top executives t ake more factors 
into account , Du tch s t ra tegy focuses more on the m o s t realistic performance t h a n 
on maximis ing it. Goals for evaluation, s u c h a s profits, sales, a n d expenses—and so 
on in m o s t Du tch MNCs a re typically measu rab le . Everything is a r t icula ted 
beforehand. Once a c o n s e n s u s is reached, accountabi l i ty is crucial (Lawrence, 
1991; Weimer, 1995; Yamada, 1999; Keizer e t al, 2000). 
To a s s e s s corporate performance, individual accountabi l i ty is t h e u n i t of 
appra isa l in mos t Du tch MNCs. Most Du tch top m a n a g e r s do not b a s e the i r follow-
u p of a p lan on t r u s t a n d delegation, b u t on w h a t they a n d their lower-level 
m a n a g e r s agreed beforehand a s a gent leman 's agreement . In their HQs, t h e 
supervisory board , no t sha reho lders evaluate the performance of t he executive board 
(Douma, 1997; Yamada, 1999; Keizer & et al, 2000). 
With regard to corrective action, if m a n a g e r s c a n n o t a t t a in t h e goals, they 
m u s t be accountab le for w h a t they agreed beforehand. Somet imes, t h e Du tch MNCs 
sack their count ry manage r s , usua l ly the local one if their subsidiary performance is 
unsat is factory (Douma, 1997; Yamada, 1999; Keizer & et al, 2000). As a resu l t of 
t h e co-deterrnination. Most Du tch MNCs tend to base their evaluat ion a n d control 
sys tem on negotiation, no t top-down determinat ion. This sys tem h a s evolved o u t of 
t he bas ic va lues a n d the s t ruc tu re in pre- industr ia l e ra (Lawrence, 1991; van 
I terson, 1997b). In conclusion, mos t Dutch MNCs expect r a the r immediate resu l t s 
a n d do no t evaluate their quali ty and performance over a long period. The mos t 
impor tan t s takeholders for the cont inui ty of mos t Dutch MNCs are cus tomers 
(Lawrence, 1991; Weimer. 1995; Keizer et al, 2000). 
4.3 SMP in Japanese MNCs 
After the Second World War, mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs adopted the American 
concept of corporate planning. With little respect to the external environment, this 
p lanning seemed to be competitive. Members of staff group in the president 's office 
devised corporate p lans . During the period of miraculous economic growth before 
1973, mos t J a p a n e s e top executives had believed tha t p lanning h a d not been vital 
for corporate survival. After the oil shock in 1973, these executives realised t h a t 
they could no longer rely on the government 's macro plan, b u t they h a d to re th ink 
abou t more feasible corporate goals and strategy. To d raw u p the more effective, 
qualitative a n d complex set of corporate p lans , many J a p a n e s e MNCs decided to 
separa te the corporate p lanning depa r tmen t from the president ' s office. This 
depa r tmen t h a s been responsible for mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs' future a n d survival by 
helping t h e m to get th rough the more volatile environment since the late 1970s. 
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Under t h e miss ion s ta tement , th i s d e p a r t m e n t h a s to de termine bo th long-term a n d 
more specific shor t - t e rm goals (Whitehill, 1991; Kono, 1992). 
Even if t h e J a p a n e s e Commercial Code does no t compel t he board of 
d i rec tors or t h e top executives to r ep resen t the in te res t of t he company 's all 
s takeholders , t h e directors a re supposed to consider t he in teres t of s u c h 
s t akeho lders a s a whole including employees, suppl iers a n d so o n (Whitehill, 1991; 
cf v a n I terson & Olie, 1992). As a resul t , mos t J a p a n e s e top executives usua l ly t ake 
more factors in to accoun t before devising s t ra tegy or mak ing a strategic decision. In 
general , they give priority to l enders a n d employees over o ther s takeholders in their 
corpora te s t ra tegy (Aoki, 1991; Chen, 1995). 
Because t h e J a p a n e s e MNCs a re embedded a n d originated in J a p a n , 
J a p a n e s e cu l tu re h a s a n impac t on t h e SMP of m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs inevitably. 
The SMP of m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs c a n be evaluated in t e r m s of environmental 
scann ing , s t ra tegy formulation, s t ra tegy implementat ion, a n d evaluation a n d 
control . J a p a n e s e cu l tu re p resumab ly h a s a n influence on these strategic e lements . 
4.3.1 Environmental scanning Because t he manager ia l discretion in mos t 
J a p a n e s e MNCs is high, p r e s su re from the sha reho lders does no t affect 
envi ronmenta l s cann ing in m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs (Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 1992; 
Chen , 1995). However, t h e J a p a n e s e top executives a r e supposed to consider t he 
in te res t of thei r firms' all s takeholders , especially b a n k s a n d employees (Aoki, 1991; 
Chen, 1995) 
To promote strategic thinking, to collect s trategic information, to determine 
goals a n d policies, to co-ordinate a n d integrate the strategic p lans of operat ing 
un i t s , to ga ther strategic i s sues and information a n d to follow u p the execution of 
t he plan, mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs set u p the p lanning depa r tmen t or the p lanning 
group in the pres ident ' s office. Most of t hem set u p th is depa r tmen t in response to 
the oil shock in 1973. Because of the existence of th is depar tment , most J a p a n e s e 
MNCs seldom employ external consu l t an t s for scann ing the environment . Thus , 
their inst i tut ional isat ion of environmental scanning is generally s t rong (Whitehill. 
1991; Kono, 1992; Pahud de Mortanges & Allers. 1996). 
Most J a p a n e s e MNCs rely on a network of information both outside and 
inside their companies . Information shar ing in mos t of t hem is very extensive. Most 
J a p a n e s e top executives often sha re knowledge a n d information with their peers a n d 
subord ina tes internally. Externally, mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs can sha re information 
with thei r pa r tne r s , suppliers, cus tomers and even competi tors. Hence, the 
information gather ing a n d the strategic a s se s smen t of industr ia l intelligence in mos t 
J a p a n e s e MNCs are very thorough and extensive (Nonaka, 1988; McMillan, 1989; 
Whitehill, 1991: Hedlund & Nonaka. 1993: Lewis, 1996). 
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To ana lyse the environment , J a p a n e s e top executives tend to rely on a 
combinat ion of quant i ta t ive and qualitative me thods wi th their intui t ion. The 
cri teria for classifying strategic i s sues into th rea t s , opportuni t ies , s t r eng ths a n d 
weaknesse s a r e clear in mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs. Their p lann ing d e p a r t m e n t s 
commonly classify s trategic information by i ts con ten t s into, (1) information on the 
s i tuat ion, (2) knowledge a n d (3) information on ideas . After the J a p a n e s e top 
executives obta in t h e categorised information from the p lann ing depar tmen t , they 
es tabl ish t h e p remises by identifying a n d continual ly revising corporate goals a n d 
philosophy, s cann ing all environmenta l cons t ra in t s , a s sess ing p a s t performance, 
forecasting future problems, benchmark ing with competi tors to identify s t r e n g t h s 
a n d weaknesses , projecting competence a n d specifying opportuni t ies a n d t h r ea t s 
(Kono, 1984, 1992; Nonaka, 1988; Katzenstein, 1991; Whitehill, 1991; Hedlund & 
Nonaka, 1993; Chen, 1995; P a h u d de Mortanges 6k Allers, 1996). 
Albeit their environmenta l scann ing is strongly inst i tut ionalised, mos t 
J a p a n e s e MNCs a re unwilling to diagnose t he envi ronment constant ly a n d to 
incorporate thei r evaluation into the strategic decis ion-making process . Hence, t he 
decision to a s s e s s t he envi ronment is characterist ically motivated by a proposal for a 
n e w inves tment in m o s t of t h e m in a n ad hoc fashion (Kono, 1992; P a h u d de 
Mortanges 6k Allers, 1996). 
4.3.2 Strategy formulation As s t rategists , m o s t J a p a n e s e top executives 
promote corporate value, se t goals a n d vision, a n d determine t he new direction of 
t he company. The ma in t a s k s of t he top executives a re to s tep in the companies ' 
crisis, to change the companies ' direction th rough strategic development, to promote 
loyalty within the companies and to main ta in high-level external relat ions with other 
companies a n d the government (Namiki 6k Sethi, 1988; Nonaka, 1988; Kono, 1992; 
Hedlund 6k Nonaka, 1993; Chen, 1995). The boards of directors a s top m a n a g e m e n t 
a re the mos t impor tan t body for making a strategic decision in mos t J a p a n e s e 
MNCs. The final decision is the responsibility of the boards (Whitehill, 1991; Kono, 
1992: Keizer et al, 2000). 
The goal-setting in most J a p a n e s e MNCs is future-oriented. To set corporate 
goals, most J a p a n e s e top executives clarify strategic i s sues by determining goals 
from the premises . Most J a p a n e s e MNCs specify the gaps for devising corporate 
s trategy a n d making a strategic decision between the projected future performance 
u n d e r p resen t s trategy a n d policy a n d the determined future performance unde r the 
p resumed cu r r en t s i tuat ion. These gaps are the bases for devising corporate 
s trategy and making strategic decisions. Most J a p a n e s e MNCs emphas i se long-term 
goals over shor t - te rm ones . Most of them emphas i se a marke t share a s a goal for 
evaluation and control. Because the marke t sha re had been a priority unti l recently, 
some J a p a n e s e MNCs employ excellent strategies wi thout m u c h regard to profits. 
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These MNCs b e c a m e less profitable a n d went b a n k r u p t (Kono, 1984, 1992; 
Smothe r s , 1990; S ta lk & Weber, 1993; Chen, 1995). 
To genera te tentat ive solut ions, mos t J a p a n e s e executive directors try to 
min imise differences be tween dissimilar viewpoints th rough nemawashi before a 
meet ing in t h e boa rds . As a resul t , they s t a r t to exchange information from 
s o m e w h a t s imilar opinions a n d t h e meet ing become r i tual . The J a p a n e s e MNCs do 
n o t need a legal framework a n d a n ins t i tu t ion to govern i t s decis ion-making process . 
Their decisions a r e ba sed on information sha r ing a n d peer p r e s s u r e (Namiki & 
Sethi , 1988; Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993; Chen, 1995; Keizer et al, 2000). 
In m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs, t he decis ion-making au thor i ty is central ised. Their 
top m a n a g e m e n t essential ly m a k e s the final decision. However, individual 
responsibil i ty for mak ing a decision is vague. To free each director from full 
responsibili ty, t h e directors m a k e a strategic decision in the n a m e of t he board. It is 
very difficult to identify who really m a k e a decision a s a n individual because mos t 
J a p a n e s e directors seldom m a k e a decision aga ins t the will of o thers (Lincoln, 1989; 
Whitehill, 1991; Kono, 1992; Keizer et al, 2000). 
To legitimise thei r s trategic decisions, m o s t J a p a n e s e top executives need to 
embrace all i n p u t s from their subord ina tes a n d colleagues th rough t h e consensua l 
decis ion-making or ringiseido. Ringiseido literally m e a n s ' the way of reverential 
inquiry". It c a n be s u m m a r i s e d into t he seven following s tages (Misawa, 1987; 
F u k u d a , 1988; Namiki & Sethi , 1988; Lincoln, 1989; Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 1992; 
Chen, 1995). 
1. Either top executives define problem a n d pas s down their initial ideas to 
the lower r a n k managers , or such m a n a g e r s themselves w a n t to find a 
solution when they encounter a problem. 
2. After ei ther receiving ins t ruct ion from the top management , or desiring to 
presen t a solution, these middle manage r s begin to diffuse the original 
ideas to the involved persons both in their own un i t s and others through 
calling a meet ing for discussion. 
3 . To sound out more ideas and rule out any discords, more meetings may 
be called for a discussion and consultat ion. In th is stage, the 
par t ic ipants in such meetings concurrent ly analyse the problem and 
work ou t al ternatives. 
4. After a n u m b e r of meetings, an in t ra-uni t and inter-uni t consensus is 
reached among the concerned persons . The g rounds for a proposal are 
prepared. 
5. The middle manage r s diffusing the inaugura l ideas and their colleagues 
th roughout the same uni t write up the proposal or ringi-sho outlining 
problems with the problem-solving scheme in details. 
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6. This ringi-sho is circulated bo th vertically a n d horizontally to all involved 
pe r sons t h roughou t the companies for c o m m e n t s a n d approval . Upon 
receipt of the ringi-sho, each responsible m a n a g e r a t t a c h e s a shee t of 
c o m m e n t s a n d affixes a seal of approval to t h e back of t h e proposal . 
7. Eventual ly t he ringi-sho is pa s sed u p to t he top m a n a g e m e n t for formal 
approval . After t h e final au thor i sa t ion , th i s ringi-sho is recorded a s a 
company document . 
With regard to s t ra tegy formulation in t he J a p a n e s e MNCs, m o s t J a p a n e s e 
top executives tend to u s e the i r intui t ion a n d vision r a t h e r t h a n the ra t ionale beh ind 
t h e s t ra tegy formulation. Normally, they tend to avoid detailed SMPs u n a b l e to 
a s s u r e corporate succes s (Kono, 1984; Nonaka, 1988; Smothers , 1990; Katzensteiri, 
1991; Whitehill, 1991; Hedlund & Nonaka. 1993; Sta lk & Weber. 1993; Chen, 1995). 
4.3.3 Strategy implementation After making a strategic decision a n d 
set t ing corporate goals, all depa r tmen t s or divisions have to achieve t he common 
goal a s a pa r t of m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs (Whitehill, 1991; Chen, 1995). 
To implement thei r strategic choices, to set p rogrammes a n d to m a k e policy, 
m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs tend to p u r s u e evolutionary s t ra tegy to achieve a long-term 
goal w h e n operat ing globally. Most J a p a n e s e MNCs employ global s t ra tegy with a 
central ised operat ion. The J a p a n e s e pa t t e rn of s t ra tegy is a n evolutionary ser ies of 
s trategies. J a p a n e s e MNCs' s t rategy h a s evolved ou t of a strategic combinat ion of 
m a n y strategies, namely knowledge-based, all iance-based, productivi ty-based and 
t ime-based strategies. Most J a p a n e s e MNCs employ a knowledge-based strategy to 
add value to their products , a n all iance-based strategy to form strategic alliance 
with their pa r tners , suppl iers and cus tomers , and a productivity-based s t ra tegy to 
e n h a n c e produc t quality and a product ion process. Because mos t J a p a n e s e 
manufac tu r ing MNCs l aunch new products faster t h a n their rivals, mos t of them are 
able to p u r s u e a t ime-based strategy (Smothers. 1990; Katzenstein. 1991; Hedlund 
& Nonaka. 1993; Stalk & Webber. 1993; Chang, 1995; Chen. 1995). 
With respect to staffing, most J a p a n e s e MNCs have two types of employees: 
(1) a core workforce, especially male universi ty g radua tes and (2) a special 
workforce, including women, par t - t ime a n d temporary workers, mid-career recrui ts 
a n d foreigners. Unlike the special workforce, the core workforce in mos t J a p a n e s e 
MNCs enjoys special privileges a n d employment security. The core employees are 
t he mos t crucial manpower in mos t J a p a n e s e MNC because they a re seen a s 
member s of corporate family. Most J a p a n e s e MNCs safeguard job securi ty only for 
the core workforce, male university g radua tes against the economic recession 
(Namiki & Sethi, 1988; Whitehill, 1991; Whitley, 1992). 
68 
With regard to direct recru i tment , mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs often recru i t 
g r a d u a t e s r ight away from universi t ies for their white-collar workforce a n d leavers 
promptly from high schools en m a s s e for their blue-collar workforce. J u s t a s in 
m a n y count r ies , t h e m o s t p rominen t MNCs select t h e b e s t a n d the br ightes t from 
t h e m o s t famous universi t ies in J a p a n . Most J a p a n e s e MNCs prefer t h e s e flesh 
g r a d u a t e s s imply b e c a u s e they can indoctr inate a n d socialise these newcomers wi th 
commi tmen t to t h e corporation, a broad comprehens ion of t he corporate miss ion 
a n d all corpora te cu l tu re a n d values . J o b mobility be tween companies seldom 
occurs in J a p a n b e c a u s e mid-career recru i t s c an ne i ther fit easily in t h e corporate 
family no r a s s u r e thei r new bosses of thei r fidelity. Most J a p a n e s e MNCs prefer 
in te rna l promot ion to external recru i tment . Under t he sys tem of lifetime 
employment in J a p a n , t h e employees ' long-term potent ial a n d devotion a re essent ial . 
The employment of wrong pe r sons c a u s e s these MNCs so dearly because they can 
ne i ther sack nor rectify them, b u t have to pay t h e m unt i l thei r re t i rement . They 
th ink of new recru i t s beyond several years . They prefer personal to technical criteria 
for thei r rec ru i tment . The h u m a n resource depa r tmen t no t merely requires all 
prospective core employees to sit a scholast ic ap t i tude t es t to prove their academic 
performance, b u t also scrut in ise their biography a n d family background to a s s u r e 
t h a t t he se cand ida te s have a s table a n d law-abiding personali ty. For recrui tment , 
personal i ty is more impor tan t t h a n capability a n d speciality (Whitehill, 1991; 
Whitley, 1992; Chen, 1995). 
On-the-job t ra ining by rotat ion in most J a p a n e s e MNCs operates u n d e r 
seniori ty-based men to r sys tem or senpai-kohjoh. Under on-the-job t ra ining system, 
they develop new employees th rough the vertical relat ionship when these employees 
rota te to different depa r tmen t s . On-the-job t ra ining plays a crucial role in mos t 
J a p a n e s e MNCs, b u t it is company-specific and functional, not primarily emotional. 
A senior or boss ac t s a s a role model for a junior or subord ina te who is 
inexperienced. The t ra ining programme is orientated towards multi-specialist 
through job rotat ion in most J a p a n e s e MNCs. Within the company, this rotation 
promotes: (1) tamoko seido (multiple skills), (2) jinmyaku (a personal web of h u m a n 
being), (3) the in terdepar tmenta l co-ordination. (4) information shar ing a n d 
communicat ion between depar tmen t s and (5) corporate loyalty. It also facilitates a 
consensus in ringiseido and minimises in terdepar tmenta l conflicts and res is tance to 
organisat ional change (Misawa, 1987; Namiki & Sethi . 1988; Aoki, 1991; 
Katzenstein, 1991; Whitehill, 1991). 
When a n employee rotates th roughout the organisation, he or she is able to 
forge the vertical ties in various depar tments , to develop a broader perspective 
through a multi-specialist experience before his or her next career advancement , 
a n d to handle a variety of different t a sks . The J a p a n e s e leadership t ra ining 
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emphas i se vision a n d intui t ion. Good a t ten t ion to h u m a n resource , ability to see 
t he future, group identity, intui t ion, holistic problem-solving skills, technical 
literacy, integrat ion of work a n d private life, cour tesy in b u s i n e s s a n d a 
comprehens ion of employees ' expectat ion a re t h e essent ia l calibre of good J a p a n e s e 
m a n a g e r s (Nonaka, 1988; Katzenstein, 1991; Whitehill, 1991; Hedlund & Nonaka, 
1993). 
To mobilise the i r workforce, m o s t J a p a n e s e m a n a g e r s usua l ly u s e their 
personal au thor i ty to motivate thei r subord ina tes . Under seniori ty-based men to r 
sys tem, they u s e on a n d giri to build t he loyalty from their subord ina tes . When their 
subord ina te s a r e loyal to them, they will have their personal au thor i ty (Fukuda, 
1988; Namiki & Sethi , 1988; Whitehill, 1991; Chen, 1995). 
4.3.4 Evaluation and control To establ ish t he criteria for evaluat ion a n d 
control, t h e top executives a n d the m a n a g e r s in mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs specify t he 
gap between t h e projected future performance u n d e r the cu r ren t s t ra tegy a n d the 
de termined future performance u n d e r t he a s s u m e d cu r r en t s i tuat ion. The goal-
set t ing is future-oriented in m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs, because their executives tend to 
adhe re to the future projection. There are var ious levels of reviewing s t ra tegy s u c h 
as , self-control, a n d a follow-up by the corporate p lann ing depa r tmen t a n d a follow-
u p by top m a n a g e m e n t . The projects in m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs a re usua l ly reviewed 
in two ways . One is t he review of t he projects u n d e r way a n d t h e accumula ted cos t s 
compared with those of t he plan. The other one is on a periodic or comprehensive 
plan. To emphas i se the change of t he company, both types of review focus on 
figures. The review normally falls into four a reas : (1) basic goals, s u c h a s sales, 
profit a n d capital s t ruc tu re , (2) p roduc t -marke t strategy, s u c h a s produc t mix, (3) 
s t ruc tu re p lans , s u c h a s inves tment a n d (4) productivity plans , such as labour 
productivity a n d r e tu rn on asse t s . Thus , their corporate goals comprise measurab le 
a n d non-measurab le ones (Kono, 1984; Smothers , 1990; Stalk & Weber, 1993; 
Chen, 1995). 
To as sess corporate performance, the managemen t control system is 
centralised, b u t the follow-up process t ends to be weak in most J a p a n e s e MNCs. 
Most of t hem tend to delegate the follow-ups of a p lan to operat ing depa r tmen t s on 
the bas i s of t rus t . Most J a p a n e s e top manage r s tend to t rus t their lower-level 
managers , because of lifetime employment. They seldom conduct a str ict follow-up 
of p lans , because remunera t ion does not crucially reflect shor t - te rm performance. 
As a result , mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs base their evaluation a n d control on t rus t . The 
quality and performance is reflected in evaluation over a long period, b u t not in a 
frequent change of b o n u s (Kono, 1984, 1992). 
The follow-up of ac tual performance is ei ther a n a m o u n t of var iance or a 
ratio of ac tua l resu l t s over p lanned n u m b e r s . The ratio is easier to comprehend. 
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The var iance c a n b e classified into volume var iance a n d price var iance. W h e n the 
J a p a n e s e MNCs review the t rend of performance for t he p a s t several years , they 
evaluate t he p lan w h e t h e r it w a s too easy or not . The performance a s s e s s m e n t of 
d e p a r t m e n t s differs from t h e follow-up of corporate s t ra tegy because th i s 
a s s e s s m e n t cons iders bo th t h e operat ional performance a n d the execution of 
corporate s trategy. The d e p a r t m e n t or a group is t h e u n i t of appra isa l in m o s t 
J a p a n e s e MNCs (Kono, 1992). 
For corrective action, mos t J a p a n e s e m a n a g e r s often u s e thei r personal 
au thor i ty to a s k the i r subord ina te s to improve corporate performance. In 
conclusion, m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs expect less immedia te resu l t s from the s t ra tegy 
implementa t ion . J a p a n e s e s t ra tegy focuses more on a t ta in ing the satisfactory 
performance t h a n on maximising it (Kono, 1984; Smothe r s , 1990; Sta lk & Weber, 
1993; Chen, 1995). 
4.4 Comparison between Dutch and Japanese SMPs 
After t he Second World War, both the Nether lands a n d J a p a n u n d e r w e n t a 
long period of economic reconst ruct ion. Both Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e economies h a d 
robus t growth du r ing the 1960s-1970s when ne i ther Dutch nor J a p a n e s e MNCs 
adopted the concept of corporate strategy. Most J a p a n e s e MNCs realised t h e 
impor tance of corporate s t ra tegy amid the oil shock in 1973. They se t u p t he 
p l ann ing depa r tmen t subsequent ly for formulating corporate strategy. Much later in 
the 1980s, mos t Dutch MNCs began to pay more a t ten t ion to th is concept when 
competition is escalated into the global scale. 
The SMPs of both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs are similar and dissimilar in 
m a n y ways. Because both Dutch and J a p a n e s e MNCs have already adopted the 
concept of strategic management , the comparison between the SMPs in both of t hem 
can be done with respect to environmental scanning, s t rategy formulation, strategy 
implementat ion, a n d evaluation and control. 
4.4.1 Environmental scanning Both Dutch and J a p a n e s e scanning 
behaviours are similar in certain ways. .Albeit the manager ia l discretion in both 
Dutch and J a p a n e s e MNCs is high, both of them tend to give priority to employees. 
The top executives in both of them often take factors from all perspectives before 
devising a p lan a s realistic a s possible. The executives in both of t hem tend to 
a s se s s the external environment in an ad hoc fashion when the new investment is 
concerned (Kono, 1992; Pahud de Mortgages & Alters, 1996). Even though both of 
t h e m are hes i t an t to analyse the environment cont inuously and to include their 
appraisa l in the strategic decision-making process, they have some different 
scanning behaviour according to their different scores in individualism-collectivism 
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a n d unce r t a in ty avoidance of bo th Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res in Hofstede's model 
(See Figure 4.1 a n d Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.1: Environmental scanning in Dutch companies 
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Figure 4.2: Environmental scanning in Japanese companies 
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With regard to t he proclivity for individualism-collectivism in t h e Nether lands 
a n d J a p a n , bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs a re different in their s cann i ng 
behav iours . Individualism-collectivism is likely to affect t he degree of information-
sha r ing in a company (Chow et al, 1999). Most J a p a n e s e MNCs rely on a ne twork of 
knowledge bo th outs ide a n d inside their companies (Nonaka, 1988; McMillan, 1989; 
Whitehill, 1991; Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993; Lewis, 1996). Most J a p a n e s e top 
executives often s h a r e information with thei r colleagues a n d subord ina te s internally. 
Externally, m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs c a n s h a r e s t rategic information wi th the i r 
pa r tne r s , suppl iers , cu s tomer s a n d even compet i tors . 
In cont ras t , m o s t Du tch top executives do no t s h a r e information wi th their 
colleagues a n d subord ina t e s even if they develop a ne twork of informal con tac t s 
t h r o u g h o u t t he companies internally (Teulings, 1987; Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-
T u r n e r & Trompenaa r s , 1994; Pahud de Mortanges & Allers, 1996). 
CP1: Collectivism is positively related to the extent to which top executives in 
MNCs tend to s h a r e more information with their employees, pa r tne r s , suppl iers , 
cu s tomer s a n d even competi tors 
With regard to their differences in unce r t a in ty avoidance in t he Nether lands 
and J a p a n , bo th Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs a re also different in the i r s cann ing 
behaviours . S t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to t he need to control 
t he env i ronment (Sallivan & Nonaka, 1988; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991; J a i n & 
Tucker, 1995; De Wit & Meyer, 1999). Thus , s t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is 
positively related to the need to inst i tut ionalise environmenta l s cann ing in response 
to pess imism. Most J a p a n e s e MNCs have the p lann ing office to collect a n d analyse 
strategic i s sues for the u s e of their top management . They seldom u s e external 
agencies for scann ing the environment (Whitehill, 1991; Kono, 1992; P a h u d de 
Mortanges & Allers, 1996). On the other hand , mos t Dutch MNCs do not have the 
p lann ing office. Most Dutch top executives tend to use their common sense 
(Lawrence, 1991). To compensa te for the weak inst i tut ionalisat ion of their 
environmental scanning, mos t Dutch MNCs use external agencies frequently (Pahud 
de Mortanges & Allers, 1996). 
CP2: St rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of 
inst i tut ionalisat ion of environmental scanning in MNCs. 
Strategic information is often classified into opportuni t ies and th rea t s . 
Under t he influence of uncer ta in ty avoidance, top executives may have their own 
perception, interpretat ion and classification of strategic i s sues when they encounter 
a n d perceive uncer ta in ty . With regard to their differences in uncer ta in ty avoidance 
in the Nether lands and J a p a n , both Dutch and J a p a n e s e top executives might differ 
in their perception, interpretat ion and classification of the strategic i ssues . Strong 
uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of pessimism, whereas weak 
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uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of opt imism percept ion 
(Sallivan 6k Nonaka, 1988; Schneider 6k De Meyer, 1991; J a i n 6k Tucker, 1995). This 
re la t ionship implies t h a t mos t Du tch top executives t end to perceive a n d in te rpre t 
t he strategic i s sues a s oppor tuni t ies r a t h e r t h a n th rea t s , b u t mos t of thei r J a p a n e s e 
coun te rpa r t s t end to do so on t h e o the r way round . Under t he Influence of thei r 
pess imism, m o s t J a p a n e s e top executives t end to feel t h a t they need more control 
over t he envi ronment . To cope with thei r perceived uncer ta in ty , they t end to a s k t h e 
p lann ing d e p a r t m e n t to classify a n d s t r u c t u r e t he s t rategic i s sues (Kono, 1984, 
1992; Chen, 1995). On t h e other h a n d , mos t Dutch top executives t end to feel more 
comfortable with uncer ta in ty . They tend to feel n o need to classify a n d s t r u c t u r e t h e 
strategic i s sues (Lawrence, 1991; P a h u d de Mortanges 6k Allers, 1996) 
CP3a: S t rong unce r t a in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of 
classification of s t rategic i s sues into th rea t s , opportuni t ies , s t r eng ths a n d 
weakness 
CP3b: S t rong unce r t a in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of 
information s t ruc tu r ing in MNCs. 
4.4.2 Strategy formulation Both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e top m a n a g e m e n t a s 
a n executive board a n d a board of directors respectively a re the m o s t vital body for 
mak ing a strategic decision in bo th Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs. The manager ia l 
discretion in bo th of t h e m is high. Albeit the shareho lders of both of t h e m rarely 
interfere with t h e decis ion-making of their top management , the top executives in 
bo th of t h e m have to take all s takeholders ' concerns into their considerat ion a n d no t 
to m a k e a decision on the bas i s of their self-interest. Even if the final decision is t he 
responsibili ty of both Dutch and J a p a n e s e top executives, both of t h e m have seldom 
made a decision aga ins t the will of their colleagues a n d subord ina tes . 
Both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs tend to u s e a consensua l decis ion-making 
process to formulate their corporate s trategy and legitimise their choices of strategic 
decisions. Most Dutch MNCs legitimise s u c h a decision th rough the co-
determinat ion between top m a n a g e m e n t and the OR, whereas most J a p a n e s e MNCs 
do so th rough nemawashi and ringi in ringiseido. Consensus is required a t all levels 
in both of t h e m (Keizer et al. 2000). Nonetheless, the way to reach a consensus on 
devising corporate s trategy in both of them are different according to their different 
scores in long-term v shor t - te rm orientation, individualism-collectivism a n d power 
d is tance of Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res (See Figure 4 .3 a n d Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.3: Strategy formulation in Dutch companies 
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Figure 4.4: Strategy formulation in Japanese companies 
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Long-term v shor t - te rm orientat ion is likely to influence w h a t top executives 
expect from the s t ra tegy formulation of their firms. Long-term orientat ion is 
positively related to t he long-term expectat ion of s u c h executives, whe reas shor t -
t e rm orientat ion is positively related to the shor t - t e rm expectation (Harrison e t al, 
1994; De Wit & Meyer, 1999; Hofstede, 2001). On t h e bas i s of t he c u r r e n t a n d 
projected environment , m o s t D u t c h top executives t end to de termine corporate goals 
for t he foreseeable future. The goal-sett ing for s t ra tegy formulation in m o s t D u t c h 
MNCs is pas t -or iented b e c a u s e m o s t of t h e m b a s e t he a t t a i n m e n t of the i r corporate 
goals on t h e p a s t profitability (Weimer, 1995; Douma, 1997; Yamada, 1999; Keizeit 
et al, 2000). In cont ras t , mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs tend to specify the gaps be tween the 
projected goals u n d e r t he c u r r e n t s t ra tegy implementa t ion a n d the de termined goals 
in t he a s s u m e d c u r r e n t s i tuat ion. They b a s e their s t ra tegy formulation a n d 
strategic decisions on these gaps . The goal-setting for t h e s trategy formulat ion in 
m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs is future-oriented (Kono. 1984, 1992; Smother , 1990; Sta lk & 
Weber, 1993; Chen, 1995). 
CP4: Long-term orientation is positively related to t he degree of future-oriented 
projection in sett ing corporate goals. 
Individualism-collectivism is likely to affect top executives' preference for 
mak ing a s trategic decision ei ther collectively or individually (Hofstede, 1984a; 
Butler, 1991; Haiss , 1991; Harr i son et al, 1994; J a c k s o n , 2000). This d imension is 
likely to depict political a n d barga in ing power in t he decis ion-making process . 
Albeit the Du tch executive boa rds and the J a p a n e s e boa rds of directors have the 
real power to make a strategic decision, the responsibili ty for each director in the 
boards themselves is quite different. Individual responsibili ty for making a decision 
is clear in mos t Dutch MNCs where a person in charge m u s t take a decision 
(Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie. 1992: Keizer et al, 2000). On the other hand , 
individual responsibili ty for making a decision is vague in most J a p a n e s e MNCs. It 
is very difficult to identify who really make a decision a s a n individual, because the 
directors make a strategic decision in the n a m e of the boards . This collective 
decision frees each director from full responsibility a s a n individual (Whitehill. 1991; 
Kono, 1992; Keizer et al. 2000). In conclusion, strategic decisions tend to be made 
by a n individual in mos t Dutch MNCs ra ther t h a n by a group in mos t J a p a n e s e 
MNCs. Thus , individual responsibility for making a decision is clearer in mos t 
Dutch MNCs t h a n in mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs. 
CP5a: Individualism is positively related to the degree of individual responsibili ty for 
mak ing strategic decision in MNCs. 
CP5b: Collectivism is positively related to the degree of collectivistic responsibili ty for 
making strategic decision in MNCs, 
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Large power d is tance is likely to influence t h e degree of t he centra l isa t ion of 
decis ion-making in a company (Jain 6k Tucker, 1995; Builtjen 6k Noorderhaven, 
1996). The decis ion-making author i ty in mos t Du tch MNCs is decentral ised. The 
n a t u r e of top-down disseminat ion of strategic decisions t h r o u g h o u t t h e company 
r u n coun te r t h e D u t c h n o r m s of c o n s e n s u s a n d participative m a n a g e m e n t (Teulings, 
1987; Lawrence, 1991; v a n I terson 6k Olie, 1992; Keizer et al, 2000). In contras t , t h e 
dec is ion-making au thor i ty in J a p a n e s e MNCs is central ised. The decis ion-making 
p rocess in t h e rtngi sys t em is no t delegated, b u t diffused. Most J a p a n e s e top 
executives essential ly m a k e the final decision (Namiki 6k Sethi , 1988; Lincoln, 1989; 
Whitehill , 1991; Keizer et al, 2000). Hence, the decis ion-making au thor i ty is more 
centra l ised in m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs t h a n in mos t D u t c h MNCs. 
CP6: Large power d i s tance is positively related to t he degree of central isat ion of 
decis ion-making author i ty in MNCs. 
4.4.3 Strategy implementation After mak ing a strategic decision a n d 
se t t ing corporate goals, each d e p a r t m e n t or division h a s to achieve t he common goal 
wi th i t s own accountabi l i ty in mos t Dutch MNCs a n d a s a p a r t of t he company in 
m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs (Teulings, 1987; Whitehill, 1991; Chen, 1995; Keizer e t al, 
2000). Everybody h a s a well-defined position a n d th i s position should be respected 
in m o s t Du tch MNCs, b u t not necessari ly in mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs. Nonetheless, 
bo th Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs sha re some commonali ty in their s t ra tegy 
implementat ion. Because the n o r m s of consensus prevail in both the Nether lands 
a n d J a p a n , in te rdepar tmenta l conflicts a re low in both Dutch MNCs a n d J a p a n e s e 
MNCs. With their more collectivistic orientation, mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs also instil 
their employees with commitment to the company, a broad comprehension of the 
corporate mission a n d all corporate cul ture and values . 
Because both Dutch and J a p a n e s e MNCs prefer internal promotion to 
external recrui tment , job mobility is rare both in the Nether lands a n d in J a p a n . In 
both of them, a n in-house and on-the-job training programme plays a crucial role, 
b u t it t ends to be company-specific. Nevertheless, the way to implement corporate 
s trategy in both of them differs according to their different scores in uncer ta in ty 
avoidance a n d power dis tance of Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tures (See Figure 4 .5 and 
Figure 4.6). 
Decision-making often deals with uncer ta in ty and risk. Because s t rong 
uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of pessimism, it is positively 
related to the extent to which top executives refrain from risky and unconvent ional 
s t rategy (Shane, 1993, 1995). Most Dutch MNCs are unlikely to choose and develop 
produc ts or marke t s carefully because they are unlikely to be afraid of the risk of 
failure. They prefer acquisition t ha t is quite risky to green-field inves tment tha t is 
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quite cau t ious (Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-Turne r & Trompenaa r s , 1994). In 
contras t , m o s t J a p a n e s e MNCs tend to p u r s u e evolutionary strategy, s u c h a s green-
field inves tment because they t end to be afraid of t he r isk of failure (Smother, 1990; 
Chang , 1995). They a r e likely to choose a n d develop p roduc t s a n d m a r k e t s 
carefully. 
CP7: S t rong unce r t a in ty avoidance is positively related to t he extent to which 
MNCs choose a n d develop p roduc t s a n d m a r k e t s more carefully. 
Large power d i s t ance is positively related to t he degree of t h e centra l isa t ion 
of a company (Wong & Birnbaum-More, 1994; Harr ison e t al, 1994). This 
central isat ion de te rmines t h e s t ruc tu re , the flow of information a n d t h e decision-
mak ing t h roughou t t h e company. With regard to their differences in power 
d is tance , t h e degree of central isat ion is different in bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs. 
Most Du tch MNCs tend to p u r s u e mul t inat ional s t ra tegy with a mul t idomest lc 
s t r u c t u r e w h e n operat ing globally (Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-Turner & 
Trompenaa r s , 1994). They tend to decentral ise t he flow of information t h r o u g h o u t 
thei r world-wide operat ion. On the o ther hand , mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs tend to 
employ global s t ra tegy with a central ised s t ruc tu re w h e n operat ing globally (Ronen, 
1986; Yip et al, 1997). They tend to central ise the flow of information t h roughou t 
thei r world-wide operat ion. 
CP8: Large power dis tance is positively related to the degree of centralisation of 
operation when MNCs pu r sue corporate strategy globally. 
Power d i s tance is likely to influence the way top executives motivate a n d 
mobilise thei r workforce, because it is related to t he con t inuum between egali tarian 
and hierarchical values . Large power dis tance is positively correlated with respect 
for h ierarchy a n d the u s e of personal author i ty th rough the corporate h ierarchy 
(Hofstede, 1984a; Chow et al, 1996; Offermann & Hellmann, 1997; Sche rmerhorn & 
Bond, 1997). Both bosses a n d subord ina tes in the Dutch MNCs m u s t be ready to 
explain a n d justify their behaviour a s equals . Most Dutch bosses have to u s e a 
discussion to motivate and mobilise their workforce. They do not have personal 
author i ty to do so (d'Iribame, 1989: Lawrence, 1991; Olie. 1994; Heijltjes et al. 
1996; van Iterson, 1997b; Vunder ink & Hofstede, 1998; Keizer et al, 2000). On the 
other hand , both bosses and subord ina tes in the J a p a n e s e MNCs m u s t respect the 
corporate hierarchy. Most J a p a n e s e bosses can u s e their personal au thor i ty to 
mobilise a n d motivate their workforce th rough the vertical relat ionship in the 
company (Misawa, 1987; Namiki & Sethi . 1988; Aoki, 1991; Katzenstein, 1991; 
Whitehill, 1991). 
CP9: Large power dis tance is positively related to the extent to which top 
executives in MNCs employ their personal author i ty through vertical relat ionship 
in the corporate hierarchy to mobilise their workforce. 
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Figure 4.5: Strategy implementation in Dutch companies 
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Figure 4.6: Strategy implementation in Japanese companies 
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4.4.4 Evaluation and control are rather dissimilar in both Dutch and 
Japanese MNCs. Albeit both of them avoid maximising performance that are unable 
to assure their corporate success, both of them deal with this avoidance differently. 
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To avoid t he top-down n a t u r e a n d the sobriety of SMP, m o s t Du tch MNCs focus on 
a t ta in ing the m o s t realistic performance. To avoid detai ls of SMP, m o s t J a p a n e s e 
MNCs focuses more on a t ta in ing satisfactory performance. With respec t to bo th 
D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tures , t he way of evaluation a n d control in bo th Du tch a n d 
J a p a n e s e MNCs differ according to their different scores in long-term v shor t - t e rm 
or ientat ion a n d power d i s tance (See Figure 4 .7 a n d Figure 4.8). 
Long-term v shor t - t e rm orientat ion is likely to predict a t endency to 
emphas i se ei ther shor t - t e rm or long-term performance m e a s u r e s (Harrison e t al, 
1994; Merchan t et al, 1995). Du tch top executives lay a relatively high e m p h a s i s on 
book value-based a n d profitability-related financial goals for evaluat ion a n d control. 
They t end to b a s e t he a t t a i nmen t of their performance m e a s u r e on the p a s t 
profitability. Even if t he manager ia l discretion is high in mos t Du tch MNCs, mos t 
Dutch top executives t end to feel p ressur i sed to a t t a in shor t - t e rm resu l t (Lawrence, 
1991; Weimer, 1995; Yamada, 1999; Keizer et al, 2000). 
In cont ras t , m o s t J a p a n e s e top executives tend to base the a t t a i n m e n t of 
thei r performance m e a s u r e s on the gaps be tween the future projection u n d e r t he 
cu r r en t s t ra tegy implementa t ion a n d the de termined goals in t he a s s u m e d c u r r e n t 
s i tuat ion. Because they are no t p ressur i sed to a t t a in shor t - t e rm resu l t s , they p u t a 
relatively low e m p h a s i s on book value-based a n d profitability-related financial goals 
for evaluat ion a n d control (Kono, 1984; Smothers , 1990; Sta lk & Weber, 1993; 
Chen, 1995). 
CP 10a: Shor t - t e rm orientat ion is positively related to t he degree of emphas i s on 
profitability a s criteria for evaluation and control in MNCs. 
CPlOb: Long-term orientat ion is positively related to the degree of emphas i s on 
profitability a s criteria for evaluation and control in MNCs. 
Power d is tance is positively correlated with the u s e of personal author i ty 
th rough the corporate hierarchy for corrective action (Chow et al, 1996; Offermann 
& Hellmann. 1997; Schermerhorn & Bond, 1997). As a resul t of the co-
determinat ion, mos t Dutch MNCs base their evaluation and control on negotiation, 
not top-down determinat ion (Douma, 1997; Yamada, 1999: Keizer et al, 2000). 
Because everybody is supposed to be equal in most Dutch MNCs, most Dutch top 
executives tend to u s e a discussion and persuas ion r a the r t han their personal 
author i ty for corrective action. On the other hand , mos t J a p a n e s e manage r s often 
u s e their personal author i ty to a sk their subord ina tes to improve corporate 
performance for corrective action (Kono, 1984; Smothers , 1990; Stalk & Weber, 
1993; Chen, 1995). Because everybody needs to respect the corporate h ierarchy in 
mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs, most J a p a n e s e top executives are unlikely to d i scuss with 
their subord ina tes a s equals for corrective action (Keizer et al, 2000). 
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C P U : Large power d is tance is positively related to t he extent to which top 
executives in MNCs u s e their personal au thor i ty t h rough vertical re la t ionship in 
the corporate h ie ra rchy for corrective act ions. 
Figure 4.7: Evaluation and control in Dutch companies 
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Figure 4.8: Evaluation and control in Japanese companies 
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In addition, the relationship between environmental scanning and power 
distance suggested in section 2.4.1 is not supported by literature on Dutch and 
Japanese SMPs in this chapter. Neither is the relationship between strategy 
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formulation and long-term v shor t - t e rm orientat ion implied in section 2 .4 .2 . Even if 
t h i s l i terature on Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e SMPs suppor t s t h e relat ionship be tween 
s t ra tegy implementa t ion a n d uncer ta in ty avoidance in t e r m s of a t endency to p u r s u e 
convent ional strategy, it does not suppor t th i s re la t ionship in t e r m s of a 
commi tmen t to t he s t a t u s quo. Li terature on t h e re la t ionship be tween na t iona l 
cu l tu re a n d SMP does n o t s u p p o r t any re la t ionship be tween any s t eps of SMPs a n d 
masculini ty-femininity a s in section 2 .4 . Neither does l i tera ture on Du tch a n d 
J a p a n e s e SMPs. However, t h e empirical evidence in Chap te r 9 migh t s u p p o r t t he se 
re la t ionships . 
4.5 Conclusion 
The SMPs of bo th Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs consis t ing of envi ronmenta l 
scanning , s t rategy formulation, s t rategy implementa t ion a n d evaluat ion a n d control 
in relat ion to t h e five d imensions , namely power dis tance, individualism-
collectivism, unce r t a in ty avoidance, masculinity-femininity a n d long-term v shor t -
t e rm orientat ion is d i scussed in th i s chapter . The comparat ive s trategic 
m a n a g e m e n t model from section 2 .5 a s a consequence of the integrat ion of Wheelen 
a n d Hunger ' s s trategic m a n a g e m e n t model a n d Hofstede's model of na t iona l cu l tu re 
is u sed a s a reference model for t h i s d iscuss ion. This model is u sed to depict a n d 
compare t he SMPs of bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs according to exist ing 
l i tera ture on Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e SMP. 
With regard to Dutch MNCs, the inst i tut ional isat ion of environmental 
s cann ing in mos t Dutch MNCs is normally weak. Most Dutch top executives tend to 
rely on common sense a n d do no t analyse strategic i s sues continuously. Most of 
t h e m tend to set corporate goals and make a strategic decision among themselves 
before proposing their decision to the OR for legitimisation. After th is legitimisation, 
each depa r tmen t or division had to achieve the common goals with its own 
accountabil i ty. The employees in all levels in mos t Dutch MNCs u s e negotiation and 
persuas ion to reach a consensus on a t ta in ing corporate goals dur ing the phase of 
strategy implementat ion. Most of them tend to u s e financial criteria for evaluation 
and control. The individual accountabili ty for wha t is reached in such a c o n s e n s u s 
is a un i t of appraisal in mos t of them. Most Dutch top executives tend to u s e 
discussion for corrective action. 
With respect to J a p a n e s e MNCs, the inst i tut ional isat ion of environmental 
s cann ing in J a p a n e s e MNCs is typically s trong. Most J a p a n e s e top executives tend 
to rely on a ne twork of information between their companies and other par t ies and 
their intuit ion. The criteria for categorising strategic i s sues are clear in J a p a n e s e 
MNCs. To set corporate goals, mos t J a p a n e s e top executives project the future 
performance u n d e r the cur ren t strategy. To legitimise their strategic decisions, the 
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J a p a n e s e top executives a s k their middle m a n a g e r s to init iate a new project t h rough 
ringiseido. After t h i s legitimisation, all d e p a r t m e n t s or divisions have to achieve the 
c o m m o n goals a s a pa r t of the companies . Most J a p a n e s e MNCs u s e both 
m e a s u r a b l e a n d non -measu rab l e criteria for evaluat ion a n d control. However, the 
follow-up process t e n d s to be weak because it is based on t rus t . Most J a p a n e s e top 
executives t end to u s e their personal au thor i ty for corrective act ion. 
Under t he reference model, t he depiction of D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e SMPs 
indicates t h a t t h e SMP of m o s t Dutch MNCs is different from t h a t of m o s t J a p a n e s e 
MNCs. Then, t h e model is also applied to t he compar i son between t h e SMPs of the 
Du tch a n d t h a t of t he J a p a n e s e MNCs. The five d imens ions in Hofstede's model a re 
u sed to explain t he difference between t he SMPs in bo th cu l tura l se t t ings . Some 
d imens ions can explain th i s difference, b u t o thers a re not . According to ex tan t 
l i tera ture on Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e SMPs, both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs prefer to 
reach a c o n s e n s u s on their s trategic decis ion-making processes even if bo th Dutch 
a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res a re in opposition to each o the r in every d imension in 
Hofstede's model. However, bo th of their consensua l decis ion-making processes 
differ from each other in m a n y ways . 
The a s s u m e d causal i ty from the compar ison is a tentat ive bas i s for 
formulating t he conceptual proposi t ions in th is chap te r . However, some relat ions 
between nat ional cu l tu re a n d SMP are comparable in bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
MNCs, b u t t he o thers a re not . Only analogous relat ions a re used to m a t c h the SMPs 
in both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs. The p resumed causa t ion between both Dutch 
and J a p a n e s e cul tures , and the SMPs in both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs generates 
11 conceptual proposit ions for both corroboration and falsification with the 
empirical data . The interaction between the conceptual proposit ions in this chapter 
and the empirical proposit ions emerging in Chapter 9 a re used a s a bas i s for 
redefining th is model and reshaping the proposit ions for the future research. 
However, ex tant l i terature on Dutch and J a p a n e s e SMPs can verify nei ther the 
cons t ruc t s in Quinn and Rohrbaugh 's CVTVl. nor the impact of Dutch and J a p a n e s e 
SMPs on the corporate performance of both Dutch and J a p a n e s e MNCs. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
RATIONALE BEHIND METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
Research into t he domain of comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t is usua l ly m u c h more 
complex a n d difficult t h a n t h a t in to t h e o ther a r e a s of m a n a g e m e n t s tud ie s . Before 
conduct ing resea rch into th i s domain , t h e deficiencies of th i s k ind of r e sea rch m u s t 
b e d iscussed beforehand. The mos t ser ious problem with th i s k ind of r e sea rch is 
t h e a t t r ibu t ion of t he findings to t he operat ional isat ion of cu l ture a s a n independen t 
or exploratory variable. This problem often leads to t h e t h r ea t s to t he qual i ty of a 
r esea rch conclusion. Nonetheless, it is impossible to avoid a comparat ive r e sea rch 
design w h e n t h e a u t h o r h a s to inquire into t he impac t of cu l ture on SMPs of MNCs 
from different h o m e count r ies . 
A good research design m u s t be able to g u a r a n t e e the quali ty of r esea rch 
findings. Because th i s s tudy is comparat ive research , more factors need to b e 
considered for el iminating methodological deficiencies a s m a n y a s possible. To 
develop a good re sea rch strategy, t he factors complicat ing comparat ive r e sea rch 
design a re investigated. To a s s u r e t he applicat ion of a comparat ive app roach to th i s 
s tudy, t h e advan tages a n d l imitat ions of th i s app roach a r e d iscussed in sect ion 5.2. 
Because t he sha red frame of reference between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu re s does 
no t exist, a n emic-etic dist inction is d iscussed in sect ion 5.3. For in ternal validity, 
a n emic approach emphas i se s depicting both cu l tu res in their full complexity. For 
external validity, a n etic approach underscores the compar ison between bo th 
cul tures . To compare both Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tu res meaningfully a n d to delve 
into each cu l ture concurrent ly, th is comparat ive s tudy m u s t satisfy both nomothet ic 
a n d idiographic modes a s discussed in section 5.4. A nomothet ic mode highlights 
the theory building. An idiographic mode emphas i ses t he causa l analys is within 
each cul ture . In section 5.5, the al ternat ives between small-N and large-N samples 
determine the choice between qualitative and quant i ta t ive research designs. The 
small-N s tudy delves into few cases . The large-N s tudy decomposes m a n y cases into 
variables for stat ist ical analysis . To design research into comparative m a n a g e m e n t 
t h a t can satisfy the requi rement of the emic-etic distinction, nomothet ic a n d 
idiographic modes a n d the al ternatives between small-N a n d large-N s tudies , the 
advan tages and the limitation of both qualitative a n d quant i ta t ive me thods in 
comparat ive research a re compared in section 5.6. 
Because comparat ive research into two or more different cu l tu res is more 
complicated t h a n research into one cul ture , the criteria for judging the quality of 
comparative research a re scrut inised in section 5.7. These criteria comprise, 
cons t ruc t validity, in ternal validity, external validity a n d reliability. The criteria for 
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comparat ive r e sea rch a r e generally more suscept ible to cross-cul tura l i s sues t h a n 
those for r e sea rch on one cu l ture . The rat ionale beh ind methodological development 
will lead to a good comparat ive research design for th i s s tudy in Chap te r 6. Section 
5.8 d raws a conclusion. 
5.2 Advantages and limitations of comparative approach 
Explicit comparat ive resea rch is appropr ia te for th i s s t udy of t h e effect of 
D u t c h or J a p a n e s e cu l tu re a t systemic level on SMPs in t he Du tch a n d the J a p a n e s e 
compan ies in Thai land a t sub-sys temic level of p h e n o m e n a . Comparat ive research 
on m a n a g e m e n t migh t embrace advancemen t in comparat ive sociology. However, 
m o s t comparat ive sociology focuses on na t ions a n d societies a s a n object of s tudy, 
w h e r e a s comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t focuses on firms within different na t iona l 
contexts (Nowak, 1989; Ragin, 1989). Normally, t he in t ra-na t ion s tud ies a re 
u n n e c e s s a r y for th is kind of research (Kohn, 1989). 
Comparat ive resea rch h a s th ree advantages . Initially, unl ike research on one 
uni t , it c a n identify cross-cul tura l similarities a n d differences. It often encourages 
t he a u t h o r s bo th to a s k ques t ions challenging to thei r own cul tura l a s s u m p t i o n s 
a n d t radi t ions , a n d to look beyond superficial similarities or differences owing to his 
deeper beliefs, va lues a n d relat ionship, so a s to minimise his cul tura l b ias when 
conduc t ing comparat ive resea rch into o ther cul tura l se t t ings . If t he a u t h o r applies 
t he s a m e concept to different cul tura l set t ings, he will easily detect h is h idden 
b iases (Ragin, 1987; Wright, 1996; Neuman, 1997). 
Secondly, comparat ive research can detect deficiencies in a research design 
a n d improve a research quality. It can tease out w h a t SMP m e a n s to a J a p a n e s e 
perception in comparison with a Dutch one. A wide range of concepts developed for 
explaining the s ame p h e n o m e n a in different cul tura l set t ings in comparat ive 
research e n h a n c e s the m e a s u r e m e n t in a research design and the 
conceptual isat ion. It is maximally useful when it resolves a controversy over 
interpretat ion (Kohn, 1989; Heartley, 1994; Neuman, 1997). 
Finally, comparative research can improve theory elaboration because 
comparative research ra ises new quest ions by either eliminating or offering 
alternative explanat ions for causali ty (Neuman, 1997). 
Theory elaboration depends on testing by comparison: data from each case used to 
assess ('test') some theoretical apparatuses. At the same times, theory elaboration leads to 
more fully specified constructs, it allows us to proceed with explaining similarities and 
differences among collectivities and the processes that create, maintain and change patterned 
behaviour (Vaughan, 1 9 9 2 , p 181)'. 
To improve a theory, Neuman (1997) affirmed t h a t comparative research can 
only apply, b u t not tes t the theory and its generalisation is limited. This a rgumen t 
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is invalid, because tes t ing is no t genera t ing t h e relevant var iables in theory-building. 
It allows t h e possibility of historical general isat ion. It c an bo th verify a n d modify a 
theory, b e c a u s e it genera tes empirical cons t ruc t s in con t r a s t s to t he discovery, t he 
in terpre ta t ion a n d the t ransformat ion of theoretical cons t ruc t s . In general , it c an 
t e s t t h e limits of s u c h a theory (Ragin, 1987; Nowak, 1989; Vaughan , 1992). 
Notwithstanding, comparat ive resea rch on organisa t ions h a s t h r ee 
weaknesses . Firstly, i ts epistemological poverty is t he m a i n c a u s e of t h e 
imperfection of s u c h research . The isolation of cu l tu re from other var iables is rarei 
Descriptive a n d vague conceptual isa t ion c a u s e s difficulty in comparat ive research . 
Much epistemological a n d methodological development is needed. Secondly, it is 
more t ime-consuming a n d difficult t h a n research into one cu l ture , because i ts 
comparabil i ty is hardly a t ta inable a n d its interpretat ion is more complex. Thirdly, it 
is p rone to u s e theoretical r a the r t h a n r a n d o m sampling, because t he randomisa t ion 
across cu l tu res is misleading w h e n compar ing two or more cu l tura l se t t ings where 
equivalence is a priority. 
5.3 The implication of an emic-etic distinction in comparative management 
It is impossible to j udge t h e quali ty of a research design in comparat ive 
m a n a g e m e n t wi thou t t he g rasp of t he dist inction between emic a n d etic. This 
dist inct ion is by far one of t he m o s t controversial i s sues in comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t 
research because it complicates the research design. The comparabil i ty of t he 
relatively dissimilar nat ional cu l tu res of the Nether lands and J a p a n is problematic 
because bo th countr ies have their own history a n d identity. An emic approach is a n 
investigation into a Dutch or J a p a n e s e phenomenon unde r Dutch or J a p a n e s e 
definitions respectively. Meanwhile, an etic approach is a n inquiry into a cul ture-
general phenomenon unde r the definitions of the universally law-governing 
explanation across Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tu res (Ronen, 1986; Ragin, 1987; Peng, 
Peterson & Shyi, 1991; Berry et al, 1992; Cavusgil 6k Das, 1997b). 
This fundamental di lemma is how to describe the SMP in Dutch cul ture to 
the Dutch meaningfully without losing the ability to compare with the SMP in 
J a p a n e s e cul ture and vice versa. Because the shared frame of reference between 
both cu l tu res does not exist, SMP in its full complexity can only been unders tood 
within each cul ture in which it occurs . According to the research design, an emic 
approach is intimately associated with i ts internal validity, b u t a n etic one is closely 
related with i ts external validity (Ronen, 1986; Berry et al, 1992). To unde r s t and 
both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cul tura l set t ings profoundly a n d compare bo th set t ings 
meaningfully, t he comparison between Dutch and J a p a n e s e SMPs m u s t embrace 
both etic a n d emic elements . 
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5.4 Nomothetic v idiographic modes 
Sjoberg, William, Vaughan a n d Sjoberg (1991) opposed both to t he 
e s t ab l i shmen t of t he universal laws (nomothetic) on the one h a n d , a n d to t he 
historical app roach a s s u m i n g no cross-cul tura l general isat ion (idiographic) on the 
o ther h a n d with regard to comparat ive research . However, bo th or ienta t ions are 
a imed a t identifying t h e lawful re la t ionship a n d t h e causa l explanat ion. A good 
comparat ive r e sea rch design m u s t satisfy bo th nomothe t ic a n d idiographic 
r equ i remen t s . F rom a n emic-etic perspective, t he emic approach leads to a 
qual i tat ive me thod of t he descriptive idiographic orientat ion, while t he etic approach 
br ings a b o u t a quant i ta t ive method of t he empirical nomothet ic orientat ion (Ronen, 
1986; Redding, 1987; Berry et al, 1992). 
Nevertheless t he leading research parad igm in comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t h a s 
been t h a t of t he quant i ta t ive survey. Most r e sea rche r s in th i s field have chosen to 
opera te within t he dominan t functionalist parad igm t h a t is nomothet ic . To asse r t 
t he general isat ion t h r o u g h o u t bo th cul tures , t he nomothet ic mode h a s 
overemphasised t he commonali ty between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cul tures . It does 
no t allow the a u t h o r to u n d e r s t a n d SMPs u n d e r Du tch or J a p a n e s e definitions. It 
migh t obscure t h e diversity across b o t h cu l tures . Some character is t ics of both 
Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tures , s u c h a s Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e preference for a 
c o n s e n s u s seem to be similar, b u t derived from different historical backgrounds t h a t 
often limit t h e validity of t he world-wide generalisat ion. Because replication from 
one cu l ture to ano the r is unlikely, th is mode alone canno t depict the discrepancy 
be tween both cu l tu res and their deviation from the law-governing universality 
(Redding, 1987; Nowak, 1989; Ragin, 1989; Chapman , 1997). 
The idiographic mode can delineate such a discrepancy and deviation. A 
cased-oriented compar ison in a given society unde r this mode helps the au thor to 
u n d e r s t a n d the complexities of a given company, b u t a cross-cul tural survey cannot 
do (Nath, 1986). However, this mode alone cannot compare both Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e cu l tu res meaningfully, because the local variables in each cul tural system 
remain unde r the definitions of both Dutch and J a p a n e s e contexts. If a comparison 
does not satisfy the nomothetic condition, the au tho r cannot summar i se 
theoretically similarities and dissimilarities th roughout this comparison especially in 
the case of a diverse comparison. Moreover, unde r the idiographic condition, the 
concepts a n d mental i ty of the au tho r ingrained with his cul tural beliefs complicate 
the compar ison a n d his interpretat ion more. However, these concepts a n d mentality 
can also unde rmine the rigour of the nomothet ic mode (Ronen, 1986; Ragin, 1987; 
Redding, 1987; Hofstede, 1991; Rosenzweig, 1994). 
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5.5 The implication of small-N v large-N samples 
Not only the choices between the nomothet ic a n d the idiographic modes , b u t 
also the a l ternat ives between large-N a n d small-N samples in each cu l tu re 
de te rmine t he opt ions between qualitative a n d quant i ta t ive research des igns . Albeit 
bo th small-N a n d large-N s tud ies a re a imed a t tes t ing a general a rgumen t , b o t h of 
t h e m are different in m a n y ways . A small-N one is a n intensive case s t u d y able to 
detect complexity by compar ing configurations holistically a n d analys ing all 
similarities a n d differences a m o n g ca se s in s u c h a s t udy totally, w h e r e a s a large-N 
one is a n extensive cross-nat ional survey applying a mult ivar ia te ana lys is u n d e r t he 
positivistic t radi t ion. Because t he n u m b e r of cases is kep t minimal, the small-N 
s tudy might obscure diversity w h e n the cases are used for theory elaborat ion 
th rough overlooking the u n i q u e n e s s of each case . On the contrary, t he large 
n u m b e r of cases in t he large-N s tudy causes the cases to loose their identi t ies a s 
they a re decomposed into variables for s tudying relat ions between variables, so 
similarities a n d differences among the whole case a re ignored (Ragin, 1989). 
The large-N s tudy can only satisfy the nomothetic-et ic mode because each 
case canno t be s tudied in i ts full complexity u n d e r i ts own definitions. Only the 
universali ty ac ross all cases , no t all idiosyncrasies wi thin each case a re applicable tp 
t he large-N one. In contras t , the small-N s tudy can satisfy both idiographic a n d 
nomothet ic mode concurrent ly because each case c a n be s tudied in i ts full 
complexity. Both commonali ty ac ross all cases a n d idiosyncrasy within each case 
are possible for a comparison of the small-N one. With recognition of t he diversity 
a n d causa l heterogeneity, th is s tudy will u se the small-N one with the quali tative 
method. 
5.6 Case-oriented v variable-oriented comparisons 
Ragin (1987) divided comparat ive research into two approaches : (1) a case-
oriented method, and (2) a variable-oriented method. The case-oriented method 
apprehends the comparison of relatively few cases chosen cautiously for elaborating 
theoretical reasons . It typically scrut inises many dependent and independent 
variables in different configurations in a limited n u m b e r of cases. It is related to 
small-N samples , b u t not directly related to a n idiographic mode because it might be 
conducted u n d e r a pre-specified conceptual model. Data are often in the form of 
documents , observat ions and t ranscr ip ts . Its analysis proceeds with extract ing 
themes or generalisation from evidence and organising da t a to interpret the 
meanings of the findings (Ragin, 1989; Neuman, 1997). This type of research is 
qualitative. 
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Table 5.1: A comparison between qualitative and quantitative comparative 
researches 
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Advantages Shortcomings 
l) It allows a n interaction between theory and l) It cannot allow an interaction between theory 
evidence. This interaction can reconceptualise and evidence, because its narrow specific 
the impact of national culture o n SMP (Ragin, quest ions about the current situation that 
1987; Orum et al. 1991: Sjoberg et al. 1991; need individual déjà vu of immediate 
Wright, 1996; Neuman, 1997, Berg, 1998). preference tend to deduce cultural 
2) Its holistic nature can capture the more commonality. Some information may lie 
dynamic reality of national culture and SMP outside the narrow focus of hypotheses (Heller, 
(Ragin, 1987; Orum et al, 1991; Sjoberg et al. 1988; Wright et al, 1988). 
1991; Snow & Thomas, 1994; Wright. 1996). 2) It cannot grasp the holistic and dynamic 
3) It can capture the complexity and nature of national and SMP in the real-world 
contradiction of national culture and SMP situation. 
(Ragin, 1987; Wright et al, 1988; Sjoberg et al, 3) It often fails to capture the complexity and 
1991; Wright, 1996; Berg, 1998). contradiction of national culture and SMP, 
4) It allows data triangulation through using because the relationship between national 
multiple sources of data (Wright, 1996). culture and SMP is complexly combinatorial 
5) It reduces preconceived biases from a priori (Ragin, 1987; Brannen, 1996). 
hypotheses with contradictory realities. 4) It does not allow the use of multiple sources 
Detailed comparisons suspend premises on for data triangulation. 
equivalence of cases and condition to enhance 5) It cannot reduce theoretical biases from a 
flexibility (Ragin, 1987: Eisenhardt, 1989; priori hypotheses for testing. Axiomatic 
Parkhe, 1993: Heartley, 1994; Wright. 1996). deduction and the narrow focus of hypotheses 
6) The more details of cases under study produce often constrain refraining the preconceptions 
richer data and more meaningful findings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Parkhe, 1993). 
(Wright et al. 1988; Heartley, 1994; Wright, 6) The disintegration of cases into variables 
1996; Neuman, 1997). under investigation often makes research 
7) It provides an insight into socio-linguistic findings l ess meaningful. 
patterns in Dutch and Japanese societies 7) It cannot be used as a test of meanings 
because the meanings attached to particular attached to particular Dutch and Japanese 
Dutch and Japanese behaviours depend on behaviours and the effects of Dutch or 
what concepts mean to the Dutch and Japanese culture, but as an observation under 
Japanese and how these behaviours are linked Dutch and Japanese conditions (Scheuck, 
(Sjoberg et al, 1991). 1990). 
8) It does not need randomisation for statistical 8) It cannot randomise the sample owing to 
inference. theoretical strictures on comparable cases 
9) It can observe the most central relationship (Ragin. 1987). 
among inaccessible and unsusceptible 9) It cannot test the most central relationship 
phenomena. among inaccessible and unobservable 
10) It does not need careful operationalisation and phenomena (Wright et al, 1988). 
standardisation for the replication. 10) Its careful operationalisation and 
11) It can satisfy both nomothetic and Idlographic standardisation often inhibit the replication 
modes by seeking commonality among (Sjoberg et al. 1991). 
cultures, whereas not overlooking each 11) It does not generally satisfy the idlographic 
cultural depiction in its own term. mode, but only the nomothetic one. 
89 
Table 5.1: A comparison between qualitative and quantitative comparative 
researches (continued) 
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Shortcomings Advantages 
1} It often Includes the author's biases 
because the author cannot detach himself 
from his research setting (Sjoberg et al, 
1991; Snow & Thomas. 1994; Neuman, 
1997). However, he can be honest w h e n he 
tells readers about data-gathering 
procedure and his perspective on evidence 
(Neuman, 1997). 
2) Its generalisation is limited, so that it can 
apply but not test a theory (Ragin, 1987; 
Wright et al, 1988; Orum et al. 1991; 
Neuman, 1997). Nonetheless, comparison 
means replication that is the best way to 
develop a theory (Neuman, 1997). 
3) To build a theory, it puts more emphas is 
on specifying factors in different cases than 
on assess ing the comparative importance 
of those factors. Unless an expected factor 
i s found, it may be improper (Vaughan, 
1992). Still, it m u s t aim at sensitising 
concepts, not at operationally defined 
concepts (Sjoberg et al, 1991). Some 
researchers are sceptical of its rigour 
(Eisenhardt. 1989: Parkhe, 1993). 
4) It is inapplicable to plenty of cases because 
an inquiry tnto a hundred of cases in a 
holistic fashion is impossible (Ragin, 1987). 
5) It can be decimated by the uncontrollable 
practices (Wright et al, 1988). 
1) It better excludes the author's biases through 
statistical inference, but not altogether. The 
way of posing questions still determines 
research findings. Complete objectivity i s 
unattainable, but quantitative researchers 
often believe that they can attain It. 
2) Its generalisation is broader, but dependent on 
the sample size. 
3) It can test a theory through statistical 
analysis. It lays an emphasis o n assess ing the 
comparative significance under the nomothetic 
mode. 
4) It is applicable to plenty of c a s e s by 
decomposing the cases into variables. After 
that, these variables are tested to find the 
relationship among themselves (Ragin, 1987). 
5) It is detached from the uncontrollable real 
world of SMP. This makes an inquiry into 
cultural causality clearer and less spurious, 
but often unrealistic. 
The variable-oriented survey is based on a hypothetico-deductive fashion 
under the nomothet ic mode. Its da ta are often in the form of n u m b e r s . This type of 
research is quant i ta t ive. To asser t its generalisation from statistical inference, it 
m u s t be p u r s u e d in a large scale requiring the large-N samples . 
Both types of comparative research have their s t rengths and weaknesses 
owing to their epistemological roots. The qualitative method p u t s more emphas i s on 
the research, b u t t he quant i ta t ive one lays more emphas i s on the da t a analysis 
(Wright, 1996). Before choosing one of both types, bo th the theoretical a n d practical 
s t reng ths a n d weaknesses of each method is assessed in Table 5 .1 . As Ragin (1987) 
suggested, because the n u m b e r of per t inent cases in th is s tudy is too small to allow 
the use of statist ical analysis , the qualitative method t h a t is insensitive to normal 
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dis t r ibut ion in place of t he quant i ta t ive method is employed in th i s s tudy . 
Fu r the rmore , t he quali tat ive method satisfies bo th nomothet ic a n d idiographic 
modes , whe reas t he quant i ta t ive method fits only the nomothet ic one. 
The quali tat ive me thod can be t te r solve t he d i lemma between emic a n d etic 
perspect ives . It migh t t e s t a n d suppor t Hofstede's model, because it c an rectify bo th 
theoret ical a n d methodological misconcept ions s t emming from the large-scale cross-
na t iona l survey of Hofstede (Bradshaw & Wallace, 1991; Wright, 1996). 
5.7 Criteria for judging the quality of research design 
The quali ty of t he research findings is t he m o s t impor tan t i s sue for 
conduc t ing th i s s tudy . Research with high quali ty m u s t produce a valid a n d reliable 
conclusion. Rigour is a se t of criteria for justifying the quality of the research 
findings. Nonetheless , the rigour of the qualitative method is ha r d to achieve 
b e c a u s e of t he combinatorial a n d holistic n a t u r e of explanat ion in th i s method. 
Random sampling, generalisability, a n d reliable a n d valid m e a s u r e m e n t a re not 
applicable to th i s method . Trus twor th iness is a more per t inen t terminology for th i s 
me thod (Ragin, 1987; Miles 6k Huberman , 1994; Padgett , 1998). 
The two ma in methodological i s sues in th i s s tudy, the design of the s tudy 
a n d the analys is of t he research findings, should be addressed carefully, so a s to 
safeguard t h e conclusion aga ins t a n y rival explanat ions th rea ten ing to t he s tudy ' s 
t rus twor th iness . A good research design m u s t p roduce a valid a n d credible 
conclusion. A good d a t a analysis m u s t follow a reliable a n d audi table procedure . 
To facilitate readers ' comprehension, the terminology forjudging the quality of 
research findings in an experimental design, namely cons t ruc t validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability are applied to th is s tudy (Ragin, 1987; Yin, 
1993. 1994). 
5 .7 .1 Construct validity is dealing with the objectivity, the perception and 
the comparabili ty between Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tu res in this s tudy. To explain 
Dutch and J a p a n e s e pa t t e rns of SMP accurately, all cons t ruc t s in the reference 
model m u s t be conceptually comparable. To cap ture Dutch and J a p a n e s e evidence 
correctly, all research in s t rumen t s m u s t be effectively t ransla table . From a 
positivistic viewpoint, the au thor ' s subjectivity is likely to influence the research 
conclusion unde r th i s qualitative s tudy. The au tho r might be unaware of his biases. 
To ensu re relative neutral i ty and reasonable freedom from these biases, he must , a t 
least, ar t iculate the existing inevitable biases a s m u c h a s possible. Objectivity is 
intimately linked with replicability, b u t nei ther of t h e m is the same thing. Only the 
objective and comparable ins t ruments for both cu l tu res can minimise these biases 
and produce the valid resu l t s (Yin, 1993, 1994; Miles 6k Huberman, 1994; Johnson , 
1996; Berg, 1998). 
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With regard to a n emic-etic dilemma, cons t ruc t validity of th i s s tudy can be 
unde rmined by the following n ine t h r ea t s (Cook & Campbell , 1979; Maxwell, 1996; 
v a n de Vijver & Leung, 1997; Padgett , 1998): (a) lack of knowledge of o thers ' way of 
seeing thing, fb) level of equivalence, (c) researchers ' subjectivity a n d 
preconcept ions , (d) reactivity, (e) r e sponden t s ' b iases , (f) confounding levels of 
cons t ruc t s a n d cons t ruc t s , (g) historical equivalence, (h) mono-operat ion b i a s a n d (i) 
mono-method b i a s (See Appendix I). 
5.7.2 Internal validity is dealing with na t iona l cu l tu re a s t h e only major 
explanat ion for the SMP in th i s s tudy. National cu l tu re is no t necessar i ly t h e be s t 
explanat ion for different findings, b u t th i s s t udy m u s t b e able to prove t ha t . In 
general , the intel lectual communi ty is socially sceptical of the sincerity of t h e 
au thor . His integrity is extremely impor tan t in th i s quali tative case s t u d y b e c a u s e a 
ques t ion of t rus t , a lack of cross checks a n d different k inds of b ias c a n u n d e r m i n e 
the credibility of the resea rch findings. However, th i s research design is n o t totally 
i m m u n e to al ternat ive explanat ions caused by some ex t raneous variables . To avoid 
a b l u n t conclusion t h a t there is t he causal i ty between cu l ture a n d SMP, t he a u t h o r 
acknowledges t h a t some other ex t raneous factors may determine SMP a n d h e 
c a n n o t totally exclude these factors from his s tudy. Because some events a re not 
directly observable, a careful inference d rawn from observat ion is crucial . In 
general , th i s s t udy m u s t be internally valid before it c a n be externally valid (Ronen, 
1986; Heller, 1988; Yin, 1994; Neuman , 1997). 
There are twelve ma in t h r ea t s to in ternal validity of th i s s tudy (Cook & 
Campbell , 1979; Adler, 1984; Hofstede, 1984a; Ronen, 1986; Ragin, 1987; Maxwell, 
1996): (a) incorrect level of analysis , (b) problems of contradictory findings, (c) 
ambiguity about the direction of causality, (d) Galton's problem, (e) methodological 
simplicity, (f) history, (g) matura t ion , (h) test ing effect, (i) ins t rumenta t ion , (j) 
selection, (k) mortality, (1) interact ions with selection (See Appendix I). 
5 . 7 . 3 External validity is dealing with how far resu l t s from the s tudy are 
generalisable is the focal point of external validity. These results , a t least, m u s t be 
generalisable th roughou t all Dutch and J a p a n e s e cases unde r this s tudy. Are they 
applicable to other Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land? Are they possible 
to apply to other foreign-based companies t ha t have the national cul tures similar to 
t h a t of ei ther Dutch or J a p a n e s e cul ture? The application of research findings to 
o ther set t ings is very crucial for a theoretical explanation. The transferability 
between the findings from each case in each cul ture can ensure t he generalisabilityl 
a n d in t u r n the valid causal i ty (Miles & Huberman , 1994; Yin, 1994). 
The main criticism of the case-oriented method is limited generalisability. Most 
qualitative me thods are both causally analytic and historically interpretative, b u t 
their findings are not often immediately generalisable beyond the study. Case s tudy 
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often implies idiosyncrasy. However, the qualitative method relies on analytical, no t 
statistical generalisation. To u n d e r s t a n d the causa l re la t ionship between nat ional 
cu l tu re and SMP, causa l general isat ion is more impor t an t t h a n historical 
in terpreta t ion. This is t he generalisat ion to the reference model (Ragin, 1987; 
Walton, 1992; Yin, 1994; S take , 1998). 
The selection of ca se s a n d cu l tu res is more s t r ingen t in comparat ive 
m a n a g e m e n t r e sea rch t h a n in resea rch into one cu l tu re . Matching ca se s on the 
b a s i s of theoret ical s t r i c tu res i s more common a n d plausible , because 
randomisa t ion hard ly verifies differences between cu l tu res . To e n h a n c e 
generalisability, t he criterion for enumera t ing cases i s equivalence, no t s a m e n e s s . 
Because some i tems a re cross-cul tural ly comparable , b u t o thers are not, ma tch ing 
on one variable m a y lead to mismatch ing on o ther var iables . This criterion is 
somet imes uncontrol lable (Heller, 1988; Wright et al, 1988; Nasif et al, 1991; Berry 
et al, 1992; Tayeb, 1994; J o h n s o n , 1996; Cavusgil & Das , 1997b). 
There are four m a i n th rea t s to external validity from the s t r ingent criteria for 
th i s s tudy (Cook & Campbell , 1979; Ragin, 1987): (a) a degree of similarity among 
cases , (b) a degree of diversity a m o n g cases , (c) limited general isat ion to modal 
i n s t ances and (d) limited general isat ion to target i n s t ances (See Appendix I). 
5.7.4 Relialbility is the ability to repeat the initial s tudy by employing the 
s ame research process within a reasonable timeframe. The same research procedures 
and ins t ruments m u s t produce the same findings even with different researchers . As a 
prerequisite for rigorous research, the purpose of reliability is to minimise the errors 
and the subjectivity in this study. The basic paradigms and the analytic constructs in 
the reference model have to be articulated (Miles & Huberman , 1994; Yin, 1994). 
However, reliability is hardly attainable in the qualitative method. To ensure reliability 
in comparative management research, all kinds of equivalence m u s t be established. 
All ins t ruments m u s t achieve comparability across cul tures . Because this s tudy is 
conducted under the influence of the author 's Thai cultural biases, the issues of 
reliability related to the data-capturing process would be suspected if researchers from 
other countries replicate this s tudy in the future. 
To enhance reliability, all research questions m u s t be clear and all features of a 
research design m u s t be congruent with these questions. All research procedures, and 
the author ' s role and s t a tus within the research sites m u s t be recorded in a written 
form, so tha t other inquirers can examine and repeat th is s tudy in the future. A failed 
replication in a different culture often misleads to cultural differences and their 
subsequent interpretation. The reiterated study m u s t be carried out in the same set of 
cul tures a s in this s tudy before its extension to another cul ture tha t h a s never been 
explored. Otherwise, the reliability of such a replication is questionable. If these 
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procedures a re well articulated, the successful replication of the research is possible 
(Wright e t al, 1988; Kohn, 1989; O r u m et al, 1991; Yin, 1994). 
The inaccuracy or incompleteness of da ta is ano ther th rea t to reliability. If t he 
captured da t a are inaccura te a n d incomplete, they can cause misinterpretat ion. Data 
m u s t be gathered across the complete range of proper cases, t imes, interviewees a n d 
so on posited by the research quest ions . To ensu re da t a accuracy a n d completeness, 
every time the a u t h o r cap tu res t he data , h e m u s t be aware of h i s own bias , a n d 
informants ' b ias , deceit a n d knowledgeability. The da t a m u s t be recorded and 
t ranscr ibed carefully a n d correctly. To ensure easy retrieval, the da t a will be 
categorised a n d codified systematically. The revisit to t he research s i tes a n d the review 
on case reports by well-informed peers can minimise th is problem (Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Yin, 1994). 
5.8 Conclusion 
To compare the SMPs of Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thailand, t he 
development of good comparat ive research is pivotal. Comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t 
facilitates t he comprehens ion of similarity a n d dissimilarity in manager ia l 
behaviours , especially SMP a m o n g companies in different count r ies . Albeit research 
into comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t h a s lots of methodological d rawbacks , it h a s th ree 
advan tages . It c a n identify cross-cul tura l similarities a n d differences in t he first 
place. Secondly, it c an improve a research design by detect ing deficiencies w h e n 
compar ing two or more n a t u r a l set t ings. Ultimately, it e n h a n c e s theorisat ion w h e n 
discrepancies arise from these different set t ings. Before developing good 
comparat ive research, the implication of a n emic-etic distinction, nomothet ic -
idiographic modes a n d small-N v large-N samples are d iscussed. Because the 
quanti tat ive method, such a s a cross-national survey cannot depict SMP accurately 
a n d deeply, and because this method can satisfy only a n etic distinction and a 
nomothetic mode with a large-N sample, the qualitative method, such as a case-
oriented comparison is chosen for this study. Notwithstanding, the quality of cross-
cul tural research is hardly a t ta inable owing to methodological problems of 
comparing two cul tura l set t ings in this s tudy. 
No mat te r w h a t kind of research, the quality of research findings is the mos t 
impor tan t i ssue in conduct ing good research. The research with high quality m u s t 
produce a valid and reliable conclusion. Rigour is a set of criteria for justifying the 
quality a n d t rus twor th iness of research findings. In the s ame vein, cross-cul tura l 
research needs s u c h rigour. To draw more a t tent ion to t he qualitative methodology 
in comparat ive management , the criteria for assess ing the quality of comparative 
research are d iscussed here. Nonetheless, the rigour of the qualitative method in 
comparat ive managemen t is ha rder to achieve t h a n t h a t of the quant i ta t ive one 
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because of t h e combinatorial a n d holistic n a t u r e of explanat ion in quali tative 
method . Normally, r a n d o m sampling, generalisability, and reliable a n d valid 
m e a s u r e m e n t a re rarely applicable to t he quali tative method (Ragin, 1987; Miles & 
H u b e r m a n , 1994; Padgett , 1998). To facilitate t he readers ' comprehension, the 
terminology pe r t inen t to a n experimental design, which is also often applied to other 
r e sea rch design is u sed a s a n ideal type here . The four criteria for judging the 
quali ty of quali tat ive resea rch into comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t comprise cons t ruc t 
validity, in te rna l validity, external validity a n d reliability (Yin, 1993, 1994). To 
a s su re t he quality of research findings in comparative management , all four criteria 
m u s t be at tained. If the research findings have high quality, the research design m u s t 
a t least achieve a high degree of t rustworthiness . Const ruct validity a s s u r e s cross-
cul tural objectivity a n d comparability. Internal validity ensures the credibility of the 
research findings t h a t there is no rival explanation. External validity asser t s the 
generalisation of the research findings to the whole population for theory building. 
Reliability affirms the verification of the research findings in the future. If cross-
cul tural research a t ta ins these four criteria a t acceptable level, it is likely to be 
t rustworthy. The rationale behind methodological development in this s tudy will be 
used to develop a n embedded multiple-case s tudy in Chapter 6 a s a research strategy 
for th is s tudy. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction 
In reply to a call for more r igorous comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t theory, th i s 
s t udy falls into explanatory theory-building. It is no t a mere descript ion, b u t it is a n 
effort to explain how far t he na t ional cu l tu res of t he Nether lands a n d J a p a n affect 
t he SMPs of t h e D u t c h a n d the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. To build a s o u n d 
explanatory theory, a sound research design is needed. After considering the 
methodological i s sues involving comparat ive research into the Dutch a n d t h e 
J a p a n e s e companies in Chapte r 5, a n embedded mul t ip le-case s t udy a s a r e sea rch 
design is developed in th i s chap te r in response to all cri teria for a s ses s ing the 
research quali ty in Chap te r 5. 
Because the case-oriented compar ison a s a quali tative method is t ime-
consuming a n d inheri ted with some methodological pitfalls, the choices between 
us ing and no t us ing a reference model to guide th is s t udy is d i scussed in section 
6.2. After choosing to u s e t he model for th i s s tudy, t he un i t of analys is in th i s s t u d y 
is d iscussed in t e rms of explanatory a n d observational u n i t s in section 6.3 in order 
to avoid t he problems of incorrect levels of reference a n d analys is . As a b a s i s for 
compar ing the cases u n d e r th i s s tudy, all conceptual definitions in t he reference 
model are operationalised in section 6.4 according to t he five d imens ions of nat ional 
cu l ture in Hofstede's model, the four s teps of SMP in Wheelen and Hunger ' s model 
a n d Competing Value Model (CVM) of Quinn and Rohrbaugh. To come u p with the 
embedded mult iple-case s tudy in section 6.6, the al ternat ives between a single and 
multiple cases within each cu l ture is d iscussed on the bas i s of the un i t of analysis 
and the generalisability within each cul ture in section 6 .5 . To forge a link between 
theorisat ion and methodological development, theoretical and cul tura l criteria are 
used to enumera t e all six cases unde r this s tudy in section 6.7. The criteria are the 
countr ies of origin, namely the Netherlands and J a p a n and three types of industry,: 
namely consumer electronics, bank ing and airline. 
To satisfy the principle of da ta tr iangulation, the da ta from the four sources , 
namely secondary data , archival records, documenta t ion and interviews m u s t be 
captured . The data-gather ing process is d iscussed in section 6.8. Section 6.9 
examines the u s e of ins t rumenta t ion for da ta collection, da ta m a n a g e m e n t a n d d a t a 
analysis in th is s tudy. In section 6.10, the da ta analysis is d iscussed in the 
following seven s teps : (1) da ta management , (2) a within-case analysis , (3) a within-
cul ture cross-case analysis , (4) a comparison between the within-cul ture cross-case 
analysis and extant l i terature, (5) a cross-cul tural cross-case analysis, (6) a 
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compar i son be tween the cross-cul tura l c ross-case ana lys is and ex tan t l i tera ture a n d 
(7) m e m b e r checking. Sect ion 6.11 reaches a conclusion. 
6.2 The use of a reference model in a case-oriented comparison 
There h a s been a deba te a m o n g m a n a g e m e n t r e sea rche r s a n d quali tative 
methodologis ts in major in te rna t iona l academic j o u r n a l s a s to whe the r ca se s tudy 
resea rch shou ld s t a r t with ei ther a priori theoretical preconcept ions or a c lean 
theoret ical s la te (Parkhe, 1993; Miles & Hube rman , 1994; Yan & Gray, 1994; 
Teagarden e t al, 1995). Because t he re la t ionship be tween theory a n d resea rch 
comprises bo th deduct ive a n d inductive e lements , m o s t case-oriented compar i sons 
lie between p re - s t ruc tu red a n d u n s t r u c t u r e d des igns . Scientific knowledge h a s been 
bui l t in bo th ways , b u t it m u s t possess 'a large body of secure a n d objective 
knowledge t h a t c a n be applied to any s i tuat ion (Walton, 1992, p 122)'. So far social 
science including comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t have no t yet reached a scientific s t a t u s . 
Most theories in social science are not general isable t h roughou t t he world. 
Paradigm shifts have occurred occasionally. 
Theory bui lding from qualitative induct ion or grounded theory method h a s 
higher s taying power t h a n one from a hypothetico-deductive fashion. Because the 
conventional wisdom of quali tative research is one t h a t only induct ion e laborates a 
meaningful theory, t he p re - s t ruc tu red designs m u s t b e kep t to a m i n i m u m . The 
theory m u s t evolve ou t of pa t t e rn s found in cases in t he course of investigation. It 
m u s t be grounded in the da ta , because the concepts evolving ou t of these da t a can 
generate new cons t ruc t s or variables. In fact, the case-oriented compar ison m u s t 
develop a theory, not tes t it (Eisenhardt . 1989; Vaughan , 1992; Brannen , 1996; 
Wright, 1996). 
The other camp of qualitative researchers disagree on this point because they 
contended t h a t the case-oriented comparison mus t , a t least, test and accoun t for 
applicable cu l tu res and susceptible variables specified by the previous s tudies . The 
resul t from this tes t might further explicate conceptualisat ion. Because it is 
impossible to commence an investigation without some ideas of its tentative 
findings, the case-oriented comparison should be built on an established knowledge 
or a t least a rud imenta ry framework. Initially, the comparat ive inquirers need a 
reference model to clarify the theoretical domain of research cons t ruc t s including 
any emic n u a n c e s in the employed concepts and to a s se s s intercul tural difference. 
The model 's domain a s sumpt ions cannot constrain the examination of the 
relat ionship a n d the pa t t e rns . Because a case analysis m u s t focus on connect ions 
a n d causes yielded to schemat ic methodological t r ea tmen t from its underlying 
paradigm, a reference model m u s t be established beforehand and then intercultural 
differences can be assessed . Without a common reference model, cross-cultural or 
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cross-case comparabil i ty is unlikely to be es tabl ished. The reference model can 
guide bo th t he in terpreta t ion of empirical d a t a a n d the parallel demons t ra t ion 
between the model a n d s u c h cases . It p revents the case-oriented compar ison from 
overwhelming da ta , ponder ing a n d gett ing out of h a n d , because s u c h d a t a a re 
schematical ly cap tu red according to i ts pre-specified cons t ruc t s (Ragin, 1987; 
Wright et al, 1988; Nowak, 1989; S j o b e r g e t a l , 1991: Walton, 1992; Yin, 1993, 
1994; Heartley, 1994; Miles & Hube rman , 1994; Wright. 1996; Cavusgil & Das , 
1997b). 
Theoretically, the case-oriented compar ison involves, a t least , two cu l tu re s or 
two cases . As a comparat ive analysis , th i s s tudy involves Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
cu l tura l se t t ings . Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cases m u s t be comparable . The u s e of t he 
reference model es tab l i shes equivalence across all D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e c a s e s u n d e r 
t he nomothet ic-et ic mode. Nonetheless, t he model may force the a u t h o r to b e n d 
d a t a ou t of Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e cul tura l contexts a n d force these d a t a to fit i ts 
buil t- in preconcept ions a n d a theoretical fix for comparabil i ty. This is t he danger of 
forcing-fit of da t a . The cases become less receptive to D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tura l 
idiosyncrasies a n d move away from t h e idiographic-emic mode w h e n the pré-
existent cons t ruc t s a re kept to a min imum. Undeniably, s u c h cons t ruc t s affects t he 
in terpre ta t ion of Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e contexts bo th unintent ional ly a n d neglectfully 
(Vaughan, 1992; Miles & Hube rman , 1994). 
To have bo th comparabil i ty between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res a n d 
sensitivity to idiosyncrasies of each cul ture , th i s s tudy m u s t lie between the 
nomothetic-et ic and idiographic-emic extremes. A model in a very loose fashion 
should guide th is comparison. As the comparison goes on, the a u t h o r looks for the 
da t a t h a t would disprove the a s sumpt ions , so a s to counterpoise his or her 
preconceived idea. Normally, the un ique da t a collected from chosen cases d raw the^ 
researcher away from the reference model evaluated in the light of findings. An 
analogy between the model and the findings can challenge, change or unde rmine the 
model itself. The initial reference model may not be the same as the las t one, 
because it might be transformed, reinterpreted and contradicted, and its cons t ruc t s 
might be configured. During the process of the comparison, the collected da t a 
r eshape the proposit ions unde r the model. In conclusion, propositions, no t full-
blown hypotheses are the s tar t ing point. The case-oriented comparison m u s t bo th 
tes t and elaborate t he reference model concurrently. A synthes is of induct ion a n d 
deduct ion is indispensable for a theory-building process (Ragin, 1987; Wright et al, 
1988; Bradshaw & Wallace, 1991; Vaughan, 1992; Walton, 1992; Heartley, 1994; 
Miles & Huberman , 1994; Wright, 1996; Stake, 1998). 
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6.3 Unit of analysis 
Does Du tch cu l tu re have t he s a m e effect on all Du tch companies in Thai land 
with respec t to tes ted regulari ty? So does J a p a n e s e cu l tu re? These two ques t ions 
a r e cau t ion w h e n u n i t of analysis is considered. Because the d a t a analys is in t he 
case-or iented compar ison h a s several levels, bo th a n incorrect u n i t of analysis a n d a 
m i s m a t c h be tween different levels of analys is m a y c a u s e mis in terpre ta t ion of 
r e sea rch findings. F rom a nomothe t ic s tandpoin t , every cu l tu re h a s a n impac t on 
a n y sub-sys temic set t ings , s u c h a s companies a n d SMPs. However, t he u n i t of 
ana lys i s is associa ted no t merely wi th relativism v e r s u s absolut ism, b u t also with 
o the r domains ' p r e sumpt ions . To avoid t he problems of incorrect levels of inference, 
t h e appropr ia te u n i t of analys is m u s t be identified, b u t s u c h identification is 
difficult. Usually, t h e type of u n i t of analys is is more impor tan t t h a n the a m o u n t of 
s u c h u n i t s (Serror, 1988; Nowak, 1989; O r u m et al, 1991; Sjoberg et al, 1991). 
On the b a s i s of bo th d a t a a n d theoretical categories, Ragin (1987) divided the 
u n i t of ana lys is into: (1) observat ional u n i t a n d (2) explanatory u n i t respectively. 
Observational unit is u sed to collect a n d analyse da ta . It is closely related 
to bo th micro-level objects of th i s s tudy and the locus of dependen t variables. In 
th i s s tudy, they a r e th ree pa i r s of Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land where 
d a t a a b o u t thei r SMPs are collected. These six companies are t he appropr ia te un i t s 
for observat ions , because they represen t populat ion sha r ing nat ionali ty a n d m u c h 
commonal i ty wi th t he clear bounda ry (Serror, 1988). 
Explanatory unit is used to explain t he pa t t e rn of resul t s . It is intimately 
related to both macro-level theoretical explanat ions for th is s tudy a n d the locus of 
independen t variables . Because the distinction between nat ion or society and 
cu l ture is unclear , nat ion ve r sus cul ture a s a un i t of analysis h a s confused many 
researchers . The researchers who have applied Hofstede's model to their s tudies 
have employed nat ional cu l ture a s a un i t of analysis in order to dis t inguish national 
cu l tu re from both nat ional contexts and sub-cul tura l phenomena . Because the 
na t ional cu l tu res of both the Nether lands and J a p a n is highly homogenous, both 
cu l tu res involving shared value in both societies are per t inent uni t s in explanation 
of th i s s tudy (Nath, 1986: Ronen, 1986: Berry et al, 1992). 
The relat ionship between both un i t s m u s t be causality. As explanatory 
un i t s , t he nat ional cul tures of the Nether lands and J a p a n m u s t depict the pa t t e rns 
of SMP in the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e companies a s observational un i t s . If a Dutch 
or J a p a n e s e company is u n d e r the influence of Dutch or J a p a n e s e cul ture , the 
relat ionship between nat ional cul ture a t macro level and SMP in the company a t 
micro level m u s t be a causa l explanation. 
99 
6.4 Operationalisation 
On the bas i s of the reference model, all conceptual definitions m u s t be 
operat ionalised in a way to es tabl ish t he criteria or pa t t e rn s for compar ing cases a n d 
to t he larger extent, t he nat ional cu l tu res of MNCs' home countr ies u n d e r th i s 
s tudy. These definitions a re not a lways strictly measurab le , b u t they m u s t a t least , 
become the focus of th i s s tudy. This focus m u s t , a t least , be observable, explicable 
a n d applicable to th i s comparat ive s tudy a s t he cri teria or pa t t e rns . T h u s , s u c h 
operat ional isat ion m u s t be cons is ten t with t h e cons t ruc t s specified in t h e reference 
model. 
According to Hofstede's model, the na t ional cu l tu res of t he Nether lands a n d 
J a p a n , namely power d is tance (PDI), individualism-collectivism (IDV), unce r t a in ty 
avoidance (UAI), mascuUnity-femininity (MAS) a n d long- term-shor t - term or ientat ion 
(LTO) are operat ionalised in Table 6 . 1 . 
Table 6.1: The description of Hofstede's scores for The Netherlands and Japan 
in the five dimensions 
Country PDI IDV UAI MAS LTO 
The Nether lands Small High Weak Low Shor t - te rn i 
J a p a n Moderate Low St rong High Long-term! 
From Table 6 .1 , t he scores of nat ional cu l tu res of the Nether lands a n d J a p a n 
are in opposition to each other in every dimension. Even if these operat ional 
definitions are measurab le , they are not aimed to m e a s u r e both cu l tu res per se. 
They are used a s a validated criterion for compar ing the national cu l tu res of both 
countr ies . This criterion comprises rituals in SMP and values in the perception of 
chief executives in charge of the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. 
According to Wheelen and Hunger (1995), SMP is operationalised in a way to 
provide s t ra tegy-making pa t t e rns for the comparison. The following operat ional 
definitions are not easily quantifiable, b u t they can be used to compare the different 
pa t t e rns among companies with different nationalit ies and industr ies . 
Environmental scanning is operationalised in a way the top executives or 
members of staff in charge of this function in the Dutch or the J a p a n e s e company 
perceive, categorise, diagnose and interpret strategic i s sues as a process before 
formulating corporate strategy. This process comprises the formal long-term 
information-gathering, the informal rout ine information-gathering, the 
environmental analysis , the criteria to classify t h rea t s and opportunit ies , the general 
perception a n d the interpretat ion of the environment, and s t rengths and 
weaknesses . How Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in Thailand scan the 
environment is the focus unde r th is operational definition. 
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Strategy formulation is operationalised a s t he process after t he 
envi ronmenta l scanning , b u t before t he top executives a n d other pe r sons in charge 
m a k e a s trategic decision according to their perceived environment . This process 
cons t i tu tes t h e focus of s t ra tegy formulation, goal-setting, al ternat ive generat ion, 
s t rategic decis ion-making, t he percept ion of s trategic decisions a n d the 
d issemina t ion of decisions a n d goals. How the D u t c h a n d the J a p a n e s e companies 
r e ach a s trategic decision, se t their corporate goals a n d devise thei r corpora te 
s t ra tegy is t h e focus u n d e r th i s operat ional definition. 
Strategy implementation is operat ionalised a s t h e s t ra tegies resul t ing from 
a strategic decision. This decision br ings a b o u t a corporate s t ruc tu re a n d other 
s t rategic activities. These activities, in essence, a re w h a t t he Dutch a n d the 
J a p a n e s e companies have done in a given period in order to achieve the i r corporate 
goals after s u c h a decision is made . This process compr ises programme-set t ing, 
policy-making, budget-se t t ing, corporate rule a n d procedure es tab l i shment , 
organising, staffing a n d mobilising workforce. 
Evaluation and control is operat ionalised in a way the top executives a n d 
other pe r sons in charge a s s e s s their companies by themselves internally. The gap 
between ac tua l a n d s ta ted goals according to t he corpora te s trategy is t he criterion 
for s u c h a n evaluat ion. This process cons t i tu tes cri teria es tabl i shment , 
performance a s se s smen t , benchmark ing , corrective act ions , interact ion with t he 
HQs a n d the RHOs, count ry manage r s ' performance a n d loss-making endurance . 
How the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e companies evaluate thei r performance, t ake 
corrective action when the s ta ted goals canno t be achieved and report their resul ts 
to their RHOs or HQs is the central point unde r th i s operat ional definition. 
Corporate performance is very difficult to be operationalised in a way to 
compare the resu l t s generated from the SMPs between the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e 
companies . According to CVM, conflict-cohesion, morale; h u m a n resource 
development, values of h u m a n resources, quality; flexibility, readiness , external 
evaluation, growth, interaction with environment, information management -
communicat ion, stability, control, planning-goal-sett ing are not quantifiable. Only 
productivity, efficiency and profitability are measurab le . Even so. these three 
concepts can be operationalised in many ways. It is still difficult to define wha t to 
be measured , because the measu remen t depends on w h a t company wan t s to 
achieve. Hence, th is s tudy canno t operationalise corporate performance a s a resul t 
of t he comparison between the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e companies . 
6.5 Multiple or single case within each culture 
At least, two cases have to be compared in th is s tudy. One is a Dutch 
company; ano ther is a J a p a n e s e one. How the nat ional cul tures of the Netherlands 
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a n d J a p a n s h a p e the SMP in bo th Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e companies respectively is a 
case . The al ternat ive be tween a single a n d mult iple ca se s t h a t r ep resen t t he whole 
cu l ture m u s t be evaluated before p u r s u i n g th is s tudy . The debate on advan tages 
a n d shor tcomings be tween mult iple- a n d single-case des igns h a s a l ready been 
d iscussed in some l i tera ture on case s t udy re sea rch (McClintock, B r a n n o n & 
Maynard-Moody, 1979; E i senhard t , 1989, 1991; B r a d s h a w & Wallace, 1991; Dyer & 
Wilkins, 1991; Walton, 1992; Heartley, 1994; Yin. 1994; Teagarden e t al . 1995; 
Brannen , 1996; Wright, 1996; Berg, 1998; Stake , 1998). Some methodologis ts 
(Bradshaw & Wallace, 1991; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Brannen , 1996; Berg, 1998; 
S take , 1998) advocated a single case for exploring a whole phenomenon ; o thers 
(McClintock, B r a n n o n & Maynard-Moody, 1979; E i senhard t , 1989, 1991; Walton, 
1992; Heartley, 1994; Yin, 1994; Wright, 1996) preferred mult iple ca se s for bui lding 
a theory. This deba te over t h a t l i terature missed some points , so these poin ts a re 
evaluated here . 
A single case h a s three advantages . Initially, it is specifically useful for 
inductive theorisat ion a s a bas i s for a hypothetico-deductive test . It is a n 
intrinsically implicit comparison. Many inquirers employ it a s a n i l lustrat ion of 
o ther cases , a s a n exploration before general isat ion a n d a s a n early s t ep in t he 
theor isat ion. If it is properly pur sued , it should no t only fit the par t icu la r company 
u n d e r s tudy, b u t also generally provide a n insight into o ther similar companies 
(Bradshaw & Wallace, 1991; Parkhe , 1993; Teagarden et al, 1995; Brannen , 1996; 
Wright, 1996; Berg, 1998; Stake, 1998). 
Secondly, it ga ins a n insight into micro-level cul tura l phenomena . It does 
not seek commonali ty for generalit ies and analogies. It m u s t be bounded , so t h a t 
certain p rominen t features in this s tudy, such a s strategy process a n d other 
behavioural pa t t e rn s can be recognised (Brannen, 1996; Stake, 1998). 
Finally, it gains a n insight into a new theoretical area. Telling the whole 
story in detail from a par t icular case can holistically be extended to: (a) the n a t u r e of 
the case, fb) historical backgrounds , (c) other contexts, such as economic, political, 
legal, (d) other cases th rough which this case is recognised, (e) those informants 
through whom the case can be known and (f) the physical sett ing (Brannen, 1996; 
Stake, 1998). 
Nevertheless, a single case h a s its own flaws, because it canno t s t imula te 
theory building even if it can prepare the groundwork for further theorisat ion. 
Generalisat ion is often restricted to a part icular company. As usua l , it focuses on 
telling the whole story in a narra t ive fashion ra the r t h a n on building a theory. A 
single Dutch or J a p a n e s e company cannot represent the whole Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
cu l tures with respect to the pa t t e rns of their SMPs. 
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Because a replication of several cases e n h a n c e s generalisability, mult iple 
ca se s a re bet ter t h a n a single case. The replication is u sed to a s s e s s t he resu l t of 
t h e original case . The re sea rche r s doing a case s tudy rarely claim t h a t their s tudy 
deals only wi th par t icu la r c i r cums tances . Because case-based general isat ion is 
possible, mult iple cases in a comparat ive framework are a n o t h e r s t ra tegy to build a 
theory. Multiple cases usua l ly embody causal i ty opera t ing in microcosms a n d their 
logic c a n demons t r a t e a causa l a r g u m e n t how general social force s u c h a s nat ional 
cu l tu re s h a p e s t h e SMP in a specific company (Orum et al, 1991; Walton, 1992; 
Stake , 1998). 
According to S take (1998), mult iple cases , however, have two drawbacks . 
Originally, a direct compar ison a m o n g collective cases d iminished the oppor tuni ty to 
learn from t h e whole case . Likewise, preconceived coding s chemes a s a way of 
theor isa t ion often inhibi ts a full comprehens ion of sufficient descriptive narra t ives . 
Because a single-case design nei ther offers a be t te r criterion for 
general isat ion th rough replication logic (Eisenhardt , 1989, 1991; Yin, 1994), nor 
d r aws a n analogy for explanation, it r ep resen t s ne i ther t h e whole Dutch nor 
J a p a n e s e cu l ture . Because a mult iple-case design c a n e n h a n c e external validity 
t h r o u g h analytic generalisat ion, it is a research s t ra tegy for th i s s tudy. 
6.6 Embedded multiple-case studies 
Case s t udy research is no t a da ta-ga ther ing technique per se, b u t it is a 
combinat ion of a n u m b e r of da ta-ga ther ing procedures . If a biography or life history 
is a s t udy of a n individual life, a case s tudy is a s tudy of a single sett ing. Because 
th is s tudy consis ts of two levels of un i t of analysis: (1) the nat ional cu l tures of the 
Nether lands and J a p a n a t explanatory level and (2) the Dutch a n d the J a p a n e s e 
companies in Thai land a t observational level, Yin (1994) recommended an embedded 
mult iple-case design for th is kind of s tudy. Each company from different indust r ies 
is embedded in either Dutch or J a p a n e s e cul ture according to the home countr ies of 
their pa ren t companies . 
As a research strategy, the first step is to collect and analyse da ta of each 
case, so a s to focus on the comprehension of SMP within a part icular company. 
This s tep provides a profound insight into the complexities of nat ional cul ture and 
SMP in each firm with its own specific chronological history th rough the analysis of 
each case (Ragin, 1987; Hamel, Dufour 6k Fortin, 1993). To be familiar with both 
Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cul tural sett ings, all secondary data , archival and documentary 
abou t social, historical, cul tura l or nat ional contexts are s tudied in the second step 
(Neuman, 1997). Because McClintock, Brannon and Maynard-Moody (1979) 
proposed the application of a survey logic to case s tudy research by construct ing 
preconceived expectation of the research findings th rough multiple cases , the 
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pa t t e rn -ma tch ing u n d e r the guidance of the reference model is u sed to find 
commonal i ty between the Du tch a n d the J a p a n e s e companies in t he th i rd s tep . 
This commonal i ty is u sed a s the equivalent criteria for t h e compar ison between 
Du tch a n d the J a p a n e s e cu l tu res . This survey logic a n d pa t t e rn -ma tch ing is used 
for a wi thin-cul ture , c ross-case ana lys is between the D u t c h a n d the J a p a n e s e 
companies . 
6.7 Selection of cases 
Some re sea rche r s ana lyse causa l m e c h a n i s m s ac ross a se t of comparab le 
cases for a focus on causali ty, no t on generalisability; o the r s u s e t he m o s t diverse 
compar ison for a focus on general isat ion not on causa t ion . Because a case s t udy 
m u s t r e s t on analytical , no t stat ist ical a s sumpt ions , cases are chosen on 
conceptual , n o t representa t ive g rounds , and the n u m b e r of cases is no t determined 
by r a n d o m sampling. On th i s bas i s , ma tch ing cases also e n h a n c e external validity. 
Perfect enumera t ion based on all var iables is proved to be virtually impossible. 
Matching on one criterion may lead to mismatch ing o n another . A trade-off between 
the level of control over cer ta in factors a n d the control over other cri teria h a s to b e 
made . T h u s , ma tch ing cases on some possible cri teria is the bes t way to find some^ 
p a t t e r n s providing t h e possibility of u n d e r s t a n d i n g complex i s sues a n d re la t ionships 
owing to t h e combinator ia l causa t ion of SMP (Ragin. 1987; Tayeb, 1987; Berry e t al . 
1992; Parkhe , 1993; Miles & Hube rman , 1994; Yin, 1994; Wright, 1996). 
Case selection is impor tan t for th is s tudy. This selection is more s t r ingent in 
a case-oriented compar ison t h a n in a case s tudy of one country. Both Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e cu l tu res are chosen because both of t h e m are both mutual ly exclusive and 
in opposition to each other in every dimension of Hofstede's model. In previous 
comparat ive research, the selection of cu l tures is often based on convenience, no t o|n 
theoretical criteria. Because both cu l tu res are quite homogeneous , Dutch a n d j 
J a p a n e s e companies can represen t a culture 's central tendency in bo th countr ies . 
Because the difference among subcu l tu re groups both in the Nether lands and in 
J a p a n is minimal, there is a lmost no impor tant th rea t of subcul ture variation to th is 
s tudy {Nasif et al, 1991: Berry et al. 1992; Tayeb, 1994: Johnson, 1996; Cavusgil & 
Das. 1997b). 
This s tudy is a comparison between the SMPs of the Dutch companies and 
those of the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. As countr ies of origin, the 
Nether lands a n d J a p a n are chosen because they have (1) the s ame level of economic 
development, (2) the comparable inves tment in Thai land and (3) cul tura l difference 
in every dimension in Hofstede's model. Types of bus ine s s m u s t not be overlooked 
as a level of analysis . Because differences in SMPs are intimately linked to indus t ry 
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sector contexts (Sorge, 1991), th ree Dutch companies a re m a t c h u p to th ree 
J a p a n e s e companies on the bas i s of types of b u s i n e s s . 
When causal i ty is combinatorial , a limited variety of cases , no t their 
n u m b e r s cons t ra in rigour. To maximise a diversity of ca se s is to e n h a n c e resea rch 
generalisabillty. Nonetheless , the diverse comparat ive s t ra tegy might overwhelm 
similari t ies a m o n g cases , because t he more dissimilar t h e cases , t he less t h e 
possibility t h a t causal ly per t inen t commonal i ty is readily identifiable. Albeit a 
variety of cases c a n e n h a n c e t h e r igour in theorisat ion, a n analys is of s u c h cases is 
t ime-consuming. A sequent ia l analys is of diversified ca se s can cause difficulty for 
t h e a u t h o r in complet ing h is s tudy (Ragin, 1987; Vaughan , 1992). 
To e n h a n c e external validity t h rough diversity, bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies in Thai land a re chosen from the indus t r ies t h a t a re very different by their 
very n a t u r e , namely c o n s u m e r electronics, sh ipping a n d mus ic b u s i n e s s in the first 
place. Dur ing the da ta -cap tur ing process , the a u t h o r encountered unforeseen 
fallback. The Dutch shipping company merged with t h e British one a n d the 
Canad ian investors bough t the Dutch mus i c firm. The comparabil i ty of cases in 
shipping a n d mus ic indus t ry is no longer valid. 
To minimise t he influence of Thai cu l ture on th i s s tudy, consumer 
electronics, b a n k i n g a n d airline indus t r ies are chosen . Because the p roduc t s a n d 
service in these th ree indus t r ies need minimal adap ta t ion to local marke t s , their 
exposure to Thai cu l ture is p resumably low. There a re th ree comparable pa i rs of 
cases in three indus t r ies . Fur thermore , these indus t r ies differ from each other to a 
considerable degree, so th is selection fits the mos t diverse case design. As a bas is 
for t he comparison, the commonali ty among three Dutch and three J a p a n e s e 
companies is the nationali ty of pa ren t companies . The commonali ty between each 
pair of a Dutch company and a J a p a n e s e one is types of indust ry . The enumera t ion 
of the six cases is shown in Table 6.2. From the perspective of J a p a n e s e 
consumers , the three J a p a n e s e companies comprising JCE , J B and JA are the bes t 
in consumer electronics, banking sector and airline industry . DCE and DA are only 
a consumer electronics company and an air carrier with Dutch nationality in both 
indust r ies . DB is the bes t Dutch b a n k from the perspective of Dutch consumers . 
Table 6.2: Case selection 
Dutch c o n s u m e r electronics (DCE) J a p a n e s e consumer electronics (JCE) 
Dutch b a n k s (DB) J a p a n e s e b a n k s (JB) 
Dutch airline (DA) J a p a n e s e airline (JA) 
The comparison between DCE and J C E is limited to the audio-visual 
p roduc ts where the direct competition between both companies is s t rong with 
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comparab le p roduc t l ines a n d services. The analogy be tween DB a n d J B is 
restr ic ted to t he corporate b a n k i n g b u s i n e s s where bo th b a n k s a r e bo th compet i tors 
a n d p a r t n e r s in syndica te loans . The investigation into DA a n d J B is confined to t he 
passenger bus ine s s , the ma in b u s i n e s s of bo th carr iers . After all, to e n s u r e t he 
precision, t h e validity a n d the stability of case findings, a n d to exclude a n y 
con t ras t ing ca se s from this s tudy , t r iangula t ion logic beh ind both wi thin- a n d 
be tween-case ana lys is is u sed to subs t an t i a t e the findings (McClintock, B r a n n o n & 
Maynard-Moody, 1979; Berry et al, 1992; Yin, 1993, 1994; Miles & H u b e r m a n , 
1994; W r i g h t 1996). 
6.8 Data gathering 
The d a t a a re systematical ly collected from the compan ies u n d e r th i s s tudy . 
Yin (1994) r ecommended the six sources of evidence: (1) documen t s , (2) archival 
records , (3) interviews, (4) direct observation, (5) par t ic ipant-observat ion a n d (6) 
physical ar tefacts . Because all six d a t a collection m e t h o d s have their own 
advan tages a n d l imitat ions, t he d a t a m u s t be ga thered from several sources for 
corroborat ing t he findings. Multiple sources provide a trade-off a m o n g several datk-
ga ther ing techniques , because they reduce t he r i sk t h a t t he findings will reflect the 
sys temat ic b i a ses or t he d isadvantages of each source . They can a s s u r e t he author-
that empirical var ia t ions in subjec ts u n d e r s t udy is a resu l t of t h e subject a t t r ibu tes 
r a the r t h a n da ta -ga ther ing me thods (Eisenhardt , 1989; O r u m et al, 1991; Snow & 
Thomas , 1994; Yin, 1994; Maxwell, 1996). 
The principle of us ing mult iple sources is known a s da ta source 
t r iangulat ion. To a t t a in in ternal validity, it c an reveal some discrepancies among 
da t a sources a n d give a bet ter pic ture of finding from each side of a story. Because 
cul tura l b iases are more appa ren t in the case-oriented comparison t h a n in the 
variable-oriented survey, between-source validity is a check on the au tho r ' s biases.! 
To a t ta in external validity, this principle increases a chance to build a more precise 
model. To build a theory, this t r iangulat ion m u s t converge on a single answer . To 
e n h a n c e reliability, it clarifies meanings and verifies the replicability of an 
observation or an interpretat ion through the use of multiple perceptions. Thus , a 
good research design m u s t include between- and within-method validity and 
reliability checks . Only tr iangulat ion canno t a s su re internal and external validity 
and reliability (Heartley, 1994; Snow & Thomas , 1994; Stake, 1995, 1998; Branneri , 
1996; Wright, 1996; Padgett, 1998). 
Theoretically, the different sources m u s t not c a u s e different observat ions, 
b u t multiple sources often induce a n analytical diversity t ha t m a k e a conclusion 
difficult. The effect of artefacts in a research design might also cause a problem 
with tr iangulat ion and corroboration for the research findings (Kohn, 1989; Snow & 
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Thomas , 1994). To m a k e a convergent a n d coheren t conclusion, t he logic of da t a 
t r iangula t ion is followed carefully. Moreover, to e n h a n c e cons t ruc t validity, the 
cha in of evidence wi th explicit l inks a m o n g the ques t ions asked m u s t be 
es tabl ished, a n d the d a t a collected a n d the conclus ions d rawn m u s t be uncovered 
(Parkhe, 1993). 
Nonetheless , archival records, documenta t ion a n d interviews a re t h e only 
th ree d a t a sources u sed in th i s s tudy . Direct a n d par t i c ipan t observat ions are t he 
m o s t uncontrol lable a n d subjective sources . Some events s u c h a s a t t i tudes , p a s t 
memories , future specula t ions a n d in tent ions a re n o t directly observable. The 
a u t h o r ' s par t ic ipat ion in t he research s i tes may affect t he events . T h u s , bo th types 
of observat ion a re unsu i t ab le (Snow & Thomas , 1994). Incidentally, physical 
artefact is i r relevant b e c a u s e th is s tudy is no t a b o u t archaeology or anthropology. 
Nonetheless , t h e secondary da t a collected from l i tera ture on Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
m a n a g e m e n t a n d o ther sources a re analysed beforehand. 
6.8.1. Secondary data involves a n inquiry into similarities a n d differences 
between Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in t e rms of na t iona l cul ture , managemen t 
style a n d SMP. This inquiry he lps to establ ish all equivalence between Dutch a n d 
J a p a n e s e ca se s with regard to significance and per t inence cross-culturally. This 
equivalence is operat ional in a way resul t ing in the valid interpreta t ion of da t a 
collected from t h e Du tch a n d the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land u n d e r the 
influence of Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res respectively. In th i s s tudy, secondary 
d a t a comprise (1) l i terature on Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t concerning 
nat ional cul ture a n d SMP, (2) the statistical da ta a b o u t Dutch and J a p a n e s e foreign 
direct inves tment (FDI) in Thai land a n d (3) the articles in periodicals abou t the 
Dutch and the J a p a n e s e MNCs unde r th is s tudy in par t icular . 
Superficial similarities m a s k profound differences s temming from different 
historical contexts might cause misinterpretat ion (Ragin. 1987). To cons t rue the 
research findings more effectively and to u n m a s k such differences, this review 
facilitates the familiarity with both cul tures , the identification of comparable 
ins tances of the s ame phenomenon and the analysis of the theoretically impor tant 
similarities a n d differences among both of them (Ragin, 1987; Kohn, 1989; 
Rosenzweig. 1994; Tayeb, 1994; Malhotra, Agarwal & Peterson. 1996; Cavusgil & 
Das, 1997a). It gives an insight into all equivalence between both cul tures . In this 
s tudy, l i terature on Dutch and J a p a n e s e managemen t revealed tha t both Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e managerial styles are consensual , b u t in a different m a n n e r owing to the 
un ique history of the Nether lands and J a p a n . If th i s l i terature is not reviewed, th is 
s tudy might conclude t ha t the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e prefer consensus in the 
same way. 
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The stat is t ical d a t a a b o u t Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e FDI a n d t h e list of Du tch a n d 
J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land reveal t he n u m b e r of these companies . These d a t a 
also disclose the significance of both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e b u s i n e s s p resence in 
Thai land. They a re cap tured mostly from domest ic sources , s u c h a s B a n k of 
Thai land (BOT), Board of Inves tment (BOT), Ministry of Commerce , J a p a n External 
Trade Organisa t ion (JETRO)'s Bangkok 's office, J a p a n - T h a i C h a m b e r of Commerce , 
t he Nether lands-Thai C h a m b e r of Commerce, Bangkok Post a n d t h e Nat ion 
newspapers . The selection of t he companies u n d e r th i s s tudy is ba sed o n t he se 
da ta . 
Li terature on Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs is retrieved mainly from 
in ternat ional sources , s u c h a s several academic j ou rna l s , the Economist , Far 
Eas t e rn Economic Review, Asiaweek, t he Nikkei Weekly, Financial Times, 
Bus inessweek a n d so on. The sources of da t a also include electronic j ou rna l s , s u c h 
a s Blackwell, MCB Press a n d Elsevier, da t abases from t h e Internet , s u c h a s UMI's 
Pro-Quest , Ebscohos t a n d SearchBank, l ibraries a n d so forth. 
6.8.2 Archival records deal with historical d o c u m e n t s a b o u t t he companies 
u n d e r th i s s tudy, including chronological p re s s coverage, books or art icles a b o u t 
corporate his tory a n d historical corporate documen t s (Brannen, 1996). These 
d o c u m e n t s a r e bo th in ternal a n d external . The in ternal sources a r e t h e 
chronological p re s s coverage, a n n u a l reports , t he companies ' web-s i tes a n d other 
d o c u m e n t s in t he companies ' archive. The legal d o c u m e n t s and financial 
s t a t emen t s t h a t the chosen companies have been required to submi t ted to t he 
per t inent agencies u n d e r Thai laws a re also the archival records. These d o c u m e n t s 
are available a t Ministry of Commerce and BOT. The external sources are the 
historical p re s s coverage from Bangkok Post, the Nation, the Economist , Far Eas te rn 
Economic Review, Asiaweek, the Nikkei Weekly, Financial Times, Businessweek and 
so on. To be familiar with the companies unde r the s tudy, their his tories m u s t be 
known beforehand. The archival records reveal the corporate history, the biography 
or autobiography of the company founders and some cu r ren t top executives, the 
strategies t h a t these companies made in the pas t and the evaluation of the 
companies and the indust r ies in which they operate. Because 'most archival 
records were produced for a specific purpose and a specific audience (Yin, 1994, p 
84)', they have to be modified, customised and systematically sorted ou t for th is 
s tudy . Archival records, such a s organisat ional cha r t s in the past , historical 
financial repor ts and companies ' history are obtained from these companies ' a n n u a l 
repor ts a n d websi tes . All these records are kept in separa te files for each company. 
6.8.3 Documentation deals with current and ongoing documents about the 
companies unde r this study, including both extra-organisational documents such as 
current press coverage of the companies, and intra-organisational documents such asj 
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cur ren t organisational char t s (Brannen, 1996). After t he background of the selected 
companies is known, the cur ren t a n d recent s i tuat ion of these cases is obtained from 
these documents . The documents are used to subs tan t ia te the evidence from the 
archival records. They are used to obtain the general information a n d verify the facts 
of these companies before, dur ing a n d after the subsequen t interviews. In some cases, 
they can provide other part icular details to suppor t the information from the 
s u b s e q u e n t interviews. If some documents are contradictory ra ther t h a n supportive, a 
further inquiry is pu r sued . These documents comprise t he recent a n d cu r ren t a n n u a l 
r epor t s a n d t h e p r e s s re leases from t h e companies ' web-si tes, financial repor t s a n d 
formal c h a r t e r s submi t t ed to Depa r tmen t of Commercial Registration, Ministry of 
Commerce , t h e c u r r e n t organisat ional char t s , t h e companies ' b r o c h u r e s a n d other 
in te rna l corporate documen t s . The concur ren t s tud ies a n d the art icles a b o u t t he 
ca se s in local, regional a n d in ternat ional sources , s u c h a s Bangkok Post, t he Nation, 
the Economist, Far Eas tern Economic Review, Asiaweek, the Nikkei Weekly, Financial 
l i m e s , Businessweek and so on are also documentat ion. 
Some d o c u m e n t s a re confidential because they a re very sensit ive to the 
companies ' s survival a n d strategy. T h u s , the ga tekeepers and key informants 
c a n n o t allow t h e a u t h o r to u s e them. The c u r r e n t d o c u m e n t s t end to be more 
confidential t h a n t h e archival records because they a re more related to t he cu r ren t 
s i tua t ion a n d the immedia te future of t he companies . By the way, all collected 
d o c u m e n t s a re kep t in separa te files a n d systematical ly codified for each company. 
6.8.4 Interviews can inquire deeply into the SMPs in the chosen companies. 
To gain access to the companies unde r the study, the personal network is very 
important . The au thor uses his personal network to find key informants, gatekeepers 
and respondents . Afterwards, both s t ructured and uns t ruc tu red interviews are used. 
In the first place, the indus t ry experts and the journa l i s t s who have long 
followed up the cases in each indust ry are interviewed in a conversat ional manner . 
Without any s t ruc ture , the indus t ry experts give broad information abou t the 
cur ren t s i tuat ion, t rend and competition in each indus t ry where these companies 
are operating. This information also includes the strategy tha t each company 
employs. The journa l i s t s not only give the same information, b u t also clarify what 
they have followed u p and writ ten in the newspapers . This clarification verifies the 
documents a n d the archival records of each case. 
To gain some more basic knowledge about the companies u n d e r the s tudy 
cases internally, the gatekeepers and the other key informants are also interviewed 
in a conversat ional m a n n e r in the second step. This information provides the 
viewpoint of the insiders, especially a t rank-and-file levels in the companies . This 
viewpoint is used to counter the s tandpoint of top executives. This internal 
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information is u sed to corroborate t he external information from the p r e s s coverage, 
t he journa l i s t s , t he indus t ry experts , the d o c u m e n t s a n d the archival records . 
Finally, t he principal interviewees in th i s s tudy a re t he chief a n d the o ther 
top executives who t ake p a r t in t he SMP of Tha i subs id iar ies of D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e 
MNCs. The nat ional i ty of interviewees is no t limited to Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e . Some 
interviewees a r e Thai . Because they have a very limited t ime, t h e s t ruc tu red 
interview t akes only one h o u r for each interviewee with open-ended ques t ions in a 
conversat ional m a n n e r . To obta in the permiss ion from these executives, anonymi ty 
a n d confidentiality a r e promised. 
Monolingual r esea rch should be avoided a n d it is be t te r to interview 
foreigners or expat r ia tes in their nat ive languages {Wright, 1996). Fortunately, all 
Thai executives a n d informants a re interviewed in Thai . Unfortunately, all D u t c h 
a n d J a p a n e s e expat r ia tes prefer to be interviewed in English. If a face-to-face 
interview is n o t possible, a te lephone conversat ion a n d a n e-mail inquiry a re u sed tb 
obta in da ta . The interviews were tape-recorded u n l e s s t he interviewees objected. To 
reduce a t ime lag in t h e course of da ta collection, all interviews were conducted 
dur ing the th ree m o n t h s be tween March 2000 a n d May 2000 . 
6.9 Instrumentation 
Because th i s s t udy u s e s only t he th ree sources of da ta , namely, documen t s , 
archival records a n d interviews, these sources need ins t rumenta t ion to ga ther datai 
All da ta collected from all six companies are kept in separa te files for each case . For 
reliability checks , a case protocol for each company uniformly records the research 
procedures for all companies . It is used for thorough a n d systematic documenta t ion 
to enhance external reviewers' confidence (Parkhe, 1993; Yin, 1994). To a s s u r e the 
uniformity of da t a across all Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e cases , the interview schedules in 
th i s s tudy a r range all ques t ions in accordance with the reference model for 
s t ruc tured interviews with the top executives. Some ques t ions are composed for the 
par t icular cul tura l and corporate si tuation, or the interviewees' position in the 
companies (Douglas & Craig. 1983). b u t mos t ques t ions are essentially the same 
across all six cases when they are not sensitive to the positions, the types of 
indus t ry a n d the un iquenes s of both Dutch and J a p a n e s e cul tures . 
Because mos t da t a and evidence in th is s tudy are not quantifiable, these 
da t a and evidence a re managed in a way to facilitate da t a analysis a n d 
interpretat ion. Data managemen t and analysis also need ins t rumenta t ion . A pre-
s t ruc tu re case report minimises da t a overload by ar ranging the da ta a n d the 
evidence in t he format according to the cons t ruc t s in the reference for the further 
analogy with other cases . This format pinpoints the main character is t ics of each 
company. This report is mainly used for a within-cul ture, within-case analysis . An 
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explanatory effects ma t r ix organises all cons t ruc t s according to t he logic of causal i ty 
in t h e model. Th i s mat r ix is chiefly u sed for a wi thin-cul ture , wi th in-case analysis . 
Because th i s ma t r ix l inks t he da ta to t he model, i ts resu l t s a re used to compare with 
t he r e su l t s from t h e o ther mat r ices in comparat ive tables . The tables a r r ange the 
d a t a a n d t h e evidence for a within-cul ture , c ross -case analys is according to t he 
ma t r i ces of all six ca se s (See Table 7.1-7.5 in Chap te r 7 a n d Table 8.1-8.5 in 
Chap te r 8). These tab les c a n detect bo th similarity a n d dissimilarity for generat ing 
t h e empirical proposi t ions for th i s s tudy in Chap te r 9. 
6.10 Evidence analysis and interpretation 
This s t udy employs a n embedded mult iple-case design to explain t he 
causa l i ty be tween na t iona l cu l tu re a n d SMP. This s tudy h a s to e n s u r e idiosyncrasy 
of each case , to identify t h e commonali ty a n d the p a t t e r n s within each cul ture , and 
to detect t he under ly ing similarities a n d differences between bo th cu l tu res u n d e r t he 
guidance of t he reference model. Its comparat ive analys is a n d i ts in terpreta t ion 
comprise t he following seven s teps : (1) da t a managemen t , (2) a wi thin-case analysis , 
(3) a wi thin-cul ture , c ross-case analysis , (4) a compar ison between within-cul ture , 
c ross-case ana lys is a n d ex tan t l i terature on Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs, (5) a cross-
cul tural , c ross-case analysis , (6) a compar ison be tween the cross-cul tural , cross-
case analys is a n d t h e reference model a n d (7) m e m b e r checking. The procedure of 
evidence analys is a n d in terpre ta t ion is shown in Figure 6.1 
6.10.1 Data management is impor tan t because t he interpreta t ion of events 
m u s t be significant a n d coherent . All da ta were decoded and t rans la ted by the 
au thor . To facilitate da ta retrieval, da ta reviews a n d da ta codification, all captured 
da t a a re kept in separa te files for each company. However, the qualitative da ta 
collected for th i s s tudy are enormous . To avoid any confusion, these da ta are 
categorised, codified and wri t ten down in a p re -s t ruc ture case format. Because this 
s tudy u s e s a priori conceptual framework as the reference model, the pre-conceived 
cons t ruc t s in consis tence with the model are establ ished as a basis for this 
categorisation and codification. These cons t ruc ts a re used to a r range these data in 
schemes , tables, d iagrams and flowcharts tha t facilitate the comparison under the 
definition of the model and the research quest ions . With the application of these 
a r rangements , each case relies on the conceptual proposit ions. With th is 
application, in ternal validity is likely to be improved if the da ta analysis is proper, 
systematic and adequa te (Ragin, 1987; Heartley, 1994; Miles & Huberman , 1994; 
Yin, 1994; Maxwell, 1996; Neuman, 1997). 
I l l 
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6.10.2 Within-case analysis m u s t precede cross-case pa t te rn-matching 
because the strategy pa t t e rns obtained from each company m u s t be compared with 
cons t ruc t pa t t e rns in the reference model. This analysis minimise the au thor ' s 
e n t h u s i a s m to m a k e a comparison ra ther t h a n to define the SMP in h i s analogy by 
bui lding the explanat ions for th is s tudy, formulating t he propositions, searching the 
evidence for *why' behind the relationship between nat ional cul ture a n d SMP a n d 
linking the da t a to the emergent theory (Ragin, 1987; Parkhe, 1993). 
This ana lys i s delves into each company for more detailed information of a n d 
a more profound ins ight into t h e relat ionship be tween na t iona l cu l tu re a n d SMP. 
Because th i s in-depth ana lys is often resu l t s in idiosyncrasies from each case with 
d a t a overload minimis ing a theoretical comprehens ion (Eisenhardt , 1989; Vaughan , 
1992: Walton, 1992; Parkhe , 1993; Neuman , 1997), a n explanatory effects mat r ix is 
cons t ruc ted to clarify a domain of conceptual t e r m s for th i s wi th in-case analys is . 
For a n individual company, all documen t s a n d all archival records a re sorted 
ou t a n d rewri t ten chronologically. This wri te-up becomes each company ' s history. 
From each history, each event is classified and codified for the da t a m a n a g e m e n t in 
compliance with t he format. So a re the t ranscr ibed interviews, bo th s t ruc tu red a n d 
u n s t r u c t u r e d . To guide t he analys is th rough the logic of causal i ty u n d e r t he model, 
th i s mat r ix sor t s ou t t he d a t a cap tured from the documen t s , the archival records 
a n d the interviews according to t he pre-conceived cons t ruc t s in t he reference model 
(Miles & Hube rman , 1994). By linking the viewpoints of the top executives, t he key 
informants , t he indus t ry exper ts and the journa l i s t s with the d o c u m e n t s a n d the 
archival records for each company, the t r iangulat ion of sources in the matr ix 
e n s u r e s t he validation of da ta (Miles & Huberman , 1994; S take, 1995). To create 
pat tern-displays within each case for further compar i sons in the within-cul ture , 
cross-case analysis , and the cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis respectively, a 
causa l network for each case is buil t to identify independent a n d dependen t 
variables, the relat ionship between both of them, SMP and pa t t e rns a n d the agents 
or actors in SMP (Miles & Huberman , 1994). To avoid unwit t ing force-fitting data to 
the reference model. Vaughan (1992) proposed two following safeguards (p 196-197): 
1. Particularity in each case m u s t be explained to delay confirmation. 
2. Variation in the data can delay confirmation of the author ' s preconception. 
6.10.3 Within-culture, cross-case analysis ensures the cultural validation 
tha t can be achieved only after the pattern-displays, such as the explanatory effects 
matrix and the causal network created from the within-case analysis. After the 
meaningful insight into the impact of national cul ture on SMP in each company takes 
shape, comprehension of SMP in each culture from pat tern-matching and replication 
logic is the following step (Walton, 1992; Yin, 1994). Because this analysis bases the 
comparison between three companies from different industr ies within each culture on 
113 
the pa t t e rns emerging from the within-case analysis, a Dutch company is compared 
with the other Dutch companies . So is a J a p a n e s e company (Ragin, 1987; Yin, 1994). 
Each of three explanatory effects matr ices of the Dutch a n d the J a p a n e s e cases are 
combined into the two cased-order effects matr ices for each cul ture. Each of th ree 
causa l networks of the Dutch a n d the J a p a n e s e cases a re integrated into the two 
cross-case causa l networks for each cul ture (Miles & Huberman , 1994). 
The explanatory effects matr ices m a k e cont ras t s a n d compar isons among three 
cases in each cul ture u n d e r t he guidance of the reference model. Under pa t te rn-
matching a n d replication logic, pa t t e rns a n d themes of each cul ture a re noted. To 
identify the clearer strategy pa t te rns , some cons t ruc ts a re clustered a n d parti t ioned. 
The cross-case causa l network is a comparative analysis between all cases within each 
cul ture a s a consequence of t he matr ices . After the integration of all cases into each 
culture, all causa l s t r eams for each case leading to the independent variables are 
isolated for the analysis . For pat tern-matching, t he variables in all cases with the 
s ame outcome in each cul ture are matched. The scenarios for similar a n d contras t ing 
outcomes, pa t t e rns a n d themes are verified. To minimise the variation in the three 
cases in each cul ture, the idiosyncrasy in each case are subsumed into the 
commonality in each cul ture . • 
The s t ra tegy p a t t e r n s emerging from a n analogy between t h e cases within 
each cu l ture provide a bas i s for es tabl ishing t h e modes t empirical general isat ion 
within each cu l tu re a n d t h e equivalent p a t t e r n s for compar ing bo th Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e cu l tu re s in the cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis (Ragin, 1987; Vaughan , 
1992; Walton, 1992; Yin. 1994; Miles & Huberman , 1994). 
6.20.4 A comparison between within-culture, cross-case analysis and 
extant literature on Dutch and Japanese MNCs The comparison between existing 
l i terature on Dutch and J a p a n e s e MNCs and the cross-case analyses within both j 
Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res is a strategy to u n d e r s t a n d the impact of both 
cu l tures on the SMP in both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land 
respectively. This l i terature gives an insight into the relat ionship between these 
Dutch and these J a p a n e s e companies and their pa ren t companies in the 
Nether lands and J a p a n respectively. It examines the possible influence of the 
pa ren t companies embedded in their nat ional cul ture on their SMP in Thai 
subsidiar ies . The incorporation of the character is t ics of Dutch MNCs into the cross<-
case analysis within Dutch cul ture e n h a n c e s a n insight into SMP in each Dutch 
company in Thai land in Chapte r 7. So does the integration of character is t ics of t he i 
J a p a n e s e MNCs into the cross-case analysis within J a p a n e s e cul ture in Chapter 8. 
The integration on both s ides provides a good bas i s for analogy in t he cross-cul tural , 
cross-case analysis . Within each cul ture, this s trategy is to uncover the 
commonali ty a n d the discrepancy among the cases , a n d then asser t the 
114 
general isat ion ac ros s all cases (Parkhe, 1993). Hence, th i s compar i son e n h a n c e s 
external validity wi thin each cul ture . 
6.10.5 Cross-cultural, cross-case analysis val idates the impac t of nat ional 
cu l tu re on SMP, so t he comparat ive analysis be tween Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res 
m u s t be systematical ly i l lustrated. Without t he s h a r e d frame of reference across 
cu l tu res a r o u n d t h e world, cross-nat ional differences a re more difficult to interpret 
t h a n cross-nat ional similarit ies. After strategic p a t t e r n s within each cu l tu re are 
es tabl ished from t h e within-cul ture , c ross-case analysis , t he analogy be tween t he 
impac t of D u t c h cu l tu re on the SMP of the Du tch companies in Thai land a n d t h a t of 
J a p a n e s e cu l ture is feasible. These pa t t e rn s easily detect cross-cul tura l 
commonali ty, b u t hardly find discrepancy across cu l tu res . The superficial 
similarities migh t conceal some underlying differences. The a p p a r e n t differences 
might b e ei ther real or art ifactual . A knowledge of a n d familiarity with bo th cu l tures 
are crucial for cons t ru ing the events . To genera te t he empirical proposi t ions in 
Chap te r 9 from t h e par t icular Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e SMPs, the cross-case causa l 
ne tworks within bo th cu l tu res a re compared a n d analysed. The pa t t e rn -match ing 
logic is no t applied to t he cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis . 
6.10.6 A comparison between cross-cultural, cross-case analysis and 
the reference model Because the causal i ty in t he reference model a n d the research 
ques t ions is clearly defined, a compar ison between empirically based pa t t e rns and 
predicted ones is possible. If the pa t t e rn s between empirical a n d theoretical 
ou tcomes coincide, the resu l t s can s t rengthen in ternal validity within each cul ture . 
The cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis generates the empirical proposit ions tha t are 
compared with the conceptual proposit ions u n d e r the guidance of the reference 
model. From th is comparison, if the empirical proposit ions suppor t the conceptual 
proposit ions, bo th of them will converge on the proposit ions for the future research. 
If not, the conceptual proposit ions will be discarded, b u t the empirical proposit ions 
will become these propositions, too. The comparison between the cross-cultural , 
cross-case analysis and the reference model in Chapte r 9 is an interaction between 
theory and empirical data . From this analogy, the relat ionship between national 
cul ture and SMP is redefined and the reference model is modified to capture the 
reality, because the new cons t ruc ts might emerge from this interaction. 
6.10.7 Member checking is a revisit to the responden ts for verifying 
interpretat ion. The a u t h o r revisits the chosen companies and re-examines all da ta 
th rough member checking when contradict ions a n d discrepancies are found 
(Brannen, 1996; Padgett, 1998). Member checking can be easy if the da ta sources 
are in the personal network of the author . Thai government agencies and rank-and-
file employees in the companies unde r this s tudy. It can be difficult if the sources 
are the top executives who have a very limited t ime. In this study, the researcher 
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writes a n e-mail to t he se executives a n d they a re willing to answer t h e ques t ions a n d 
clarify t he cont radic t ions a n d the discrepancies in t he findings. 
6.11 Conclusion 
In reply to t he rat ionale beh ind methodological development in Chap te r 5 
a n d the call for more r igorous r e sea rch into comparat ive managemen t , t h i s s t udy 
employs a n embedded mult iple-case s tudy a s a r e sea rch design. After d i scuss ing j 
t h e advan tages a n d l imitat ions of t he choice be tween u s i n g a n d n o t u s i n g a 
reference model , th i s s tudy u s e s t he reference model developed in Chap te r 2 a s a 
gu idance to prevent overwhelming da t a a n d s t imula te pa t t e rn -ma tch ing for case 
analogies a n d ana lyses . To avoid t he problem of incorrect levels of reference, t h e ! 
nat ional cu l tu res of t h e Nether lands a n d J a p a n a r e u s e d a s explanatory u n i t s of 
analysis , a n d SMPs in bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land a re u sed als 
observat ional u n i t s of analysis . Because th is s tudy h a s two levels of reference, 
observat ional u n i t s of analysis a re embedded in explanatory u n i t s of analys is . To 
cap tu re the relevant evidence a n d data , a n d to depict t h e extent to which na t iona l 
cu l tu res of t he Nether lands a n d J a p a n have a n impact of on t he SMPs of these 
Du tch a n d these J a p a n e s e companies , all conceptual definitions a r e operationalisejl 
a s namely, power d is tance , individualism-collectivism, uncer ta in ty avoidance, 
masculinity-femininity a n d long-term v shor t - te rm orientat ion, envi ronmenta l 
scanning , s t ra tegy formulation, s t ra tegy implementat ion, evaluation a n d control a n d 
corporate performance. 
Multiple cases represent t he whole Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res bet ter t h a n 
a single case . Six cases are chosen on the theoretical, not sampling bas is . Three 
pairs of cases a re ma tched on the bas i s of both home countr ies of pa ren t companiejs, 
the Nether lands a n d J a p a n a n d types of indust ry . All six cases a re located in 
Thai land. To e n h a n c e generalisability within Dutch and J a p a n e s e cul tures , each 
pair of cases is selected from three diversified sectors, namely c o n s u m e r electronic^, 
b a n k s and air carr iers are . To cap ture data, secondary da ta analysis, archival 
records, documenta t ion , interviews are the source of evidence. 
To discover idiosyncrasy in each six case, the commonality among three Dutch 
and three J a p a n e s e cases and the comparability among the three matched pairs of 
cases, this s tudy employs three levels of analysis, namely, a within-case analysis, a 
cross-case analysis within each culture and a cross-cultural, cross-case analysis in 
combination with both extant l i terature on Dutch MNCs a n d tha t on J a p a n e s e MNCs i 
in terms of cul ture a n d management . If some scepticism is occurred, the member 
checking is conducted by revisiting the research sites. The result of the within-case 
i 
analysis and the cross-case analysis within Dutch cul ture will be discussed in Chaptejr 
7 and tha t within J a p a n e s e cul ture will be argued in Chapter 8. The outcome of the | 
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cross-cultural , cross-case analysis will be discussed in Chapter 9. The a s sumed 
linkage between national cul ture a s a predictor a t macro level and SMP a s a dependent 
variable a t micro level will be used to explain the evidence in Chapter 7, 8 a n d 9 and to 
formulate the empirical propositions in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
SMPS OF DUTCH COMPANIES IN THAILAND 
7.1 Introduction 
Dutch companies in Thailand, including the three Dutch cases u n d e r th is 
s tudy a re pa r t of the world-wide operation of Dutch MNCs. To guaran tee the 
anonymity of t he Dutch cases a n d all interviewees, DCE, DB and DA a re designated ^or 
a Dutch consumer electronics firm, a Dutch b a n k a n d a Dutch air carr ier in Thailand-
The character is t ics a n d the brief history of DCB, DB and DA are impor tan t to t he 
comprehension of the SMP in their subsidiaries in Thailand. Their pa ren t companies 
were found in different years in t he Netherlands a n d entered Thailand in different 
years , too. The world-wide organisation of DCE, DB and DA partly de termines their 
overseas subsidiaries and operat ions everywhere including their Thai operation. To 
unde r s t and the individualily of each Dutch company a n d the similarities a n d 
differences among these three cases , the comparison of characterist ics among t h e m is 
discussed in section 7.2 with regard to the years of their foundation bo th in the 
Netherlands a n d in Thailand, their flow of reports , their organisational s t ruc tures , th£ir 
legal s t a tuses a n d the characteris t ics of their workforce a s expressed in Table 7.1. 
To d i scuss these idiosyncrasies, similarities and differences a m o n g the Dutch 
cases according to Wheelen a n d Hunger 's model, section 7.3 compares the 
environmental scanning of DCE, DB and DA in Table 7.2 and describes it for DCE, DB 
and DA in Figure 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 respectively. Section 7.4 compares the strategy 
formulation of DCE, DB and DA in Table 7.4 and explores it for DCE, DB and DA in 
Figure 7.4, 7.5 and 7 .6 respectively. Section 7.5 compares the strategy implementatibn 
of DCE, DB and DA in Table 7 .6 and describes it for DCE, DB and DA in Figure 7.7, 
7.8 and 7.9 respectively. Section 7.6 compares the evaluation and control of DCE, DB 
and DA in Table 7.8 and explores it for DCE. DB and DA in Figure 7.10, 7.11 a n d 7.12 
respectively. As a result from both the within-case analysis of each Dutch company in 
Figure 7.1-7.12 and the cross-case analyses within Dutch culture in Table 7.1-7.9, 
idiosyncrasies in each Dutch case and some commonalities and differences among all 
Dutch cases are discussed. 
The similarities among the Dutch cases in terms of environmental scanning, 
strategy formulation, strategy implementation and evaluation and control is used a s a1 
basis for identifying the common SMP of the Dutch companies in Thailand. The Dutcli 
SMP a s a result of the cross-case analyses within Dutch culture in th is chapter is usejd 
to compare with the J a p a n e s e SMP as a result of the cross-case analysis within 
J a p a n e s e culture from Chapter 8 in Chapter 9. This comparison is used to formulate 
the empirical propositions for the conclusion of this analysis. To reformulate the 
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propositions for t h e conclusion of th is s tudy and for the future research, the empirical 
propositions from this analysis is used to compare with the conceptual propositions 
from Chapter 4 . The differences among them are used to elaborate the idiosyncrasies 
of each Dutch case and to discuss these idiosyncrasies in Chapter 10. Section 7.7 
arrives a t a conclusion. 
7.2 The comparison of Dutch cases 
To u n d e r s t a n d the similarity a n d difference among the Dutch cases , the 
profiles a n d character is t ics of these cases are expressed in Table 7 .1 . 
Table 7.1: The characteristics of Dutch companies in Thailand 
Characteristics Dutch consumer 
electronic 
(DCE) 
Dutch 
bank 
(JB) 
Dutch 
airlines 
(DA) 
Remarks 
Year of foundation in 
home country 
1891 AD (Humes, 
1993; Metze, 1993; 
Sluyterman & 
Winkelman, 1993; 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1998; de Goey, 
1999) 
1824 AD (Sijbrands 
& Eppink, 1994; 
Janssen , April 
1995; de Goey, 
1999) 
1919 AD (Lawrence, 
1991; Bangkok 
Post, 1999, 
September 20) 
Year of entry into 
Thailand 
1952 AD 
CThapanachai, 
2 0 0 0 , January 26) 
1991 AD as 
representative 
office; 1994 AD a s 
full branch 
(Janssen, April 
1995) 
1929 AD (Bangkok 
Post, 1999, 
September 20) 
Type of bus iness Consumer 
Electronics 
Bank Airlines 
Legal status Branch (NSO--in 
DCE' s term) 
(DCEI1*) 
Branch (DBI1) Branch (DAI1; 
DAK) 
The number of staffs 
in Thailand 
5 ,000 (DCEI1; 
DCEI2) 
2 0 0 (DBI1; DBI2) 200 (DAI1; DAI2) 
The head of Thai 
organisation 
The Chairman & 
Managing Director 
(DCEU) 
Branch manager 
(DBI1; DBI2) 
General Manager 
(GM) (DAI1; DAI2) 
Report to The Chairman & 
Managing Director 
& Regional head 
office (DCEI1) 
Country manager 
& Regional head 
office (DBI1; Woo, 
1998, September 
11) 
Regional head office 
(DAI1: DAI2) 
Regional Head Office Asia-Pacific 
Regional 
Headquarters in 
Singapore 
Asia-Pacific 
Regional Office in 
Singapore 
Southeast Asian 
Head Office in 
Singapore & Asia-
Pacific Head Office 
in Hong Kong 
Headquarters Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands 
Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands 
Arnstelveen, the 
Netherlands 
Nationality of 
Chairman 
British (DCEI1) N/A N/A No 
chairman 
for DB & DA 
Nationality of 
CEO/MD 
Thai (DCEI1) Dutch (DBI1: DBI2) Dutch (DAI1; DAI2) 
Nationality of 
CFO/FM 
Dutch (DCEI1) Dutch (DBI2) Dutch (DAI 1;DAI2) 
Who controls Thai 
operation 
Dutch (DCEI1; 
DCEI 2) 
Dutch (DBI1; DBI2) Dutch (DAI1; DAI2) 
The number of 
expatriates from 
home country 
1 Dutchman 
(DCEI1; DCEI 2) 
3 Dutchmen (DBI2) 7 Dutchmen (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
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Table 7.1: The characteristics of Dutch companies in Thailand (continued) 
Characteristics Dutch consumer 
electronic 
(DCE) 
Dutch 
bank 
(JB) 
Dutch 
airlines 
(DA) 
Remarks 
The number of third-
country 
managers/staffs (not 
Dutch, not Thai) 
1 (DCEI1: DCEI 2) 2 (DBI2) 0 (DAI 1; DAK) DA used to 
have a 
third-
country staff 
The number of 
department/division 
7 divisions (DCEI1; 
DCEI 2) 
5 divisions (DBI1; 
DBI2) 
7 divisions (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
*) T h e s e a b b r e v i a t i o n s refer t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r v i e w e e s . 
All Du tch cases in t h i s s tudy a r e a p a r t of th ree Dutch MNCs t h a t have a 
world-wide operat ion in t he th ree bus inesses , namely c o n s u m e r electronics, b a n k i n g 
a n d air car r iers . The SMPs of t he se cases a re restr ic ted to corporate level in 
Thai land. 
This investigation limits t he activities in DCE only to the marke t ing operat ion 
for audio-visual p roduc ts , those in DB only to t he corporate bank ing a n d those in 
t he DA only to t he passenger service. All of t h e m w a s establ ished in t h e 
Nether lands a n d s ta r ted their operat ion in Thai land in different yea r s . All of t h e m 
have a legal s t a t u s of a b r a n c h of a foreign company. 
7.2.1 DCE s t a r ted i ts operat ion in Thai land in 1952 with a var ious range of 
lighting p roduc t s , h o m e appl iances, audio-visual equ ipment and other professional 
p roduc t s a n d sys tems available to Tha i cus tomers . I ts pa ren t company w a s foundejd 
in Eindhoven, t h e Nether lands on 5 » May 1891 (Humes, 1993; Metze, 1993; 
Sluyterrnan & Winkelman, 1993; Bart let t & Ghoshal , 1998; de Goey, 1999; 
Thapanacha i , 2000 , J a n u a r y 26). 
DCE set u p its first manufac tur ing uni t , the l amp factory a t Bangna District, 
Bangkok, Thai land in 1960. The factory h a s produced high quality incandescen t 
and fluorescent l amps since then. In 1973, it founded the television factory to 
produce all mos t up- to-date television sets ranging from 14 inch to 29 inch- screen 
sizes for Thai market . 
In May 1986, His Majesty the King of Thailand awarded DCE the Royal 
Garuda in recognition of meeting s t r ingent qualifications in rendering a service to 
the Royal Household and for a contr ibut ion to nat ional development. DCE is the 
first foreign company in Thailand tha t receives th is award. Only few Thai and 
foreign companies are entitled to use this Garuda, the national emblem of Thai land 
for all corporate purposes . The other mult inat ional companies who receive th is 
award include IBM, Unilever, a n d Royal Dutch Shell. It was a reward for 34 years qf 
DCEs' generosity. 
DCE is well-known for empowering its overseas subsidiar ies . Its Thai staff, 
no t Dutch expatr ia tes predominant ly r u n DCE in Thai land. All country manage r s 
are Thai, b u t t he financial manager is Dutch according to DCE's world-wide | 
financial control. DCE const i tu tes a commercial un i t a n d several manufac tur ing 
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u n i t s with more t h a n 5,000 employees. The commercial u n i t a s National Sales 
Organisa t ion (NSO u n d e r DCE's term) h a s seven marke t ing divisions compris ing 
c o n s u m e r electronics, lighting, domest ic appl iance a n d personal care, medical 
sys tem, b u s i n e s s electronics, semiconductors a n d componen t s . Since September 
1999, a Bri ton h a s succeeded a D u t c h m a n as t he c h a i r m a n a n d manag ing director 
of DCE in Tha i land . He ac t s a s t he governing body of t h i s NSO. Under DCE's 
ma t r ix repor t ing sys tem, each general manage r of t he seven divisions repor t s to bo th 
t h e coun t ry c h a i r m a n a n d each corresponding p roduc t g roup manage r a t t he Asia-
Pacific Regional Headqua r t e r s in Singapore a s i ts RHO. These regional p roduc t 
group heads , in t u rn , repor t to t he HQs' p roduc t divisions responsible for the world-
wide policy of each product . With regard to t he repor t ing system, financial control 
a n d general policy, t he Dutch control Thai operation (Eppink & v a n Rhijn, 1988; 
Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars , 1994; Olie, 1996; Brouthers , K 
D 6k Brou thers , L E, 1997). 
The globalisation of t he world's marke t h a s m a d e t h e mult i -domest ic 
s t ruc tu re of DCE ineffective. To fight J a p a n e s e c o n s u m e r electronics giants , whose 
s t ra tegy a n d s t r u c t u r e a re more globalised, DCE h a s adopted more global s trategy to 
i t s mul t i -domest ic s t ruc tu re (Eppink 6k van Rhijn, 1988; Hampden-Turne r 6k 
Trompenaa r s , 1994; Volbeda, 1997). DCE's world-wide reorganisat ion h a s affected 
Thai NSO since 1990. 
DCE founded t he luminai re factory a t the Bangpoo Industr ia l Es ta te in the 
mid -1991 . This factory manufac tu res a complete range of b a t t e n s and luminaires . 
As a n in ternat ional product ion centre (IPC), the factory serves both Thai and 
regional marke t s . In 1993, its lamp factory relocated from Bangna District to the 
Bangpoo Industr ia l Esta te . The factory manufac tu res a full range of l amps and 
lighting p roduc t s to serve both Thai and regional marke t s . 
7 .2 .2 DB is a resul t of many mergers between several Dutch b a n k s in the 
pas t . Among these merged banks , the oldest one was establ ished in 1824 a s 
Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij (NHM- The Nether lands Trading Society). DB 
opened a representat ive office in Thailand in September 1991. DB opened a 
Representative Office a t 38. Convent Rd, Q House Convent. 1 3 t h Fl in Silom Bangrak 
managed by Clive M Albrecht. At the end of J a n u a r y 1992, Senior Executive Vice 
President of the Internat ional Division officially opened th is office. In March 1993, 
Bank of Thai land (BOT) granted DB an off-shore bank ing licence of Bangkok 
Internat ional Banking Facilities (BIBF) effective from October 1993. Thai land h a s 
granted only 14 foreign b a n k full-branch licences since 1888 on the bas i s of one 
country, one licence. Because the licence for a Dutch b a n k had passed to Chase 
Manha t t an th rough the acquisition of the Bangkok b r a n c h of Nationale 
Handelsbank from Rotterdamsche Bank in 3 1 s t December 1963, DB were not allowed 
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to open a full b r a n c h unt i l 1994 (Sijbrands & Eppink, 1994; J a n s s e n , 1995, April; 
American Banker , 1998, October 22; de Goey, 1999; Soeteba, 2000). 
B a n k of America a n d Securi ty Pacific Corporat ion merged in t h e US in 1992. 
This merger left over one full-branch licence in Thai land. DB decided to b u y th i s 
licence on 3 r d October 1994; otherwise, it h a d to wai t unt i l 1997 to see BOT would 
choose it for one of t h e five new b a n k i n g l icences. On 2 3 r d Sep tember 1994, DB 
received a subs t i t u t e full-banking licence from BOT ins tead of t he original leftover 
one. Under t h i s licence, DB h a s become t h e first foreign full-banking b r a n c h s ince 
1 s t December 1994. In th i s year, BOT also granted DB a debt -underwri t ing licence | 
a n d a debt - t rad ing licence. In J a n u a r y 1995, DB received two Provincial 
In ternat ional Bank ing Facility (PIBF) Licences to operate restr icted b r a n c h e s in 
Chiang Mai a n d Rayong provinces ( Janssen , 1995, April; J i r ap i sunku l , 1997, 
J a n u a r y 20; The Nation, 1997, March 10; Soeteba, 2000). 
By 1997, DB h a d 100 employees in Bangkok b r a n c h . On 1 s t J u l y 1998, DB 
agreed to acquire a 7 5 % s take in t he B a n k of Asia (BoA), Thai land with 110 
b r a n c h e s t h r o u g h o u t t he country . On 9 t h September 1998, the official s igning 
ceremony took place in Bangkok (The Nation, 1997, March 10; Soeteba, 2000). 
Under t he mat r ix a r r a n g e m e n t t h roughou t Asia-Pacific, mos t employees in 
t h e line function in Tha i b r a n c h e s have two bosses . The b r a n c h m a n a g e r repor ts to 
New Growth Marke t Division a n d Internat ional Division a t the HQs In Ams te rdam 
a n d Chief Executive Officer Asia-Pacific a t Asia-Pacific Regional Office a s i ts RHO iri 
Singapore a n d t h e count ry manage r of Thai land. Since DB took over BoA in 1998, 
the country manage r h a s moved from DB's Bangkok b r a n c h to BoA's head office. 
Because the count ry manage r reports to BoA's vice pres ident and, in tu rn , to BoA's 
president , the cha in of command is quite complicated. BoA h a s charge of retail 
banking, while DB's Thai b r a n c h e s take charge of corporate bank ing (Woo, 1998, 
September 11, Soeteba. 2000). 
The count ry manage r ac ts a s the governing body of Thai b r anches . The chi^f 
executive of corporate bank ing is Bangkok b ranch ' s manager . Both the country and 
the b r anch m a n a g e r s are Dutch. All three Thai b r anches employ 200 staff 
comprising Dutch . Thais and other nationali t ies. These b ranches have five 
divisions. Each head of divisions reports to the b ranch manager a n d their 
corresponding bosses a t the RHO a t the same t ime. In term of its report ing system, 
i ts financial control and its general policy, the Dutch control Thai operation for 
corporate banking . 
7 . 2 . 3 DA is the world's first airline with t he original name . It h a s cont inued 
to use this n a m e since i ts foundation in October 1919. DA initiated the 
experimental flight from Amsterdam to Indonesia in 1924. This flight lasted for 55 
days with the dis tance of 15,373 kilometres. During th is flight, DA's aircraft landed 
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in Thai land for t h e first t ime in November 1924. Because DA decided to include 
Bangkok a s a s topover in i ts Asian rou te network, t h e first aircraft for regula r 
service landed a t Don Muang Aerodrome, Bangkok on 2 0 t h Sep tember 1929. This 
w a s i ts first commercia l presence in Thai land (Lawrence, 1991; Bangkok Post, 1999, 
Sep tember 20). 
DA's legal s t a t u s is a b r a n c h of a foreign c o m p a n y with 200 employees. The 
composi t ion of staff is current ly Du tch a n d Thai , b u t DA used to have a British 
m a n a g e r in t h e pas t . The general m a n a g e r (GM) in Thai land no t only ac t s a s the 
governing body a n d t h e chief executive for Thai operat ion s imul taneously , b u t also 
oversees t he opera t ions in Indochina. Both GM a n d the financial m a n a g e r s are 
Dutch . To e n s u r e t h e in te rdepar tmenta l communica t ion a n d to e n h a n c e t he 
reliability in Tha i operat ion, all h e a d s of seven divisions are Dutch . All D u t c h 
expat r ia tes repor t to thei r corresponding m a n a g e r s a t S ou t hea s t Asian Head Office 
a s i ts RHO in Singapore a n d these m a n a g e r s repor t to their corresponding bosses a t 
Asia-Pacific Head Office a s i ts RHO in Hong Kong a n d their corresponding directors 
in t he HQs in t h e Nether lands . GM in Thai land usua l ly deals with Executive Vice 
Pres ident Passenger Sales for pricing. With respect to i ts report ing system, i ts 
financial control a n d its general policy, t he Dutch control Thai operat ion. Because 
DA h a s been in Thai land for 71 years , DA h a s i ts own warehouse for cargo service, 
own accommodat ion a n d t ra in ing cent re for i ts crews a n d i ts t r ade un ion . DA is 
capable of providing ma in t enance service for o ther air l ines in Thai land. 
In 1997, DA became the first Loxcom's cus tomer for a free-of-charge 3-minute 
pin phone card for us ing a t Schiphol Airport. Loxcom is a Thai-Dutch joint venture. In 
1998. DA set u p Gate Gourmet Co, a subsidiary for catering service in Thailand. 
Likewise, DA and a n American carrier shared the s ame space in Bangkok. DA 
operated mainly dur ing the night while the American carrier did mainly dur ing the day. 
In April, DA a n d Golden Exotic Co, Ltd, a Thai exporter of fruits and vegetable 
collaborated to set u p the new perishable service centre in Bangkok for the perishable 
export goods. To cu t operating costs and costs of office space by half, DA and the 
American carrier merged their airport office in Bangkok (Limchevawong. 1997, April 
29; The Nation, 1997, April 29; Khompeera, 1998, September 26; J i rasakuntha i , 1998, 
November 7, 1999, May 4; The Nation, 1999, February 4). 
7.2.4 Similarity All Dutch cases have a legal s t a t u s of a foreign b ranch in 
Thailand. DB a n d DA have approximately the s a m e size and the s ame n u m b e r of 
employees. All of t h e m have to report to the RHOs located in Singapore a t i ts first 
h a n d . The count ry manage r s in DCE have to report to the country cha i rman, the 
head of Thai NSO, whereas the b ranch manager in DB h a s to report to the country 
manager in Thai land. Thus , the report sys tems in DCE and DB are u n d e r the 
matr ix a r rangement s . The HQs of all Dutch companies is located in Amsterdam 
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even if t he HQs of DA is s i tua ted in Amstelveen nearby Amste rdam. The nat ional i ty 
of t he b r a n c h m a n a g e r of DB a n d the general m a n a g e r of DA is Dutch . The 
nat ional i ty of all financial h e a d s in all Du tch cases is Dutch , because t he se h e a d s 
know bo th D u t c h language a n d t h e Dutch account ing system. Their knowledge c a n 
e n s u r e t he financial uniformity t h roughou t t he world. The Du tch control Thai 
operat ion th rough financial m e a n s . All of t h e m can employ th i rd-count ry manager ' s 
a n d staff in Thai b r a n c h e s even if DA does no t do it current ly . The n u m b e r of 
divisions in all of t h e m is be tween 5-7 divisions. The majority of employees in all of 
t h e m are Tha is . 
7.2.5 Difference DB is t he first a m o n g all Du tch cases found in t h e 
Nether lands , b u t t he las t one a m o n g t h e m enter ing Thai land. DA is on t he o ther ! 
way round . All of t h e m are operat ing in three different indus t r ies . DCE h a s m u c h 
more staff t h a n DB a n d DA have. DA's GM repor ts only to i ts S ou thea s t Asian Head 
Office in Singapore, in t u rn , repor t to i ts Asia-Pacific Head Office in Hong Kong a n d 
finally to i ts HQs in Amstelveen, not to o ther bosses in Thai land. DA's repor t systein 
is no t u n d e r t he mat r ix a r r angemen t s . Only DCE current ly h a s a Brit ish chairman^. 
The nationali ty of count ry m a n a g e r s in DCE is Thai . The n u m b e r of expatr ia tes 
from the Nether lands is varied in all of them, b u t it is well below the limit u n d e r 
Thai labour law. In DCE, t he count ry m a n a g e r s a re t h e h e a d s of Thai operat ion for 
each p roduc t group. In DB, t he b r a n c h manage r is t h e head of Thai operat ion for 
corporate bank ing . In DA, GM is t he head of t h e operat ions in Thai land a n d 
Indochina. 
Table 7.2: The environmental scanning in Dutch companies in Thailand 
Environmental 
Scanning 
DCE DB DA 
Frequency of 
scanning 
Almost everyday (DCEI1*) Very often (DBI1) Very often (DAI1; DAI2 ) 
Long-term 
Information 
gathering 
Internal and external 
audit units collect 
information twice a vear 
(DCEI1) 
Employ external consultants 
and researchers only in 
important case ie investment 
(DBI1) 
Employ external 
consultants and 
researchers regularly 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
Regular 
information for 
making strategy 
Ask subordinates to do 
and buy from agencies 
(DCEI1) 
Ask subordinates to collect 
extensive data from World 
bank. IMF, EIU, BOT and 
newspapers (DBI1) 
Ask subordinates to cc 
extensive data from TE 
and BOT (DAI 1; DAI2) 
Uect 
iRI 
Environmental 
analysis 
Use working group, but 
country manager 
analyses the strategic 
i s sues (DCEI1) 
Branch manager analyses 
the strategic i s sues (DBI1) 
Use working group, biit 
country manager analyses 
the strategic i s sues (DÀI1; 
DAI2) 
Political risk 
assessment 
Country manager does, 
but DCE avoid political 
involvement and litigation 
(DCEI1) 
Branch manager does, but 
DB avoid political 
Involvement and litigation 
(DBI1) 
Political risk affects on 
sales , but DA avoid 
Utigation(DAIl; DAI2) 
ly 
SWOT & criteria Theoretical and practical 
classification Into threats 
and opportunities 
(DCEI1) 
See threats and 
opportunities at the same 
rime but more opportunities 
(DBI1) 
See threats and 
opportunities at the sa 
time but more 
opportunities (DAI 1 ; D 
me 
M2) 
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Table 7.2: The environmental scanning in Dutch companies in Thailand 
(continued) 
Environmental 
S c a n n i n g 
DCE DB DA 
Opportunities & 
Threats 
Mixed up; opportunities; 
open economy; threats; 
strong competition, 
diversified distribution 
system, creative way to 
cut costs (DCEI1) 
Depend on Thai 
government's policy whether 
favourable or not, especially 
liberalisation of banking 
sector (DBI1) 
No visible threats, but less 
intensifying competition 
c a u s e s more opportunities 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
Key s u c c e s s 
factors 
Process, technology, 
imagination, h u m a n 
resource (DCEI1) 
Good publicity and image, 
credibility, superior 
products, technology (DBI1; 
The Nation, 1997, July 14; 
Nivatpumin & Ingsrisawang, 
1999, J u n e 25) 
Top-5 European airline, 
conservatism, partnership 
with an American airline, 
reliable service (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Main weaknesses Unclear brand image and 
clumsy marketing 
(DECK; CEJ1; CEJ2; 
Bangkok Post, 1998, 
J u n e 11; Thapanachai, 
2 0 0 0 , January 26) 
DB can leave Thailand 
anytime if it will not see the 
long-term prospect any more 
(BJ2) 
Low profile and unclear 
corporate image (AJ) 
Changing 
Environment 
Cause threats and 
opportunities 
concurrently (DCEI1) 
Cause threats and 
opportunities concurrently 
(DBI1) 
Cause more opportunities 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
Trend of industry More competition (DCEI1) Expected economic recovery, 
long-term growth and 
political stability (DBI1; Woo, 
1998; December 30; 
Kanoksilp, 1999 September 
16) 
Less competition (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Industry mobility 
and barrier 
Intensifying competition 
(DCEI1) 
The number of BOTs licence, 
protective policy for local 
banks and discriminatory 
regulation and capitalisation 
for foreign banks p B I l ) 
Deregulation, merger and 
acquisition and strategic 
alliance (DAI1; DAI2) 
Future Good (DCEI1) Good (DBI1) Good, depending on 
forming an alliance (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
*) T h e s e a b b r e v i a t i o n s refer to the re spec t ive in terv iewees . 
7 .3 The comparison of environmental scanning 
All Dutch companies under this study have both similarities and differences 
in their environmental scanning in many aspects. All Dutch cases are compared in 
detail to find out these similarities and differences. The comparison of the 
environmental scanning in these Dutch cases is expressed in Table 7.2. The 
similarities in the environmental scanning among these Dutch cases are used as a 
basis for the cross-cultural, cross-case analysis with their Japanese counterparts in 
relation to the environmental scanning in section 9.2.1. 
7 .3 .1 DCE has six product divisions in Thailand. Each division has its own 
country manager. These country managers are considered as the top executives who 
mainly make a strategic decision for National Sales Organisation (NSO) in Thailand. 
The environmental scanning process of DCE is depicted in Figure 7.1. 
With regard to the informal routine information gathering, the country manager 
scans the environment almost everyday by asking his subordinates to gather regular 
information from newspapers, customers and government agencies. He sometimes 
buys information about the market from marketing research agencies in Thailand. He 
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always exchanges information with other country managers in Asia-Pacific region for 
the same product group. This information is external. DCE uses its own external a n d 
internal un i t s to collect da ta twice a year in its formal long-term information gathering. 
After ga ther ing the information, the count ry manage r ana lyses s t rategic 
i s sues a n d a s s e s s e s political r i sks by himself. He organises a working g roup to help 
h i m to ana lyse t he se strategic i s sues internally. DCE h a s bo th theoret ical a n d 
pract ical cri teria to classify s trategic i s sues into t h r e a t s a n d oppor tuni t ies . 
However, oppor tuni t ies a n d t h r e a t s a r e often mixed u p . Thai land 's open economy is 
a good opportuni ty, b u t c a u s e s s t rong competi t ion a s a t h r ea t concurrent ly . The 
diversified dis t r ibut ion sys tem in Thai ma rke t c a u s e s bo th t h r ea t s a n d opportunities 
a t t h e s a m e t ime. The creative way to cu t cos ts a n d no barr ier for en t ry c a u s e s 
m a n y opportuni t ies . 
Figure 7.1: Environmental scanning (DCE) 
External audit 
twice a year 
r 
Formal long-term 
information-gathering 
i i 
Internal audit 
twice a year 
External 
External data 
Informal routine 
information-
gathering 
Environmental 
analysis I 
Working 
group 
Value: 
Opportunity & 
threat are mixed 
up . Open economy 
is opportunity, but 
c a u s e s strong 
competition as a 
threat. Diversified 
distribution 
system causes 
both. 
Ritual: Theoretical 
& practical criteria 
to classify 
strategic i s sues 
into threats & 
opportunities 
Internal 
Ritual: Country 
manager scans the 
environment almost 
everyday by asking 
his subordinates to 
gather regular 
infonnation or buy 
them from agency. 
DCE uses its own 
external and 
internal units to 
collect formal data 
semi-annually. 
Ritual: Country 
manager analyses 
strategic i s sues 
and as se s se s 
political risk. He 
tries to organise 
working group to 
analyse strategic 
Issues internally. 
Interpretation 
General Perceptlbn 
-Changing 
environment 
causes threats ahd 
opportunities 
-More competition 
is a trend of 
industry 
-Industry mobility 
and barrier are 
intensifying 
competition 
-No political risk 
because DCE 
avoids political 
involvement and j 
litigation 
- A good future 
Value 
Strength: Process!, 
technology, 
Imagination & 
h u m a n resource 
Weakness: Clumsy 
marketing, a poor 
brand image 
The country manager sees t ha t the changing environment in Thai land causep 
both th rea t s a n d opportuni t ies . More competition is no t merely the t r end of 
Thai land 's consumer electronics market , b u t also the mobility and the barr ier of th i s 
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b u s i n e s s . DCE perceives no political r i sk because it avoids political involvement a n d 
litigation a t all cos ts . It sees a good future in Thai land. 
DCE men t ions process , technology, imaginat ion a n d h u m a n resources a s i ts 
key succes s factors. DCE h a s m a n y cutt ing-edge produc ts , s u c h a s shavers , s t eam 
i rons a n d so on. It does no t ta lk a b o u t i ts weakness . Most exper ts in t h e c o n s u m e r 
electronics b u s i n e s s in Thai land recognise c lumsy marke t ing a n d a poor b r a n d 
image a s i ts weaknesses . It h a s a 'g randpa ' b r a n d image. Each p roduc t group h a s 
different posi t ioning u n d e r t h e s a m e b r a n d n a m e t h a t confuses Thai cus tomers . 
7 . 3 . 2 DB h a s recently t aken over a b a n k with more t h a n 150 b r a n c h e s in 
Thai land. This acquired b a n k still con t inues u s ing its old n a m e , while DB's Thai 
b r a n c h e s u s e s DB's n a m e . The acquired b a n k focuses on retail banking, whereas 
DB concen t ra tes on wholesales banking . The b r a n c h manage r is t he top executive 
who mainly m a k e s a strategic decision for Thai corporate bank ing operat ion. The 
count ry m a n a g e r t akes charge of bo th retail and wholesales banking . The 
envi ronmenta l s cann ing process of DB is i l lustrated in Figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2: Environmental scanning (DB) 
External 
consultant & 
researchers 
only In case of 
big or new 
investment 
r / 
Formal long-term 
Information-gathering 
External 
External data 
Informal routine 
information-
gathering 
1 
Internal data 
Ritual: Branch manager scans 
the environment very often by 
asking his subordinates to 
collect intensive data from 
IBRD, IMF, EIU. BOT & 
newspapers. He reports about 
strategic issues he perceives to 
HQs twice a year officially & 
quarterly informally. He uses 
this data for making a decision 
& devising strategy. Some 
information comes from credit 
risk departments. 
Ritual 
Value: 
Opportunity & 
threat depend on 
Thai government 
policy whether 
favourable or not, 
especially 
liberalisation of 
banking sector 
Criteria: See 
threats & 
opportunities at 
the same time, but 
more opportunities 
manager 
analyses 
strategic 
issues , such 
as political 
situation, 
economic 
issues , risks 
& market 
c o n d i t i o n . 
Interpretation 
General Perception 
-Changing 
environment 
causes threats & 
opportunities 
-Economic 
recovery & long-
term growth are a 
trend of industry. 
-Industry mobility 
and barrier are 
BOTs licence, 
policy & regulation 
for foreign banks 
-No political risk 
because DB avoid 
political 
involvement and 
litigation 
- A good future 
Value 
Strength: Good 
publicity, superior 
products & 
technology 
Weakness: Short-
term orientation 
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With respect to the informal routine information gathering, the b r a n c h manage r 
s c a n s the environment very often by asking his subordina tes to collect intensive d a t a 
from World B a n k (IBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU), Bank of Thailand (BOT) and newspapers . This information is external . 
Internal information comes from all credit r isk depar tmen t s a t local, regional a n d 
global levels. DB employs external consu l tan t s a n d researchers only in case of a big or 
new inves tment s u c h a s acquisit ion in the formal long-term information gathering. He 
reports on the strategic i s sues he perceives to Internat ional Division/New Growth 
Market Division a t t he HQs twice a year officially a n d every three m o n t h s informally. 
He u se s th is d a t a for making a decision and devising strategy. 
After ga ther ing the information, the b r a n c h manage r ana lyses these s trategic 
Issues , s u c h a s political s i tuat ion, economic i ssues , r i sks a n d marke t condi t ions. 
DB sees t h r e a t s a n d oppor tuni t ies s imul taneously, b u t more oppor tuni t ies t h a n 
th rea t s . Its oppor tuni t ies a n d t h r ea t s depend on ei ther favourable or unfavourable 
policies of Thai government towards the liberalisation of Thai bank ing sector in 
par t icular . If t h e government p lans to limit the n u m b e r of foreign b a n k s in 
Thai land, h e t h i n k s it is a th rea t . If the government allows foreign b a n k s to acquire 
local b a n k s , it is a n opportuni ty . 
The b r a n c h manage r sees t h a t the changing envi ronment in Thai land causejs 
bo th t h r e a t s a n d opportuni t ies . Economic recovery a n d long-term growth a r e t he 
t r end of Thai land ' s b a n k i n g sector. The mobility and t h e barr ier for DB are B O T s i 
licences, policies a n d regulat ions for foreign b a n k s . DB perceives no political r i sk 
because it avoids political involvement and litigation a t all costs . It sees a good and 
promising future in Thai land. He is very optimistic abou t Thailand in the long a n d 
the medium te rms . 
DB ment ions good publicity, superior p roduc t s a n d technology a s its key 
success factors. It does not talk abou t its weakness . Most experts in Thai bank ing 
sector identify its shor t - te rm orientation as its weakness . They suspec t s t h a t DB 
can pull out of Thai land a t any t ime if th ings go wrong. 
7.3.3 DA h a s the only one GM. He is the top executive who mainly makes a! 
strategic decision for Thai operation. In te rms of the informal routine information 
gathering, GM s c a n s the envi ronment very often by ask ing his subord ina tes to 
collect intensive da t a from Thai land 's Development Research Inst i tute (TDRI) a n d 
BOT. All da ta are wri t ten u p into a report with a n extensive list of references. This 
da t a collection is subject to the b u s i n e s s p lans of each depar tment . This 
information is external . DA annual ly employs external consu l t an t s a n d researchers 
to collect strategic information for formulating strategy through regional meet ings in 
the formal long-term information gathering. The environmental scann ing process of 
DA is elucidated in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3: Environmental scanning (DA) 
External 
consultant & 
researchers 
External 
Formal long-term 
lrtfonnation-gathering 
External data 
Environmental 
analysis 
Informal routine 
information-
gathering 
Working 
group 
Internal 
Ritual: GM scans the 
environment very often 
by asking his 
subordinates to collect 
intensive data from 
TDRI & BOT. This 
collection is subject to 
business plan of each 
department He employs 
consultant & 
researchers to collect 
strategic information for 
formulating strategy as 
regional meeting. 
Ritual: GM 
analyses 
strategic i s sues 
& a s s e s s e s 
political risks. 
He organises 
working group to 
analyse strategic 
issues according 
to business plan 
of each 
deDartment. 
Value: 
No visible threat, 
but l ess 
intensifying 
competition 
c a u s e s more 
opportunities 
Ritual 
Criteria: See 
threats & 
opportunities at 
the same time, 
but more 
opportunities 
Value 
Value 
Interpretation 
General Perception 
-Changing 
environment 
c a u s e s more 
opportunities. 
-Less competition 
is a trend of 
industry. 
-Industry mobility 
and barrier are 
deregulation, 
M&A, & strategic 
alliance. 
-Political risk only 
affects sales. DA 
avoids litigation at 
all cost. 
- A good future 
Strength: Top-5 
European airlines, 
conservatism, 
reliable service. 
Weakness: Low 
profile & an 
unclear image. 
After gathering the information. GM analyses strategic issues and assesses 
political risks by himself. He organises a working group to help him to analyse 
these strategic issues according to the business plans of each department internally. 
DA sees threats and opportunities concomitantly, but more opportunities than 
threats. There is no visible threat, but less intensifying competition causes more 
opportunities. 
DA sees that the changing environment in Thailand causes more 
opportunities. Because of more strategic alliances and mergers reducing the 
number of air carriers in the global airline industry, less competition is the trend of 
its business in Thailand. The mobility and the barrier for DA are deregulation, M&A 
and strategic alliance. Political risks only affect sales. DA avoids litigation at all 
costs. It sees a good future in Thailand, but it depends on its strategic alliance with 
other airlines. 
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DA men t ions a top-5 E u r o p e a n airline, i ts conservat ism, i ts p a r t n e r s h i p with 
a n American airl ine a n d i ts reliable service a s i ts key succes s factors. It does no t 
ta lk a b o u t i ts weaknesses . Most exper ts in the airline indus t ry specify i ts low 
profile, n o effort in marke t ing a n d a n unc lea r image a s i ts weaknesses . 
7.3.4 Similarity and difference F rom Table 7 .3 , all Du tch compan ies u n d e r 
th i s s t udy s h a r e m u c h commonal i ty in the i r envi ronmenta l s cann i ng process . The 
HQs a n d t h e RHOs do no t get involved with t he envi ronmenta l s c a n n i n g process in 
all D u t c h cases . All of t h e m do n o t have t he clear-cut criteria to differentiate 
between t h r e a t s a n d oppor tuni t ies even w h e n t he envi ronment is changing . All of 
t h e m u s e less in ternal d a t a a n d review t h e s i tua t ion on t h e ad hoc ba s i s . The 
perception of Du tch cases is quite optimistic. This commonal i ty a m o n g t h e m might 
be related to uncer ta in ty avoidance in Hofstede's model. This d imens ion is likely to 
be associated with t he perception of r i sks . However, there a re few differences amoijig 
all of them. DCE h a s a n in ternal aud i t un i t because it h a s th is u n i t in i ts world-
wide operat ion. DB relies on i ts credit r isk depa r tmen t for i ts in ternal information 
a n d the envi ronmenta l analys is because its deals mainly with r i sks . Political r i sks 
cause the n u m b e r of passengers to drop abrupt ly a n d DA's sales accordingly. 
Because th i s difference a m o n g t h e m is ne i ther significant nor related to na t ional 
cul ture , only t he above similarities, no t t he differences will be described a s Figure 
9.2 in Chap te r 9. 
Table 7.3: The similarity and difference in the environmental scanning among 
3 Dutch companies in Thailand 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Similarities Differences 
Frequency of 
scanning 
All of them scan the environment 
very often in the informal routine 
information gathering. 
Long-term 
Information 
gathering 
All of them employ external 
consultants and researchers when 
they need. 
Only DCE has an internal audit unit to 
collect information twice a year and buy 
information from agencies. 
Regular 
information for 
making strategy 
All of them collect mainly external 
data. 
Only DB relies on its credit risk 
department for some internal information. 
Environmental 
analysis 
The chief executives in all of them 
do. Only DCE & DA organise working 
group to support this analvsis. 
Only DB does not organise a working ! 
group to support this analysis. 
Political risk 
assessment 
The chief executives in all of them 
do. All of them avoid political 
involvement & litigation at all costs. 
Political risks affect DA's sales. 
SWOT & criteria All of them perceive threats & 
opportunities at the same time, but 
more opportunities. 
Only DCE uses theoretical and practical 
criteria. 
i 
Main weaknesses DCE & DA share marketing & an 
unclear corporate image as main 
weaknesses . 
Changing 
Environment 
All of them perceive opportunities & 
threats at the same time. 
Future All of them perceive a good future. 
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7.4 The comparison of strategy formulation 
All Dutch companies unde r this s tudy have both similarities and differences in 
relation to their strategy formulation in many facets. All Dutch cases are compared in 
detail to detect these similarities and differences. The comparison of the strategy 
formulation in these Dutch cases is expressed in Table 7.4. The similarities in t he 
strategy formulation among the Dutch cases are used a s a basis for cross-cultural, 
cross-case analysis with their J a p a n e s e counterpar ts in relation to the strategy 
formulation in section 9.2.2. 
Table 7.4: The strategy formulation in Dutch companies in Thailand 
Strategy 
Formulation 
DCE DB DA 
Focus of 
strategy 
formulation 
Thai NSO, but report to RHO 
for each product group, must 
be in line with regional 
strategy (DCE11») 
HQs, RHO and Thai branch 
jointly formulate strategy for 
Thailand (DB11) 
Thai branch, but HQs 
controls pricing, budget 
is subject to sales (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Corporate goals Profits, market share, brand 
image, top-3 brand in 
Thailand (DCEI1; 
Jitpleecheep, 1999, 
September 24 , 1999, 
November 3; Paweewun, 
1999, September 24; 
Rungfapaisarn, 1999, 
November 3). This goal is 
consistent with the regional 
goal (Jirapisankul, 1999, 
August 20; Rungfapaisarn, 
1999, March 27). 
Profits, customer 
satisfaction, top-5 bank in 
Thailand (DBI1). This goal is 
consistent with the regional 
goal (Granitsas, 1998, June 
18; AFP, 1999, October 12; 
Birchall, 1999, October 12; 
Paramesawaran, 1999, 
October 12) 
Profit (DAI1; DAI2) 
Goal-settings By consensus at RHO's 
meeting, depend on 
bargaining power of each 
country (DCEI1) 
Propose plan to RHO for 
approval after consult with 
subordinates in the 
committee (DBI1) 
By negotiation and sales 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
Alternative 
generation 
3 alternatives (DCEI1) Many alternatives (DBI1) Many alternatives (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Authorisation 
for decision-
making 
Thai managers, but report to 
RHO (DCEI1) 
No devolution on single 
person, every decision needs 
a committee (DBI1; DBI2) 
General manager, but 
report to RHO 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
Consultation Involved persons and 
subordinates (DCEI1) 
Subordinates if decisions 
affect them (DBI1) 
Trade union if decisions 
affect them (DAI1; DAI2) 
Negotiation With RHO for corporate goal 
(DCEI1) 
Subordinates if decisions 
affect them (DBI1) 
Trade union if decisions 
affect them p A I l ; DAI2) 
Consensus Need 70% vote (DCEI1) Unanimity (DBI1; DBI2; 
Granitsas, 1998, June 18) 
Need 51% vote (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Committee Used (DCEI1) Used (DBI1) Not used (DAI1; DAI2) 
Involved persons 5-8 persons in the committee 
(DCEI1) 
3-5 persons in the committee 
(DBI1) 
3-5 persons (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Perception of 
strategy 
SaUsfactory (DCEI1) SaUsfactory (DBI1) SaUsfactory (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Difference from 
HQs 
Decision-making process is 
quicker in Thailand (DCEI1) 
Decision-making process is 
quicker in Thailand (DBI1) 
Decision-making 
process is quicker in 
Thailand (DAI1; DAI2) 
Strategic 
document 
Write down short-term plan, 
talk to involved person for 
long-term plan and 
confidential (DCEI1) 
Write down all strategic 
decision, confidential (DBI1) 
Write down all strategic 
decision, confidential 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
Dissemination Involved persons (DCEI1) Involved persons (DBI1) Involved persons (DAI 1 ; 
DAI2) 
Thai economic 
crisis 
Affect strategy; some lay-off 
(DCEI1) 
Opportunity, but dissolve 
some units (DBI1) 
Affect outbound 
passengers, but offset 
by inbound passengers 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
*) T h e s e abbr iv ia t ions refer to t h e re spec t ive in t erv i ewees . 
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7.4.1 DCE h a s its b r a n c h in Thai land called 'National Sales Organisat ion 
(NSO)'. This NSO becomes more important , because Thai land h a s recently become 
DCE's key count ry by definition. With a gent leman 's agreement , each count ry 
m a n a g e r a n d the count ry cha i rman review the strategy for each p roduc t group twkte 
a year. Thai NSO formulates t he s t ra tegy for Thai operation, b u t repor t on it to t he 
corresponding p roduc t group h e a d s a t the RHO for each product group. Thai 
s trategy m u s t be in line with t he regional s t rategy in Asia-Pacific. Depending on the 
bargain ing posit ion of each country, the country manage r se ts goal by c o n s e n s u s at. 
t he RHO's meet ing for each produc t group of each count ry with h i s own 
accountabil i ty. These goals are profits, marke t share , a good b r a n d image a n d a 
top-3 b rand in Thai land. They m u s t be in line with the regional goals u n d e r a 
gent leman 's agreement a t the RHO. 
Figure 7.4: Strategy formulation (DCE) 
Focus of 
strategy 
formulation 
Ritual: With 
gentlemen 
agreement, 
country 
manager & 
chairman 
review 
strategy twice 
a year. Thai 
NSO 
formulates 
strategy for 
Thai 
operation, but 
report to RHO 
for each 
product 
group. 
Strategy must 
be in line with 
the regional 
strategy. 
Goals: 
profits, 
market 
share, brand 
Image, top-3 
brand In 
Thailand & 
In line with 
the regional 
goal under 
gentlemen 
agreement at 
RHO (Value) 
Ritual: 
Country 
manager sets 
goal by 
consensus at 
RHO's 
meeting 
depending 
on 
bargaining 
power of 
each 
country. 
RHO 
Goal-
' setting W 
Alternative 
generation 
Ritual: To 
achieve 
goals, 
country 
manager 
generates 3 
alternatives 
before 
making 
decisions 
Process 
Making a 
strategic 
decision 
Rituali Country 
manager makes 
most strategic 
decisions alone, 
but report these 
decisions to RHO 
by phone & 
country chairman 
monthly. With top-
down & bottom-up 
communication, 
some decisions 
need committee 
for 70% votes, 
consultation with 
Involve person & 
subordinates. He 
negotiates with 
RHO about 
guideline. 5-8 
persons 
participate in the 
committee. 
Outcome 
Perception 
Ritual: All his 
decisions are 
satisfactory, 
but the 
decision-
making 
process in 
Thailand is 
faster than in 
&RHO. 
Dissemination 
of decisions & 
goals 
Ritual: These 
decisions are 
disseminated 
to involved 
person write 
down only 
short-term 
plan, talk to 
involved 
persons for 
long-term 
plans. These 
documents are 
confidential. 
Level of secrecy 
is varied. 
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To achieve the corporate goals, the country manager generates three 
alternatives before making a strategic decision. He makes most strategic decisions 
alone. He reports on his decisions by telephone to the RHO and the country cha i rman 
monthly. With top-down and bot tom-up communication, some decisions need 
consultat ion with the involved persons and his subordinates through the committee. 
The n u m b e r of the involved persons depends on situation. For decision-making, five to 
eight persons usually participate in t he committee and 70% votes are needed. In 
general, DCE prefers a consensus to a majority decision. He negotiates with the RHO 
about guidelines for decision-making. The strategy formulation process of DCE is 
delineated in Figure 7.4. 
All his decisions satisfy himself. Because Thai NSO is small with less involved 
persons, the decision-making process in Thailand is faster t han t ha t in the HQs and 
the RHO. These decisions are disseminated only to the involved persons . DCE writes 
down only its short- term plans . The country manager talks only to the involved 
persons for long-term plans . All strategic documents are confidential and their degree 
of secrecy is varied. 
7 .4 .2 DB h a s some procedures and me thods for ensur ing the compliance of 
Thai b r a n c h with the s trategy and the policy of i ts HQs (Sijbrand & Eppink, 1994). 
In ternat ional Division a t the HQs, Asia-Pacific Regional Office and Thai b r a n c h 
review strategy every year a n d formulate the s t ra tegy for Thai operat ion because 
some strategies need global information, some need regional one a n d the r e s t needs 
local one. DB h a s to deal with r i sks in these th ree levels. To come u p with the 
corporate goals, t he b r a n c h manage r consul t s with subord ina tes in t he commit tee in 
Thai b r a n c h . Then, he proposes these goals to a n d d i scusses with Chief Executive 
Officer Asia-Pacific in Singapore for approval. These goals are profits, cus tomer 
satisfaction a n d a top-5 b a n k in Thai land. They m u s t be in line with the regional 
goals in Asia-Pacific. The strategy formulation process of DB is described in Figure 
7.5. 
To achieve the corporate goals, the b r a n c h manage r generates m a n y 
al ternat ives before making a strategic decision, b u t he h a s to pa s s u p some strategic 
decisions to the RHO. He r u n s many scenar ios and takes many combinat ions of 
factors into account . Because no single person is allowed to m a k e a s trategic 
decision, every decision needs a commit tee for 100% vote. Only one opponen t can 
ha l t t he decisions. He needs to consu l t a n d negotiate with his subord ina tes in t he 
commit tee if t he decisions affect them. He h a s to have all h i s subord ina tes agree to 
w h a t he is going to do. Three to five pe r sons part ic ipate in the committee. The 
n u m b e r of t he involved pe r sons depends on the s i tuat ion. Depending on the scale of 
inves tment a n d loans, t he b r a n c h manage r needs approval from the HQs a n d the 
RHO. 
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Figure 7 .5: Strategy formulation (DB) 
Process 
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RHO 
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the rest 
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Goals: 
profits, 
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& a top-5 
bank in 
Thailand & 
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(Value) 
Making a 
strategic 
decision 
Ritual: 
Branch 
manager 
consults 
with 
subordinate 
s i n the 
committee 
in Thai 
branch 
comes up 
with goals & 
proposes 
goal to RHO 
for approval. 
Ritual: To 
achieve goals, 
branch 
manager 
generates 
many 
alternatives 
before 
making 
decisions He 
runs many 
scenarios & 
take many 
combinations 
of factors Into 
account. 
Ritual: No single 
person makes 
strategic 
decisions. All 
the decisions 
need committee 
for 100% vote, 
consultation & 
negotiation with 
subordinates if 
the decisions 
affect them 3-5 
persons 
participate in 
the committee. 
Depending on 
scale of 
investment & 
loan, branch 
manager needs 
approval from 
HQs & RHO. 
Outcome 
Perception 
Ritual: All his 
decisions are 
satisfactory, 
but the 
decision-
making 
process in 
Thailand is 
faster than in 
HQs & RHO. 
Dissemination 
of decisions & 
goals 
Ritual: These 
decisions are 
disseminated 
to involved 
persons. Write 
down all 
strategic 
decisions. 
These 
documents are 
confidential. 
All h i s decisions satisfy himself. Because Thai b ranch is small with less 
person, the decision-making process in Thailand is faster t h a n t ha t in the HQs and th|e 
RHO. These decisions are disseminated only to the involved person. DB writes down 
all strategic decisions and these strategic documents are confidential. 
7.4.3 DA r u n s both cargo and passenger bus inesses in Thailand. Thai branch 
formulates strategy, especially the market ing p lans for Thai operation after each 
b ranch submi t s da ta a t the regional meeting, b u t i ts budgets are subject to the sales in 
the previous year. Passenger Sales Division a t the HQs controls pricing policy in 
Thailand. On the bas i s of the sales in the previous years, GM negotiates a n agreement 
for t he goals a t the RHO's meeting. This goal is profit. The strategy formulation 
process of DA is portrayed in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.6: Strategy formulation (DA) 
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To achieve t he corporate goals, GM genera tes m a n y al ternat ives before 
mak ing a strategic decision. He m a k e s mos t strategic decisions, b u t h a s to report 
on h i s decisions to the RHO. He needs to consul t a n d negotiate with t he t rade 
un ion if the decisions affect the employees. Sometimes, three to five pe r sons 
part icipate in t he meet ing for making a decision a n d every decision needs a t least 
5 1 % votes. DA does not need a p e r m a n e n t committee and consensus . 
All h is decisions satisfy himself. Because Thai b r anch is small with less 
involved person, the decision-making process in Thai land is faster t h a n t h a t in the 
HQs a n d the RHO. These decisions are disseminated only to the involved persons . 
DA writes down all s trategic decisions and these strategic documen t s a re 
confidential. 
7.4.4 Similarity and difference From Table 7.5, all Dutch companies sha re 
m u c h commonali ty in their s trategy formulation process . All of t h e m need only to, 
a t most , report to their RHOs when they formulate strategy for Thai operat ion. Only 
RHOs have sufficient au thor i ty to approve the corporate goals. This commonali ty 
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among t h e m might be related to power d is tance in Hofstede's model. Power d is tance 
is likely to be associated with the degree of central isat ion and formalisation. All of 
t h e m need suppor t for thei r decis ion-making a n d consul ta t ion only from the j 
involved pe r sons and the m e m b e r s of the committee. They d isseminate their 
s trategic decisions only to t h e involved person a n d the m e m b e r s of t h e committee, j 
This similarity a m o n g t h e m might be related to uncer ta in ty avoidance in Hofstede's 
model. This d imension might be related to t he d e m a n d s for people's suppor t for a 
c o n s e n s u s in strategic decision-making. However, there a re few differences among 
all of them. The HQs only get involved only in the strategy formulation of t he Dutch 
service companies , DB and DA. Before proposing the goals to i ts RHO, DB needs to 
consul t with the committee in Thai b ranch . Only DA organise a n o n - p e r m a n e n t 
commit tee and DCE writes down only i ts shor t - te rm p lans . Because th is difference 
a m o n g t h e m is ne i ther significant nor related to nat ional cul ture, only t he above 
similarities, no t the differences will be depicted a s Figure 9.4 in Chapte r 9. 
Table 7 .5 : The similarity and difference in the strategy formulation among 3 
Dutch companies in Thailand 
Strategy 
Formulation 
Similarity Difference 
External 
relationship with 
HQs & RHO 
All of them at least report to RHO 
when they formulate strategy. Thai 
strategy must be in line with regional 
strategy in all of them. 
HQs, RHO and Thai branch jointly 
formulate strategy in Thailand in DB. 
HQs controls only pricing policy in DA 
strategy formulation. 
Corporate goals All of them use profit as primary goal. 
The goals in Thailand must be in line 
with regional goals. 
Goal-settings All of them need discuss ions & 
approval at regional level & their 
RHOs approve goal. 
Only DB need consultation with 
subordinates in the committee in Thai 
branch for setting goal. 
Alternative 
generation 
All of them need to generate at least 3 
alternatives. 
DB & DA generate more alternatives 
than DCE does. 
Making strategic 
decisions 
All of them need more than one 
person to make a decision. DCE & DB 
organise a standing committee Their 
chief executives need to consult & 
negotiate with involved person & 
subordinates 
DA organises a non-permanent 
committee. 
Perception of 
strategy 
Decision-making in Thailand is faster 
in the Netherlands for all of these 
companies. 
Dissemination All of them disseminate strategic 
decisions to the involved persons only 
& write down some strategic decisions 
& long-term plan. These documents 
are confidential to varied degree. 
Only DCE writes down its short-term 
plans. 
7.5 The comparison of strategy implementation 
All Dutch companies unde r this s tudy have both similarities and differences in 
relation to their strategy implementation in many features. All Dutch cases are 
compared in detail to uncover these similarities and differences. The comparison of thk 
strategy implementation in these Dutch cases is expressed in Table 7.6. The 
similarities in the strategy implementation among the Dutch cases are used a s a bas is 
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for the cross-cultural, cross-case analysis with their J a p a n e s e counterpar ts in relation 
to the strategy implementation in section 9.2.3. 
Table 7.6: The strategy implementation in Dutch companies in Thailand 
Strategy 
Implementation 
DCE DB DA 
Programme/Policy-
setting 
Country manager for his 
product group (DECI1*) 
Branch manager and RHO 
(DBI1) 
General manager (DAI 1 ; 
DAI2) 
Budget setting Country manager with 
advice from financial 
manager (DECI1) 
Branch manager proposes 
budget to the committee 
and presents it to RHO 
(DBI1) 
General manager (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Budget and short-
term plan approval 
Country manager, but 
report to RHO (DECI1) 
Branch manager mostly 
for marketing activities 
(DBI1) 
General manager (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
Corporate rules & 
procedure 
Country manager (DECI1) Branch manager (DBI1) General manager (DAI 1 ; 
DAI2) 
Structural 
determination 
Country manager with 
office lav-out (DECI1) 
Branch manager (DB11) General manager (DAI 1 ; 
DAI2) 
Manpower 
management 
Human resource 
managers (DECÏ1) 
Human resource 
managers (DBI1) 
Human resource 
managers (DAI1; DAI2) 
Recruitment & 
training 
Human resource 
department (DECI1) 
Human resource 
department (DBI1) 
Human resource 
department (DAI1; DAI2) 
Special Techniques MBO, TQM, JIT (DECI1) No (DBI1) TQM (DAI1; DAI2) 
Mobilisation Country manager (DECI1) Branch manager (DBI1) General manager (DAI 1 ; 
DAI2) 
HQs & RHO 
involvement 
Report to RHO only 
(DECI1) 
Little involvement, only 
supporting role (DBI1) 
Sometimes in recruitment 
process, mostiy pricing 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
*) T h e s e a b b r e v i a t i o n s refer to t h e re spec t ive in t erv i ewees . 
7.5.1 DCE After mak ing a strategic decision, t he country manage r se ts 
p rogrammes a n d m a k e s policies for h i s p roduc t group. To set budge ts , h e seeks 
advice from the financial manage r abou t financial ana lyses before approving the 
budge t s and the shor t - te rm p lans . He repor ts on his approval to the RHO with all 
r easons because all financial m a t t e r s m u s t be reported to the RHO. 
The count ry manage r in corporation with a working group se t s t he corporate 
ru les a n d procedures for h i s p roduc t group. He organises the corporate s t ruc tu re 
a n d the office layout by himself. He a sks the HR manage r to manage manpower , 
rec ru i tment a n d training. DCE's HRM and HRD are highly localised in Thailand, 
The HQs a n d the RHO involve in recrui t ing DCE's top executives in Thai land. 
DCE h a s never organised company-wide activities and training. With 
interactive communicat ion in the committee, the count ry manage r mobilises the 
m a n a g e r s a n d workforce in his product group th rough decisions in the committee. 
DCE employs MBO, TQM a n d J IT a s special techniques suppor ted by 
corporate rules , procedures a n d t ra ining p rogramme in HR depar tment . The 
strategy implementat ion process of DCE is explicated in Figure 7.7. 
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Figure 7.7: Strategy implementation (DCE) 
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7.5.2 DB h a s a highly decentral ised operational m a n a g e m e n t a n d highly 
central ised r i sk m a n a g e m e n t th rough a mat r ix s t ruc tu re (Sijbrands & Eppink, 
1994). After mak ing a strategic decision, the b r a n c h m a n a g e r a n d the RHO jointly 
se t p r o g r a m m e s a n d m a k e policies for Thai b r a n c h . To set budgets , t he b r a n c h 
m a n a g e r p roposes the budge t s to the budget council compris ing the involved 
pe r sons in Thai b r a n c h and then p resen t s the budge t s to t he RHO. Depending on 
the scale of inves tment , t he HQs a n d the RHO are involved in shor t - te rm acquisitiori 
a n d strategic change . He approves t he budge t s mostly for marke t ing activities and 
small-scale inves tments . 
The b r a n c h manage r se ts corporate ru les a n d procedures for Thai b ranch , 
b u t t h e general procedures m u s t be in line with the regional policy. He organises 
t he corporate s t ruc tu re and mobilises h i s workforce. He interviews all newcomers irji 
Thai b r a n c h , b u t normally a s k s the HR manage r to m a n a g e manpower , recru i tment 
a n d t ra ining. The RHO suppor t s some training. DB h a s a clear goal to recrui t 
employees. It u s e s h e a d - h u n t e r s a n d classified a d s for recru i tment . The strategy 
implementa t ion process of DB is exemplified in Figure 7 .8 . 
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Figure 7.8: Strategy implementation (DB) 
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GM se t s corporate rules a n d procedures for Thai b r a n c h . He organises t h e 
corporate s t ruc tu re a n d mobilises h i s workforce. He normally a s k s t he HR manage r 
to m a n a g e manpower , rec ru i tment a n d training. He needs advice from the t rade 
un ion for new recrui tment , because t he un ion emphas i se s internal promotion and 
recrui tment . The recruited position is subject to each head of depar tment . 
The HQs and the RHO are involved in t he rec ru i tment of some posit ions. DA 
employs only TQM a s a special t echnique suppor ted by the corporate rules , the 
procedures a n d the t ra ining p rogrammes in the HR depar tment . The s t ra tegy 
implementat ion process of DA is demons t ra ted in Figure 7.9. 
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Figure 7.9: Strategy implementation (DA) 
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7.5.4 Similarity and difference From Table 7.7, all Dutch companies sha re 
m u c h commonality in their strategy implementation process. The chief executives in 
all of t h e m set programmes, policies, corporate rules a n d procedures to sui t their need 
They are likely to change all of t h e m when they take u p the new job a s the chief 
executives. They are less likely to mainta in wha t their predecessors se t beforehand. 
This similarity among them might be related to uncer ta in ty avoidance in Hofstede's 
model. 
Table 7.7: The similarity and difference in the strategy implementation among 3 
Dutch companies in Thailand 
Strategy 
Implementation 
Similarity Difference 
Programme/Policy-
setting 
By the chief executives in all of them The chief executive in DB needs RHO's 
involvement. 
Budget setting The chief executives in all of them 
need advice before approving budget. 
Only DB & DA need approval of their 
budget from RHO 
DCE se ts & approves budget & then 
reports on this approval to RHO. DB 
can approve mosuy marketing budget in 
Thailand. 
Corporate rules & 
procedure 
The chief executives in all of them set 
corporate rules & procedure. 
Organising The chief executives in all of them 
organise the structure. 
The chief executive in DCE can organise 
office layout for his product group. 
Staffing The chief executives in all of them 
ask their HR manager to do. Their 
HQs & RHOs get involved in high-
level recruitment In Thailand. 
HQs & RHO support training in DB. 
Mobilisation The chief executives In all of them 
mobilise the workforce. 
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This dimension might be related to likelihood to main ta in corporate ru les 
and procedures in subsidiar ies . However, there are few differences among all of 
them. The chief executives in DCE can also organise their office layout. DCE se ts 
a n d approves i ts budge t s in Thai land and reports on t h e m to i ts RHO. DB can 
approve mostly marke t ing budge t s . To be in line with the regional policy, t he 
b r a n c h manage r in DB needs to set ru les and procedures with i ts RHO's 
involvement. The HQs and the RHO suppor t t ra in ing programme in DB. Because 
th is difference among t h e m is nei ther significant nor related to nat ional cul ture , only 
the above similarities, no t t he differences will be i l lustrated as Figure 9.6 in Chapte r 
9. 
7 .6 The comparison of evaluation and control 
All Dutch companies unde r th is s tudy have both similarities and differences in 
relation to their evaluation and control in many at t r ibutes . All Dutch cases are 
compared in detail to uncover these similarities and differences. The comparison of the 
evaluation and control in these Dutch cases is expressed in Table 7.8. The similarities 
in the evaluation and control among the Dutch cases are used as a bas is for the cross-
cultural , cross-case analysis with their J a p a n e s e counterpar ts in relation to the 
evaluation a n d control in section 9.2.4. 
Table 7 .8: The evaluation and control in Dutch companies in Thailand 
Evaluation 
& Control 
DCE DB DA 
Criteria 
establishment 
Country manager with 
advice from subordinates 
and colleagues (DCEI1*) 
Branch manager proposes 
them to country manager after 
discussion with involved 
persons (DBI1) 
General manager with advice 
from subordinates and 
colleagues (DAI1; DAI2) 
Criteria & 
standard 
Both qualitative and 
quantitative, such a s 
balance score card, KPI, 
PIMS (DCEI1) 
Quantitative and very specific 
(DBI1) 
Quantitative and very 
specific (DAI1; DAI2) 
Performance 
assessment 
Country manager a s se s se s 
units by sales, profits and 
other broader criteria 
(DCEI1) 
Branch manager from daily 
report (DBI1) 
General manager a s s e s s e s 
performance on the basis of 
bus iness plan of each 
department (DAI1; DAI2) 
Benchmarking No (DCEI1) With Western banks in 
Thailand only (DBI1) 
No (DAI1; DAI2) 
Corrective 
action 
By warning, meeting and 
committee (DCEI1) 
By meeting and discussion 
(DBI1) 
By meeting and discussion 
(DAI1; DAI2) 
Report to HQs 
& RHO 
To RHO once a month 
(DCEI1) 
To RHO once a month (DBI1) To RHO and H 9 s once a 
week (DAI1; DAI2) 
Frequency of 
HQs' visit 
Twice a year from HQs 
without timetable, but 
from RHO twice a year on 
schedule (DCEI1) 
Twice a year from both HQs 
and RHO without timetable 
(DBI1) 
Once a year from HQs and 
every 2-3 month from RHO 
without timetable (DAI1; 
DAI2) 
CEO's 
performance 
By RHO with clear criteria 
from a gentleman's 
agreement beforehand 
(DCEI1) 
By country manager and report 
to RHO once a month with 
clear criteria from a 
gentleman's agreement 
beforehand (DBI1) 
By RHO with clear criteria 
from a gendeman's 
agreement beforehand in 
monthly report (DAI1; DAI2) 
Loss-making 
endurance 
2-3 years (DCEI1) 2-3 years (DBI1) 2-3 years (DAI1; DAI2) 
*) T h e s e a b b r e v i a t i o n s refer to t h e re spec t ive in t erv i ewees . 
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7.6.1 DCE To establ ish criteria for evaluation and control, t h e count ry 
m a n a g e r seeks advice from his subord ina tes and h is colleagues. In t he pas t , 
count ry m a n a g e r s h a d to report on these criteria to t he count ry cha i rman . He u s e s 
both quali tat ive and quant i ta t ive criteria to m e a s u r e both group and individual 
performance, s u c h a s ba lance score card, KPI and PIMS. Without benchmark ing , h e 
a s s e s s e s h i s u n i t s from sales, profits a n d o ther b roader criteria. He reviews the 
performance quarter ly, semi-quarter ly, annua l ly monthly and daily. He u se s 
warn ings , meet ings and commit tees to find individual and collective accountabil i ty 
for corrective act ion. The process of evaluation and control of DCE is explained in 
Figure 7.10. 
Figure 7.10: Evaluation and control (DCE) 
Performance Interaction 
with HQs f Criteria assessment & Corrective establishment benchmarking &RHO L w actions w I 
Country 
manager's 
performance 
Ritual: Country 
manager with 
advice from 
subordinates & 
colleagues. He 
u s e s both 
qualitative & 
quantitative 
criteria to measure 
both group & 
individual 
performance. 
Ritual: Without 
benchmarking, 
country manager 
assesses units by 
sales, profit & other 
broader criteria. He 
reviews 
performance 
quarterly, semi-
quarterly, annually 
monthly & daily. 
Value: 
Equality 
Ritual: 
Country 
manager 
u s e s 
warning 
meeting & 
committee. 
Value: Short-
term 
Ritual: DCE 
can afford 
loss-making 
2-3 years. 
Ritual: Thai 
subsidiary 
reports to RHO 
once a month. 
Staff from HQs 
without 
timetable & 
RHO on 
schedule visits 
Thai 
subsidiary 
twice a year. 
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Ritual: RHO 
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country 
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with clear 
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gentlemaiV 
agreement 
between 
country 
manager 
regional 
manager. 
ce 
fh|>m a 
s 
With respec t to the interact ion with t he HQs and the RHO, Thai NSO repor ts 
on the performance to Regional Headquar te r s of Asia-Pacific in Singapore a s i ts RHO 
once a m o n t h . Top executives a n d staff from produc t group divisions both a t t he 
HQs wi thou t t imetable and a t t he RHO on schedule visit Thai NSO twice a year. Th$ 
RHO a s s e s s e s t he count ry manager ' s performance with the clear criteria from a 
gent leman ' s agreement between the country manage r and the regional manager . 
DCE can afford loss-making in Thai land for only 2-3 years in a row and a sk its 
count ry m a n a g e r s to leave if the s i tuat ion is no t enhanced . 
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7.6.2 DB To establ ish criteria for evaluation and control, the b r anch 
m a n a g e r proposes the criteria to t he country manage r after discussion with involved 
pe r sons . For t he control procedure, DB b a s e s its s t a n d a r d s on the volume of 
t ransac t ions , t he impor tance of clients and the required service-time (Sijbrands & 
Eppink, 1994). He u s e s quant i ta t ive very specific criteria. He assesses the 
performance from daily reports . He b e n c h m a r k s DB's performance agains t only 
Western b a n k s in Thai land. He u s e s meet ings and discuss ions with the involved 
pe r sons for corrective action. The process of evaluation and control of DB is 
clarified in Figure 7 .11 . 
Figure 7.11: Evaluation and control (DB) 
Criteria 
establishment 
Performance 
assessment & 
benchmarking Corrective 
actions 
Ritual: Branch 
manager 
proposes criteria 
to country 
manager after 
discussion with 
involved 
persons. Using 
quantitative & 
very specific 
criteria. 
Ritual: Branch 
manager a s s e s s e s 
performance from 
dally report & 
benchmark against 
only Western 
banks in Thailand. 
Value: 
Equality 
Ritual: 
Branch 
manager 
u s e s 
meetings & 
discussions. 
Interaction 
with HQs 
& RHO 
Value: Short-
term 
Ritual: DB can 
afford loss-
making 2-3 
years. 
Otherwise, HQs 
& RHO have to 
review policy. 
Ritual: Thai 
subsidiary 
reports to RHO 
once a month. 
Staff from both 
HQs & RHO 
visits Thai 
subsidiary twice 
a year without 
timetable. 
Branch manager 
visits HQs 
annually. 
Country 
manager's 
performance 
Loss-
making 
endurance 
Ritual: 
Country 
manager 
a s s e s s e s 
branch 
manager's 
performance 
& report it to 
RHO once a 
month based 
on a 
gendeman's 
agreement 
between 
country 
manager & 
branch 
manager. 
With regard to t he interact ion with t he HQs a n d the RHO, Thai b r a n c h 
repor ts on i ts performance to the RHO once a mon th . Top m a n a g e r s a n d staff from 
Internat ional Division/New Growth Market Division a t t he HQs a n d Chief Executive 
a t t he RHO visit Thai b r a n c h twice a year wi thout t imetable. Sometimes, these top 
m a n a g e r s regularly m a k e a telephone call to Thai b ranch , and the b r anch manage r 
s ends a n u m b e r of wri t ten reports to the HQs (Sijbrands & Eppink, 1994). He visits 
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t he HQs for a t t end ing the a n n u a l conference every year. On the bas i s of a 
gen t leman ' s agreement between the country manager a n d the b r anch manager , the 
coun t ry m a n a g e r a s ses ses the b r a n c h manager ' s performance and repor ts on it to 
t he RHO once a mon th . DB can afford loss-making for 2-3 consecutive years . 
Otherwise, t he HQs a n d the RHO have to review the policy. 
7.6.3 DA GM u s e s quant i ta t ive and very specific criteria. Without 
benchmark ing , h e a s se s se s t he performance on the bas i s of t he b u s i n e s s p lans of 
each depar tmen t . He u s e s meet ings and discuss ions with the involved pe r sons for 
corrective act ion. 
With regard to the interaction with the HQs and the RHO, Thai b ranch reports; 
on performance to the RHO and the HQs once a week. Top executives and staff from 
the HQs visit Thai b ranch once a year. Their counterpar ts from the RHO at tend 
regional conference in every b ranch in the region every 2-3 months without timetable. 
On the bas is of a gentleman's agreement between GM a n d the regional manager, the j 
RHO assesses GM's performance from monthly report he submits . DA can afford loss-
making 2-3 years consecutively and asks its GM to leave if the situation is not 
improved. The process of evaluation and control of DA is illustrated in Figure 7.12. 
Figure 7.12: Evaluation and control (DA) 
Criteria 
establishment 
Ritual: GM u s e s 
quantitative & 
very specific 
criteria. 
Performance 
asses sment & 
benchmarking 
Corrective 
actions 
Ritual: Without 
benchmarking, 
GM a s s e s s e s 
performance on 
the basis of 
bus iness plan of 
each 
department. 
Ritual: GM 
u s e s 
meetings & 
discussions. 
Interaction 
with HQs 
& RHO 
Value: Short-
term 
Ritual: DA can 
afford loss-
making 2-3 
years. 
Ritual: Thai 
subsidiary 
reports to RHO 
& HQs once a 
week. Staff 
from HQs visit 
Thai subsidiary 
once a year & 
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without 
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Country 
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performance 
Loss-
making 
endurance 
Ritual: RHO 
assesses GM's 
performance 
from monthly 
report he 
submits on the 
basis of a. 
gentleman's 
agreement 
between GM & 
regional 
manager. 
144 
7.6.4 Similarity and difference From Table 7.9, all Dutch companies share 
much commonality in their evaluation and control. All of them can set u p criteria for 
evaluation and control wi thout their HQs' or RHOs' involvement. The chief executives 
in all of them tend to use meetings and discussions ra ther t h a n personal authori ty in 
the corporate hierarchy for corrective action. All of them do not need formalisation for 
performance a s ses smen t from their HQs. This commonality among t h e m might be 
related to power dis tance in Hofstede's model. Power dis tance is likely to be associated 
with the degree of centralisation and formalisation. However, there a re few differences 
among all of them. Because DCE deals with both selling and manufactur ing products , 
it u ses both qualitative and quantitat ive criteria, such a s balance score card, KPI, PIMS 
and so on. Only DB b e n c h m a r k s its performance against the Western b a n k s a s its 
direct competitors in Thailand. Its b ranch manager h a s to propose the criteria to the 
country manager . DA appraises the performance from the bus iness plans of each 
depar tment . Their frequency of the interaction with their HQs and RHOs, such a s staff 
visit and reports on performance is varied. Because this difference among them is 
neither significant nor related to national culture, only the above similarities, not the 
differences will be delineated a s Figure 9.8 in Chapter 9. 
Table 7.9: The similarity and difference in the evaluation and control among 3 
Dutch companies in Thailand 
Evaluation & 
Control 
Similarity Difference 
Criteria 
establishment 
All of them use quantitative & very 
specific criteria & need to advise 
subordinates & colleagues before 
establishing the criteria. 
DCE also u s e s qualitative criteria. Only the 
branch manager in DB proposes these 
criteria to his country manager after 
discussing with involved persons. 
Performance 
assessment & 
Benchmarking 
DCE & DB does it daily. DCE & DA 
do not use benchmarking. 
DA does it from bus iness plan of each 
department quarterly. Only DB u s e s 
benchmarking. 
Corrective action All of them use meeting & 
committee for warning & 
discussion. 
Interaction with 
HQs & RHO 
All of them report on their 
performance only to RHO. Staff 
from HQs and RHOs visits Thai 
units at least twice a year without 
timetable. 
DCE & DB report it once a month, but DA to 
RHO & HQs once a week. Top managers in 
HQs sometimes call DB. 
CEO's 
performance 
All of them use a gentleman's 
agreement. 
DCE & DA use a gentleman's agreement with 
RHO, but DB with the country manager. 
Loss-making 
endurance 
All of them can't afford to make loss 
more than 2-3 years. 
DCE & DA change their country manager if 
there's no improvement. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Because all t he Du tch cases a re operat ing in three different types of 
bus iness , namely c o n s u m e r electronics, bank ing a n d air carr iers , they have different 
character is t ics inheri ted from these three indus t r ies . Fur thermore , all of t h e m 
s tar ted their b u s i n e s s in Thai land in different years from 1929-1991 . The size of 
their b r anches in Thai land is also different from companies to companies . 
Nonetheless, all Dutch cases sha re some similar features when they are operat ing in 
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Thai land. All Dutch cases still employ th i rd-count ry staff and report on their 
performance to thei r RHOs in Singapore first. 
With regard to environmental scanning , all Du tch cases have different 
information-gathering processes and environmental diagnosises, because all of t h e m 
encoun te r different envi ronments in their own bus ines s . However, all of t h e m s h a r e 
some similari t ies in their environmental scann ing process , such a s avoiding political 
involvement a t all cos ts to minimise risk, employing more external consu l t an t s a n d 
seeing a good future. Their outlook is quite optimistic. The description of th i s stage 
of SMP for all Du tch cases in Thai land will be expressed in Figure 9.2 in Chapte r 9. 
With respect to strategy formulation, all Dutch cases formulate corporate 
strategy in a different way from each other because of their relat ions with their HQs 
a n d RHOs, the difference in their own bus ine s s environment and the size of their 
b r a n c h e s in Thai land. Nevertheless, all of t hem sha re some aspec ts of the strategy 
formulation and the strategic decision-making process in their Thai operation; for 
example, emphas i s ing profits a s a pr imary goal, d isseminat ing the strategic 
decisions to only the involved persons . Their decision-making process is quicker in 
Thai land t h a n t h a t in the Nether lands . The description of th is s tage of SMP for all 
Du tch cases will be expressed in Figure 9.4 in Chapter 9. 
As far a s s trategy implementat ion is concerned, all Dutch cases implement 
thei r corporate s trategy in a different way because of thei r relat ions with their HQs 
a n d RHOs, t he difference in thei r own bus ine s s envi ronment and the size of their 
b r a n c h e s in Thai land. Still, all of t h e m sha re some facets of their s t ra tegy 
implementa t ion in their Thai operation. All chief executives in these cases set 
corporate ru les , organise the corporate s t ruc tu re a n d mobilise the workforce 
themselves in Thai land. Their h u m a n resources m a n a g e r s manage manpower . The 
descript ion of th i s s tage of SMP for all Dutch cases will be expressed in Figure 9.6 iri 
Chapte r 9. 
In t e r m s of evaluation and control, all Du tch cases evaluate their s trategy 
a n d control their performance in a different way because of their relat ions with their 
HQs a n d RHOs, t he difference in their own b u s i n e s s environment and the size of 
their b r a n c h e s in Thai land. Even so, all of t h e m s h a r e some similar processes of 
evaluation a n d control for their operation in Thai land, such a s meet ings and 
d i scuss ions ins tead of us ing personal author i ty for corrective action a n d us ing the 
clear cri teria from a gent leman 's agreement between their chief executives a n d their 
immediate bosses . The description of th i s s tage of SMP for all Dutch cases will be 
expressed in Figure 9.6 in Chapter 9. 
According to the above four s teps of SMP in Wheelen and Hunger ' s model, 
t he compar ison among all Dutch cases in the cross-case analysis within Dutch 
cu l ture leads to the findings of the similarities a n d the differences among these 
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cases . Fur thermore , each Dutch case h a s its own part iculari t ies . The similarities 
a s a resu l t of t he cross-case analysis within Dutch cu l ture in th i s chap te r will be 
compared with the similarities a s a resu l t of the cross-case analysis within J a p a n e s e 
cu l ture in Chapte r 8 in the cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis in Chapter 9. The 
differences a s a resul t of the cross-case analysis within Dutch cul ture in th i s 
chap te r will be compared with t he differences a s a resul t of the cross-case analysis 
within J a p a n e s e cu l ture in Chapte r 8 for discussion in Chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
SMP OF JAPANESE COMPANIES IN THAILAND 
8.1 Introduction 
J a p a n e s e companies, including the three J a p a n e s e cases unde r th i s s tudy in 
Thailand are par t of the global operation of J a p a n e s e MNCs. To guarantee the 
anonymity of the J a p a n e s e cases and all interviewees, JCE , J B and J A are allocated for 
a J a p a n e s e consumer electronics firm, a J a p a n e s e bank and a J a p a n e s e air carrier in 
Thailand. The characterist ics and the brief history of JCE, J B and JA are pivotal to tijie 
insight into the SMP in their subsidiaries in Thailand. Their paren t companies were 
founded in different years in J a p a n and entered Thailand in different years, too. The 
global s t ruc ture of JCE . J B and JA determines the relationship among their paren t 
companies in J a p a n , Thai subsidiaries and their global operations. To comprehend th1 e 
individuality of each J a p a n e s e company and the similarities and the differences amorjg 
these three cases , the comparison of characterist ics among them is discussed in 
section 8.2 with regard to the years of their foundation both in J a p a n and in Thailand 
their flow of reports , their organisational s t ructures , their legal s t a tuses and the 
characterist ics of their workforce a s expressed in Table 8 .1 . 
To d iscuss these idiosyncrasies, the similarities a n d the differences among 
these J a p a n e s e cases according to Wheelen and Hunger 's model, section 8.3 compare^ 
the environmental scanning of JCE , J B and J A in Table 8.2 and describes it for JCE , 
J B and J A in Figure 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 respectively. Section 8.4 compares the strategy 
formulation of JCE, J B and J A in Table 8.4 and explores it for JCE, J B and JA in 
Figure 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 respectively. Section 8.5 compares the strategy implementation 
of JCE , J B and JA in Table 8.6 a n d describes it for JCE, J B and J A in Figure 8.7, 8.8 
and 8.9 respectively. Section 8.6 compares the evaluation and control of JCE, J B and 
J A in Table 8.8 and explores it for JCE , J B and JA in Figure 8.10, 8.11 and 8.12 
respectively. As a resul t from both the within-case analysis of each J a p a n e s e companjy 
in Figure 8.1-8.12 and the cross-case analyses within J a p a n e s e cul ture in Table 8 .1-
8.9, idiosyncrasies in each J a p a n e s e case and some commonalities and differences 
among all J a p a n e s e cases a re discussed. 
The similarities among the J a p a n e s e cases in t e rms of environmental scanning, 
strategy formulation, strategy implementation and evaluation and control a re used a s 
bas is for identifying the SMP of the J a p a n e s e companies in Thailand. The J a p a n e s e 
SMP as a resul t of the cross-case analysis within J a p a n e s e cul ture is used to compare 
with the Dutch SMP as a result of the cross-case analysis within Dutch culture from 
Chapter 7 in Chapter 9. This comparison is used to formulate the empirical 
propositions for the conclusion of this analysis. To reformulate the propositions for th^ 
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conclusion of th is s tudy and for the future research, the empirical propositions from 
this analysis is used to compare with the conceptual propositions from Chapter 4. The 
differences among them are used to elaborate the idiosyncrasies of each J a p a n e s e case 
and to discuss them in Chapter 10. Section 8.7 reaches a conclusion. 
Table 8.1: The characteristics of Japanese companies in Thailand 
Characteristics Japanese 
consumer 
electronic (JCE) 
Japanese bank 
(JB) 
Japanese 
airlines 
(JA) 
Remarks 
Year of foundation In 
home country 
1917 AD (Hume, 
1993) 
1880 AD, BT 
(Degawa, 1999); 
1919 AD, MB (Fruin, 
1992; Tovo Keizai, 
1995) 
1951 AD (JAI) 
Year of entry Into 
Thailand 
1961 AD as NT Co, 
Ltd; 1970 AD as a 
joint venture 
between 
Kamchanajari 
family and NT Co, 
Ltd (Kotter, 1997, 
March 31) 
1950 AD as 
representative office 
of BT; 1962 AD as 
full branch; 1994 AD 
as representative 
office of MB (JBI*) 
1956 AD (JAI) 
Type of bus iness Consumer 
Electronics 
Bank Airlines 
Legal s tatus Joint venture 
(minority) 
Branch Branch Only JCE is 
a joint 
venture 
The number of staffs 
In Thailand 
6 5 7 (JCEI) 300 (JBI) 2 0 0 (JAI) 
The head of Thai 
organisation 
Managing director 
(MD) (JCEI) 
General manager 
(GM) (JBI) 
Vice President (VP) 
(JAI) 
Report to The board of 
directors in 
Thailand & 
Regional head office 
(JCEI) 
Headquarters (JBI) Regional head 
office (JAI) 
Only JCE 
has 
subsidiary 
board 
Regional Head Office Regional Head 
Office for Asia and 
Oceania in 
Singapore 
Asian Headquarters 
in Tokyo 
Asean Head Office 
in Tokyo, but its 
head works in Asia 
and Oceania 
Region Office in 
Hong Kong 
Headquarters Osaka, Japan Tokyo, Japan Tokyo, Japan 
Nationality of 
Chairman of the 
subsidiary board 
Thai N/A N/A No 
chairman 
for JB & JA 
Nationality of 
CEO/MD 
Japanese (JCEI) Japanese (JBI) Japanese (JAI) 
Nationality of 
CFO/FM 
Japanese (JCEI) Japanese (JBI) Thai (JAI) Only JA has 
Thai FM 
Who controls Thai 
operation 
Japanese (JCEI) Japanese (JBI) Japanese (JAI) 
The number of 
expatriates from 
home country 
6 Japanese (JCEI) 8 Japanese (JBI) 13 Japanese (JAI) 
The number of third-
country 
managers/staff (not 
Japanese /no t Thai) 
0 (JCEI) 0 (JBI) 0 (JAI) No third-
country staff 
for 
Japanese 
MNCs 
The number of 
department/division 
5 divis ions/25 
departments (JCEI) 
2 7 divisions (JBI) 12 divisions; 5 at 
the Thai HQs; 7 at 
the airport (JAI) 
*) T h e s e a b b r e v i a t i o n s refer to t h e re spec t ive in terv iewees . 
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8.2 The comparison of Japanese cases 
To comprehend the similarity a n d difference among the J a p a n e s e cases , t he 
profiles a n d character is t ics of these cases are expressed in Table 8 .1 . All J a p a n e s e 
cases in th i s s tudy a re a pa r t of th ree J a p a n e s e MNCs t h a t have a global operation 
in t he three bus inesses , namely consumer electronics, b a n k s a n d air carr iers . The 
SMPs of t he se cases a re confined to t he corporate level in Thai land. 
This inquiry res t r ic ts t he activities in the J C E only to the marke t ing 
operat ion for audio-visual p roduc ts , those in J B only to the corporate bank ing and 
those in J A only to t he passenger service. All of t h e m were founded in J a p a n a n d 
began their operat ions in Thai land in different years . Only J C E is set u p a s a jo in t 
ven tu re firm in Thai land. The res t of t hem have a legal s t a t u s of a b r a n c h of a 
foreign company. 
8.2.1 JCE is the marke t ing un i t for audio-visual p roduc ts of a big J a p a n e s e 
electronics MNCs in Thai land. It current ly employs 657 staff. It is a jo int ven tu re \ 
between th i s MNCs subsidiary and a Thai d is t r ibutor of radios, record players a n d 
loudspeakers . This MNC w a s es tabl ished in Osaka, J a p a n on 5 t h May 1917. 
Meanwhile, a n overseas Chinese family in Thai land founded the Thai dis t r ibutor in 
1949. In 1954, th is MNC designated th is Thai dis t r ibutor a s a n author ised dealer of 
i ts p roduc t s in Thai land. In December 1961, th i s MNC set u p its first overseas 
factory in t he world a s well a s i ts first subsidiary in Thai land. This factory 
manufac tu red i t s p roduc t s s u c h a s dry cell ba t ter ies , t rans i s tors , radios, TV se t s 
a n d ca r ba t te r ies for Thai a n d export ma rke t (Humes, 1993; Kotter, 1997). 
As t he commercial re la t ionship between both sides h a d been good for some 
t imes, the Thai dis t r ibutor (51%) a n d th is MNC (49%) establ ished J C E a s a jo in t 
ven tu re on 2 0 t h April 1970. In 1980, the new head office a t Lad Prao road was 
completed with t he sa les of Bt 1000 million sales . This jo in t ven tu re w a s r enamed 
in 1991 . In th i s year, J C E Foundat ion ' w a s establ ished for social contr ibut ion 
activities. In 1997, J C E moved its head office from Lad Prao road to Seri Thai road. 
With a n a r ea of 3 1 , 305 sq.m, the new office is bigger t h a n the old one three t imes. 
The legal s t a t u s of J C E is a Thai company. The governing body is the board 
of directors consis t ing of Thais a n d J a p a n e s e . The cha i rman of t he board is Thai, 
b u t t he Managing Director (MD) is J a p a n e s e . J C E ' s MD repor ts to the Regional 
Head Office for Asia a n d Oceania a s i ts RHO of i ts pa ren t company in Singapore for 
i ts operat ion. Even if t he board rarely intervenes in MD's decision on day-to-day 
operation, MD h a s to report to t he board wi thout t he sense of mat r ix a r r angemen t s . 
Its financial director is J a p a n e s e . J C E employs only Thais and J a p a n e s e . J C E h a s 
only 6 J a p a n e s e expatr ia tes to manage its five divisions a n d 2 5 depar tmen t s . In 
case of i ts report ing system, i ts financial control and its general policy, the Japanese: 
control J C E . 
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J C E ' s p a r e n t company became internat ionalised later t h a n its rivals in 
Western Europe and North America. To cope with the globalisation of the world 
market , the HQs empowers J C E to some extent, b u t the J a p a n e s e , no t local 
m a n a g e r s m a n a g e J C E . Because the pa ren t company employs global strategy, the 
HQs can co-ordinate i ts global flows of money between J a p a n a n d m a n y hos t 
countr ies a n d ac t a s a portfolio investor (Burton & Saelen, 1987; Smothe r s , 1990; 
Whitley, 1992; Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993; Chang, 1995; Chen, 1995). 
8.2.2 JB is a consequence of many mergers between several J a p a n e s e b a n k s 
in the pas t . Among these merged b a n k s , the oldest one was establ ished in 1880 a s 
the Yokohama Species Bank (YSB). YSB was renamed in 1946 a s BT. MB was 
founded in 1919 a s a financial a rm of one of the biggest enterpr ise group in J a p a n . 
Both b a n k s merged to become J B on 1 s t April 1996 (Fruin, 1992; Toyo Keizai, 1995; 
The Economist , 1996. April 6, p 5, p 75-76; Degawa, 1999). 
J B h a s been in Thai land since 1950 as a representat ive office of BT before 
t he merger. After receiving a full-banking licence from Bank of Thailand, BT 
establ ished a full b r anch in Thai land in Ju ly 1962. Before the last merger, MB 
entered Thai land in 1993 a s a representat ive office. On 1 s t April 1996, both b a n k s 
merged its Thai operation into J B (Thailand). 
After t he merger, J B h a s four b r a n c h e s in Thai land. Each b r a n c h in 
Bangkok, Chon Buri , Chiang Mai a n d Ayut thaya h a s two J a p a n e s e expatr ia tes , so 
t he total J a p a n e s e expatr ia tes in Thai land are eight. Its legal s t a t u s is a b r a n c h of a 
foreign company. All four b r a n c h e s have 27 divisions with 300 staff. J B only 
employs Thais a n d J a p a n e s e for Thai operation. Its General Manager (GM) in 
Bangkok b r a n c h ac ts a s both t he governing body a n d the chief executive in 
Thailand. He is J a p a n e s e . So is t he financial manager . He repor ts to Asian 
Headquar te r s a s i ts RHO in Global Corporate Banking Bus iness Unit in Tokyo. In 
t e rms of i ts report ing system, i ts financial control and its general policy, the 
J a p a n e s e control J B . 
8.2.3 JA w a s founded in 1951 . It opened its Bangkok b ranch on 1 7 t h 
September 1956. JA flew its first flight to Bangkok on 4 t h October in t he s a m e year. 
Its first Bangkok b r a n c h was located on Surawongse Rd. On 8 t h May 1958, J A 
commenced the Bangkok-Singapore route . With Convair 880 aircrafts, J A 
embarked on 'Silk Road' service between J a p a n a n d Europe via S ou thea s t Asia a n d 
the Middle E a s t on 4 t h October 1962. The service s topped over Calcut ta , Karachi, 
Cairo, Rome, Kuwait and Frankfurt . The other s topovers on the rou te were London, 
Hong Kong a n d Bangkok. On 8 t h May 1967, J A extended the Tokyo-Bangkok route 
to Kuala Lumpur . JA s tar ted to operate the DC-10 on the Tokyo-Bangkok-
Singapore route on 2 n d April 1977. 
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In December 1990 dur ing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, J A operated a 747 
Char te r to Bangkok to rescue 155 J a p a n e s e hos tages from Iraq who had been flown 
to Thai land by Iraq Airway. From 2 8 t h to 3 0 t h J a n u a r y 1991, JA operated four 
cha r t e r flights to Cairo to pick u p a total of 1,046 Asian refugees fleeing Iraq. One 
flight w a s b o u n d for Bangkok a n d the res t for Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam via Tokyo^ 
On 1* April 1992, JAL initiated i ts Osaka-Bangkok rou te wi th four DC-10 flights a 
week. J A leased the in-flight service of Osaka-Bangkok-Singäpore rou te to J a p a n 
Air Char te r on 1 s t J u l y 1993. J A a n d Thai Airways Internat ional announced 
expanded joint operat ions between Bangkok and three J a p a n e s e cities. On 2 1 s t 
February, J A moved its Bangkok b r a n c h to i ts own bui lding on Rachadapisek Rd. 
This building also houses most JA's subsidiar ies in Thai land. 
To open Nikko Hotel in Thailand, Nikko Hotel Management Co, a JA's affiliates 
signed a hotel management contract with Bangkok Thanee Co, a joint venture between 
J a p a n Asia Investment Co (45%), Titiporn Namngem (45%) and Bangkok Bank (10%) 
in 1996. The Nikko Hotel in Bangkok was si tuated nearby JA's Bangkok office on 
Rachadapisek Rd. This contract was terminated in the late 1998. Because of its bad 
location and the economic meltdown, JAL's shareholders pressurised Nikko to pull out.. 
After the termination, JA had to shift its room reservation for its clients to Pan-Pacific 
Hotel (J i rasakunthai , 1998, December 16, 1998, December 19, 1999, J a n u a r y 12; 
Noma, 1999, J u l y 26). 
To cu t costs, J A hived off a subsidiary employing more t h a n 600 Thai cabin 
a t t endan t s (J i rasakunthai , 2000, J a n u a r y 19). To serve J a p a n e s e clients, this 
subsidiary operates flights from major cities in J a p a n to Bangkok. JA h a s a legal 
s t a t u s of a b r anch of a foreign company in Thailand. It employs 200 staff consisting 
only of J a p a n e s e and Thais . The Vice President (VP) ac ts a s both the governing body 
and the chief executive for Thai operation. He is a J a p a n e s e and reports to Asean 
Regional Head Office a s its RHO in Tokyo, bu t the head of th is office is working a t Asia^ 
and Oceania Region Office in Hong Kong. The financial manager is a Thai. It h a s 
twelve divisions, five a t J A Plaza and seven a t the airport. Because there are 13 
J a p a n e s e expatriates, the J a p a n e s e control Thai operation concerning the reporting 
system, financial control and general policy. 
8.2.4 Similarity All J a p a n e s e cases entered Thai land after the Second World 
War. J B a n d J A have a legal s t a t u s of a b r a n c h of a foreign company in Thai land. 
Both of t h e m have no board of directors for their Thai b r anches , because both a re 
small . Neither of t h e m is a jo in t ven ture . J C E and J A report to their RHOs a t i ts 
first h a n d . J B a n d J A have the i r HQs in Tokyo. Because the nationali ty of all chief 
executives in all these cases is J a p a n e s e , the J a p a n e s e control Thai operation. 
Albeit the n u m b e r of J a p a n e s e expatr ia tes is varied, all of t hem maximise their u s e 
of expatr ia tes u n d e r Thai labour law, so as to a s su re thei r operational uniformity 
152 
t h roughou t t he world. The J a p a n e s e u s e expatriates, financial repor ts a n d expertise 
for the control procedure in Thai land. The nationali ty of the financial h e a d s in J C E 
a n d J B is J a p a n e s e . All of t h e m have never employed a single th i rd-country staff 
s ince their foundation in Thai land. All of them have more t h a n 10 divisions in their 
Thai operation. The majority of employees in all of t h e m are Thais . 
8.2.5 Difference All J a p a n e s e cases were establ ished in J a p a n a n d entered 
Thai land in different years . All of t h e m are operat ing in three different indus t r ies . 
J C E h a s more staff t h a n DB and, in tu rn , DA h a s . Only J C E is a jo int ven ture and 
h a s a legal s t a t u s of a Thai company in Thailand, so t h a t it h a s a board of directors 
comprising Thai and J a p a n e s e directors. MD, GM and VP are t he h e a d s of Thai 
operation for JCE , J B and JA respectively. Only JCE ' s MD h a s to report both to the 
boards of directors in Thai land a n d to RHOs. Only J C E h a s its HQs in Osaka. Only 
J B repor ts to Asian HQs in Tokyo. All of them have different locations of their 
RHOs. J C E h a s i ts RHO in Singapore. J B h a s its RHO in J a p a n . JA h a s its RHO in 
Hong Kong. J A repor ts to Asean Regional Head Office in Tokyo a t i ts first hand , b u t 
the head of th i s RHO is working a t Asia and Oceania Region Office in Hong Kong. 
The nat ionali ty of J C E ' s cha i rman is Thai. Only JA h a s a Thai financial manager . 
The n u m b e r of expatr ia tes from J a p a n is varied, b u t all J a p a n e s e cases maximise 
their u s e of expatr ia tes u n d e r Thai labour law. The n u m b e r of divisions of all of 
t h e m is varied. 
8.3 The comparison of environmental scanning 
All J a p a n e s e companies u n d e r th i s s tudy have both similarities a n d 
differences in thei r environmenta l s cann ing in m a n y aspec ts . All J a p a n e s e cases 
are compared in detail to find out these similarities and differences. The 
compar ison of t he environmental s cann ing in these J a p a n e s e cases is expressed in 
Table 8.2. The similarities in the environmental s cann ing among the J a p a n e s e 
cases is used a s a bas i s for t he cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis with their Dutch 
coun te rpa r t s in relation to the environmental scann ing in section 9 .2 .1 . 
Table 8.2: The environmental scanning in Japanese companies in Thailand 
Environmental 
Scanning 
JCE JB JA 
Frequency of 
scanning 
By MD and his colleague 
at any time (JCEI*) 
By GM and his colleague at 
any time (JBI) 
By VP weekly (JAI) 
Long-term 
Information 
gathering 
Internal staff and 
external sources, such a s 
agencies (JCEI) 
Use working group with top-
down and bottom-up 
communication (JBI) 
From newspapers, 
magazines, tourist 
agencies and PR agencies 
(JAI) 
Regular 
information for 
making strategy 
Publicised data from in-
house and outsourcing 
(JCEI) 
Publicised data from in-
house and outsourcing (JBI) 
Focus on Thai Airway (JAI) 
Environmental 
analysis 
In-house and outsourced 
analysis with top-down 
and bottom-up 
communication (JCEI) 
From top-down and bottom-
up communication (JBI) 
By VP (JAI) 
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Table 8.2: The environmental scanning in Japanese companies in Thailand 
(continue) 
Environmental 
Scanning 
JCE JB JA 
Political risk 
assessment 
MD, the board and top 
executives from HQs 
minimise the risk fTunyasiri 
& Sivasomboon, 1998, 
February 13; Changsorn, 
1999, February 2 5 
GM and top executives from 
HQs (Reuter, 1997, October 
29; Agence France-Press, 
1997, December 19) 
Not necessary (JA1) 
SWOT & criteria For the company, threat is 
bad, opportunity is good 
(JCEI*) 
For the bank, threat is bad, 
opportunity is good (JBI) 
No classification 
between threats anc 
opportunities (JAI) 
Opportunities & 
Threats 
Threats: economic 
circumstance, government 
stability and policy, social 
infrastructure and 
competitors (JCEI); 
Opportunities: AFTA (Na 
Thalang, 1999, November 
11) and economic crisis 
(The Nation, 1997, August 
2) 
Threats: economic crisis and 
uncertainty about economic 
recovery (Lucas, 1998, May 
14; Keenan & Sender, 1998, 
October 15); Opportunities: 
the long-term growth of Thai 
economy 
(Kaewkumnerdpong, 1999, 
July 14) 
Mixed up, no threat 
(JAI) 
Key succes s 
factors 
Management philosophy, 
technology and human 
resource (JCEI) 
Asset quality (Nagaoka, 
1999, October 4; Tett, 1999, 
September 4) F/X, 
correspondent banking and 
setUement (Degawa, 1999), 
global service network 
(GSBHJBI) 
Long-term 
establishment and I 
quality service (JAI) 
Ugh 
Main weaknesses Conservatism (CEJ1) Low profile, obscure 
corporate image, 
conservatism, red tape, 
limited products, service and 
activities, narrow-based 
customers (BJ1; BJ2; JBI) 
Highest cost structu 
in the world (Harney 
1999, November 22) 
Narrow-based 
customers (AJ) 
re 
Changing 
Environment 
Cause more threats (JCEI) Cause both threats and 
opportunities (JBI) 
No effect, because o; 
good relations betwe 
Thailand and Japan 
(JAI) 
en 
Trend of industry More competiUon and a 
move to digital age (JCEI) 
Frenzy trend of M&A in 
Japanese banking sector 
(Tett & Nakamae, 1999, 
September 4; Sato, 1999; 
October 18) 
More inbound 
passengers from Jap 
(JAI) 
an 
Industry mobility 
and barrier 
Government policy, 
economic recovery, 
employment and 
purchasing power (JCEI) 
Bad loans, limited branch 
network and narrow 
customer base (BJ1; BJ2) 
Strict immigration 
control, prohibitive 
living cost and 
fluctuating yen in 
Japan(JAI) 
Future Excellent (JCEI) Not good (JBI) Good (JAI) 
*) T h e s e a b b r e v i a t i o n s refer to t h e r e s p e c t i v e in terv iewees . 
8.3.1 JCE is a joint ven ture between J a p a n e s e a n d Thai companies . Its 
board of directors consis ts of both Tha i s and J a p a n e s e , b u t the J a p a n e s e controls 
i ts managemen t . MD represen t s the whole group of J C E ' s affiliates in Thai land. He 
mainly m a k e s a strategic decision for J C E . 
With regard to the informal routine information gathering, MD and his 
colleagues scan informally the environment a t any time in the wake of the rapidly 
changing bus iness environment by us ing publicised da ta from in-house publications 
a n d outsourcing. Sometimes, MD asks his staff to do it. This information is both 
internal and external. MD annual ly reviews the situation from both external and 
internal sources in the formal long-term information gathering. 
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After ga ther ing the information, MD analyses strategic Issues with top-down 
a n d bo t tom-up communica t ion with concerned organisat ions a n d a s se s se s political 
r i sks in Bus ines s Plan Meeting, Management Conference, Managers ' Meeting and 
Project Task Force. Sometimes, he ou tsources the analysis of these strategic i ssues . 
J C E h a s clear-cut criteria to classify strategic i s sues into th rea t s a n d opportuni t ies 
depending on their effects on J C E . For J C E , t h rea t s a re bad a n d opportuni t ies are 
good. AFTA a n d economic crisis a re opportuni t ies . Economic c i rcumstance , 
government stability, social inf ras t ructure and competi tors are t h r ea t s . The 
environmental s cann ing process of J C E is depicted in Figure 8 .1 . 
Figure 8.1: Environmental scanning (JCE) 
External source 
agencies Exterrial 
Formal long-term 
Information-gathering 
Ï 
Value: 
Opportunity: AFTA 
& economic crisis 
Threats: Economic 
circumstance, 
government 
stability, social 
infrastructure & 
competitors 
Internal staff 
External 
analysis 
External data I 
Environmental 
analysis 
Informal routine 
information-
gathering 
Internal 
analysis 
Internal 
Internal data 
Ritual: MD 
formally reviews 
situation annually. 
He & his 
colleagues scan 
informally 
environment at 
any time by us ing 
publicised data 
from in-house & 
outsourcing. 
Ritual: MD 
analyses strategic 
i s sues with top-
down & bottom-up 
communication 
with concerned 
organisations & 
a s s e s s e s political 
risk in bus iness 
plan meeting. 
Ritual 
Criteria: threats 
are bad & 
opportunities are 
good. 
Interpretation 
General Perception 
-Changing 
environment 
c a u s e s more 
threats. 
-More competition 
& a move to digital 
age is a trend of 
industry 
-Industry mobility 
and barrier are 
government policy, 
economic recovery 
& purchasing 
power 
-No political risk 
because MD, the 
board & HQs 
minimise political 
risk by wielding 
influence on Thai 
government 
- An excellent 
future 
Value 
Strength: 
Management 
philosophy, 
technology, quality 
& h u m a n resource 
Weakness: 
Conservatism 
MD sees t h a t t he changing envi ronment in Thai land c a u s e s more th rea t s . 
More competi t ion from n u m e r o u s b r a n d s and a move to t he digital age is t he t rend 
of Thai land 's c o n s u m e r electronic marke t . The mobility and the barr ier of th i s 
bus ine s s are government policies, economic recovery a n d pu rchas ing power. J C E 
perceives no political r isk because MD, the board a n d the HQs minimise political 
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r i sks by wielding a n influence on Thai government . It sees a n excellent future in 
Thai land. 
J C E ment ions management philosophy, technology and h u m a n resources a s 
its key success factors. It does not talk about its weaknesses . Most experts in the 
consumer electronics marke t in Thailand identify i ts conservatism a s it weakness . 
8.3.2 JB focuses only on corporate bank ing in Thai land. The general 
manage r (GM) is t he top executive who mainly m a k e s a strategic decision for Thai 
b r a n c h . With respec t to t he informal rout ine information gathering, GM and h i s 
colleagues s c a n the environment a t any t ime by us ing publicised da t a from in -hous^ 
publication a n d outsourcing. This information is both internal and external . GM 
annual ly reviews the s i tuat ion from both external and internal sources in the formal 
long-term information gathering. The environmental s cann ing process of J B is 
portrayed in Figure 8.2. 
Figure 8.2: Environmental scanning (JB) 
External data I Exterrial 
Formal long-term 
Information-gathering 
Internal data 
External data 
i 
Environmental 
analysis 
Informal routine 
information-
gathering 
Ï 
Deputy's 
assistance 
Internal 
Internal data 
Ritual: GM 
formally reviews 
situation annually. 
He & his deputy 
scan informally 
environment at 
any time by us ing 
publicised data 
from in-house & 
outsourcing. 
Ritual: GM & his 
deputy analyse 
strategic Issues 
with top-down & 
bottom-up 
communication & 
assess political 
risks. 
Value: 
Opportunity: 
Long-term growth 
of Thai economy 
Threats: Economic 
crisis & 
uncertainty about 
recovery 
Ritual 
Criteria: threats 
are bad & 
opportunities are 
good. 
Value 
Interpretation 
Value 
General Perception 
-Changing 
environment 
causes more 
threats. 
-The frenay trend i 
of M&A in I 
Japanese banking 
sectors is a trend 
of industry 
-Industry mobility 
and barrier are 
bad loan, limited 
branch network & 
narrow customer 
base. 
-No political risk 
because GM & 
HQs minimise 
political risk by 
wielding influence 
on Thai 
government 
-An uncertain 
future 
Strength: Asset quality, 
F/X, correspondent 
banking & settlement & 
global service network 
Weakness: 
Conservatism, corporate 
Image, limited product, 
service & activities & 
narrow-based 
customers. 
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After gathering the information, GM and his deputy analyses strategic i ssues 
with top-down and bot tom-up communication and assesses political r isks. J B h a s 
clear-cut criteria to classify these strategic issues into th rea ts and opportunities 
depending on their effects on J B . For J B , threa ts are bad and opportunities are good. 
Long-term growth of Thai economy is an opportunity. Economic crisis and uncer ta inty 
about recovery are threa ts . 
GM sees t h a t the changing environment in Thai land c a u s e s more th rea t s . 
The frenzy t rend of M&A in J a p a n e s e bank ing sector affects the consolidation a n d 
the real ignment of J a p a n e s e b a n k s in Thailand. The mobility and the barr ier for J B 
are bad loans, a limited b r a n c h network and a nar row cus tomer base . J B perceive 
no political risk because GM a n d the HQs minimise political risk by wielding an 
influence on Thai government. It sees an uncer ta in future in Thai land. 
J B ment ions asset quality, foreign exchange service, correspondent banking 
and settlement, and global service network as its key success factors. It does not talk 
about its weaknesses . Most experts in Thai banking sector pinpoint its conservatism 
including its complicated and lengthy process, an obscure corporate image, limited 
products , services and activities and narrow-based cus tomers a s its weaknesses . 
8.3.3 JA h a s the vice pres ident (VP) as the top executive who mainly m a k e s 
a strategic decision for Thai operat ion. In t e rms of the informal rou t ine information 
gathering, VP s c a n s t he envi ronment weekly from newspapers , magazines , in -house 
jou rna l s , news clippings a n d tour is t agencies by focusing on THAI Airway. This 
information is bo th in ternal a n d external . He annua l ly employs a public relation 
(PR) agency to collect da ta in t he formal long-term information gathering. The 
environmental s cann ing process of J A is represented in Figure 8.3. 
After gather ing the information, VP analyses these strategic i ssues , especially 
abou t THAI Airway. He a s se s se s political risks by himself. VP h a s no need for 
criteria to classify strategic i s sues into t h rea t s a n d opportunit ies , because Thai 
operation is small . Thus , t h r ea t s and opportuni t ies are often mixed-up. VP 
perceives no threa t , b u t the real t h rea t is the falling profit. 
VP sees t h a t the changing envi ronment in Thai land c a u s e s no effect because 
of the good relation between Thai land and J a p a n . More in-bound passengers from 
J a p a n are the t rend of its bus ine s s in Thai land. Meanwhile, the n u m b e r of Thai 
passengers to J a p a n r ema ins t he s ame . The mobility a n d the barr ier a re t he str ict 
immigrat ion control for Thai citizens a n d the high cost of travelling in J a p a n with 
t he f luctuating yen. VP perceives no political risk from Thai government a n d sees a 
good future in Thai land. J A ment ions i ts long-term es tab l i shment and i ts high 
quality service a s i ts key success factors. It does not ta lk abou t i ts weaknesses . 
Most experts in t he airline indus t ry specify i ts high cost s t ruc tu re and its narrow-
based cus tomers a s its weaknesses . 
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Figure 8.3: Environmental scanning (JA) 
External data Exteinal 
Formal long-term 
information-gathering 
Value: 
Threats & 
opportunities are 
mixed-up. No 
threats 
External data I 
Environmental 
analysis 
Ritual: No criteria 
to classify 
strategic Issues 
into threats & 
opportunities. 
Informal routine 
information-
gathering 
Internal 
Internal data 
Ritual: VP scans the 
environment weekly 
from newspapers 
magazines, in-house 
Journal & tourist 
agencies by focusing 
on THAI Airway. He 
employs PR agency 
to collect data 
annually. 
Ritual: VP 
analyses strategic 
Issues, especially 
about THAI 
Airway. He 
a s s e s s e s political 
risk himself. 
Interpretation 
Value 
General Perception 
-Changing 
environment 
causes no effect 
because of good 
relation between 
Thailand & Japan. 
-More in-bound 
passengers from 
Japan are a trend 
of industry. 
-Industry mobility 
& barrier are strict 
immigration 
control, high cost 
in Japan & 
fluctuating yen. 
-No political risk 
-A good future 
Strength: Long-term 
establishment & high 
quality service 
Weakness: High cost 
structure & narrow-
based customers. 
8.3.4 Similarity and difference From Table 8.3, all J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thai land s h a r e m u c h commonali ty in their environmental scann ing process . The 
HQs a n d the RHOs do not get involved with the environmental scann ing process in 
all J a p a n e s e cases . All of t h e m collect da ta externally for the a n n u a l review. All of 
t h e m tend to u s e more in ternal da ta and review the s i tuat ion on the pre-determined 
schedule . All of t h e m have t he clear-cut criteria to differentiate between th rea t s and 
oppor tuni t ies . The perception of J a p a n e s e cases is quite pessimistic. All of t h e m do 
everything they can do to reduce political r isks . This commonali ty among t h e m 
might be related to uncer ta in ty avoidance in Hofstede's model. This dimension is 
likely to be associated with t h e perception of r i sks . However, there a re few 
differences among all of t hem. JA is quite different from J C E a n d J B . It only s c a n s 
t he envi ronment more regularly. It does not u s e in ternal da t a and top-down and 
bo t tom-up communica t ion to analyse the environment a n d the political r isks . 
Because th is difference a m o n g t h e m is ne i ther significant nor related to nat ional 
158 
cul ture , only t he above similarities, not the differences will be exemplified a s Figure 
9.3 in Chapte r 9. 
Table 8 .3 : The similarity and difference in the environmental scanning among 3 
Japanese companies in Thailand 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Similarity Difference 
Frequency of 
scanning 
MD in JCE & GM in JB & their colleagues 
scan the environment at any time in the 
informal routine information gathering. 
VP In JA scans the environment weekly in 
the informal routine information gathering. 
Long-term 
Information 
gathering 
All of them employ external consultants & 
researchers for their annual review. 
Regular 
Information for 
making strategy 
All of them collect data from external 
sources informally. JCE & JB also use 
internal informal data collection. 
JA doesn't use Internal Informal data 
collection 
Environmental 
analysis 
The chief executives In all of them do. 
Only JCE & JB use top-down & bottom-
up communication to support this 
analysis. 
JCE uses both Internal & external analysis. 
JA doesn't use top-down & bottom-up 
communication to support this analysis. 
Political risk 
asses sment 
The chief executives In all of them 
minimise political risks by either wielding 
an influence on or forging a relation with 
Thai government. Only JCE & JB use 
top-down & bottom-up communication to 
analyse political risks 
JA doesn't use top-down & bottom-up 
communication to analyse political risks. 
SWOT & criteria JCE & JB have clear-cut criteria to 
classify strategic i s sues into threats & 
opportunities. 
JA has no such criteria. 
Main weaknesses JCE & JB are too conservative. JB & JA 
have a too narrow customer base. 
Changing 
Environment 
JCE s ee s more threats. JB s ee s both threats 
& opportunities. JA s e e s no effect because 
the good relationship between Thailand & 
Japan. 
Future JCE & JA perceive a good future In 
Thailand, but are uncertain about 
economic recovery. 
JB doesn't perceive a good future in 
Thailand. 
8.4 The comparison of strategy formulation 
All J a p a n e s e companies u n d e r th i s s tudy have both similarities a n d 
differences in relation to their s trategy formulation in m a n y facets. All J a p a n e s e 
cases a re compared in detail to detect these similarities and differences. The 
comparison of t he strategy formulation in these J a p a n e s e cases in Thai land is 
expressed in Table 8.4. The similarities in the strategy formulation among the 
J a p a n e s e cases is used a s a bas i s for the cross-cul tural , cross-case analys is with 
their Dutch coun te rpa r t s in relation to the strategy formulation in section 9.2.2. 
Table 8.4: The strategy formulation in Japanese companies in Thailand 
Strategy 
Formulation 
JCE JB JA 
Focus of strategy 
formulation 
JCE in Thailand (JCEI*) HQs advises GM to formulate 
strategy (JBI) 
HQs sets target in 
discussion with VP 
(JAI) 
Corporate goals An excellent corporate 
citizen in Thailand 
(JCEI) 
Serving Japanese clients and 
profits (JBI) 
Profits, customer 
satisfaction, market share 
and efficiency (JAI) 
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Table 8.4: The strategy formulation in Japanese companies in Thailand 
(continued) 
Strategy 
Formulation 
JCE JB JA 
Goal-settings JCE submits bus iness 
plan to HQs for approval 
(JCEI) 
Set goals with HQs (JBI) Set goals with HQs ( JAI) 
Alternative 
generation 
Many alternatives (JCEI) Many alternatives (JBI) 3 -20 alternatives (Jl U} 
Authorisation for 
decision-making 
JCE makes a strategic 
decision (JCEI) 
GM doesn't decide on every 
issue, some need HQs 
approval; others need advice 
from subordinate. GM can 
extend loan (JBI; 
Kaewkumnurdpong, 1999, 
Julv 14) 
VP makes a strategi 
decision with limitec 
budget (JAI) 
I 
Consultation Colleagues and 
subordinates (JCEI) 
Colleagues and subordinates 
(JBI) 
Colleagues and 
subordinates (JAI) 
Negotiation Colleagues and 
subordinates (JCEI) 
Colleagues and subordinates 
(JBI) 
Colleagues and 
subordinates (JAI) 
Consensus Depending on the i s sues 
(JCEI) 
Depending on the i s sues 
(JBI) 
Prefer consensus , bi 
majority vote is fine 
it 
(JAI) 
Ringi and 
Nemawashi 
Used with some Thai 
staffs' involvement (JCEI) 
Not used (JBI) Not used (JAI) 
Involved persons 9-25 persons depending 
on the i s sues (JCEI) 
2-3 persons (JBI) 2-3 persons (JAI) 
Perception of 
strategy 
Satisfactory (JCEI) Satisfactory (JBI) Satisfactory (JAI) 
Difference from 
HQs 
Decision-making process 
Is quicker In Thailand 
(JCEI) 
Decision-making process is 
quicker In Thailand (JBI) 
Decision-making pre 
is almost the same 1 
excluding ringi and 
nemawashi (JAI) 
?cess 
Strategic 
document 
Write down annual 
management policy, annual 
business plan which are 
internal 
JCE has press conference 
about them (JCEI) 
Not write down strategic 
decisions (JBI) 
Write down strategic 
decisions to some e> 
but confidential (JAI 
tent, 
) 
Dissemination Colleagues and 
subordinates (JCEI) 
Subordinates if strategic 
decisions affect them (JBI) 
90-95% of strategic i s sues 
(JAI) 
Thai economic 
crisis 
No lay-off (JCEI) No lay-off but cut back loans 
(JBI; Kaewkumnurdpong, 
1999, July 14) 
No lay-off (JAI) 
•) These abbreviations refer to the respective interviewees. 
8.4.1 JCE Is a jo in t ven tu re company in Thai land. Both Thai a n d J a p a n e s e 
pa r tne r s focus on the strategy in Thai land. From the a n n u a l review, J C E ' s top 
m a n a g e m e n t in Thai land including MD formulates the strategy for Thai operation. 
Corporate Planning Office a t the HQs se ts t he goals abou t profit and marke t sha re 
for J C E in t he pas t . The RHO in Singapore somet imes suppor t s the b u s i n e s s plan 
in J C E . J C E se t s the goals by communica t ion among itself, the HQs a n d Thai 
p a r t n e r s a n d s u b m i t s i ts p l ans and its goals to Corporate Planning Office a t the HQs 
for approval . I t s explicit goal is a n excellent corporate citizen in Thai land, b u t i ts 
implicit goals a re profits and marke t share . 
To achieve t he corporate goals, MD genera tes m a n y al ternat ives before 
mak ing a s trategic decision according to t he b u s i n e s s p lans . The HQs au thor i ses 
J C E to m a k e a strategic decision for Thai land. MD m a k e s mos t strategic decisions, 
b u t h a s to repor t on his decisions and the b u s i n e s s p lans to t he HQs for au tomat ic 
approval. He needs to consul t and negotiate with h i s colleagues a n d h is 
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subord ina tes . J C E u s e s ringi and nemawashi with Thai staff to some extent. Nine-
to-twenty-five persons part icipate in the decision-making process . They need 
c o n s e n s u s on some issues , b u t do not depend on them too m u c h . The strategy 
formulation process of J C E is epitomised in Figure 8.4. 
Figure 8.4: Strategy formulation (JCE) 
Process 
Focus of 
strategy 
formulation 
HQs 
Thai partners 
Goal-
setting 
Alternative 
generation 
Making a 
strategic 
decision 
Goals: An 
excellent 
corporate 
citizen In 
Thailand 
(implicitly 
profits & 
market 
share). 
(Value) 
Ritual: From 
annual 
review, JCE's 
top 
management 
in Thailand 
including 
MD 
formulates 
strategy for 
Thai 
operation. 
Ritual: HQs 
sets goals 
about profit & 
market share 
for JCE in the 
past. JCE sets 
goals by 
communlcatio 
n among 
itself. HQs & 
Thai partner 
submit plan & 
goals to HQs 
for approval. 
Ritual: To 
achieve 
goals, MD 
generates 
many 
alternatives 
before 
making 
decisions 
according to 
business 
plan. 
Ritual: MD 
makes strategic 
decisions, but 
has to report his 
decisions to 
HQs. The 
decisions need 
consultation & 
negotiation with 
colleagues & 
subordinates. 
Using ringi & 
nemawashi with 
Thai staff. They 
need consensus 
on some issues . 
9-25 persons 
participate in 
the decisions. 
Outcome 
Perception 
Ritual: All his 
decisions are 
satisfactory, 
but the 
decision-
making 
process in 
Thailand is 
faster than in 
HQs & RHO. 
Dissemination 
of decisions & 
goals 
Ritual: These 
decisions are 
disseminated to 
colleagues & 
subordinates. 
Write down all 
annual 
management 
policy, annual 
business plan. 
These documents 
are internal, but 
JCE has press 
conferences on 
them. 
All h i s decisions satisfy himself. Because Thai affiliate is small with less 
involved person, t he decision-making process in Thai land is faster t h a n t ha t in the 
HQs a n d the RHO. These decisions are disseminated to the affected colleagues a n d 
subord ina tes . J C E writes down all a n n u a l m a n a g e m e n t policies a n d a n n u a l 
b u s i n e s s p l ans . These strategic documen t s a re internal , b u t J C E h a s p ress 
conferences on t h e m two or three t imes a year. 
8.4.2 JB h a s only corporate bank ing in Thai land. After the a n n u a l review, 
Asian Planning Office a t Asian Headquar te r s in Tokyo advises GM to formulate the 
strategy for Thai operation. GM sets goals with Asian HQs. Its goals a re serving 
J a p a n e s e clients a n d profits. 
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To achieve the corporate goals, GM genera tes m a n y al ternat ives before 
mak ing a strategic decision. GM makes some strategic decisions, b u t he needs 
advice from Asian HQs a n d h is subord ina tes . Even if t he J a p a n e s e executives in J B 
do no t devolve all power on Thai managers , the consul ta t ion with local m a n a g e m e n t 
is impor tan t . He needs to consu l t and negotiate with h i s deputy, colleagues a n d 
subord ina tes . Without ringi a n d nemawashu J B ' s staff needs c o n s e n s u s on some 
i s sues . Two-three pe r sons par t ic ipate in the decis ion-making process . Depending 
on t he scale of inves tment a n d loans, GM needs approval from Asian Credit Division 
a t t he HQs. The strategy formulation process of J B is exemplified in Figure 8.5. 
Figure 8.5: Strategy formulation (JB) 
Process Outcome 
Focus of 
strategy 
formulation 
HQs 
Goal- Alternative 
setting generation 
Making a 
strategic 
decision 
Goals: 
Serving 
Japanese 
clients & 
profits 
Ritual: After 
the annual 
review, HQs 
advises GM 
to formulate 
strategy for 
Thai 
operation. 
Ritual: 
GM sets 
goals 
with 
HQs. 
Ritual: To 
achieve 
goals, GM 
generates 
many 
alternatives 
before 
making 
decisions 
Ritual: GM makes 
some strategic 
decisions, but needs 
advice from HQs & 
subordinates. The 
decisions need 
consultation & 
negotiation with his 
deputy, colleagues 
& subordinates. 
Without ringi & 
nemawashu They 
need consensus on 
some i ssues . 2-3 
persons participate 
in the decisions. 
Depending on scale 
of investment & 
loan, GM needs 
approval from HQs. 
Perception 
Ritual: All his 
decisions are 
satisfactory, 
but the 
decision-
making 
process in 
Thailand is 
faster than in 
HQs & RHO. 
Dissemination 
of decisions & 
goals 
Ritual: These 
decisions are 
disseminated to 
colleagues & 
subordinates 
who are 
affected. Not 
write down 
strategic 
decisions. 
All h i s decisions satisfy himself. Because Thai b r a n c h is small with less 
involved persons , t h e decis ion-making process in Thai land is faster t h a n t h a t in the 
HQs a n d the RHO a n d the re is no need for ringi and nemaivashi These decisions 
a re d isseminated to t he affected colleagues and subord ina tes who are affected. J B 
does not write down its strategic decisions. 
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8.4.3 JA r u n s both cargo and passenger bus ines ses in Thai land. After the 
a n n u a l review, Corporate Planning Office a t the HQs se ts targets in discuss ion with 
VP. VP se ts goals after a discussion with Asia and Oceania Region Office. These 
goals a re profits, cus tomer satisfaction, marke t share , and cost-efficiency and safety 
improvement . 
To achieve t h e corporate goals, he generates 3-20 al ternat ives before making 
a strategic decision. He m a k e s strategic decisions with a limited budget . He needs 
to consul t a n d negotiate with colleagues and subord ina tes . Without ringi and 
nemawashi, VP prefers a consensus , b u t a majority decision is fine. Two to three 
pe r sons part icipate in t he decisions. The strategy formulation process of J A is 
i l lustrated in Figure 8.6. 
Figure 8.6: Strategy formulation (JA) 
Process 
HQs 
Focus of 
strategy 
formulation 
Ritual: After 
the annual 
review, HQs 
sets target in 
discussion 
with VP. 
RHO 
[ Goal-
' setting 
Goals: Profits, 
customer 
satisfaction, 
market share, 
cost-efficiency 
& safety 
improvement. 
(Value) 
Ritual: VP 
sets goals 
after 
discussion 
with RHO. 
Alternative 
generation 
Ritual: To 
achieve 
goals, VP 
generates 3-
20 
alternatives 
before 
making 
decisions 
himself. 
Making a 
strategic 
decision 
Outcome 
Ritual: VP makes 
strategic decisions 
with limited budget. 
The decisions need 
consultation & 
negotiation 
colleagues & 
subordinates. 
Without ringri & 
nemawashi VP 
prefers consensus , 
but majority vote is 
fine. 2 -3 persons 
participate in the 
decisions. 
Perception 
Ritual: All his 
decisions are 
satisfactory. 
The decision-
making 
process in 
Thailand is 
almost the 
same as in 
H g s & RHO if 
excluding ringi 
nemawashi 
Disse mination 
of decisions & 
goals 
Ritual: 90-95% 
of strategic 
decisions are 
disseminated 
throughout the 
organisation. 
Write down 
strategic 
decisions to 
some extent. 
These 
documents are 
confidential. 
All his decisions satisfy himself. The decision-making process in Thailand is 
almost the same a s in the HQs and the RHO if excluding ringi and nemawashi 
Because Thai b ranch is small, there is no need for ringi and nemawashL 90-95% of 
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the strategic decisions are disseminated th roughout the organisation. J A writes down 
its strategic decisions to some extent. These strategic documents are confidential. 
8.4.4 Similarity and difference From Table 8.5, all J a p a n e s e companies 
s h a r e m u c h commonali ty in their s t rategy formulation process . All of t h e m 
formulate s t ra tegy for Thai operation after t he a n n u a l review. Their HQs get 
involved with t h e strategy formulation in all of them. Their RHOs do n o t have 
sufficient au thor i ty to approve corporate goals. This commonali ty a m o n g t h e m 
might be related to power d is tance in Hofstede's model. Power d is tance is likely to 
be associated with the degree of central isat ion and formalisation. All of t h e m need 
suppor t for thei r decis ion-making and the country manage r s ' consul ta t ion from 
colleagues a n d subord ina tes t h roughou t the organisat ion. 
Table 8.5: The similarity and difference in the strategy formulation among 3 
Japanese companies in Thailand 
Strategy 
Formulation 
Similarity Difference 
External 
relationship with 
HQs & RHO 
JB & JA need HQs' advice & 
discussion. 
JCE doesn't need HQs' advice & 
discussion. j 
Corporate goals JCE & JB does not state market 
share & profit as its goals explicitiy. 
JA states profit a s a primary goal 
explicitly. 
Goal-settings All of them need their HQs' 
involvement. HQs approve goals. 
Only JCE needs communication among 
itself, its HQ & Thai partners before It 
submits plan & goals to HQs for 
approval. 
Alternative 
generation 
All of them need to generate at least 
3 alternatives. JCE & JB need to 
report on alternatives to the HQs or 
RHOs before making a strategic 
decision. 
JA doesn't need to report on alternatives 
to the HQs or RHOs before making a 
strategic decision. 
Making strategic 
decisions 
All of them need more than one 
person to make a decision & prefer 
consensus if possible. A consensus 
isn't always necessary for all of them. 
JB & JA don't use rihgi & 
nemawasht 
JCE use rihgi & nemawasht JCE's MD 
reports on strategic decisions he makes 
to the HQs. 
Perception of 
strategy 
Decision-making in Thailand is 
faster than in Japan in all of these 
companies. 
Dissemination All of them disseminate strategic 
decisions to colleagues & 
subordinates broadly. JCE & JA 
write down some strategic decisions 
& long-term plan. 
JCE has regular press conference about 
them. JB has never written down these 
decisions. JA keeps them confidential. 
*) T h e s e a b b r e v i a t i o n s refer to t h e re spec t ive i n t e r v i e w e e s . 
All of t h e m prefer c o n s e n s u s if possible. This similarity among t h e m might 
be related to uncer ta in ty avoidance in Hofstede's model. This dimension might be 
related to t he d e m a n d s for people's suppor t for a c o n s e n s u s in strategic decision-
making. However, there a re few differences among all of them. Only J C E needs to 
communica te with i ts Thai pa r tne r s because it is a joint venture . It u s e s ringi a n d 
nemawashi for decis ion-making and repor ts on its decisions to i ts HQs. J A s ta tes 
profit a s a pr imary goal and does not report on al ternat ives to i ts HQs or i ts RHOs. 
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All of t h e m have different ways to disseminate their strategic decisions. Because 
th is difference among t h e m is nei ther significant nor related to nat ional cul ture , only 
t he above similarities, no t t he differences will be demons t ra ted a s Figure 9.5 in 
Chapte r 9. 
8.5 The comparison of strategy implementation 
All J a p a n e s e companies u n d e r th is s tudy have both similarities a n d 
differences in relation to thei r s t rategy implementat ion in many features. All 
J a p a n e s e cases are compared in detail to uncover these similarities and differences. 
The comparison of the s trategy implementat ion in these J a p a n e s e cases is expressed 
in Table 8.6. The similarities in the strategy implementat ion among the J a p a n e s e 
cases are used as a bas i s for the cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis with their Dutch 
coun te rpa r t s in relation to t he strategy implementat ion in section 9 .2 .3 . 
Table 8.6: The strategy implementation in Japanese companies in Thailand 
Strategy 
Implementation 
JCE JB JA 
Programme/Policy-
setting 
MD and affiliated 
organisations (JCEI*) 
GM (JBI) VP, but someUmes seeks 
advice from HQs (JAI) 
Budget setting MD and related units 
consult with financial 
director (JCEI) 
GM (JBI) HQs (JAI) 
Budget and short-
term plan approval 
MD and concerned 
divisional heads (JCEI) 
GM with loan extension 
(JBI) 
VP submits data to HQs 
for approving budgets and 
short-term plan (JAI) 
Corporate rules & 
procedure 
MD and concerned 
divisional heads (JCEI) 
GM's predecessor (JBI) VP's predecessor (JAI) 
Structural 
determination 
MD and concerned 
divisional heads (JCEI) 
GM (JBI) VP (JAI) 
Manpower 
management 
MD and concerned 
divisional heads 
Including human 
resource manager (JCEI) 
Human resource manager 
(JBI) 
Administrative office (JAI) 
Recruitment & 
training 
Human resource 
department (JCEI) 
Human resource 
department (JBI) 
Administrative office (JAI) 
Special Techniques MBO, TQM, JIT (JCEI) No (JBI) No (JAI) 
Mobilisation The concerned divisional 
heads (JCEI) 
GM (JBI) VP (JAI) 
HQs & RHO 
involvement 
Little involvement, only 
supporting role (JCEI; 
Shimizu, 1999, July 26) 
HQs involves large-scale 
loans (JBI) 
HQs and RHO involve 
decisions about other 
affiliates in Thailand. The 
degree of involvement 
depends on the scale of 
investment (JAI) 
*) These abbreviations refer to the respective interviewees. 
8.5.1 JCE After mak ing a strategic decision, MD a n d the h e a d s of J C E ' s 
affiliated organisa t ions se t p rogrammes and m a k e policies for the company. To set 
budgets , MD a n d the h e a d s of related un i t s consu l t with the financial director. MD 
and concerned divisional h e a d s approve the budge t s a n d the shor t - t e rm p lans 
collectively. 
MD a n d the concerned divisional heads set corporate rules and procedures , 
organise t he corporate s t ruc tu re and mobilise the workforce for J C E . MD, the 
concerned divisional h e a d s and the HR manage r m a n a g e manpower , r ec ru i tment 
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a n d t raining. J C E employs MBO, TQM and J IT a s i ts special t echniques suppor ted 
by the corporate ru les , the procedures and the t ra in ing p rogrammes in the HR 
depar tmen t . J C E h a s i ts company-wide t ra ining a n d somet imes s ends i ts selected 
employees to t he t ra in ing cent res in J a p a n and Singapore. The strategy 
implementa t ion process of J C E is demons t ra ted in Figure 8.7. 
Figure 8.7: Strategy implementation (JCE) 
Programme -
sett ing/ 
Policymaking 
Ritual: MP & 
affiliated 
organisations 
Budget 
setting 
Corporate 
rules & 
procedures 
setting 
Ritual: MP & 
related units 
consult with 
the financial 
director. MP & 
concerned 
divisional 
heads approve 
budgets & 
short-term 
plans 
collectively. 
Organising 
t Special techniques: 
TQM 
Ritual: 
MP & 
concerned 
divisional 
heads 
Ritual: 
MD & 
concerned 
divisional 
heads 
HQs 
RHO 
Staffing 
Ritual: MD. 
concerned 
divisional 
heads & HR 
manager 
manages 
manpower, 
recruitment 
Straining. 
Mobilising 
workforce 
Ritual: 
MD & 
concerned 
divisional 
heads 
8.5.2 JB After making a strategic decision, GM sets programmes and makes 
policies for Thai b r a n c h with some limitations from Global Corporate Banking Business 
Unit a t the HQs. 
Figure 8.8: Strategy implementation (JB) 
Programme-
sett ing/ 
Policymaking 
Corporate 
rules & 
procedures 
setting 
Organising Staffing 
Mobilising 
workforce 
Ritual: 
GM with 
limitation 
by HQs 
Ritual: GM 
approves 
budget & 
short-term 
plan with loan 
extension. 
Ritual: GM's 
predecessor 
Ritual: 
GM 
Ritual: HR 
manager 
manages 
manpower, 
recruitment 
& training. 
Ritual: 
GM 
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To set budgets , GM approves the budge ts and the shor t - te rm p lans with the 
loan extension u n d e r t he author isa t ion from Asian Credit Division a t the HQs. The 
strategy implementat ion process of J B is delineated in Figure 8.8. 
GM does not change the corporate rules and procedures t ha t h is predecessor 
set before he came to take u p his position in Thailand. He organises t he corporate 
s t ruc ture and mobilises h is workforce, b u t he asks the HR manager to manage 
manpower, recrui tment and training. J B h a s its company-wide training. 
8.5.3 JA After mak ing a strategic decision, VP se ts p rogrammes and makes 
policies for Thai b ranch , b u t somet imes he seeks advice from the Corporate 
Planning Office a t the HQs. To set budgets , VP submi t s appropr ia te da ta to the HQs 
for set t ing and approving the budge ts and the shor t - te rm p lans . 
Figure 8.9: Strategy implementation (JA] 
HQs 
Programme-
sett ing/ 
Policymaking 
Corporate 
rules & 
procedures 
setting 
Organising —I' Staffing 
Mobilising 
workforce 
Ritual: VP's Ritual: Ritual: Ritual: 
predecessor VP Administrative VP 
office manages 
manpower, 
recruitment & 
training. 
VP does not change the corporate rules and procedures t h a t his predecessor set 
before he came to take u p his position in Thailand. He organises the corporate 
s t ruc ture and mobilises h is workforce, b u t he asks the administrative office to manage 
manpower, recrui tment and training. JA recruits new employees through classified 
ads and personal networks. JA h a s its company-wide training. The strategy 
implementation process of JA is described in Figure 8.9. 
8.5.4 Similarity and difference From Table 8.7, all J a p a n e s e companies 
s h a r e m u c h commonali ty in their s t ra tegy implementat ion process . The chief 
executives in all of t h e m tend to main ta in their predecessor ' s corporate ru les and 
procedures even if they can set p rogrammes , policies, corporate ru les a n d 
procedures to su i t their need. They a re unlikely to change all of t h e m when they 
take u p the new job a s the chief executives if unnecessa ry . This similarity among 
t h e m might be related to uncer ta in ty avoidance in Hofstede's model. This dimension 
Ritual: VP 
does, but 
sometimes 
seeks advice 
from HQs. 
Ritual: VP 
submits 
data to HQs 
for setting & 
approving 
budget & 
short-term 
plan. 
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might be related to a tendency to ma in ta in corporate ru les and procedures in 
subs id iar ies . 
Table 8 .7 : The similarity and difference in the strategy implementation among 
3 Japanese companies in Thailand 
Strategy 
Implementation 
Similarity Difference 
Programme/Pollcy-
settlng 
By the chief executives in all of them. 
JCE & JB do it without the HQs' or 
RHOs' involvement. 
JCE's affiliated organisations help JCE's 
chief executives to do it. Only JA do it 
with the HQs' or RHOs' involvement 
Budget setting The chief executives in JCE & JB set 
& approve budget & short-term plan. 
Financial director & concerned division 
heads help JCE's chief executives to 
approve budget & short-term plan. VP 
submits data to HQs for approving them 
for JA. 
Corporate rules & 
procedure 
Neither JB's GM nor JA's VP changes 
the corporate rules & procedures 
that their predecessors set before. 
MD & concerned division heads set 
corporate rules & procedures for JCE. 
Organising The chief executives in all of them 
organise the structure. 
Concerned division heads help the chief 
executive to organise corporate 
structure for JCE. 
Staffing HR department manage recruitment, 
manpower & training for JCE & JB. 
MD & concerned division heads help HR 
manager to manage the manpower for 
JCE. Administrative office manages 
recruitment, manpower & training for 
JA. 
Mobilisation The chief executives in JB & JA 
mobilise workforce. 
The concerned division heads mobilise 
workforce for JCE. 
However, there are few differences among all of them. Because J C E h a s a lo^ 
of i ts affiliated companies , i ts MD needs the h e a d s of t h e affiliated companies to hehi 
h im to set p rog rammes a n d to m a k e policies. The concerned division h e a d s always 
help MD to se t a n d approve budgets , shor t - te rm plans , corporate rules a n d 
procedures , organis ing and mobilise the workforce for J C E . These h e a d s also help 
t he HR m a n a g e r s to manage manpower . The HQs gets involved in JA's policy-
making, budget - and programme-set t ing. Because th is difference among t h e m is 
ne i ther significant nor related to nat ional cul ture , only the above similarities, no t t he 
differences will be explicated a s Figure 9.7 in Chapte r 9. 
8.6 The comparison of evaluation and control 
All J a p a n e s e companies u n d e r th i s s tudy have both similarities a n d 
differences in relation to their evaluation and control in many a t t r ibu tes . All 
J a p a n e s e cases a re compared in detail to uncover these similarities a n d differences. 
The compar ison of the evaluation a n d control in these J a p a n e s e cases is expressed 
in Table 8.8. The similarities t he evaluation a n d control among the J a p a n e s e cases 
is used a s a bas i s for the cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis with their Dutch 
coun te rpa r t s in relation to evaluation a n d control in section 9.2.4. 
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Table 8.8: The evaluation and control in Japanese companies in Thailand 
Evaluation & 
Control 
JCE JB JA 
Criteria 
establishment 
JCE's MD (JCEI*) GM with HQs approval 
(JBI) 
VP for sales only (JAI) 
Criteria & 
standard 
Qualitative and 
quantitative criteria with 
wide and deep scope 
(JCEI) 
Qualitative and 
quantitative criteria (JBI) 
Quantitative criteria for 
sales; qualitative ones for 
others (JAI) 
Performance 
assessment 
MD, on the bas is of 
bus iness plan (JCEI) 
GM, on the basis of credit 
exposure (JBI) 
VP submit figure to HQs for 
performance assessment 
(JAI) 
Benchmarking By announced bus iness 
performance (JCEI) 
No (JBI) No (JAI) 
Corrective action MD and concerned 
directors ask 
subordinates to improve 
performance (JCEI) 
GM asks colleagues and 
subordinates to improve 
performance (JBI) 
VP asks colleagues and 
subordinates to improve 
performance on the basis of 
action plan from each 
division (JAI) 
Report to HQs & 
RHO 
To HQs once a month 
(JCEI) 
To HQs once a month (JBI) To HQs and RHO twice a 
year (JAI) 
Frequency of HQs' 
visit 
Any time without 
timetable (JCEI) 
Every year without 
timetable (JBI) 
From both HQs and RHO 
once or twice a year (JAI) 
CEO performance The director of Asia and 
Oceania corporate 
management division in 
HQs (JCEI) 
HQs (JBI) RHO from VP's report and 
RHO's recommendation (JAI) 
Loss-making 
endurance 
Never made loss, so not 
the considering point 
(JCEI) 
Not the considering point 
(JBI) 
Never made loss, so 
insufficient profit is 
unacceptable (JAI) 
*) T h e s e a b b r e v i a t i o n s refer to t h e r e s p e c t i v e in terv iewees . 
8.6.1 JCE To establ ish criteria for evaluation and control, MD u s e s 
qualitative a n d quant i ta t ive criteria with wide and deep scope on the bas i s of t he 
professional know-how from the HQs. MD asses ses t he performance on the bas i s of 
bus ine s s p lans . He b e n c h m a r k s h i s company by announc ing b u s i n e s s 
performance, ma rke t surveys and so on. For corrective action, MD a n d the 
concerned directors a sk their subord ina tes to improve the performance. The 
process of evaluation and control of J C E is explained in Figure 8.10. 
With respect to the interact ion with t he HQs a n d the RHO, Thai subsidiary 
repor ts on its performance to the HQs once a mon th . Top executives a n d staff from 
the HQs and the RHO visit Thai subsidiary any t ime wi thout t imetable. The director 
of Asia and Oceania corporate m a n a g e m e n t division in the HQs as ses ses MD's 
performance from MD's achievement of the b u s i n e s s p lans . Because J C E h a s never 
made a loss since i ts e s tab l i shment in Thailand, loss-making is no t a concern. J C E 
h a s never fired i ts MD on g rounds of making loss for 2-3 consecutive years . The 
s i tuat ion is no t so simple t h a t can be described in figures for a s sess ing loss-making. 
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Figure 8.10: Evaluation and control (JCE) 
HQs 
Criteria 
establishment 
Performance 
asses sment & 
benchmarking Corrective actions 
Ritual: MP 
u s e s 
qualitative & 
quantitative 
criteria with 
wide & deep 
scope on the 
bas is of 
professional 
know-how at 
HQs. 
Ritual: MP 
a s s e s s e s 
performance on 
the basis of the 
bus iness plans 
& benchmarks 
by announcing 
bus ines s 
performance. 
Value: 
Inequality 
Ritual: MP & 
concerned 
directors ask 
subordinates 
to improve 
performance. 
Interaction 
with HQs & 
RHO 
Country 
manager's 
performance 
Value: Long-
term 
Ritual: JCE 
has never 
made loss. 
Loss-making is 
not a concern. 
Ritual: Thai 
subsidiary 
reports to HQs 
once a month. 
Staff from 
HQs & RHO 
visit Thai 
subsidiary 
any time 
without 
timetable. 
Loss-
making 
endurance 
Ritual: The 
director of 
Asia & 
Oceania 
corporate 
management 
division in 
HQs a s s e s s e s 
MP's 
performance 
from MP's 
achievement 
of the 
bus iness 
plans. 
8.6.2 JB To establish criteria for evaluation and control, GM with the HQs' 
approval u s e s qualitative and quanti tat ive criteria. Without benchmarking, GM 
assesses the performance on the bas is of i ts credit exposure. For corrective action, GM 
a s k s his colleagues and his subordinates to improve the performance. 
With regard to the interaction with the HQs and the RHO, Thai b ranch reports 
on its performance to the HQs once a month . Top executives and staff from Global 
Corporate Banking Bus iness Unit a t the HQs and Asian Headquar ters visit Thai 
b r a n c h every year without timetable. The HQs assesses GM's performance from GM's 
reports . Because J B comes to Thailand to serve J a p a n e s e clients, it does not consider 
loss-making a s i ts main assessment . J B h a s never dismissed its GM because of 
making loss. The process of evaluation and control of J B is explicated in Figure 8 .11 . 
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Figure 8.11: Evaluation and control (JB) 
HQs 
Criteria 
establishment 
Performance 
assessment & 
benchmarking Corrective actions 
Country 
manager's 
performance 
* 
Interaction 
with HQs & 
RHO 
Ritual: GM 
with HQs' 
approval u s e s 
qualitative & 
quantitative 
criteria. 
Ritual: Without 
benchmarking, 
GM a s s e s s e s 
performance on 
the basis of its 
credit exposure. 
Value: 
Inequality 
Ritual: GM 
asks 
colleagues & 
subordinates 
to improve 
performance. 
Value: Long-
term 
Ritual: JB 
doesn't 
consider loss 
as its main 
assessment. 
Ritual: Thai 
subsidiary 
reports to HQs 
once a month. 
Staff from 
HQs & RHO 
visit Thai 
subsidiary 
every year 
without 
timetable. 
Loss-making 
endurance 
Ritual: HQs 
a s s e s s e s GM's 
performance 
from GM's 
reports. 
8.6.3 JA To establish criteria for evaluation a n d control, VP u s e s figures for 
sa les a n d ma in tenance only. He u se s qualitative criteria for o thers . Each 
depa r tmen t can set i ts own criteria, b u t VP h a s to add something to them. Without 
benchmark ing , VP submi t s the figures to Corporate Planning Office in t he HQs for 
performance a s ses smen t . On the bas i s of the action p l ans from each division, VP 
a s k s colleagues and subord ina tes to improve the performance for corrective action. 
With respect to the interaction with the HQs and the RHO, Thai b ranch reports 
on its performance to the HQs and the RHO twice a year. Top executives and staff 
from the HQs and the RHO visit Thai b ranch once or twice a year. VP informally 
reports to the HQs by e-mail and phone. The RHO assesses VP's performance from 
VP's report and the RHO's recommendation. Because J A h a s never made a loss since 
its es tabl ishment in Thailand, insufficient profit is unacceptable. VP h a s to accept pay 
cu ts or slow salary increases, b u t he will not be dismissed. Market share is a small 
factor because JA's most clients are the J apanese . The process of evaluation and 
control of JA is illustrated in Figure 8.12. 
171 
Figure 8.12: Evaluation and control (JA) 
Criteria 
establishment 
Each 
departmenl 
Ritual: VP 
u s e s figures 
for sales & 
maintenance 
only & 
qualitative 
criteria for 
other. Each 
department 
can set its 
own criteria, 
but VP has to 
add 
something. 
HQs 
Performance 
assessment & 
benchmarking 
Ritual: Without 
benchmarking, 
VP submits 
figures to HQs 
for performance 
assessment . 
Corrective 
actions 
Value: 
Inequality 
Ritual: VP 
asks 
colleagues & 
subordinates 
to improve 
performance 
on the basis of 
the action 
plans from 
each division. 
Interaction 
with HQs & 
RHO 
Value: Long-term 
Ritual: JA has 
never made loss, so 
insufficient profit is 
unacceptable. VP 
has to accept pay 
cut or slow salary 
increase. 
Ritual: Thai 
subsidiary 
reports to HQs 
& RHO twice a 
year. Staff from 
HQs & RHO 
visit Thai 
subsidiary once 
or twice a year. 
VP informally 
reports to HQs 
by e-mail & 
phone. 
Country 
manager's 
performance 
i k 
r 
Loss-
making 
endurance 
Ritual: RHO 
a s s e s s e s VP's 
performance from 
GM's 
reports & RHO's 
recommendation. 
8 .6 .4 Similarity and difference From Table 8.9, all J a p a n e s e companies 
s h a r e m u c h commonali ty in their evaluation a n d control. All of t h e m can se t u p 
criteria for evaluat ion and control with their HQs' involvement. The chief executives 
in all of t h e m tend to u s e personal author i ty in t he corporate h ierarchy r a t h e r t h a n 
meet ings a n d d iscuss ions for corrective action. All of t h e m need formalisation for 
performance a s s e s s m e n t from their HQs. This commonali ty among t h e m might be 
related to power d is tance in Hofstede's model. Power d is tance is likely to be 
associated with t he degree of central isat ion and formalisation. However, there a re 
few differences a m o n g all of them. J C E u s e s professional know-how from its HQs. 
J C E and J A a s s e s s their b u s i n e s s performance on the bas i s of t he b u s i n e s s or 
act ion p lans , b u t J A h a s to s u b m i t figures to i ts HQs for approval. Their frequency 
of interact ion with their HQs a n d RHOs, s u c h a s staff visits a n d repor ts on their 
performance is varied. Because th is difference a m o n g t h e m is nei ther significant 
nor related to nat ional cul ture , only t he above similarities, no t the differences will be 
elucidated a s Figure 9.9 in Chapte r 9. 
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Table 8 .9 : The similarity and difference in the evaluation and control among 3 
Japanese companies in Thailand 
Evaluation & 
Control 
Similarity Difference 
Criteria 
establishment 
All of them use both qualitative & 
quantitative criteria. JCE & JB need 
their HQs' involvement. 
JCE u s e s professional know-how from 
HQs. JB needs its HQs' approval. VP 
establishes criteria only for sales & u s e s 
quantitative criteria for sales & 
maintenance only in JA. 
Performance 
assessment & 
benchmarking 
All of them do It quarterly, but 
neither of them u s e s benchmarking. 
JCE does so on the basis of bus iness 
plans. In JA, VP does so on the basis of 
action plan from each division & submit 
figures to HQs for performance 
assessment . 
Corrective action All of them ask their subordinates 
to improve the performance. 
Interaction with 
HQs & RHO 
JCE & JB report on their 
performance to their HQs once a 
month. 
JA reports on its performance to the HQs 
& RHOs twice a year formally & any time 
informally by e-mail & telephone. Without 
timetable, staffs from HQs & RHOs visit 
JCE any time, visit JB every year & visit 
JA once or twice a year. 
CEO's 
performance 
HQs as se s s CEO's performance for 
JCE & JE. 
RHO asse s se s VP's performance from VP's 
report & RHO's recommendadon. 
Loss-making 
endurance 
JCE & JA have never made a loss in 
Thailand. 
JB makes a loss because of bad loans, but 
still operates in Thailand. Insufficient 
profit is unacceptable for JA. 
8.7 Conclusion 
Because all J a p a n e s e cases a re operat ing in th ree different types of bus iness , 
namely consumer electronics, bank ing a n d air carr iers , they have different 
character is t ics inheri ted from these three indus t r ies . In addition, all of t h e m s ta r ted 
their bus ine s s in Thai land in different years from 1950-1961 . The size of their 
b r a n c h e s in Thai land is also varied from companies to companies . Only J C E is a 
joint ven ture . Nonetheless, all the J a p a n e s e cases sha re some similar features when 
they are operat ing in Thai land. All J a p a n e s e cases have never employed third-
country staff s ince i ts foundation in Thai land. All of t h e m have to report on their 
performance to their HQs or RHOs in Tokyo a n d Osaka in J a p a n first. 
With regard to environmental scanning, all J a p a n e s e cases have different 
information-gathering processes and environmental diagnosises, because all of t h e m 
encoun te r different envi ronments in their own bus ines s . However, all of t h e m sha re 
some similarities in their environmental scanning processes , s u c h a s exerting a 
political influence on Thai government to minimise risks and us ing more in-house 
da ta . Their outlook is quite pessimist ic . All chief executives in these cases need 
consul ta t ion a n d negotiation with their colleagues a n d subord ina tes before making a 
strategic decision. All of t h e m did not lay off their employees dur ing the economic 
crisis in Thai land. The description of th i s s tage of t he SMP for all J a p a n e s e cases 
will be expressed in Figure 9.3 in Chapter 9. 
With respect to s trategy formulation, all J a p a n e s e cases formulate corporate 
s trategy in a different way from each other because of their relat ions with their HQs 
a n d RHOs, t he difference in their own bus ines s envi ronments a n d the size of their 
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b r a n c h e s in Thai land. Nonetheless, all of t h e m s h a r e some aspec t s of the s trategy 
formulation a n d strategic decis ion-making process in thei r Thai operation; for 
ins tance , d i sseminat ing the strategic decisions t h roughou t their companies in 
Thai land. All J a p a n e s e cases need their HQs' involvement for goal-sett ing. Their 
decis ion-making process is quicker in Thai land t h a n in J a p a n . The descript ion of 
th i s s tage of SMP for all J a p a n e s e cases will be expressed in Figure 9 .5 in Chapte r 9. 
As far a s s trategy implementa t ion is concerned, all J a p a n e s e ca se s 
implement corporate s t ra tegy in a different way because of thei r re lat ions with their 
HQs a n d RHOs, the difference in their own b u s i n e s s env i ronments and the size of 
their b r a n c h e s in Thai land. Still, all of t hem s h a r e some facets of their s t ra tegy 
implementa t ion in their Thai operation. Their HQs and RHOs have never involved in 
rec ru i tment in all J a p a n e s e cases , because all of t h e m do not employ th i rd-country 
m a n a g e r s t h a t are ne i ther J a p a n e s e nor Thai a n d prefer internal promotion to 
external r ec ru i tmen t for thei r manager ia l posit ions. The description of th i s s tage of 
SMP for all J a p a n e s e cases will be expressed in Figure 9.7 in Chapte r 9. 
In t e r m s of evaluation and control, all J a p a n e s e cases evaluate thei r s t ra tegy 
a n d control thei r performance in a different way because of their relat ions with their 
HQs a n d RHOs, the difference in their own b u s i n e s s envi ronments a n d the size of 
their b r a n c h e s in Thai land. Even so, all of t h e m s h a r e some similar p rocesses of t he 
evaluat ion a n d control for their operation in Thai land, s u c h a s us ing personal 
au thor i ty for corrective act ion ins tead of meet ings a n d discuss ions , u s ing both 
quali tat ive a n d quant i ta t ive criteria for evaluation and control and no t considering 
loss -making a s their main concern. The description of th i s s tage of SMP for all 
J a p a n e s e cases will be expressed in Figure 9.9 in Chapte r 9. 
According to t he above four s teps of SMP in Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s model, 
the compar i son among all J a p a n e s e cases in the cross-case analysis within 
J a p a n e s e cu l tu re leads to the findings of the similarities and the differences among 
these cases . Fur thermore , each J a p a n e s e case h a s i ts own idiosyncrasies. The 
similarit ies a s a consequence of the cross-case analysis within J a p a n e s e cul ture in 
th i s chap te r will be compared with the similarities a s a consequence of t he cross-
case ana lys is within Dutch cu l ture in Chapter 7 in t he cross-cul tural , cross-case 
analys is in Chap te r 9. The differences a s a consequence of the cross-case analysis 
within J a p a n e s e cu l ture in th i s chap te r will be compared with the differences a s a 
consequence of t he cross-case analysis within Du tch cul ture in Chap te r 7 for 
d iscuss ion in Chap te r 10. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN DUTCH AND JAPANESE SMPS IN 
THAILAND 
9.1 Introduction 
This chap te r essentially deals with the cross-cul tural , cross-case analysis 
between the SMPs of Dutch companies and tha t of the J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thai land. As a n interact ion between theory and empirical evidence, the process of 
th i s analysis begins with building the reference model for comparing SMPs in 
section 2 .5 . Under this model, the conceptual proposit ions are formulated in 
section 4.4 with corroboration from l i terature on Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tu res in 
Chapter 3 and on Dutch and J a p a n e s e SMPs Chapter 4. After combining the cross-
case analysis within Dutch cul ture with extant l i terature on Dutch MNCs in Chapte r 
7 and the cross-case analysis within J a p a n e s e cul ture with existing l i terature on 
J a p a n e s e MNCs in Chap te r 8, the resu l t s from both preceding chap te r s are 
compared to formulate the empirical proposit ions in th i s chapter . To find the 
evidence, the process of th i s analysis is encapsula ted in Figure 9.1 
The research findings from th is s tudy answer the central research quest ion 
in Chapter 1 t h a t the na t ional cu l tu res of Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs' pa ren t 
companies intervene in the SMPS of their Thai subsidiar ies . The findings indicate 
t h a t only two d imens ions in Hofstede's model are significant for the prediction of the 
SMPs in MNCs' subsidiar ies . In t he light of th i s s tudy, only power d is tance and 
uncer ta in ty avoidance have a n influence on the four s teps of SMP in Wheelen a n d 
Hunger 's model. Power d is tance t ends to exert a n influence on strategy formulation 
and evaluation a n d control. Uncer ta inty avoidance is likely to wield an influence on 
environmental scanning, s t rategy formulation and strategy implementat ion. There 
is no relat ionship between individualism-collectivism a n d any s teps of the SMPs in 
Thai subsidiar ies . These subsidiar ies may be too small to organise collective 
decision-making. No evidence shows t h a t long-term orientat ion is related to the 
degree of the future-oriented projection of the corporate goals for s t ra tegy 
formulation and the criteria es tab l i shment for evaluation and control. No evidence 
indicates the relat ionship between shor t - te rm orientat ion and the degree of 
emphas i s on profitability a s a goal for s trategy formulation and a s a criterion for 
evaluation a n d control. The mos t different scores between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
cu l tu res in masculinity-femininity do not affect the SMPs of the Dutch a n d the 
J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land a t all. No evidence confirms th is relat ionship. 
This dimension may be related to some aspec ts of manager ia l behaviours t h a t a re 
irrelevant to t he SMP of MNCs. Only strategy implementat ion is associated with 
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corporate performance because MNCs have to implement their s t rategy to a t ta in 
w h a t they want . 
Figure 9.1: The process of a comparative analysis and its write-up 
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To answer the research ques t ions for each component of SMPs in section 1.5, 
section 9.2, 9 .3 , 9.4 and 9.5 describe the research findings in t he light of t he 
relat ionship between SMP comprising environmental scanning, s t rategy formulation, 
s t rategy implementat ion a n d evaluation and control a n d nat ional cu l ture 
respectively. This relat ionship will be summar i sed in the empirical proposit ions in 
these four sect ions. Section 9.6 d i scusses the relat ionship between strategy 
implementat ion and corporate performance. Section 9.7 integrates all re la t ionships 
from the research findings into the integrative model for compar ing SMPs. Section 
9.8 arrives a t a conclusion. 
9.2 Environmental scanning 
The findings answer t he research quest ion t ha t the top executives in both 
Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies s can the environment differently from each other in 
Thai land from the perspective of Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tures . From the empirical 
evidence, t he relat ionship between Dutch cul ture and environmental s cann ing in t he 
Dutch companies is expressed in Figure 9.2 a s a resul t of the compar ison in section 
7 .3 . As a consequence of t he compar ison in section 8.3, the relat ionship between 
J a p a n e s e cu l ture and environmental s cann ing in the J a p a n e s e companies is 
expressed in Figure 9 .3 . Neither t he HQs nor the RHOs gets involved with the 
environmental s cann ing process in bo th Dutch and J a p a n e s e cases . The count ry 
m a n a g e r s in all six cases s can the envi ronment ei ther by themselves or with their 
colleagues in Thai subsidiar ies . 
Nevertheless, no empirical proposit ion in th i s chap te r s u p p o r t s t he 
conceptual proposition (CP1) from section 4 .4 .1 . There is no evidence t h a t shows 
the relat ionship between individualism-collectivism a n d information sha r ing in bo th 
Dutch and J a p a n e s e cases . Both of t h e m are small . Because Thai labour law does 
not require the Dutch companies to have a work council in Thai land, the s i tua t ion 
in the Nether lands is not applicable to Thai s i tuat ion. The J a p a n e s e companies in 
Thai land are too small to organise p lann ing office and a working group for sha r ing 
information a m o n g employees. Moreover, their Thai pa r tne r s , suppliers , cus tomers 
a n d competi tors are unwilling to s h a r e the information they want . 
The empirical evidence sugges t s the relat ionship between uncer ta in ty 
avoidance a n d environmenta l scanning . From Figure 9.2 a n d 9 .3 , t he empirical 
proposi t ions (EPla) , (EPlb), (EP2) a n d (EP3) suppor t th i s re la t ionship. 
The Dutch companies tend to review the s i tuat ion on the incident-oriented 
(ad hoc) bas is , while the J a p a n e s e companies tend to review the s i tuat ion on the 
schedule-oriented bas i s . In t he formal long-term environmental s cann ing process , 
all Du tch cases review the s i tuat ion in a n ad hoc fashion when the s i tuat ion 
requires . 
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Figure 9.2: Environmental scanning in Dutch companies 
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Figure 9.3: Environmental scanning in Japanese companies 
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Only DCE u s e s its own external and in ternal un i t s to collect t he formal da ta 
semi-annual ly . DB and DA do not review the s i tuat ion on schedule. DB employs 
external consu l t an t s and researchers when a new inves tment is u n d e r 
considerat ion. DA does t he s ame th ing before its imminen t regional meet ings . All of 
t h e m tend to rely on less in ternal da ta , because n o p lann ing office in t he HQs or 
RHOs suppl ies d a t a from in-house publ icat ions for them. 
In t he informal rout ine environmental s cann ing process , all Du tch 
companies , except DB are likely to rely solely on external data , because DB need 
some internal information from its credit risk d e p a r t m e n t s a t all levels before dealing 
with i ts cus tomers on the case-by-case bas is . The chief executives in all Dutch 
companies scan the envi ronment very often. 
They usual ly ask their subord ina tes to ei ther collect or buy da t a from 
external agencies. This lack of informal internal da t a implies t he weak 
inst i tut ional isat ion of environmental s cann ing in the Dutch companies . On the 
o ther hand , all J a p a n e s e companies review the s i tua t ion on pre-determined 
schedule in the formal long-term environmenta l s cann ing process . J C E and J B u s e 
external agencies to collect da ta before reviewing the s i tuat ion every year on 
schedule . JA employs public relation (PR) agencies to collect da t a for i ts a n n u a l 
review. 
All J a p a n e s e companies rely on external da ta , b u t only J C E and J B res t on 
their in ternal d a t a from in-house publ icat ions s imul taneous ly in the a n n u a l review. 
Their coun t ry m a n a g e r s in Thai land scan the envi ronment very often in t he informal 
rout ine environmenta l scann ing process . All J a p a n e s e cases collect da t a from both 
external a n d in ternal sources informally. The more u s e of in ternal da t a in these 
J a p a n e s e companies reflects the s t rong inst i tut ional isat ion of environmental 
scanning . Because all of t h e m are more anxious a b o u t incert i tude, they tend to 
inst i tut ional ise thei r information-gathering process . 
E P l a : S t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to t he degree of 
s i tuat ion review on the schedule-oriented bas i s in MNCs' subsidiar ies . 
E P l b : Weak uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of 
s i tuat ion review on the incident-oriented bas i s in MNCs' subsidiar ies . 
The empirical proposit ions (EPla) and (EPlb) are cor respondent to the 
conceptual proposit ion (CP2) from section 4 . 4 . 1 . Because Dutch MNCs do not have 
the p lann ing depa r tmen t a s their s t rong inst i tut ional isat ion of environmental 
s cann ing th roughou t their global operation, t he Du tch companies in Thai land tend 
to review their s t rategy on the incident-oriented bas i s . They do not do it according 
to the procedure regularly. In contrast , with their s t rong inst i tut ional isat ion of 
environmenta l scann ing th roughou t their global operation, the J a p a n e s e companies 
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in Thai land tend to review the s i tuat ion on the schedule-oriented bas i s . They do it 
according to the procedure regularly. 
The J a p a n e s e companies tend to have more clear-cut criteria to differentiate 
between th rea t s and opportunities t h a n the Dutch companies do. In general, the 
J a p a n e s e companies tend to have more fear of the environment. They tend to have 
clear-cut criteria to categorise strategic i ssues into th rea t s and opportunit ies. For J C E 
and J B , opportunit ies are good. Threa ts are bad. Both companies canno t see both 
th rea t s and opportunit ies a s the same strategic issues, because their criteria for 
differentiation are clear. Both of t hem cannot perceive economic crisis a s the same 
issue as economic recovery. For JA there is no criterion for classifying strategic i ssues 
into threa ts and opportunities. JA does not perceive th rea t s because it believes it can 
manage a good relationship with Thai government. 
On the other hand , all Dutch companies tend to have less fear of the 
environment. They do not have clear-cut criteria to categorise strategic i ssues into 
opportunit ies and th rea t s . Both kinds of issue are too mixed u p to see t h e m a s 
separate i ssues concurrently. They can see both of them a s the same strategic i ssues 
depending on how both of them affect the companies. For DCE, Thailand's open 
economy causes more new opportunities and strong competition concurrently. For 
DB, Thai government policy on financial liberalisation can be both th rea t s and 
opportunities, because it triggers off both competition and new bus iness 
concomitantly. DA perceives no visible threat because of less intensifying competition. 
EP2: Strong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of t he clear-
cu t criteria to differentiate between threa ts and opportunities in MNCs' 
subsidiaries. 
The empirical proposition (EP2) is in line with the conceptual propositions 
(CP3a) and (CP3b) from 4 .4 .1 . Because the J a p a n e s e top executives feel t h a t they need 
more control over the environment, they tend to need clear-cut criteria for classifying 
strategic i ssues into threa ts and opportunit ies before analysing them. On the other 
hand , even if DCE a s a Dutch company h a s both theoretical and practical criteria for 
this classification, it rarely u se s them. The top executives in the Dutch companies 
tend to have less clear-cut criteria for this classification t h a n their counterpar t s in the 
J a p a n e s e companies, because they feel no need to control the environment. 
J a p a n ' s economy h a s already undergone a 10-year recession. Dutch economy 
h a s not shared the s ame experience with its J a p a n e s e counterpart , b u t both Dutch 
and J a p a n e s e companies have faced the same situation in Thailand since the economic 
crisis in 1997. Even so, both of them have their own perception of Thai economy 
different from each other. The J a p a n e s e companies tend to have more pessimistic 
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perceptions of external environment, b u t the Dutch companies tend to have more 
optimistic ones. 
All J a p a n e s e companies tend to see fewer opportunities even if the changing 
environment causes both th rea ts and opportunities a t the same time. Because their 
perceptions tend to be pessimistic, they are very conservative. They still feel uncer ta in 
about economic recovery and the purchas ing power of Thai consumers in t he next 
couple of years even though J C E and JA see their future more favourably. Because J B 
limits its bus iness only to corporate banking, it still sees an uncer ta in future from their 
bad loans in Thailand and the frenzy trend of merger and acquisition (M&A) in J a p a n . 
To minimise political risks in Thailand, J C E and J B often try to wield an influence on 
Thai government for favourable economic policies. In the similar vein, JA tries to forge 
a good relationship with Thai government and THAI Airway. On the other hand , all 
Dutch companies tend to see the crisis a s their opportunities to expand and 
res t ruc ture their bus iness . Their perceptions tend to be optimistic. 
EP3: Strong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree of pessimistic 
perception of environment among MNCs' subsidiaries. 
The empirical proposition (EP3) is cons is tent with the implication of 
l i tera ture in section 2.4.1 a n d section 4.4.1 t h a t s t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is 
positively related to the degree of pess imism. 
9 .3 Strategy formulation 
The findings answer the research question t ha t the strategy formulation of both 
Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies differs from each other from the perspective of Dutch 
and J a p a n e s e cul tures . From the empirical evidence, the relationship between Dutch 
cul ture and strategy formulation in the Dutch companies is expressed in Figure 9.4 a s 
a consequence of the comparison in section 7.4. As a resul t of the comparison in 
section 8.4, the relationship between J a p a n e s e cul ture and strategy formulation in the 
J a p a n e s e companies is expressed in Figure 9.5. Both HQs and RHOs get involved with 
strategy formulation, b u t not strategic decision-making in both Dutch and J a p a n e s e 
cases . Both of t hem prefer consensual decision-making. 
Nonetheless, no empirical proposit ion in th i s chap te r suppor t s t he 
conceptual proposition (CP4) from section 4.4 .2 . There is no evidence t h a t shows 
the relat ionship between long-term orientat ion and the degree of the future-oriented 
projection of t h e corporate goals. It is ha rd to identify and to measu re w h a t is a 
shor t - te rm or long-term goal in reality. This m e a s u r e m e n t is quite subjective 
because every company h a s i ts own criterion for classifying its corporate goals into 
long-term and shor t - te rm ones . There is no common ground for th is classification. 
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Figure 9.4: Strategy formulation in Dutch companies 
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Figure 9 .5: Strategy formulation in Japanese companies 
Focus of 
strategy 
formulation 
HQs 
RHOs 
Goal-setting 
Ritual: 
HQs gets 
involved in 
Japanese 
service 
companies' 
strategy 
formulation. 
Value: 
Profit isn't a 
primary 
goal for 
Japanese 
companies. 
Process 
Alternative 
generation 
Making a 
strategic 
decision 
PDI in EP4: 
Japanese 
companies have at 
least to 
communicate with 
HQs or RHOs when 
they set goal. They 
need higher-level 
approval. 
Ritual: 
Japanese 
companies 
generate at 
least 3 
alternatives 
before 
making 
strategic 
decisions. 
Value: Japanese 
companies prefer 
consensus if 
possible. 
Value: Consultation 
with colleagues & 
subordinates is 
necessary if the 
decisions affect 
them. 
Ritual: At least 2 
Japanese companies 
need to report these 
alternatives to HQs 
or RHOs before 
making strategic 
decisions. 
Outcome 
Perception 
Ritual: All their 
decisions are 
satisfactory. Because 
Thai units are smaller, 
the decision-making 
process is faster than in 
HQs and RHOs. 
Dissemination 
of decisions & 
goals 
UAI in EP5 & EP6: 
Strategic decisions 
are disseminated 
more broadly to 
affected colleague 
& subordinated, & 
at least 2 of them 
written down to 
some degree. 
These documents 
are internal. 
182 
No empirical proposition in th i s chapter suppor t s the conceptual 
proposi t ions (CP5a) and (CP5b) from section 4.4.2. There is no evidence t h a t shows 
t h e relat ionship between the degree of individualism and the degree of individual 
responsibili ty for making a strategic decision in the Dutch cases . 
No evidence suppor t s the relat ionship between the degree of collectivism a n d 
the degree of collective responsibili ty for making a strategic decision in t he J a p a n e s e 
cases . Both Dutch and J a p a n e s e cases are too small . All Dutch cases have no 
subsidiary board. Neither have JA and J B . Even if J C E h a s a subsidiary board, i ts 
MD h a s a clear responsibility for report ing on his decisions to the HQs. 
From Figure 9.4 and 9.5, the empirical evidence sugges ts the relat ionship 
between power d is tance and strategy formulation. The empirical proposition (EP4) 
suppor t s th is re lat ionship. The evidence also sugges ts the relat ionship between 
uncer ta in ty avoidance and strategy formulation. The empirical proposit ions (EP5) 
and (EP6) confirm this re la t ionship. 
9.3.1 The relationship between power distance and strategy 
formulation The degree of power d is tance presumably affects t he degree of t he 
central isat ion of decis ion-making author i ty and operat ions . Unlike Dutch MNCs, 
J a p a n e s e MNCs are well-known for thei r central isat ion of the world-wide operation. 
No ma t t e r where their subsidiar ies are located, these subsidiar ies need the 
formalisation from the HQs for their s t rategy formulation in the local opera t ions 
(Ronen, 1986; Yip et al, 1997; Bart let t & Ghoshal , 1998). The HQs of Du tch MNCs 
get less involved with thei r subsidiar ies ' s t rategy formulation t h a n the HQs of their 
J a p a n e s e coun te rpa r t s do in Thai land. J a p a n e s e companies need a h igher level of 
formalisation for approval of their s t rategy formulation in Thai land t h a n Dutch 
companies do. 
The HQs tend to get more involved with t he Dutch service companies ' 
s t ra tegy formulation. For DB, i ts HQs, its RHO and Thai b r a n c h review a n d 
formulate the s trategy for Thai b r a n c h every year, because some s t ra tegies need 
global information, some need regional one and the res t needs local one. For DA, i ts 
HQs controls only pricing policy in Thai b r anch on the global bas is . For DCE, i ts 
HQs does not get involved with Thai NSO's strategy formulation. In line with the 
regional strategy, DCE formulates the strategy for Thai NSO, b u t repor ts on its 
s t ra tegy to i ts RHO for each p roduc t group. DA formulates t he s trategy for Thai 
b r a n c h after all Asian b r a n c h e s submi t da ta of their each depa r tmen t a t t he regional 
meet ings . All Dutch cases need the formalisation for approving their corporate goals 
a t regional level. DCE a n d DA negotiate their corporate goals a t t he RHOs' meet ing 
on the bas i s of the sales in previous years and their bargaining position. DB 
proposes i ts corporate goals to its RHO for approval after the b r a n c h manage r 
consul t with h i s subord ina tes in Thai b ranch . 
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On the o ther hand , all J a p a n e s e cases need more their HQs' involvement in 
their s t rategy formulation a n d corporate goal-setting t h a n their Dutch coun te rpa r t s 
do. After t he a n n u a l review of strategy, the HQs advises J B a n d J A to formulate 
their s t rategy a n d set the targets for their Thai b ranches . Only J C E ' s top 
m a n a g e m e n t in Thai land including MD formulates strategy for Thai operation 
because J C E is a jo int ven ture , no t a b r a n c h . Hence, t he HQs get more involved 
with t he s t ra tegy formulation of t he J a p a n e s e service companies in Thai land. 
Nevertheless, all J a p a n e s e cases need their HQs' involvement in their corporate goal-
set t ing in Thai land. J C E se t s goals by communicat ion among itself, t he HQs and 
Thai pa r tne r s and submi t s i ts p l ans and its goals to the HQs for approval. J B and 
JA set their corporate goals for Thai b r a n c h after d iscuss ions with the HQs and the 
RHOs respectively. Albeit DB a s a b a n k is more centralised t h a n DA and DCE and 
J B a s a b a n k is more central ised t h a n JA and J C E in their s trategy formulation, DB 
is less central ised t h a n J B . J B needs to report to the HQs more t h a n DB does. In 
general , t he HQs get involved with t he strategy formulation in all J a p a n e s e cases . 
Hence, the J a p a n e s e companies have more centralised communica t ion among the 
HQs, the RHOs a n d Thai u n i t s t h a n the Dutch companies a s far a s their s trategy 
formulation and corporate goal-sett ing are concerned. 
EP4: Large power d is tance is positively related to t he need for higher-level 
formalisation for approval in MNCs' s t rategy formulation for subsidiar ies . 
The conceptual proposition (CP6) from section 4.4.2 affects the empirical 
proposition (EP4). The degree of the centralisation of formalisation and decision-
making authori ty in J a p a n e s e MNCs is higher t han tha t in Dutch MNCs. Because 
J a p a n e s e MNCs centralise their decision-making authori ty when they pu r sue 
corporate strategy globally, all J a p a n e s e cases in Thailand a s a subsidiary need a high-
level of formalisation in their strategy formulation, especially from their HQs. On the 
other hand, Dutch MNCs tend to decentralise their decision-making authority. All 
Dutch cases do not need m u c h formalisation from their HQs in their strategy 
formulation. 
9.3.2 The relationship between uncertainty avoidance and strategy 
formulation The degree of uncer ta in ty avoidance presumably affects strategy 
formulation because the decis ion-making process in MNCs often involves incert i tude 
and r isks . The different degree of uncer ta in ty avoidance t ends to cause difference in 
d e m a n d s for people part ic ipat ing in a n d acknowledging the strategic decision-
making process in MNCs. The empirical proposit ions (EP5) a n d (EP6) suppor t th i s 
relat ionship. 
The J a p a n e s e country m a n a g e r s need more people to suppor t t hem in the 
strategic decis ion-making t h a n their Dutch counte rpar t s do. Both Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e cases need more t h a n one person in their decision-making process . All 
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J a p a n e s e cases prefer c o n s e n s u s if possible. Their count ry m a n a g e r s need to 
consul t and negotiate with both subord ina tes and colleagues before mak ing a 
strategic decision if such a decision affects them. J C E u s e s ringi and nemawashi 
with Thai staff for making s u c h a decision. Nine to twenty-five pe r sons can 
part icipate in t he decision-making in J C E . J C E only needs consensus on some 
i ssues . Because Thai b r a n c h e s are small, J B and J A need only 2-3 pe r sons to take 
p a r t in their decis ion-making process without ringi a n d nemawashi Both 
companies also need consensus only on some i ssues . If a consensus is impossible, 
a majority decision is fine. All pe r sons who take pa r t in the decision-making process 
in all J a p a n e s e cases are collectively responsible for the decision. 
On the other hand , the chief executives in all Dutch cases also need to 
consul t and negotiate with subord ina tes before making a strategic decision if such a 
decision affect them. However, they limit their consul tat ion to only the involved 
pe r sons who take action. The Dutch companies need fewer persons to take par t in 
decision-making t h a n the J a p a n e s e companies do. DCE and DB need to organise 
commit tees for making a decision. To take par t in the committee, DCE needs 5-8 
involved pe r sons and DB needs 3-5 involved persons . DA does not organise 
committees, b u t need 3-5 persons to m a k e a decision in the meet ings . DCE needs 
7 0 % votes, DB needs unan imi ty a n d DA needs simply 5 1 % vote. Each person who 
t akes pa r t in t he decision-making process in all Dutch cases is individually 
accountable for t h e decision in his or he r own par t . 
EP5: Strong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the demand for more people 
support ing a consensus in strategic decision-making process in MNCs' subsidiaries. 
J a p a n e s e companies tend to disseminate their strategic decisions more broadly 
throughout their organisation t han their Dutch counterpar ts do. Because the chief 
executives in all Dutch cases limit their consultation to only the involved persons who 
take action, all Dutch cases tend to disseminate their strategic decisions only to such 
persons . They do not diffuse these decisions to the affected colleagues and 
subordinates th roughout the company. DCE writes down only its short- term plans . 
Its country manager talks only to the involved persons for its long-term plans . These 
documents are confidential to a various degree. DB and DA write down all their 
strategic decisions. All documents abou t these decisions are confidential. 
On t he other hand, the demands for more people support ing strategic decisions 
is likely to lead to more dissemination of the strategic decisions throughout the 
J a p a n e s e companies. All J a p a n e s e cases disperse their strategic decisions not only to 
the concerned persons who take action, b u t also to the affected colleagues and 
subordinates throughout the company. J C E disseminates strategic decisions to 
affected colleagues and subordinates . It writes down all annua l management policies 
and annua l bus iness plans. These documents a re internal, b u t J C E h a s press 
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conferences on its goals and strategy in the documents regularly. J B disperses t he 
strategic decisions to the affected colleagues and subordinates , b u t does not write 
down these decisions. JA disseminates 90-95% of its strategic decisions th roughout 
the company. It writes down these decisions to some extent. These documents are 
confidential. In general, the J a p a n e s e companies are less restricted abou t the secrecy 
of s u c h decisions and strategic documents t h a n the Dutch companies are . 
EP6: As far a s c o n s e n s u s orientat ion is concerned, s t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is 
positively associa ted with t h e extent to which strategic decisions are d isseminated to 
the staff t h roughou t MNCs' subsidiar ies . 
9 .4 Strategy implementation 
The findings answer t h e research quest ion t h a t t he strategy implementa t ion 
of both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies differs from each other from the perspective 
of Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res . From the empirical evidence, the relat ionship 
between Dutch cu l ture a n d s t ra tegy implementat ion in t he Dutch companies is 
expressed in Figure 9.6 a s a n outcome of the compar ison in section 7.5. As a 
conclusion of t he compar ison in section 8.5, the relat ionship between J a p a n e s e 
cu l tu re a n d s t ra tegy implementa t ion in the J a p a n e s e companies is expressed in 
Figure 9.7. All J a p a n e s e cases can m a k e their policies, se t their corporate ru les a n d 
procedures , organise thei r corporate s t ruc tu re s a n d mobilise their workforce for Thai 
operat ion wi thou t HQs' a n d RHOs' involvement. In contras t , t he HQs a n d the RHOs 
of t he Du tch cases get involved with rec ru i tment of t he high-level th i rd-count ry and 
local m a n a g e r s in Thai subsidiar ies . 
Notwithstanding, no empirical proposition in this chapter suppor t s any 
conceptual proposition from section 4 .4 .3 . No empirical proposition suppor t s the 
conceptual proposition (CP7). There is no evidence t ha t shows the relationship 
between the degree of uncertainty avoidance a n d the choice of marke t s and products 
in both Dutch and J a p a n e s e cases . DB, DA, J B and JA do not develop their products , 
services and marke t in Thailand. Both J C E and DCE develop their products in 
Thailand, b u t sell these products both in Thailand a n d in other Asian countries. It is 
difficult to evaluate how both of them develop their products and their marke t in 
Thailand. 
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Figure 9.6: Strategy implementation in Dutch companies 
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Figure 9.7: Strategy implementation in Japanese companies 
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No empirical proposit ion suppor t s the conceptual proposition (CP8). There is 
n o evidence t h a t shows the relat ionship between the degree of power d is tance and 
the degree of central isat ion in both Dutch and J a p a n e s e subsidiar ies in Thai land. 
The evidence only suppor t s t he relat ionship between the degree of power d is tance 
a n d the centra l isa t ion of decis ion-making a n d operat ions among the HQs, the RHOs 
a n d Thai subs id iar ies of bo th Du tch and J a p a n e s e MNCs. 
No empirical proposit ion suppor t s the conceptual proposit ion (CP9). In both 
Dutch and J a p a n e s e cases , no evidence indicates t he relat ionship between the 
degree of power d is tance and the degree of employing personal au thor i ty th rough the 
vertical re la t ionship in corporate h ierarchy to mobilise the workforce. 
The empirical evidence sugges t s the relat ionship between uncer ta in ty 
avoidance and strategy implementat ion. From Figure 9.6 and 9.7, the empirical 
proposit ion (EP7) confirms th i s relat ionship. 
The J a p a n e s e country m a n a g e r s are more likely to main ta in t he corporate 
ru les and the procedures t h a t their predecessors set t h a n the chief executives in t he 
Dutch companies do. Because people in a s t rong uncertainty-avoiding society t end 
to be conservative and sceptical of adopt ing new ideas, the J a p a n e s e companies are 
more conservative t h a n their Dutch coun te rpa r t s in main ta in ing the ru les a n d the 
procedures . The J a p a n e s e expatr ia tes who take u p the new posi t ions a s t he new 
count ry m a n a g e r s in J B and J A do not change the corporate ru les a n d the 
p rocedures t h a t their predecessors set before. Only in J C E , MD a n d the concerned 
divisional h e a d s set ru les a n d procedures if the s i tuat ion changes . In general, the 
count ry m a n a g e r s in t he J a p a n e s e companies tend to ma in ta in thei r predecessors ' 
corporate ru les a n d procedures if t he new si tuat ion does no t really required. 
On the other hand , the new country managers in the Dutch companies who 
take u p the new ass ignments in Thailand are unlikely to main ta in the corporate rules 
and the procedures in the subsidiaries t ha t their predecessors set. DCE u s e s a 
working group to sets the rules and the procedures. To be in line with the regional 
policy, the b r anch manager set the rules and the procedures for DB. So does the GM 
in DA. 
EP7: St rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively related to the degree to which 
chief executives in MNCs' subsidiar ies main ta in their corporate ru les a n d 
procedures t h a t thei r predecessors set. 
Although the empirical proposition (EP7) does not suppor t any conceptual 
proposit ion from section 4 .4 .3 , it is likely to be in line with the re la t ionship between 
uncer ta in ty avoidance a n d s t ra tegy implementat ion implied in section 2 .4 .3 . 
Because s t rong uncer ta in ty avoidance is positively correlated with top executives' 
commi tment to the status quo (Geletkanycz, 1997), the J a p a n e s e companies tend to 
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main ta in their rules and procedures a s their commitment to the status quo unl ike 
the Dutch companies . 
9 .5 Evaluation and control 
The findings answer the research quest ion t h a t both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies in Thai land evaluate their own performance differently from each other 
from the perspective of Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tures . From the empirical evidence, 
t he relat ionship between Dutch cul ture and evaluation and control in the Dutch 
companies is expressed in Figure 9.8 a s a resul t of the comparison in section 7.6. 
As a consequence of the comparison in section 8.6, the relat ionship between 
J a p a n e s e cul ture and evaluation and control in the J a p a n e s e companies is 
expressed in Figure 9.9. Both the HQs and the RHOs get involved with the 
evaluation and control in both Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. The 
staff from the HQs and the RHOs visits Thai subsidiar ies of all six cases a t least 
once a year. All these cases need to report on their performance to ei ther the HQs or 
the RHOs. Ei ther the HQs or the RHOs assess the performance of these count ry 
manager s . 
However, no empirical proposition in th i s chap te r suppor t s t he conceptual 
proposit ions (CP 10a) and (CP 10b) from section 4 .4 .4 . There is no evidence t h a t 
shows the relat ionship between shor t - te rm orientat ion and the degree of emphas i s 
on profitability a s the criteria for evaluation a n d control. It is ha r d to identify a n d to 
m e a s u r e w h a t are shor t - te rm or long-term criteria for evaluation a n d control. This 
m e a s u r e m e n t is quite subjective because every company h a s i ts own criteria for 
classifying its performance evaluation into shor t - te rm and long-term ones . There is 
no common ground for th i s classification among these companies . 
The empirical evidence sugges ts the relat ionship between power d is tance a n d 
evaluation and control. From Figure 9.8 a n d 9.9, the empirical proposi t ions (EP8), 
(EP9a), (EP9b) and (EP10) suppor t th i s relat ionship. 
The J a p a n e s e companies need their HQs' involvement in their criteria 
es tab l i shment for evaluation and control unlike t he Dutch companies . The degree of 
the central isat ion of Dutch MNCs' world-wide operat ions is low. The chief 
executives in all Dutch companies only need advice from their subord ina tes and 
colleagues in Thai un i t s to set u p t he criteria for evaluation and control in Thai 
operation. All of t h e m need nei ther the HQs' nor t he RHOs' involvement in set t ing 
u p these criteria. In DCE, t he count ry manager seeks advice from his subord ina tes 
and colleagues. In DB, the b r a n c h manage r proposes these criteria to the country 
manager after d iscuss ions with the involved persons . In DA, GM does it himself. 
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Figure 9.8: Evaluation & control in Dutch companies 
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Figure 9.9: Evaluation & control in Japanese companies 
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In contrast , the degree of the centralisation of J a p a n e s e MNCs' world-wide 
operations is high. All J a p a n e s e companies need their HQs' involvement in 
establishing the criteria for evaluation and control in Thai operation. J C E use s 
qualitative and quantitative criteria with wide and deep scope on the bas i s of 
professional the know-how from the HQs. J B sets u p these criteria with the approval 
from its HQs. J A does not need the HQs' approval for this criteria establishment, b u t 
h a s to submi t the figures to the HQs for performance assessment . 
EP8: Large power distance is positively related to the degree of HQ's involvement in 
their criteria es tabl ishment for evaluation and control in MNCs' overseas subsidiaries. 
The conceptual proposition (CP8) from section 4 .4 .3 affects the empirical 
proposition (EP8). Because J a p a n e s e MNCs tend to central ise their operat ions when 
pu r su ing their corporate s trategy globally, they need more their HQs' involvement in 
the criteria es tab l i shment for evaluation and control in their Thai subsidiar ies . On 
the other hand , Dutch MNCs do not central ise thei r operat ions when they carry ou t 
their world-wide corporate strategy. Hence, they need less their HQs' involvement in 
the criteria e s tab l i shment for evaluation and control in their Thai subsidiar ies . 
The Dutch companies prefer a discussion in a meeting or committee to 
personal authori ty for corrective action unlike their J a p a n e s e counterpar ts . For 
corrective action, all J a p a n e s e country managers prefer to u s e their personal authori ty 
to a sk their subordina tes a n d colleagues to improve corporate performance. In JCE, 
MD and the concerned directors do. In J B , GM and his deputy do. In JA. VP asks his 
subordinates and colleagues to improve the corporate performance on the basis of 
action p lans from each division. All of them are likely to order their subordinate to do 
wha t they wan t without question. 
In contras t , the chief executives in all Du tch cases are unlikely to u s e their 
personal au thor i ty for corrective action. All of t h e m prefer to organise a meet ing a n d 
a commit tee for d i scuss ions abou t t he corrective action and performance 
improvement, because they w a n t everybody to s h a r e a n opinion and exchange views 
and information a s equals . In case of DCE, the country manage r also u s e s warn ings 
for corrective act ion if t he performance is not improved. 
EP9a: Large power distance is positively related to the use of personal authori ty in 
corporate hierarchy for corrective act ions in MNCs' subsidiaries. 
EP9b: Small power dis tance is positively related to the u s e of discussion among 
equals for corrective act ions in Thai subsidiaries. 
The empirical propositions (EP9a) and (EP9b) are consistent with the 
conceptual proposition (CP11) from section 4.4.4. The J a p a n e s e top executives tend to 
employ their personal authori ty through the vertical relationship in the corporate 
hierarchy for corrective action. They can ask their subordinates to improve the 
performance. On the other hand , the Dutch top executives cannot use their personal 
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authori ty to ask their subordinate to do the same thing. Under the influence of Dutch 
egalitarian norms , the Dutch companies prefer to u s e committees and meetings for 
discussions of the corrective action. 
For evaluation and control, all Dutch cases usually report their performance to 
the RHOs, not t he HQs. They base their a s sessment of their chief executives' 
performance on a gent leman's agreement. Only the executives in the RHOs located 
outside the Netherlands evaluate the performance of the chief executives in charge of 
Thai uni ts . In DCE. i ts RHO assesses the country manager ' s performance with the 
clear criteria from a gentleman's agreement between the country manager and the 
regional manager . In DB, the country manager assesses the branch manager ' s 
performance and reports on it to its RHO on the basis of a gentleman's agreement 
between the country manager and the b ranch manager . In DA, its RHO assesses GM's 
performance from monthly reports submitted on the basis of a gentleman's agreement 
between GM and its RHO. 
On the other hand , all J a p a n e s e cases need to report on their performance to 
the HQs located in J a p a n even if they have their RHOs in Singapore or Hong Kong. In 
J C E . the director of Asia & Oceania corporate management division in the HQs 
assesses MD's performance from MD's achievement of the submit ted bus iness plans . 
In J B , the Head of Asian headquar te r in the HQs assesses GM's performance from 
GM's reports . In JA, Asean Head Office in J a p a n assesses VP's performance from VP's 
reports and its recommendat ion. The J a p a n e s e companies are more centralised t h a n 
their Dutch counterpar t s for their chief executive's performance evaluation in Thailand. 
EP10: Large power d is tance is positively related to t he degree of formalisation for 
evaluat ing chief executives' performance in MNCs' subsidiar ies . 
The conceptual proposition (CP8) from section 4.4.3 affects the empirical 
proposition (EP10). J a p a n e s e MNCs tend to centralise their operations when pursuing 
corporate strategy globally. They need more their HQs' involvement in the chief 
executives' performance assessment in Thai subsidiaries. In contrast , Dutch MNCs do 
not centralise their operations when they implement their world-wide corporate 
strategy. Hence, they need less their HQs' involvement in the chief executives' 
performance a s se s smen t in Thai subsidiaries. 
9 .6 The relationship between SMP and corporate performance 
The evidence collected from all six cases is insufficient to formulate any 
empirical proposit ion for summar i s ing the relat ionship between SMP and corporate 
performance. However, the research findings are adequa te to demons t ra t e a 
tentat ive linkage between strategy implementat ion and corporate performance. 
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Under Thai law, all six cases have to submi t their financial s t a t emen t s to 
Depar tmen t of Revenue for taxat ion and Depar tment of Commercial Registration for 
reference. As b a n k s , DB a n d J B also have to s u b m i t their financial s t a t emen t s to 
BOT. The resu l t s in their financial s t a t emen t s are their corporate performance. 
Without s trategy implementat ion, all six cases canno t produce these resu l t s . Thus , 
t he relat ionship between strategy implementat ion a n d corporate performance 
presumably exists. Nonetheless, there is p resumably no relat ionship between three 
o ther s teps of SMP, namely environmental scanning, s trategy formulation and 
evaluation and control, a n d corporate performance. These three s teps alone cannot 
produce any corporate resul t wi thout strategy implementat ion. 
Even though Quinn and Rohbaugh ' s Competing Value Model (CVM) h a s 17 
operat ional isat ions of corporate performance, all six cases do not m e a s u r e their 
organisat ional effectiveness in all 17 i tems. It is very difficult to compare the 
corporate performance across the six cases . All six cases operate in three different 
indus t r ies . The m e a s u r e m e n t of corporate performance in these indus t r ies is no t 
comparable to each other. From a hos t -count ry perspective, only DCE and J C E 
compete with each other in Thai land. DB and J B have different focuses on their 
b u s i n e s s in Thai land. Sometimes, DB and J B co-operate in m a n y syndicate loans to 
big Thai companies . JA and DA have different m a r k e t s in Thai land owing to their 
different in ternat ional routes . Both of t hem do not compete with each other . From 
a home-count ry perspective, DCE a n d DB come to serve both Thai a n d internat ional 
cus tomers . DA u s e s Thai land a s a h u b and a facility cent re for i ts S ou thea s t Asian 
operat ions. J C E u s e s Thai land a s a manufac tu r ing b a s e for export to thi rd 
countr ies . J B a n d JA come to serve mainly t he J a p a n e s e clients in Thai land. Thus , 
th i s s tudy w a s no t able to compare corporate performance across all six cases . 
9 .7 Towards an integrative model for comparing SMPs 
Figure 9.10, an integrative model, s u m m a r i s e s t he research findings 
concerning nat ional cul ture , SMPs and corporate performance. The consis tent 
evidence generated from the comparison between Dutch and J a p a n e s e SMPs across 
t he six cases a s s u m e s a direct, positive relat ionship between the nat ional cu l ture of 
MNCs' home count r ies a n d the SMPs of their subsidiar ies in the hos t countr ies . The 
nat ional cu l tu res of the Nether lands and J a p a n p resumably cause differences 
between the SMPs of both Du tch and J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land respectively. 
Even if t he evidence is insufficient to allow a tes t of t he relative significance of each 
dimension of t he nat ional cu l tu re in shap ing t h e SMP, it sugges ts t h a t power 
d is tance a n d uncer ta in ty avoidance are highly related to how MNCs devise their 
subsidiary s trategy in the hos t countr ies . Power d is tance presumably affects 
s t rategy formulation and evaluation a n d control a s a ma in component of the 
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nat ional cu l ture . Uncertainty avoidance presumably influences environmental 
scanning , s t ra tegy formulation and strategy implementat ion. However, t he 
re la t ionship between uncer ta in ty avoidance and strategy implementat ion is 
relatively weak. 
Figure 9.10: The relations among national culture, SMPs and performance 
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Nevertheless, the comparison between the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e SMPs 
across the six cases in t e rms of corporate performance is no t possible. All six cases are 
operating in Thailand with different reasons and purposes . The submission of 
financial s t a tements to different agencies in Thai bureaucracy by these companies only 
implies t ha t all six cases do produce their corporate performance from their strategy 
implementation. The relationship between strategy implementation and corporate 
strategy presumably exists even if no empirical proposition suppor ts th is relationship. 
Without strategy implementation, the three s teps of SMP, namely environmental 
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scanning, strategy formulation and strategy implementation cannot generate corporate 
performance. After the comparison between the conceptual propositions from Chapter 
4 and the empirical propositions in this chapter, all empirical propositions summar i se 
the relationships discussed in section 9.2-9.6 a s Figure 9.10. 
9 .8 Conclusion 
The research findings answer the central research quest ion in Chapte r 1 t h a t 
the nat ional cu l ture of MNCs' pa ren t companies intervenes in the SMPs of their 
overseas subsidiar ies . The nat ional cu l tu res of home countr ies p resumably cause 
differences in environmental scanning , s trategy formulation, s t rategy 
implementat ion and evaluation a n d control in the overseas subsidiar ies . The resu l t 
from the comparison between the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e SMPs in the cross-
cul tural , cross-case analysis a re d iscussed in t e rms of the re la t ionships between 
each s tep of SMP and each dimension of nat ional cu l ture in section 9.2, 9 .3 , 9.4 and 
9.5 respectively. Section 9.2 d i scusses environmental scanning. Section 9.3 
deba tes s trategy formulation. Section 9.4 a rgues s t ra tegy implementat ion. Section 
9.5 d i scusses evaluation a n d control. These re la t ionships are summar i s ed in the 
empirical proposit ions in section 9.2, 9 .3 , 9.4 a n d 9 .5 . According to each s tep of 
SMP, t he conceptual proposi t ions from section 4 . 4 . 1 , 4 .4.2, 4 .4 .3 a n d 4.4 .4 are 
compared with t he empirical proposi t ions from section 9.2, 9.3, 9.4 a n d 9.5 
respectively. As a n interact ion between the empirical evidence a n d the reference 
model, t he compar ison be tween t h e conceptual a n d the empirical proposi t ions 
becomes a bas i s for refining the reference model in section 2.5 a n d r e shap ing the 
conceptual proposit ions in section 4 .4 . The conceptual proposi t ions (CP1), (CP4), 
(CP5a), (CP5b), (CP7), (CP9), (CP 10a) a n d (CP 10b) a re discarded because no 
empirical proposition corroborates them. The conceptual proposi t ions (CP2), (CP3a), 
(CP3b), (CP6), (CP8) and (CP11) a re reshaped by the relevant empirical proposi t ions. 
This s tudy genera tes 10 empirical proposit ions from the collected evidence in 
all six cases on the bas i s of the relat ionship speculated in the reference model. After 
compar ing these 10 proposi t ions with t he 11 conceptual proposi t ions from section 
4.4, all empirical proposi t ions become the proposit ions for the future research . 
These proposi t ions are encapsu la ted in the integrative model for compar ing SMPs in 
Figure 9.10 in section 9.7. 
In t he light of t he evidence, no t all d imens ions in Hofstede's model suggested 
in section 2.4 a n d 4.4 have a n impact on all s teps of SMP in Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s 
model. As l i terature sugges ts in section 2.4 a n d 4.4, masculinity-femininity is no t 
per t inent to t he compar ison of t he SMPs in MNCs' subsidiar ies . The empirical 
evidence demons t r a t e s t h a t ne i ther individualism-collectivism nor long-term v short -
t e rm orientat ion is related to any s t eps of SMP. From this comparison, only power 
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dis tance and uncer ta in ty avoidance have the re la t ionships with the four s teps of 
SMP. Both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land have some differences in 
thei r SMPs according to t he different degree of power d is tance a n d uncer ta in ty 
avoidance between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tures . Power dis tance is p resumably 
related to s t ra tegy formulation and evaluation a n d control. Uncer ta inty avoidance is 
tentatively related to envi ronmenta l scanning, s t rategy formulation a n d strategy 
implementat ion. 
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CHAPTER 10: 
DISCUSSION 
10.1 Introduction 
The m a i n purpose of th i s disser ta t ion is to u n d e r s t a n d how the nat ional 
cu l tu re of MNCs' home count ry will determine t he SMP of their subsidiar ies in t he 
hos t count ry abroads . To achieve th is purpose , a comparat ive analys is between 
Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land concerning their SMPs is t he focus of 
th i s dissertat ion. Thai land is chosen as the research site because of the au thor ' s 
familiarity. J a p a n and the Nether lands are selected because of the two ma in 
r easons . Firstly, both Dutch and J a p a n e s e cu l tures are in opposition to each other 
in all five d imensions of Hofstede's model. This is a theoretical reason. Secondly, 
t he Nether lands and J a p a n have recently been the n u m b e r one a n d two foreign 
investors in Thai land respectively. This is a practical reason. This selection h a s a 
clear theoretical significance and practical implications. After reviewing l i terature on 
theoretical perspectives, the reference model for guiding th is s tudy is developed from 
a synthes i s of Hofstede's model of nat ional cu l ture a n d Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s model 
of SMP a n d Quinn and Rohrbaugh ' s Competing Value Model (CVM) in Chapter 2 . 
Chapte r 3 compares both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res on the bas i s of historical 
a spec t s to confirm the scores of both cu l tures in t he five d imens ions according to 
Hofstede's model. After compar ing the extent to which Dutch cu l ture h a s a n impact 
on t he SMP of Dutch MNCs a n d the extent to which J a p a n e s e cu l ture h a s a n impact 
on t he SMP of J a p a n e s e MNCs, the conceptual proposit ions are formulated in 
Chapte r 4. For th is s tudy, t he embedded mult iple-case design is developed in 
Chapte r 6 from the criteria for research quality in Chapte r 5. The within-case 
ana lyses a n d the within-cul ture , cross-case ana lyses are concluded in Chapte r 7 for 
t he Du tch companies and in Chapter 8 for the J a p a n e s e companies . The resu l t s 
from these two chap te r s a re analysed to find the relat ionship between nat ional 
cu l ture a n d SMP by formulating the proposit ions for the future research from the 
analogy between the empirical proposit ions emerging from the research findings a n d 
the conceptual proposit ions u n d e r the reference model in Chapte r 9. 
Section 10.2 d i scusses the significance of t he integrative model for 
compar ing SMPs developed from the interact ion between the reference model a n d 
empirical evidence in Chapte r 9. It also d iscusses t he possible application of t he 
model to t he future research . Section 10.3 a rgues the validity of t he model in t e rms 
of th ree possible rival explanat ions . The n a t u r e of the market , the s t ruc tu re of 
MNCs a n d the influence of Thai inst i tut ional envi ronment might be the t h r ea t s to 
the validity of the model. Section 10.4 explicates t he theoretical implications of the 
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research findings for reconceptual isat ion, further theorisat ion and methodological 
development for comparat ive research into SMP and the selection of research si tes 
in t he future. Section 10.5 deliberates the practical implications a n d the policy 
recommendat ion how Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land should adjus t 
thei r SMPs to Thai cu l tura l se t t ing in par t icular . This recommendat ion will be 
guidel ines for in ternat ional m a n a g e r s and expatr ia tes w h e n they a re relocated to 
different hos t count r ies a round the world in general a n d for the Dutch a n d the 
J a p a n e s e expatr ia tes who are working in Thailand in par t icular . Thai employees 
can adjus t themselves bet ter to working in foreign companies , par t icular ly in Dutch 
and J a p a n e s e companies with a specific knowledge of both of t hem from th is s tudy. 
Section 10.7 m a k e s a recommendat ion for the future research into comparat ive 
m a n a g e m e n t after a discussion abou t the theoretical a n d practical l imitat ions of th i s 
s tudy in section 10.6. Section 10.8 arrives a t the final conclusions of th i s 
d isser ta t ion. 
10.2 The significance and application of the integrative model 
The outcome of th is s tudy answers the central research quest ion in Chapter 
1. Under t he influence of t he different nat ional cu l tu res of t he Nether lands and 
J a p a n , the Dutch and the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land have their own way to 
follow the s a m e s teps of SMP in Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s model (1995) more or less. 
The research findings a re encapsu la ted in t he integrative model for compar ing SMPs 
in Figure 9 .10. The model is a p re sumed linkage between cu l ture a n d SMP t h a t h a s 
long been miss ing from previous empirical researches a n d a theory-building process 
in s trategic m a n a g e m e n t (Van den Bosch & Van Prooijen, 1992). This model is bui l t 
on t he re la t ionship between the clearly defined cul tura l theory (Hofstede's model) 
a n d the unclear ly defined model of SMP (Wheelen and Hunger ' s model). The model 
is a possible i n s t r u m e n t of further in-depth investigations into comparat ive 
m a n a g e m e n t a n d some other related fields. 
In t he pas t , t he theoretical development for compar ing SMPs in MNCs from 
different home count r ies in a given hos t count ry was insufficient to conceptual ise 
t he re la t ionship between nat ional cu l tu re a n d SMP. To reduce difficulties in th is 
conceptual isat ion, th i s s tudy develops the four cons t ruc t s , namely environmental 
scanning , s t ra tegy formulation, s t ra tegy implementat ion a n d evaluation a n d control 
for compar ing SMPs across cu l tu res . To develop the theoretical groundwork for 
compar ing SMPs between MNCs w h e n taking nat ional cu l tu re into account , th i s 
s t udy conceptual ised nat ional cu l tu re a s power dis tance, individualism-collectivism, 
uncer ta in ty avoidance, masculinity-femininity and long-term v shor t - te rm 
orientat ion. The empirical evidence is adequa te to specify t ha t only power dis tance 
a n d unce r t a in ty avoidance have a n impact on the four s teps . To some extent, the 
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four s teps in SMP as the more narrowly valid concepts of the theory emerge from 
this s tudy. These concepts can detect the more precise meaning of re la t ionships 
among variables across cu l tures . 
The empirical inquiries into the relat ionship between nat ional cu l tu re and 
SMP did not unify all four s t eps of SMP into t he s a m e s tudy In t he pas t . Schneider 
a n d De Meyer (1991) investigated t he linkage between nat ional cu l ture a n d 
environmental scanning. J a i n a n d Tucker (1995) a n d Builtjen and Noorderhaven 
(1996) inquired into the correlation between nat ional cu l ture and strategy 
formulation. Wong and Birnbaum-More (1994) scrut inised the linkage between 
nat ional cul ture and strategy implementat ion. Chow et al (1996) examined the 
relat ionship between nat ional cu l ture and evaluation and control. Thus , the 
integrative model in th is s tudy unifies all four s teps of SMP into a body of testable 
proposit ions for the future research . 
Comparative researches into SMPs between MNCs originated from two or 
more different home countr ies in a given third country generated the controversial 
findings in the pas t . Some s tud ies concluded t h a t MNCs' subsidiar ies from different 
home countr ies employed the s a m e strategy when they operate in the s a m e hos t 
country (Kotabe & Omura , 1989; Kotabe, 1990; Kotabe & Okoroafo, 1990; Murray, 
1996), b u t o thers had the contrary findings (Capon et al, 1987; Doyle et al, 1995). 
This controversy h a s led to t he debate between convergence a n d divergence of t he 
SMPs of MNCs with different nat ional i t ies . The integrative model indicates t h a t 
whereas m a n y MNCs regardless of nat ionali t ies a round the world follow the four 
s t eps of SMP, they have their own way to follow the s a m e s teps u n d e r t he influence 
of the nat ional cu l tu res of thei r home countr ies . Thus , there are bo th convergence 
a n d divergence of the SMPs of MNCs with different nat ional cu l tures . 
The integrative model can be used to compare SMPs between MNCs 
originated from two or more different home countr ies in a given third country . This 
model can be tested agains t a broader framework with different nat ional cu l tu res 
a n d MNCs for generalisat ion a n d inference in the future research. J o b b e r a n d Lucas 
(2000) recommended tha t formulating proposit ions for test ing in the future research 
is a way to establ ish internal validity. These proposit ions speculate t he relat ionship 
between nat ional cu l tu re a n d SMP emerging from this s tudy will be operat ionalised 
for test ing th is model in t he future by a large-scale, cross-nat ional quant i ta t ive 
survey. 
10.3 The validity of the integrative model 
Albeit t he integrative model can overcome the shor tcomings of t h e p a s t 
s tudies when comparing the SMPs of MNCs from different home countr ies , there 
might be the possible rival explanat ions for differences between SMPs in the 
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compar ison . The three possible t h rea t s to t he in ternal validity of the model are (1) 
t he n a t u r e of the marke t where MNCs are operating, (2) the world-wide s t ruc tu re of 
MNCs a n d (3) the influence of Thai inst i tut ional context t h a t Thai subsidiar ies of 
t he se MNCs encounte r . In t he light of the research findings, how nat ional cu l tu res 
of t he Nether lands a n d J a p a n can water down the influence of these th ree factors on 
t h e SMPs of t he Dutch a n d the J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land is d iscussed a s 
follows. 
2 0 . 3 . 1 The nature of the market. The influence of nat ional cu l tu re can 
r u n coun te r t he influence of t he marke t . The Du tch companies in Thai land still 
s h a r e some similarities in their typical SMP according to Dutch cul ture . So do the 
J a p a n e s e companies according to J a p a n e s e cu l ture . With regard to the consumer 
electronics bus iness , in the 1990s, most consumer electronics companies had slow 
growth in th i s price-competitive market . More competition from Sou th Korea and 
Taiwan entered th is marke t and drove down revenue and profit. The produc ts 
become commodit ies t h a t do not give a high profit margin. New world-wide marke t 
d e m a n d for more customised p roduc t s and be t te r consumer services. The demand 
forces mos t c o n s u m e r electronics companies to localise their p roduc t s a n d 
marke t ing to fit cus tomers ' new needs . This phenomenon also h a p p e n s to Thai 
marke t . 
Since t he economic crisis in Thai land in 1997, the pu rchas ing power of Thai 
c o n s u m e r s h a s been considerably declined. The shr inking d e m a n d for consumer 
p r o d u c t s in combinat ion with more intensifying competi t ion have aggravated t he 
s i tua t ion . Because Thai economy is very open wi thout restr ict ion on its consumer 
electronics market , new competi tors can enter th i s ma rke t a t any t ime. Because of 
increasingly diversified demand for consumer electronics p roduc t s in Thailand, both 
DCE a n d J C E have to localise their p roduc t s a n d market ing . T h u s , their HQs get 
less involved with their s t rategy formulation, s t ra tegy implementat ion and 
evaluation a n d control in Thai operation. Both of t h e m sell thei r p roduc t s mainly to 
Thai cus tomers . Both of t h e m manufac tu re some produc ts in Thai land and export 
these p roduc t s to other countr ies a s a pa r t of their world-wide network. Thus , both 
of t h e m serve bo th domestic a n d in ternat ional ma rke t s . 
This indus t ry is moving towards digital p roduc ts . R&D a n d new technologies 
a re vital for companies ' survival. Nowadays, electronics technology changes very 
fast. Companies in th i s indus t ry have to keep pace with th i s technological change. 
Owing to more competition, the rapid pace of technological change a n d the economic 
crisis in Thai land, both DCE a n d J C E have to fight ha r d to main ta in thei r marke t 
s h a r e s in t he shr inking market . Their top m a n a g e r s have to review the s i tuat ion 
very often. The consumer electronics companies , including both of t h e m need to 
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emphas i se quick decision-making, fast response to cus tomers ' needs a n d 
complaints , innovativeness, technical knowledge and toughness . 
With respect to the bank ing sector, b a n k s deal with risks natura l ly . In 
general, b a n k s are more p r u d e n t a n d conservative t h a n most other bus ine s se s 
wi thout regard to nationali ty. To reduce r isks from lending, financial t r ansac t ions 
a n d o ther f luctuat ing factors, mos t b a n k s a round the world choose to central ise 
their operat ions. The decision-making process in mos t b a n k s is quite slow with 
m u c h involvement of their HQs in general . Most p roduc t s and services in th i s sector 
are not suscept ible to local cus tomers ' demand a s far a s the local law is not applied. 
Since the economic crisis in Thai land in 1997, Thai land 's bank ing sector h a s faced a 
problem with non-performing loans. Both Thai and foreign b a n k s suffered from the 
crisis. They become even more conservative when facing the economic crisis. 
As far a s the airline indus t ry is concerned, since the 1990s, the airline 
indus t ry h a s become a price-competitive marke t because of deregulation, 
liberalisation a n d open-sky agreements . New competi tors, especially low-fare 
carr iers have th rea tened incumben t airl ines with no-frill services in m a n y short-
range rou tes . Even if air traffic is growing, the competit ion is growing, too. More 
competi tors lead to falling revenue, rising operat ing costs and rising wages owing to 
the shor tage of pilots a n d technic ians . To cu t cost from the larger economy of scale, 
mos t airl ines s t a r t to join code-shar ing agreements , pa r tne r sh ips , a l l iances a n d even 
mergers a n d acquisi t ions in response to t he changing s i tuat ion. Nonetheless, these 
al l iances a re uns tab le . Switching all iance and failure of merger negotiation are 
common. The envi ronment in th i s indus t ry is very unpredic table . 
Because all airl ines compete with each other in t e rms of their global 
operat ions, the central isat ion of pricing policy and budge t with world-wide 
s t a n d a r d s is common. Every airline h a s i ts cons t ra in t s when they operate 
internationally. The airl ines t h a t w a n t to have b r a n c h e s or representat ive offices in 
Thai land face no exception. These cons t ra in t s depend on the agreements between 
Thai land and the country of air l ines ' origin, LATA rules , airlines' global a n d regional 
h u b s a n d their agreements with o ther airl ines. 
Albeit all Du tch companies are operat ing in the very different m a r k e t s by 
na tu re , all of t h e m have m u c h commonali ty in their typical SMPs u n d e r t he 
influence of Dutch cu l ture (See Chap te r 7). So have all J a p a n e s e companies (See 
Chapter 8). The different n a t u r e of m a r k e t s of consumer electronics, b a n k i n g 
sectors a n d airline does no t have m u c h influence on the SMP in both Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. 
10.3.2 The structure ofMNCs. Because power dis tance is p resumably 
related to the degree of t he central isat ion of MNCs' global operat ions (Wong & 
Birnbaum-More, 1994; Harr ison et al, 1994), t he nat ional cu l ture ofMNCs' home 
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count r ies is likely to de termine the global s t ruc tu re of MNCs. J a p a n e s e MNCs tend 
to central ise their world-wide operat ions, whereas Dutch MNCs tend to decentral ise 
the i rs . The s t ruc tu re of J a p a n e s e MNCs t ends to be more central ised t h a n t h a t of 
Du tch MNCs. The HQs a n d the RHOs of J a p a n e s e MNCs are likely to be more 
involved with the SMP of their Thai subsidiar ies t h a n those of Du tch MNCs. The 
HQs of J a p a n e s e MNCs have to approve corporate s t ra tegy formulated in Thai 
subsidiar ies , es tabl ish the criteria for evaluation a n d control, a n d a s s e s s chief 
executives ' performance for Thai operation. Dutch MNCs tend to delegate their 
au thor i ty to approve corporate s trategy formulated in Thai subsidiar ies , establ ish 
t he criteria for evaluation a n d control and a s s e s s chief executives' performance for 
Thai operat ion to either Thai subsidiar ies or to their RHOs. 
With regard to the Dutch companies , DCE and DB are organised u n d e r 
mat r ix a r r angemen t s . The top executives in both companies have to report to two 
bosses , one in Thai land and the other in their RHOs in Singapore. DA h a s to report 
to Sou thea s t Asian Head Office in Singapore, in tu rn , repor ts to Asia-Pacific Head 
Office in Hong Kong. With respect to the J a p a n e s e companies , only J C E is a jo int 
ven tu re a n d h a s a legal s t a t u s a s a Thai company. J C E ' s MD h a s to report to both 
i ts boa rds of directors in Thai land a n d its RHOs in Singapore wi thout the sense of 
mat r ix a r r angemen t s . J B repor ts to Asian HQs in Tokyo. J A repor ts to Asean Head 
Office in Tokyo, too. Although both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs u n d e r th i s s tudy 
have different world-wide s t ruc tu re s according to t he n a t u r e of ma rke t where they 
a re operat ing, t he s t ruc tu re of J a p a n e s e MNCs is more central ised t h a n t h a t of 
Dutch MNCs w h e n compar ing the Dutch MNC with the J a p a n e s e MNC t h a t a re 
operat ing in t he s ame indus t ry . J C E , J B and J A a re more central ised t h a n DCE, 
DB a n d DA respectively in th i s s tudy. The s t ruc tu re of MNCs have no impact on 
SMP per se , b u t the na t ional cu l tu res of MNCs' home countr ies have a n influence on 
the s t r u c t u r e s of MNCs, and in t u r n on the SMP of MNCs overseas subsidiar ies . 
10.3.3 The influence of Thai institutional environment. The influence of 
na t ional cu l tu re can dilute the influence of Thai environment . In the past , some 
resea rches into J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land (Kosiyanon & Yoshihara, 1985; 
Thian tha i , 1986; S a m m a p a n , 1996) concluded t h a t the SMP of J a p a n e s e companies 
in Thai land still reflects J a p a n e s e behaviours , pract ices a n d character is t ics even if 
t he majority of their employees are Thais . The research findings from th is s tudy 
suppor t t h i s conclusion. 
With regard to t he legal envi ronment in Thailand, both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies face t he s a m e legal cons t ra in ts . In general, Thai labour law limits the 
n u m b e r of expatr ia tes in all foreign-based subsidiar ies . However, all Du tch 
companies do not maximise their u s e of expatr iates , b u t all J a p a n e s e companies do. 
In par t icular , bo th DB a n d J B have to operate u n d e r the s ame specific legal 
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cons t ra in t s because Thai land h a s long p u r s u e d discriminatory policies towards t he 
foreign b a n k s in t he country . 
With respect to the social envi ronment in Thailand, both Dutch a n d 
J a p a n e s e companies still res is t the influence of Thai cu l ture to some extent . 
S a m m a p a n (1996) argued t h a t ring* a n d nemawashi a re hardly t ransferable to 
J a p a n e s e companies in Thailand, because t he ma in decisions are t aken in J a p a n , 
a n d because Thai m a n a g e m e n t style is typically top-down u n d e r the influence of 
Thai cul ture . Most Thai staff is re luc tan t to give their t rue opinions because the gap 
between manager ia l and rank-and-file staff is large. Even so, th i s s tudy does no t 
confirm th i s a rgument . Even though J B and JA do not u s e ringi and nemawashi 
unlike J C E , all top executives in the J a p a n e s e companies need to consul t with their 
colleagues and their subord ina tes before making a strategic decision t h a t affects 
both of them. 
In case of Dutch SMP, all top executives in the Dutch companies seek advice 
from their subord ina tes and the involved pe r sons before making a strategic decision 
t h a t affects these staffs. Even if Thai n o r m s of decis ion-making are top-down a n d 
autocrat ic , these Dutch companies have never allowed any single person to make a 
decision alone. All of t h e m need to organise either a s t and ing or a n informal 
commit tee for decision-making. 
As far a s t he political envi ronment in Thai land is concerned, bo th Dutch a n d 
J a p a n e s e companies have their own way to deal with political r isks . All Du tch 
companies t ry to avoid political involvement a n d litigation a t all costs on t he one 
h a n d . They believe t h a t political involvement c a u s e s t he political r i sks . On the 
other hand , all J a p a n e s e companies try to either exert a n influence on or forge a 
relat ionship with Thai government when they face possible political r i sks . In 
conclusion, Thai inst i tut ional envi ronment comprising legal, social a n d political 
cons t ra in t s h a s a little influence on the SMP of both Dutch and J a p a n e s e 
companies . Albeit bo th of t h e m encoun te r these three cons t ra in t s in t he s ame way, 
all Du tch companies still display their typical SMPs. So do all J a p a n e s e companies . 
10.4 The theoretical implications of the research findings 
This s tudy confirms several empirical inquiries in the pas t (O'Connell. J J & 
Zimmerman , J W, 1979; Sallivan & Nonaka, 1988; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991; 
Segalla, Fischer & Sandner , 2000). It concludes t h a t manage r s from different 
count r ies t end to prioritise thei r s trategic problems in a different way a n d order 
owing to their perception a n d interpreta t ion of strategic i ssues . However, t he 
findings are no t sufficient to indicate t he p resumed relat ionship between t he other 
d imensions , namely individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity a n d long-
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t e rm v shor t - t e rm orientation, and the four s teps of SMP, namely environmenta l 
scanning , s t ra tegy formulation, s t rategy implementat ion a n d evaluation a n d control. 
The research findings add a more holistic depiction to the available findings. 
By us ing the quali tative approach, the research findings a re more profound and 
comprehens ive t h a n the available findings by us ing the quant i ta t ive approach . The 
excessive simple empirical surveys in t he pa s t (eg Wong & Birnbaum-More, 1994; 
J a i n & Tucker , 1995) gave a scat tered portrai t of t he relat ionship between nat ional 
cu l tu re a n d each s tep of SMP. These surveys could not explain how nat ional cu l tu re 
h a s an impact on each s tep of SMP in an integral picture, because they failed to 
unify all re la t ionships between nat ional cu l ture and each s tep of SMP into one 
s tudy . They also failed to verify correlations among all s t eps of SMP. Because the 
u s e of retrospective accounts , especially documentary records and interviews with 
m a n a g e r s are based on a different level of reality—from observat ions of behaviour, 
t hese da ta have a different ontological s t a t u s for giving a more integral and holistic 
p ic ture (Partington, 2000). Comparat ive research into t he relat ionship between 
nat ional cu l tu re and SMP in t he future needs more u s e s of t he qualitative approach 
ei ther a s a m a i n research method or a s a supp lement to the quant i ta t ive approach. 
The research findings improve the clarity of t he conceptual isat ion of nat ional 
cu l tu re and SMP. Even if th i s s tudy applies t he s ame reference model to t he 
depiction of SMPs in Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land, t he companies of 
bo th nat ional i t ies have their own idiosyncrasies u n d e r t h e s a m e general reference 
model of SMP according to the na t ional cu l tu res of the Nether lands a n d J a p a n . The 
whole model canno t explain these idiosyncrasies, b u t each dimension of nat ional 
cu l tu re can do. The integrative model in th i s s tudy can identify which pa r t of SMP 
is dependen t on a n d which pa r t is independent of the na t ional cu l tures of MNCs' 
home countr ies . This model is applicable to t he further in-depth investigation into 
t he compar ison of SMPs between MNCs from different home countr ies . The 
application of th i s model to the future research is likely to generate the outcome 
similar to t h a t of th i s s tudy if t he nat ional cu l tu res of MNCs home countr ies are 
similar to those of the Nether lands and J a p a n . T h u s , Danish or Swedish MNCs 
might be good candida tes for Western MNCs. So might Taiwanese or Korean MNCs 
for Asian MNCs. 
10.5 Practical implications and policy recommendations 
The location of comparat ive research into t he relat ionship between nat ional 
cu l tu re a n d SMP in a developing count ry like Thai land is under represen ted . To 
counterpoise a tendency to p u r s u e researches in industr ial ised countr ies , the 
research findings generate addit ional da t a from the compar ison between Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. The findings explain how MNCs from Western 
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countr ies o ther t h a n the US operate in a developing country in compar ison with 
J a p a n e s e MNCs in t e rms of SMP. The model developed in a developing count ry may 
be more sui table for comparat ive research located in other fellow developing 
count r ies t h a n the one developed in a developed country. The model from developed 
count r ies often ignored the condit ions in developing countr ies . 
In general , because t he a u t h o r in th i s project is a non-wes tern person, t he 
findings may provide a non-wes tern insight into t he development of SMP. Both 
resea rchers a n d pract i t ioners in t he West might be t te r u n d e r s t a n d how strategy 
t akes shape w h e n taking nat ional cu l tu re into accoun t from a non-wes tern 
perspective. Their coun te rpa r t s in J a p a n might gain a bet ter insight into their own 
SMP in a n industr ial is ing country like Thai land from a hos t -count ry perspective. 
Thai top executives and m a n a g e r s who working in these subsidiar ies may 
u n d e r s t a n d the impact of nat ional cu l tu re of MNCs' home countr ies on t he SMP in 
these subsidiar ies in their own country . 
The findings are expected to e n h a n c e the awareness of cul tura l difference 
between home a n d hos t count r ies a m o n g MNCs' top executives, in ternat ional 
m a n a g e r s a n d expatr ia tes . Even though the envi ronment both within a n d outs ide 
MNCs a round the world becomes more mult icul tural , mos t top executives, corporate 
s t ra tegis ts , in ternat ional m a n a g e r s a n d expatr ia tes in these MNCs often 
unde res t ima te t he cul tura l influence in MNCs' home countr ies on t he SMP of these 
overseas subsidiar ies . They m u s t recognise t h a t t he nat ional cu l tu res of home 
count r ies tend to have a n impac t on t he operat ions in hos t countr ies t h rough MNCs' 
corporate cul ture a n d world-wide pract ices . Because they often ignore t he 
condit ions in developing countr ies , they might need a n insight into MNCs' 
operat ions in a n industr ia l is ing count ry like Thai land before they can gain an 
insight into t he operat ions in other developing countr ies having condit ions similar to 
those of Thai land. In part icular , t he findings will help the Dutch a n d the J a p a n e s e 
expatr ia tes who are working in Thai land to recognise their own cul tura l b iases , so 
t h a t they can adjus t their SMPs to Thai cul tural set t ings more efficiently and 
properly. 
The foreign-based companies a re one of the ma in employers of Thai 
workforce. The research findings help Thai employees to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t he 
na t ional cu l tu re of the p a r e n t companies t ends to have a n influence on foreign 
behaviours in Thai subsidiar ies . From the findings, even if the majority of 
employees in all six companies are Thai and Thai chief executives r u n some of these 
companies , t h e SMPs of t he six companies still demons t ra t e Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
character is t ics . The findings imply t h a t the foreign-based companies tend to display 
t he character is t ics of their home count r ies in Thai land even though the majority of 
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the i r employees are Thai . Hence, Thai employees need to u n d e r s t a n d t h e nat ional 
cu l tu re of p a r e n t companies w h e n they work in these foreign-based companies . 
10.6 Limitations 
Notwithstanding, t he s tudy h a s some l imitations t h a t will be u sed a s a bas i s 
for improving the resea rch process for compar ing SMPs in t he future. In some 
cases , more t h a n one d imens ions might depict two or more k inds of MNCs' 
behaviour . The a t ten t ion to t he combinatory u s e of Hofstede's d imens ions is 
necessa ry in t h e future research . 
To concent ra te on the impact of the nat ional cu l tu re of pa ren t companies on 
their subs id iar ies in Thailand, th i s s tudy keeps political, legal, economic and 
educat ional factors cons t an t in Thai land. This concentra t ion m a k e s a s tudy of SMP 
more possible. Even so, lack of a n insight into t he broader variables in the 
Nether lands , J a p a n a n d Thai land might cause th is s tudy to mis s some perspectives. 
Because th i s comparat ive s tudy between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies is 
conduc ted in Thai land, cross-nat ional equivalence is t aken into accoun t when 
interviewing Dutch , J a p a n e s e or Thai r esponden ts . Cognisance of cross-cul tura l 
differences is impor tant , because any in teract ions with the expatr ia tes a n d foreign 
contexts in Thai land might be a n interactive effect on t he interpretat ion. The i s sues 
of c ross-cu l tura l equivalence in t he qualitative method a re more complex t h a n in t he 
quant i ta t ive method because historical a n d nat ional contexts play a n impor tan t role 
in t h e in terpre ta t ion. 
The indigenous inculcat ion into the a u t h o r m a y m a k e some interpreta t ions 
unc lea r especially w h e n encounter ing foreign pe r sons a n d phenomena . This s tudy 
might reflect a Thai perspective on the SMP of foreign companies in Thai land. The 
a u t h o r migh t in terpre t t he Du tch a n d the J a p a n e s e SMPs from a Thai viewpoint. 
This might be ano the r b ias in th i s s tudy. 
In doing th i s s tudy, the a u t h o r often approaches top executives, o ther 
corporate elites, middle m a n a g e r s a n d his friends and frequently ignores the lowest-
r a n k m e m b e r s . The perspect ives in t he six companies might not be symmetrical . 
The problem of a top-down v e r s u s a bo t tom-up perspective in these cases is 
occasionally overlooked. Moreover, t he top executives might m a k e m a n y crucial 
decis ions d rawn from a variety of depa r tmen t s . This s tudy might m i s s some 
perspect ives . 
The chosen th ree indus t r ies , namely c o n s u m e r electronics, b a n k i n g a n d 
airl ine indus t ry a re different from each other to a considerable degree, so t h a t t he 
selection of ca se s from these indus t r i es satisfies t he mos t diverse case design to 
some degree. Because the th ree indus t r ies opera te on the bas i s of world-wide 
p roduc t s a n d services, all of t h e m need the least adapta t ion to local marke t s . The 
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effect of Thai cu l ture a s t he nat ional cu l ture of t he hos t count ry on strategy can be 
weakened to some degree. Likewise, the generalisat ion may be limited, because the 
case selection does no t include t he sectors t h a t a re more responsive a n d suscept ible 
to local marke t s , s u c h a s consumer produc ts . 
Because t he comparat ive analys is between the Dutch a n d the J a p a n e s e 
companies in Thai land concerning SMPs is the focal point of th i s s tudy, t he 
empirical evidence in HQs a n d RHOs of both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e MNCs is 
overlooked. Because t he research site of th is s tudy is Thai land, the effect of the 
nat ional cu l tu res of Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e on their overseas subsidiar ies concerning 
SMP in other count r ies h a s no t yet been investigated. 
10.7 Recommendations for the future research 
For t he combinatory u s e of Hofstede's d imensions , the e thnographic or 
qualitative me thods are more desirable even if less a t ta inable . Harr ison and 
McKinnon (1999) suggested t h a t cross-cul tura l r e sea rchers should u s e all 
d imens ions of Hofstede in combinat ion, examine and interpret each Hofstede's 
dimension carefully in t he future research on the bas i s of Hofstede's model. The 
combinat ion of uncer ta in ty avoidance and masculinity-femininity posi ts t he possible 
relat ionship between nat ional cu l tu re a n d corporate performance in CVM. 
To e n h a n c e mult i -perspect ives in t he future research , t he impact of cul ture , 
his tory a n d political-economic sys tems on companies a n d their executives m u s t be 
considered in t he s t udy (Wright, Lane & Beamish, 1986). The interact ion between 
the nat ional cu l tu re of t he home count ry and t h a t of t he hos t count ry m u s t be 
inquired. To give a be t te r insight into th i s interaction, t he broader variables in t he 
comparat ive mat r ix of Fa rmer a n d Richman (1965) m u s t be included. 
To minimise t he influence of a native viewpoint, t he inqui rers in t he future 
research m u s t scrut in ise their own cu l tu res a n d target cu l tu res by analogy 
carefully. This compar ison e n h a n c e s a n insight into thei r own cul tures , target 
cu l tu res a n d a n interact ion between the inquirers ' own and target cu l tu res . This is 
the way to minimise their b iases in the interpretat ion. 
The invest igators in t he future research m u s t t ake the perspective of the 
lowest r a n k s employees in t he companies , s u c h a s new recrui ts , workers , secretary, 
clerks, ca re takers a n d drivers into account . To e n h a n c e the depiction of t he 
findings a n d to appra i se t he decis ion-making process from mult i-perspectives, t he 
resea rchers m u s t have a n access to these perspectives on w h a t h a s t aken place, so 
t h a t their different viewpoints can be exposed to t he audiences (Sjoberg e t al, 1991). 
To e n h a n c e generalisat ion a n d to u n d e r s t a n d the effect of the na t ional 
cu l tu re of t he hos t count ry on SMP, t he case selection of the future research m u s t 
include t he sector whose p roduc t s a n d services are highly sensitive to local marke t s , 
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s u c h a s food a n d o ther consumer produc ts . Still, t he invest igators m u s t b a s e thei r 
selection of case on t h e mos t diverse-case research design. 
To see t h e complete p ic ture of the impact of t he na t ional cu l tu re of MNCs' 
home count ry on the i r world-wide operat ions, t he resea rch si tes in t he future 
invest igat ions into comparat ive strategic m a n a g e m e n t m u s t include their HQs a n d 
RHOs in all cases . Two or more compar i sons in two or more hos t a n d home 
count r ies a r e desirable. 
10.8 The final conclusion 
The ma in purpose of th i s dissertat ion is to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t he nat ional 
cu l tu res of MNCs' home countr ies play an impor tan t role in determining the SMPs in 
thei r overseas subsidiar ies . To a t ta in th i s purpose , a comparison between Dutch 
a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land concerning the relat ionship between nat ional 
cu l tu re and SMP h a s been the focal point of th i s disser tat ion. The research findings 
with the integrative model answer the central research quest ion t h a t the na t ional 
cu l tu res of t he Nether lands a n d J a p a n intervene in t he SMPs of Du tch a n d 
J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land respectively. 
The research findings have theoretical implications for further developments 
in comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t because t he outcome of th i s investigation discovers 
some cons t ruc t s t h a t can minimise difficulty in a n d complexity of conceptual is ing 
a n d operat ional is ing some variables for compar ing SMPs across cu l tures . A 
syn thes i s of Hofstede's model of na t ional cu l ture a n d Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s model 
of SMP develops a model of comparat ive strategic m a n a g e m e n t for compar ing SMPs 
in MNCs w h e n tak ing nat ional cu l tu re into account . However, the empirical 
evidence from th i s s tudy is insufficient to verify t he validity of Qu inn a n d 
Rohrbaugh ' s (1983) CVM even if a p re sumed linkage between SMP a n d corporate 
performance exists . However, the relat ionship between nat ional cu l tu re a n d SMP 
does p resumably exist. 
With t he qualitative research design developed for th i s cross-cul tura l s tudy, 
t h e interact ion between theory and evidence genera tes t he proposit ions for the 
future research . In compar ison with t he outcomes from most cross-cul tural survey 
research , the research findings from th is dissertat ion give a more profound, 
comprehensive, integral p ic ture of the SMPs of t he companies u n d e r th i s s tudy. 
The resea rch findings also help the pract i t ioners , the corporate s t ra tegis ts 
a n d the top executives in MNCs, bo th in the p a r e n t companies , t h e regional head 
offices a n d the overseas subsidiar ies , Internat ional m a n a g e r s a n d expatr ia tes to 
u n d e r s t a n d how nat ional cu l tu re of MNCs' home countr ies h a s a n influence on the 
SMP in their overseas operat ions. This comprehension he lps t h e m to formulate 
be t te r corporate s t ra tegy when dealing with o ther cu l tura l perspectives different 
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from their own ones . The employees of MNCs also derive the benefit of h inds igh t 
from the research findings. When these employees u n d e r s t a n d the impact of foreign 
cu l tu res on foreign-based companies in their countr ies , they can accommodate 
themselves to t he foreign working condit ions a n d behaviours in these companies . 
All t he par t ies in MNCs can work o u t a bet ter solution for mul t icu l tura l problems on 
t h e bas i s of m u t u a l unde r s t and ings . 
Nevertheless, t he l imitations of th i s s tudy comprises lack of combinatorial 
a n d broader factors, indigenous subjectivity on interpretat ion, asymmetr ica l 
perspectives on corporate set t ings, less responsiveness to and less interact ion with 
the local nat ional cu l ture in t he hos t country and lack of HQs', RHOs' a n d other 
hos t countr ies ' perspectives. To minimise these shor tcomings in t he future 
research, the inquirers m u s t analyse t he effect of combinatorial factors 
concomitantly, include more macro factors, co-operate with foreign researchers , pay 
more a t tent ion to a lowest-rank workers ' perspective, a n d embrace t he indus t r i es 
t h a t a re more responsive to local m a r k e t s and the perspectives of HQs, RHOs, and 
other hos t countr ies . 
To gain a be t te r insight into the cul tura l impac t on SMP, t he resea rchers in 
t he future need to p u r s u e more comparat ive research . They m u s t change the choice 
of MNCs' nationali t ies and the locations of the hos t count r ies . To counterpoise a 
tendency to conduc t th i s k ind of r esea rch in industr ia l ised countr ies , t he locations 
in t he future research m u s t be industr ia l is ing count r ies . If possible, t hese 
resea rchers m u s t tes t the integrative model t h rough t h e u s e of quant i ta t ive survey 
with a large-scale sample . The outcome of t he future research might help to develop 
a new theoretical framework for compar ing SMPs across cu l tu res further. The field 
of comparat ive strategic m a n a g e m e n t might emerge from a syn thes i s of comparat ive 
m a n a g e m e n t a n d strategic m a n a g e m e n t when the l inkage between na t iona l cu l tu re 
a n d SMP is confirmed. 
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APPENDIX I: THE DETAIL OF VALIDITY 
The detai ls of cons t ruc t validity, in ternal validity, external validity a n d 
reliability in section 5.7 are d iscussed in th is appendix. There a re n ine t h r e a t s to 
cons t ruc t validity in a case-oriented compar ison (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Maxwell, 
1996; v a n de Vijver & Leung, 1997; Padgett, 1998): (a) lack of knowledge of o thers ' 
way of seeing thing, (b) level of equivalence, (c) researchers ' subjectivity a n d 
preconcept ions , (d) reactivity, (e) r e sponden t s ' b iases , (f) confounding levels of 
cons t ruc t s a n d cons t ruc t s , (g) historical equivalence, (h) mono-operat ion b ias a n d (i) 
mono-method b ias . 
a) Lack of knowledge of others' way of seeing things. People from different 
cu l tu res may see th ings in a different way from each other because they do not 
s h a r e the s a m e conceptual frame of reference. Research into both Dutch and 
J a p a n e s e cu l tu res is difficult for the a u t h o r a s a Thai . It is ha rd for t he a u t h o r to 
u n d e r s t a n d a Dutch or a J a p a n e s e viewpoint u n l e s s he u n d e r s t a n d s bo th Dutch 
a n d J a p a n e s e cul tura l contexts . The same social phenomenon can have different 
mean ings in bo th cu l tu res . For ins tance , Tayeb (1994) i l lustrated t h a t "close 
a t tent ion to t ime keeping might be cons t rued in one cul ture a s au thor i t a r ian 
leadership a n d in ano the r a s indication of s t rong commi tment to t he goals of the 
work group (p 441) ' . These different in terpre ta t ions reflect different in tent ions a n d 
percept ions according to different cul tura l logic. Because t he cul tura l backgrounds 
be tween t h e resea rcher a n d the Dutch or J a p a n e s e interviewees in th is s tudy are 
qui te different, th i s d iscrepancy may or may no t be meaningfully interprétable . If 
t he d a t a a re no t cons t rued carefully, a n u m b e r of al ternative explanat ions may 
ar ise . A profound comprehens ion of Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e mental i ty a n d social 
contexts is critical for u n d e r s t a n d i n g t he Dutch and J a p a n e s e SMPs, manipula t ing 
interviewees t h rough meaningful i n s t r u m e n t s a n d interpret ing t he da t a in a n 
appropr ia te way (Ronen, 1986; Adler et al, 1989; Riordan & Vandenberg, 1994; 
B r a n n e n , 1996). The review on Dutch and J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t minimises th i s 
problem. 
b) Level of equivalence. In th i s s tudy, identical cons t ruc ts , concepts , i tems 
a n d indicators a re virtually impossible across both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cul tures . 
After gaining knowledge of Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e ways of seeing th ings from l i terature 
review on bo th cul tures , equivalence involving bo th cu l tu res is es tabl ished. 
Otherwise, t he s a m e p h e n o m e n o n in both cu l tu res might be ei ther misinterpreted or 
misunders tood . Because equivalence is t he consis tent re lat ionship ac ross both 
cu l tures , i t s e s tab l i shment c an minimise the cross-cul tura l b iases in th i s s tudy. 
Because th i s s tudy chooses a qualitative research design, th i s equivalence 
comprises lexicon, contextual , conceptual a n d in s t rumen ta l equivalence (Kohn, 
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1989; Nowak, 1989; Cavusgil & Das, 1997a; Neuman, 1997; van de Vijver & Leung, 
1997): 
Lexicon equivalence is t he comparable t rans la t ion of words, p h r a s e s , 
posit ions, r a n k s , corporate definitions a n d other i tems in interview schedules , 
d o c u m e n t s a n d archival records in Dutch , J a p a n e s e , English a n d Thai languages . 
The pre-operat ional explication of cons t ruc t s m u s t be adequa te a n d comparable 
across cu l tures , because t he s ame cons t ruc t s might have different m e a n i n g s in 
different cu l tu res . To avoid t he discrepancy of socio-linguistic pa t t e rn s between 
Dutch and J a p a n e s e languages , wri t ten da ta and evidence are gathered mainly from 
English- a n d Thai- language sources . Most a u t h o r s of English-language l i terature on 
Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t a re mostly Dutch-English and Japanese -Engl i sh 
bilingual scholars . Words, ph rases , verbal i tems, posit ions, r a n k s a n d corporate 
definitions become more comparable between bo th cu l tu res when they a re 
t rans la ted from Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e into English. Lexicon equivalence in th i s s tudy 
is a s su red to some extent (Adler, 1984; 0yen , 1990; Berry et al, 1992; Brewster et 
al, 1996; J o h n s o n , 1996; Wright, 1996; Neuman, 1997). 
Contextual equivalence is the comparable application of t e rms or concepts in 
both cu l tures . All t e rms or concepts u n d e r th is s tudy m u s t serve t he s a m e roles or 
functions in bo th Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e cul tures ; for example, legal s t a t u s e s of bo th 
Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land, t he scope of produc t l ines between 
bo th of t h e m in Thai land and so on. This type of equivalence is likely to affect t he 
qualitative interpreta t ion. This in terpreta t ion might be subject to historical context, 
because t h e Nether lands a n d J a p a n have their own un ique history. In th i s s tudy, 
the observat ions a n d conclus ions m u s t no t refer to quite any different p h e n o m e n a 
across both cu l tu res (Kohn, 1989; Yu, Keown & J a c o b s , 1993; Cavusgil & Das , 
1997b; Neuman, 1997). 
Conceptual equivalence is the expression of t he s ame concepts ac ross bo th 
cu l tures . How are cons t ruc t s expressed in the form of behaviours or a t t i t udes in 
Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res? This is a n impor tan t quest ion because t he way top 
executives formulate s trategy in their companies may be different in bo th cu l tu res . 
The responsibili ty of the executives in t he same position in Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies may be different, too. This condition is problematic because m a n y 
concepts a re cultural ly bound . These concepts a re ha r d to define cross-cultural ly. 
The a u t h o r who grows u p in Thai land often b a s e s h i s concepts on h is experience 
a n d knowledge of Thai cu l ture (Nowak, 1989; Malhotra et al, 1996; Yu et al, 1993; 
Neuman, 1997). Because t he a u t h o r used to live in th ree different countr ies , travel 
to m a n y count r ies a n d speaks m a n y languages , h e can identify conceptual 
equivalence to some extent . 
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Instrumental equivalence m u s t cap ture all t he s ame concepts , i tems, 
r e sponse categories, s t imuli and behaviours in bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tures . 
The i n s t r u m e n t s m u s t satisfy bo th etic a n d emic or ientat ions in th i s s tudy . The 
interview schedules , case protocols and other s chemes are composed for the 
uniformity ac ross both cu l tu res a n d the idiosyncrasy within each cu l tu re . To 
rniriimise t h e d iscrepancy between bo th cul tures , all i n s t r u m e n t s a re wri t ten in 
Engl ish . The reference model de termines t he uniform i n s t r u m e n t s ac ross both 
cu l tu res . However, t hese i n s t r u m e n t s m u s t facilitate meaningful comprehens ion 
a n d a depiction of p h e n o m e n a a n d explanatory theories (Adler, 1984; Nowak, 1989; 
Poortinga, 1989; Peng et al, 1991; Berry et al, 1992; Yu et al, 1993; Malhotra et al, 
1996; Neuman , 1997). 
c) Researcher's subjectivity and preconceptions a re likely to de termine t he 
au tho r ' s collection and interpretat ion of da ta in th is s tudy. Because he is a Thai , h e 
t e n d s to select a n d interpret da t a according to h i s Thai cul tura l a s sumpt ions . 
Because bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res have their owns premises , logic, 
or ienta t ions towards t ime a n d fundamenta l va lues on h u m a n life, t he review of 
D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t can enhance h i s familiarity with bo th cu l tu res . 
Albeit it is unreal is t ic to p r e s u m e t h a t he is fully free from the Thai cul tura l 
indoctr inat ion, t he review can help h im to encoun te r unfamiliar Dutch a n d 
J a p a n e s e behav iours wi thout ei ther overlooking some impor tan t var iables or 
mis in terpre t ing t he event according to t he Thai cul tura l subjectivity. The review 
gives more information abou t bo th cul tures . Because t he a u t h o r u sed to live in 
m a n y countr ies , h e becomes mul t icu l tura l a n d cosmopoli tan to some extent 
(Punnet, 1988; Serror, 1988; Rosenzweig, 1994; Brewster e t al, 1996; J o h n s o n , 
1996; Wright, 1996; Neuman, 1997; Padgett, 1998). Because the a u t h o r applies t he 
reference model to th i s s tudy, h e might expect t he research findings to be congruent 
with t he conceptual proposi t ions in t he model. He may collect a n d cons t rue da t a 
according to the preconceived cons t ruc t s in t he model (Cook & Campbell, 1979; 
Miles & Hube rman , 1994; Maxwell, 1996; Wright, 1996; Padgett, 1998). 
Nevertheless, t he emergent pa t t e rn s from th is qualitative s tudy can r u n counter 
t he se theoretical preconcept ions 
d) Reactivity is the effect of the a u t h o r a n d a research process on 
interviewees' a n d corporate se t t ings dur ing t he course of t he da ta -cap tur ing 
procedure . Because t he a u t h o r is a Thai, h i s presence influences Dutch , J a p a n e s e 
a n d Thai interviewees in a different way. The Du tch executives, mos t journa l i s t s 
a n d h i s Thai friends see h im a s equals . The J a p a n e s e a n d Thai executives see h im 
a s a lower-s ta tus figure. Cognisance of r ight ques t ions to a sk according to these 
different cu l tura l percept ions is crucial . To receive the s a m e idea across Thai, 
D u t c h a n d J a p a n e s e cul tures , the ques t ions a re cus tomised for each interviewee 
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according to the s t a tu se s , cu l tu res and indust r ies . Because mos t interviewees are 
familiar with th i s kind of research process , they a re willing to co-operate with th is 
s tudy. Both Dutch and J a p a n e s e expatr iates a re familiar with t he ques t ions in 
English. Thai interviewees can answer the ques t ions in Thai . Hence, there is no 
problem. Nonetheless , t he interviewees' familiarity with th is kind of research 
process might cause t h e m to guess how they are supposed to give t he answers w h e n 
they know t h e research topic. The only way to reduce th is a s sumpt ion guess ing is 
no t disclosing the n a m e of other companies a n d re sponden t s to t h e m (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979; Adler, 1984; Ronen, 1986; Punne t , 1988; Hofstede, 1991; Nasif et 
al, 1991; Yu et al, 1993; Rosenzweig, 1994; Fay, 1996; Wright, 1996; Padgett , 1998). 
e) Respondent's biases a re the interviewees' exaggeration, lie or 
u n d e r s t a t e m e n t owing to a n a t t empt to please the a u t h o r or to defend themselves 
and bus ine s s secrets . The interviewees might feel themselves being evaluated by the 
author , so t h a t they try to give socially acceptable answers . Dutch , J a p a n e s e and 
Thai executives often respond to the interview schedule according to their own 
cul tura l a s sumpt ions . To a t t a in response equivalence, t he uniform data-ga ther ing 
procedure ac ross both Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res is adopted. To minimise the 
difference between da ta collected from Dutch sources a n d those from J a p a n e s e 
sources , t he i n s t r u m e n t s in English are employed (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Ronen, 
1986; Adler et al, 1989; Riordan & Vandenberg, 1994: Wright, 1996; Padgett , 1998). 
f) Confounding levels of constructs and constructs a re t he degree of 
interrelat ion between cons t ruc t s . Theoretically, cons t ruc t s m u s t no t co-vary each 
other. The a u t h o r might conclude t h a t some levels of nat ional cu l tu re affect some 
levels of SMP. Because na t ional cu l tu re is decomposed into the five d imens ions a n d 
SMP is divided into the four s teps , t he a u t h o r m u s t conclude t he research findings 
in t he way which d imens ions in nat ional cul ture affect which s t eps in SMP. He 
m u s t be aware how far t he five d imensions of na t ional cu l ture a n d the four s teps of 
SMP are interrelated with each o ther (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
g) Historical equivalence is the stability of the mean ings of concepts and 
cons t ruc t s over t ime. Are all concepts and cons t ruc t s generalisable across t ime? 
Are the mean ings of na t ional cu l ture and SMP now the s a m e a s those of t h e m ten 
years ago? The new interpreta t ion of the old concepts often c a u s e s the new 
definition of these concepts . The reinterpretat ion of t he concepts c an h a p p e n any 
t ime. The only way to e n s u r e historical equivalence is minimising t ime lag between 
the beginning a n d the end of t he research process (Cook & Campbell . 1979; 
Neuman, 1997). 
h) Mono-operation bias is the selection of one operational definition from 
many . Because some abs t r ac t s a n d cons t ruc t s can be operationalised in m a n y 
ways, t he a u t h o r needs to recognise t h a t h i s operat ionalisat ion is one in m a n y ways . 
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There are m a n y ways to operatlonalise nat ional cu l tu re a n d SMP, b u t th i s s tudy 
chooses Hofstede's model to operat ionalise na t ional cu l tu re a n d Wheelen a n d 
Hunger ' s model to operat ionalise SMP. This s tudy is designed to have only na t iona l 
cu l tu re a s a part icular ly possible cause for explaining SMP (Cook & Campbell , 
1979). 
i) Mono-method bias is t h e selection of one m e a s u r e m e n t of operat ional 
definition from m a n y . Because some operat ional definitions can be m e a s u r e d in 
m a n y ways , t he a u t h o r needs to recognise t h a t h i s m e a s u r e m e n t i s one in many . 
There a re m a n y ways to m e a s u r e na t ional cu l ture a n d SMP, b u t th i s s tudy chooses 
indices in Hofstede's model to m e a s u r e nat ional cu l tu re a n d some criteria in 
Wheelen a n d Hunger ' s model to m e a s u r e SMP (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
From section 5.7, there a re twelve main t h r ea t s to internal validity of th i s 
s tudy (Cook 6k Campbell , 1979; Adler, 1984; Hofstede, 1984a; Ronen, 1986; Ragin, 
1987; Maxwell, 1996): (a) incorrect level of analysis , (b) problems of contradictory 
findings, (c) ambigui ty abou t t he direction of causali ty, (d) Galton's problem, (e) 
methodological simplicity, (f) history, (g) matura t ion , (h) tes t ing effect, (i) 
ins t rumenta t ion , (j) selection, (k) mortality, (1) in teract ions with selection. 
a) Incorrect levels of analysis. The da ta analysis can be conducted a t four 
levels: (1) individual, (2) wi th in-country subcu l tu re uni t , (3) cross-cul tura l uni t , a n d 
(4) pan -cu l tu ra l uni t . The a u t h o r is careful of different levels of analysis . The d a t a 
from each interviewee are analysed separate ly a t individual level. The da t a from 
different companies a re analysed separately for each wi th in-country cul tura l un i t 
analys is . The da t a from all Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e companies a re aggregated for each 
coun t ry on t he sole bas i s of t he posit ioning effect of cu l ture t h a t ignores t he 
dis t r ibut ion of r e sponses within each cu l ture in the cross-cul tura l analysis . The 
da t a from bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e companies a re pooled a n d analysed in p a n -
cul tura l analys is . The incorrect levels of analysis e m a n a t e from the two types of 
confusion: (1) ecological fallacy a n d (2) reverse ecological fallacy or individualistic 
fallacy. The former is drawing inferences abou t individuals directly from evidence 
collected for companies or cu l tu res . For ins tance , albeit nat ional cu l tu re is a 
collective phenomenon , it might de termine a single p e r m a n e n t character is t ic of a n 
individual. The lat ter is drawing conclus ions a b o u t cu l tu res or subcu l tu re s from 
evidence cap tu red for t he behaviour of individuals. These two k inds of distort ion 
m a k e in ternal validity quest ionable (Hofstede, 1984a; Price & Mueller, 1986; Leung 
& Bond, 1989; Boyacigiller, Kleinberg, Philips & S a c h m a n n , 1996; Brannen , 1996; 
Frankfor t -Nachmias & Nachmias , 1996; Malhotra et al, 1996). 
b) Problems of contradictory findings. Contradictory findings often e m a n a t e 
from errors of explanation owing to the errors of bo th causa l inferences a n d 
universal i ty a s sumpt ions . The organisat ional causal i ty is both mult iple a n d 
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combinatorial , so t h a t i ts a s s e s s m e n t is difficult. As a n ideal type, a n exper iment is 
inapplicable to the analysis of causa l complexity (Ronen, 1986; Ragin, 1987; 
Cavusgil & Das, 1997a). 
Superficial cul tura l similarity between the Nether lands a n d J a p a n , such a s 
Du tch and J a p a n e s e preferences for consensus m a s k s t he profound differences 
between their consensua l decis ion-making processes owing to their different 
his tories . Several combinat ions of cul tura l condit ions produce the s a m e changes or 
emergent events or character is t ics in a different way. If nat ional cu l ture is 
interactively influencing cul tura l causality, th i s interact ion may modify any impact 
of cu l ture on cul tural causali ty. It may catalyse a conditional relat ionship, a 
multiplicative factor for intensifying th is causali ty. It may change t he direction or 
shape the causali ty. Both mult iple combinatorial complexity and interact ions of 
variables often cause contradictory findings. To unde r s t and the combinatorial 
complexity a n d the incons is ten t findings in th is s tudy, the a u t h o r needs to review 
l i tera ture on Dutch and J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t a n d the history of each company 
(Ragin, 1987; Kohn, 1987; Nowak, 1989). 
These contradict ions may s t em from the difference in the language pa t t e rns 
between Dutch and J a p a n e s e languages . Because any factors capable of restr ict ing 
t he generalisability of the findings m u s t be clearly identified, two dis t inct ions in a 
case-oriented comparison m u s t be made : (1) t he distinction between cross-cul tural ly 
identical a n d non-identical domains , and (2) the dist inction between close a n d open 
sys tems in generalisat ion. Irrationality, evasiveness, or acquiescence can cause 
contradict ions even within t he identical domain. Before accept ing contradictory 
findings, t he level of inference m u s t be scrut inised. The contradict ions or 
al ternative explanat ions m u s t no t be resolved by chance , the a u t h o r m u s t no t let 
preconcept ions deny contradict ions (Ronen, 1986; Kohn, 1989; Vaughan , 1992; 
Cavusgil & Das, 1997a). 
c) Ambiguity about the direction of causality is the possibility to infer t h a t 
s t ra tegy process is an explanatory factor of nat ional cul ture , no t the o ther ways 
round a s a s s u m e d by the reference model. MNCs' s t rategy might have a n influence 
on nat ional cu l tu re of both hos t a n d home countr ies . If th i s a r g u m e n t is t rue , it 
becomes a ser ious th rea t to in ternal validity a n d the conclusion t h a t na t ional 
cu l tu re h a s a n impact on SMP. In th i s s tudy, s u c h a direction canno t be reversed, 
b e c a u s e SMP in a company a t micro level is unlikely to determine nat ional cu l ture 
a t macro level in which s u c h a company is embedded (Cook & Campbell , 1979). 
d) Galton's problem is a ma in th rea t to in ternal validity in th i s s tudy w h e n 
bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res a re t aken into account for caus ing differences in 
SMPs between Dutch and J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. The ma tched cases 
may no t be independent and mutua l ly exclusive because both Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e 
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companies can ei ther imitate each other 's pract ices in Thai land or adopt some Thai 
prac t ices . Though globalisation m a k e s it more difficult for bo th Du tch a n d 
J a p a n e s e cu l tu re to be i m m u n e to cul tura l diffusion, bo th Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies c an mostly ma in ta in their typical character is t ics inheri ted from their 
p a r e n t companies in the Nether lands a n d J a p a n respectively (Scheuck, 1990; Ember 
& Otterbein, 1991; Nasif et al, 1991; Peng et al, 1991, Malhotra et al, 1996; 
Neuman , 1997). 
e) Methodological simplicity is a t h r ea t from a simplistic a n d e thnocentr ic 
r esea rch design. Because th i s s tudy is comparat ive research between bo th Dutch 
a n d J a p a n e s e cul tures , it is more difficult and complex t h a n research into one 
cul ture . The tempta t ion to simplify a research design by pu r su ing one-shot , after-
the-fact, case s tud ies or s tat ic group compar i sons is likely because of 
ethnocentr ici ty, contextual equivalence and a t ime frame (Ronen, 1986; Nasif et al, 
1991). E thnocent r ic research is carried out by replicating a s tudy from one cu l ture 
in a second cu l ture owing to i ts convenience a n d simplicity. To avoid th is type of 
research , contextual equivalence between Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e behaviours in 
response to t he similar problems is es tabl ished. To develop a good design of 
comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t research, th is s tudy borrows some methodological 
principles from research into comparat ive sociology. In the interpretat ion of th i s 
s tudy, in t ra -count ry compar ison groups are es tabl ished before in ter -country one. 
J) History is a t h r ea t w h e n some events t ake place dur ing t h e course of the 
da ta -ga ther ing process . These events can influence interviews a n d SMPs of t he 
companies u n d e r s tudy. In th is s tudy, all companies experienced t he economic 
crisis in Thai land in 1997. Each of them h a d to adjus t thei r s t ra tegy to cope with 
the crisis . Because t he crisis affected all companies more or less t he same, the re is 
no th rea t from his tory (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
g) Maturation is a th rea t from a t ime lag w h e n interviewees get older, cleverer, 
a n d s t ronger a n d so on dur ing t he course of t he da ta-ga ther ing process . The way of 
evaluat ing cases now is different from the one ten years ago. The a u t h o r m u s t be 
aware of th i s difference. Because th is s tudy is no t longitudinal, a t ime lag and a 
ma tu ra t ion effect a re not the t h r ea t s to th is s tudy (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
h) Testing effect is a th rea t when the place, t ime and condit ions of interview 
a re not favourable for gather ing da ta . All interviews with top executives in th i s 
s tudy took place in their offices where there w a s no interference. All interviews with 
key informants were conducted in a conversat ional m a n n e r where t he a tmosphere 
w a s relaxed. Only the interviews with t he journa l i s t s were p u r s u e d on the telephone 
where t he condi t ions were not so convenient. Still, m o s t interviews with journa l i s t s 
were carried ou t w h e n they h a d free time, so t h a t th i s t h rea t can be minimised 
(Cook & Campbell , 1979). 
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i) Instrumentation is a th rea t when measu r ing i n s t rumen t change dur ing t he 
course of t he da ta -cap tu r ing process . Even if m e a s u r e m e n t canno t be t he s ame over 
t en years , i n s t r u m e n t s canno t be changed dur ing t he course of the da ta-ga ther ing 
process . Because the interviewing process l as t s for two mon ths , th i s s tudy h a s 
a lmost ne i ther a t ime lag nor change in ins t rumenta t ion (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
j) Selection is a th rea t if t he difference between t he k inds or backgrounds of 
interviewee r a t h e r t h a n different ques t ions c a u s e s t he interviewees to answer t he 
ques t ions in a different way. The selection of interviewees m u s t be equivalent ac ross 
both Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tures . Interviewees m u s t be good representa t ives for 
both cu l tu res to minimise th i s t h rea t (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
k) Mortality is a t h r ea t when a company or more go b a n k r u p t . In case of 
MNCs, t he pa ren t companies might pull ou t their subsidiar ies from Thai land if they 
do not see t he future of their bus ine s s in Thai land. They may face b u s i n e s s failures. 
All companies u n d e r th i s s tudy have been r u n n i n g their b u s i n e s s in Thai land a s 
u s u a l unt i l now. All of t h e m have s t rong commi tment to Thai land. Thus , there is 
no th rea t from mortal i ty (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
I) Interactions with selection a re th rea t s w h e n cases have some systemat ic 
differences in backgrounds . Dutch companies might have some systemat ic 
difference from J a p a n e s e companies . In general, all Du tch companies a re older 
t h a n their J a p a n e s e coun te rpa r t s in each chosen indus t ry . The different ages of 
companies might be t he m a i n factor for explaining t h e differences between Dutch 
a n d J a p a n e s e SMP ra the r t h a n the different na t iona l cu l tu res between bo th 
countr ies . The academic backgrounds of interviewees might cause these differences, 
too. Nevertheless, t he age h a s no effect because all cases have their own historical 
evolution. Both DCE a n d J C E companies have evolved ou t of t he companies 
producing a single product . Both DB a n d J B are t he resu l t s of several mergers in 
the pas t . Only DA a n d J A have the different l ines of evolution. All interviewees 
including top executives, key informants and journa l i s t s have, a t least , Bachelor 's 
degree. Thus , the re is no th rea t from interact ions with selection (Cook 6k Campbell , 
1979). 
From section 5.7, there a re four ma in th rea t s to external validity from the 
s t r ingent criteria in the case-oriented compar ison (Cook 6k Campbell , 1979; Ragin, 
1987): (a) t he degree of similarity among cases , (b) the degree of diversity among 
cases , (c) limited general isat ion to modal in s t ances a n d (d) limited general isat ion to 
target ins tances . 
a) The degree of similarity among cases affects the external validity within 
each cul ture . To e n s u r e comparabil i ty in comparat ive m a n a g e m e n t research, t he 
selection of cases is sys temat ic in th i s s tudy. Theoretically, the more similar t he 
case, the greater comparabili ty. However, if the cases a re too similar, t he a u t h o r 
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m u s t be aware of illusory difference - fea tures t h a t a re apparent ly different, b u t 
causa l ly equivalent a t more abs t r ac t level. If t he companies a re too similar, thei r 
corpora te cu l tu res might be similar, too. The influence of corporate cu l tu re may 
increase in t he da t a analysis . This might lead to mis interpre ta t ion a n d limited 
general isat ion to only the companies t h a t have similar corporate cu l ture . To reduce 
th i s t h r e a t by randomis ing cases is impossible. The only way to reduce it is 
diversifying ca se s in t e r m s of different types of b u s i n e s s and idiosyncrasy of each 
case wi th in each cu l tu re (Ragin, 1987; Kohn, 1989; Miles & Hube rman , 1994; Yin, 
1994). 
b) The degree of diversity among cases also affects the external validity within 
each cul ture . Rhetorically, the more diverse the case, the greater generalisability. Few 
cases canno t e n h a n c e the generalisability, b u t their diversity can do. If the cases a re 
too dissimilar, he m u s t acknowledge illusory commonality -features, which are 
apparent ly similar, b u t causally different. Both illusory difference and commonality 
interfere with the specification of underlying similarities and differences (Ragin, 1987; 
Cavusgil & Das, 1997b). However, the risk of a mos t diverse case design is a failure to 
replicate a new case in t he s a m e cul ture , ei ther Dutch or J a p a n e s e one. This failure 
often leads to t he quest ion of reliability, validity and comparabili ty of the research 
process . A new case wi thou t commonali ty with t he old one is incomprehensible . It 
migh t p roduce discrepancies a s cur ious inconsistency. Unless few cases can 
maximise t h e possibility to identify types of SMP u n d e r the influence of nat ional 
cul ture , they m u s t bo th t es t t he limit of generalisability a n d contradict 
general isat ion a s a way of c i rcumvent ing t he absence of under lying commonali ty 
a m o n g themselves (Ragin, 1987; Kohn, 1989; Miles & Huberman , 1994; Yin, 1994; 
Stake , 1998). 
c) Limited generalisation to modal instance is t he degree of difference between 
cases a n d a typical populat ion. B a n k s a n d airl ines belong to service indus t r ies . 
Both of t h e m a re subject to par t icu lar cus toms , bus ine s s pract ices a n d internat ional 
ru les a n d regulat ion applying to each of their own indust ry . This b u s i n e s s 
idiosyncrasy might differentiate both of t h e m from their fellow Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies in o ther indus t r ies . To appease th i s particularity, consumer electronics 
companies a re chosen for both Du tch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tures . Nevertheless, t hese 
th ree indus t r i e s do no t need to cus tomise their p roduc t s a n d services for Thai 
cus tomers . The general isat ion might be limited to only indus t r ies t h a t a re not 
highly suscept ib le to localisation a n d Thai cu l tu re (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
d) Limited generalisation to target instance is t he effect of match ing criteria on 
generalisability. Because th is s tudy restr ic ts cases only to Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e 
companies in consumer electronics, b a n k s a n d air carr iers in Thailand, the research 
resu l t might be generalisable only to Dutch a n d J a p a n e s e cu l tu res for consumer 
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electronics, bank ing a n d airline indus t r i es in Thai land. To e n h a n c e th i s limited 
generalisability, t he g rounds for val idat ing both observation a n d general isat ion have 
to be provided (Kohn, 1989; Stake , 1998). As suggested by five d imens ions in 
Hofstede's model. The possible general isat ion to foreign-based companies from 
count r ies t h a t have nat ional cu l tu re similar to t h a t of the Nether lands a n d J a p a n 
m u s t no t be overlooked. 
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APPENDIX H: THE CURRENT SITUATION OF DUTCH MNCS 
D u t c h companies in Thai land are a pa r t of t he world-wide opera t ions of 
Du tch MNCs. The world-wide organisat ion of Dutch MNCs part ly de te rmines their 
overseas subs id iar ies and opera t ions everywhere including their Thai operat ion. The 
s t r u c t u r e of Du tch MNCs de te rmines t he relat ionship a m o n g their p a r e n t companies 
in The Nether lands , their Thai subsidiar ies a n d the i r world-wide opera t ions . To 
u n d e r s t a n d t he character is t ics of Dutch MNCs, t he exploration into t h e impact of 
t h e D u t c h Civil Code on the incorporat ion of Dutch MNCs, Dutch corporate 
governance system, the role of t he work council, t he s t ruc tu re of Du tch MNCs a n d 
changing cu l tu re a n d m a n a g e m e n t in Dutch MNCs in general a re impor tan t . 
A. Legal incorporation s t ipula tes the governing s t ruc tu re of Du tch MNCs 
largely. According to Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, there a re two bas ic k inds of 
company with limited liability in the Nether lands: (1) an NV (Naamloze Venootschap) 
equivalent to a public limited company (pic) with quoted sha res , a n d (2) a BV 
[Besloten Venootschap met Beperkte Aansprakelykheid) comparable to a company 
limited (Co, Ltd) with non-quoted sha re s . The NV h a d been a n only legal form of 
company from the outse t of the twentieth cen tury to 1981 . It may or may not quote 
thei r s h a r e in Amste rdam Stock Exchange (AEX). The BV, a form of private 
company, w a s in t roduced in 1981 u n d e r the company law harmonisa t ion 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e EU (European Union), because t he code m u s t be subject to the EU's 
policy. The shareho lders in a BV or a n NV can be ei ther a jur i s t ic or a na tu r a l 
person, b u t n o t the s a m e legal entity a s the company (Lawrence, 1991; King, 1993; 
van I terson & Olie, 1992; Si jbrands & Eppink, 1994; van Iterson, 1997b; Maassen, 
1999). 
Most large Dutch firms, especially t he well-known MNCs, s u c h a s Shell, 
Unilever, a n d th ree Dutch cases in th i s s tudy choose t he legal form of NV. The code 
s t ipula tes t h e s e large firms to have two-tier boa rds : (1) the Rood van 
Commissarissen (a supervisory board), and (2) t he Raad van Bestuur (an executive or 
manag ing board) . The appo in tment of both boa rds is usual ly p e r m a n e n t (d'lribarne, 
1989; Lawrence, 1991; van I terson & Olie, 1992; King, 1993; Olie, 1996; Kabir, 
Cantri jn & J e u n i k , 1997). In essence, t he code de termines the s t ruc tu re and the 
roles of b o a r d s of directors in t he Dutch MNCs. 
The Book 2 of t he code (BurgurlyTc Wetboek) s t ipula tes t he four legal regimes 
governing bo th BVs a n d NVs, namely t he common regime {Gewoon Model), the 
s t r u c t u r e regime {Structuurmodel), t he mitigated s t ruc tu re model (Vezwakt 
Structuurmodel) a n d the exempt regime [Vrygesteld Model) (See Maassen , 1999). The 
common a n d s t r u c t u r e regime are not applicable to Dutch MNCs, b u t the mitigated 
s t r u c t u r e a n d the exempted ones are designed for the companies bo th employing 
m o s t of thei r staff and quot ing their s h a r e s outs ide the Nether lands . Algemene 
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Vergadenng van Aandeelhouders (General Assembly of Shareholders) appoin ts t he 
supervisory board . If there is a vacancy in the board, the existing m e m b e r s of the 
board will decide who will join themselves. Then, the appoin tment of a new member 
will be subject to t he consen t of a n Ondernamingsraad (OR—Work Council) and the 
general assembly th rough a co-option. This board does not const i tu te any 
representa t ives from the shareholders , the employees or any other g roups of 
s takeholders , b u t it comprises wholly the non-executive directors t h a t m a y come 
from either t he s a m e or different companies , or politicians a s a baromete r of 
corporate prestige. Interlocking directorates among Dutch MNCs are common. The 
member s of the board are called Commissarisen a n d its chairperson is called 
President-commissaris. In general, the Dutch boa rds are quite small (Lawrence, 
1991; van Iterson & Olie, 1992; Heijltjes et al, 1996; Olie, 1996; Douma, 1997; van 
Iterson, 1997b). 
As a sepa ra t e entity, t he executive board r u n s the company on the regular 
bas is . Its m e m b e r s a re usual ly full-time senior m a n a g e r s within t he s a m e company. 
The appoin tment of the board is p e r m a n e n t and only the board itself can appoint 
new directors. The directors a re colloquially called de direktte. De direktie h a s the 
right to elect the President-direkteur, the Dutch equivalence of manag ing director 
(MD) or chief executive officer (CEO), b u t th i s position h a s m u c h more limited 
author i ty t h a n MD a n d CEO in Anglo-Saxon countr ies . In practice, t he supervisory 
board appoin ts th i s position. For smaller Dutch firms, t he board may be ei ther 
functional or divisional nominat ion depending on type of indus t ry . B u t for larger 
ones it is likely to be a n amalgam of functional a n d divisional appo in tment 
(Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie, 1992; Olie, 1996; Kabir et al, 1997; van 
Iterson, 1997b). 
As a separa te governing body, the supervisory board h a s the right to appoint 
a n d d ismiss t he executive board, b u t only in case of a n idturiatum remedtum. The 
relat ionship between bo th t iers of boa rds is character ised by t rus t . On duty, t he 
supervisory board h a s to advise, ratify and monitor t he executive board in case of 
crucial decisions. The executive board is generally answerable to t he supervisory 
board . Because t h e directors of t he supervisory board lack expert ise in b u s i n e s s in 
which the firms operated, their involvement in the firms' policies is modes t . 
Because t he code compels bo th b o a r d s to consider t h e in teres ts of t he firms' all 
s takeholders , s u c h a s cus tomers , suppliers , employees a n d so forth, the supervisory 
board only intervene t he executive board in a crisis or a strategic decision affecting 
t he firms' all s takeholders a n d future. All strategic decisions a n d long-term policies 
m a d e by the executive board need a n approval from the supervisory board . To 
neutra l ise t he in teres t of any par t icular groups , the code prohibi ts the nominat ion of 
workers to be a member of bo th boards (Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie, 1992; 
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Olie, 1996; Heijltjes et al, 1996; Douma, 1997; Kabir et al, 1997; v a n Iterson, 1997b; 
Maassen , 1999). 
B. Corporate governance is a resu l t of Dutch b u s i n e s s history. Because t he 
s tock m a r k e t in t he Nether lands h a s long been developed for 500 years , t he s h a r e s 
of D u t c h public companies (NV) are usual ly widely dispersed. Approximately 4 5 per 
cen t of s h a r e s quoted in AEX belong to private h a n d s . Because t he Du tch Civil 
Code allows b a n k s a n d other financial ins t i tu t ions to hold a m a x i m u m of 10% of 
shareho lders ' capital in non-financial firms, these ins t i tu t ions a n d b a n k s own no 
more t h a n 15-20% of t he s h a r e s of listed companies in the Nether lands . Cross 
sharehold ing or interlocking ownership is ra re among Dutch companies . Unlike in 
J a p a n a n d Germany, b a n k s and other financial ins t i tut ion s tay a t a rm ' s length from 
Dutch companies ' m a n a g e m e n t (Weimer, 1995; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000). 
Du tch companies a re able to limit the power of t he shareholders by law, 
dispersion of ownership , mult iple ant i- take-over devices in AEX a n d o ther 
m e c h a n i s m s . Through t he two-tier board system, t he code restr ic ts ordinary 
shareho lders ' r ights to only all economic r ights , s u c h a s to get dividend and the 
r ight to a s s e s s t he overall performance of t he firms. These shareholders do no t have 
voting r ights for the firms' major decisions a n d affairs. The dispersion of ownership 
does not enable a n y par t ies to domina te the shareholders ' meeting. To safeguard 
themselves aga ins t t he self-interests of some par t ies , Du tch companies divide their 
ownership into non-voting ordinary sha re s , preference s h a r e s a n d non- t radab le 
s h a r e s a s p a r t of several ant i- take-over m e a s u r e s . Only friendly foundat ions a n d 
ins t i tu t ional investors can hold bo th preference a n d priority sha re s . Both of t h e m 
have t he r ight to: (1) a m e n d the companies ' char te r s , (2) approve a n appoin tment or 
a d ismissa l of directors of bo th boa rds th rough a co-option and (3) i ssue new 
ordinary s h a r e s or common s tocks in case of capital isation. The holders of both 
s h a r e s mee t once a year in the general assembly. Even so, they rarely exercise their 
formal ownership r ights (van Iterson & Olie, 1992; Weimer, 1995; Heijltjes et al, 
1996; Douma, 1997; Kabir et al, 1997; van Iterson, 1997b, 2000; Maassen , 1999). 
The external ma rke t dynamism canno t discipline corporate governance a n d 
m a n a g e m e n t in t he Nether lands even if t he domest ic ownership is very small a n d 
the concent ra t ion of ownership is very low in Du tch companies . Fur thermore , t he 
manager ia l discretion in Dutch companies is very high because the intervention 
from bo th t h e supervisory board a n d the shareholders is minimal . In spite of th i s 
discretion, t h e executive board t e n d s to p u r s u e t he public in teres t of t h e companies 
a n d no t t h e part ial in te res t s of t he shareholders , t h e board itself, employees or any 
o ther par t ies . Albeit the shareholders a re disengaged from the major decisions in 
the companies , they can ac t a s effective moni tors . All Dutch firms have been 
required to divulge audi ted a n n u a l financial repor ts s ince 1971 a n d with more 
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details s ince 1983. This disclosure abiding by the code enables shareho lders to 
scru t in ise a n y scepticism a b o u t m i s m a n a g e m e n t in the firms (van I terson & Olie, 
1992; Weimer, 1995; Heijltjes et al, 1996; Maijoor & van Witteloostuijn, 1996; Kabir 
et al, 1997; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Maassen, 1999). 
Hostile take-overs aga ins t t he will of t he firms' executives a re rarely 
successful because elaborate legal protection th rough two-tier board sys tem limits 
voting power of the ordinary shareholders . Additionally, 9 0 % of Dutch companies 
quot ing s h a r e s in AEX fend off company hostile take-over b ids by us ing a t least one 
of m a n y mult iple ant i- take-over devices. Thus , Dutch companies do no t need cross-
shareholding to protect themselves from hostile take-overs (van Iterson & Olie, 1992; 
Weimer, 1995; Kabir, Cantri jn & Jeun ik , 1997; Maassen, 1999). 
C. Work council in Dutch MNCs h a s a lot of impact on Dutch MNCs' global 
strategy. The Work Council Act of 1971 enforced Dutch firms with more t h a n 35 
employees to establ ish a work council or an OR. This law also applies to not-for-
profit organisat ions, s u c h a s hospi ta ls , foundat ions a n d so on. The ORs' ac t ions 
a n d decisions a re supposed to be independent of t he m a n a g e m e n t because it 
cons t i tu tes only elected employee delegates from bo th middle m a n a g e r s a n d 
workers . To e n h a n c e the advisory competence a n d the scope of co-determinat ion of 
t he ORs, th i s law was amended in 1979, so t he required m i n i m u m of employees is 
extended to 100 employees. The ORs are legally entitled to have a set of four r ights -
- to consent , to consult , to know information, a n d to init iate a proposal . T h u s , t he 
work counci ls in t he Nether lands have the mos t extensive r ights in Europe 
(Lamrners, Meur & Mijs, 1987; Teulings, 1987; Kuns t & Soeters , 1991; Lawrence, 
1991; van I terson & Olie, 1992; Olie, 1996). These four r ights ensur ing co-
determinat ion between t he top managemen t and the employees have a following 
impact on Dutch MNCs in their s t ra tegy formulation. 
The right to consent Before p u r s u i n g or changing any policies, the top 
m a n a g e m e n t or en t r ep reneu r s need t he viewpoint or consent of t he ORs for mos t 
strategic decisions. All m a t t e r s of collective social and HRM policies, s u c h a s 
corporate ru les and regulat ions a re subject to the full co-determinat ion of t he ORs. 
The ORs have a r ight of veto in any decisions abou t h u m a n resources . If the top 
m a n a g e m e n t does not respond to the ORs' veto, t he ORs can br ing d i spu tes with the 
employers or t he m a n a g e m e n t on social and HRM policies to arbi t ra t ion commit tees 
a t b r a n c h level or directly to t he magis t ra te (Teulings, 1987; King, 1993; Kuns t & 
Soeters , 1991; Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson & Olie, 1992). Moreover, t he ORs have 
the r ight to propose or oppose t he appoin tment of bo th boa rds (Hoodendoorn, 1992, 
p 4 2 ) . 
The right to consultThe Ors a re empowered to advise the top m a n a g e m e n t of 
a complete r ange of strategic decisions, s u c h a s inves tment a n d dives tment policies, 
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technology, t ransfer of control, merger, take-over, jo in t venture , closure, 
reorganisat ion, relocation a n d re t r enchmen t . The appo in tmen t a n d t h e dismissal of 
directors a n d top managemen t , a n d the employment of external consu l t an t s need 
advice from the ORs. The m a n a g e m e n t is obliged to take s u c h advice into 
considerat ion (Teulings, 1987; King, 1993; Kuns t 6k Soeters , 1991; v a n I terson & 
Olie, 1992). 
The right to know information At the reques t of t he ORs, t he m a n a g e m e n t is 
obligated to disclose all financial a n d economic both policies a n d resu l t s , all 
financial a n d economic resul t s , all decisions abou t company s t ra tegy a n d policy, 
and all o ther relevant information (Teulings, 1987; Kuns t & Soeters, 1991; 
Lawrence, 1991; van Iterson 6k Olie, 1992). Fur thermore , the OR is entitled to 
investigate any sceptical m i smanagemen t of executives (Hoodendoorn, 1992, p 42). 
The right to initiate a proposal The ORs are empowered to take t he initiative to 
propose a new idea for organisat ional change th rough pu t t ing forward a wri t ten 
proposal to the managemen t . Reciprocally, t he m a n a g e m e n t have to respond to th i s 
proposal (Teulings, 1987). 
D. The structure of Dutch MNCs de termines t he relat ionship between 
Du tch companies in Thai land a n d their pa r en t companies ' world-wide operat ions . 
The ma in pu rpose of Dutch foreign inves tment is t rading, no t manufac tur ing . This 
pu rpose reflects t h e s t rong m e r c h a n t t radi t ions . Owing to t he small size of t he 
Nether lands , once Dutch firms grow enough, they begin to look a t foreign marke t s . 
There a re few mid-size companies in the Nether lands (van Iterson 6k Olie, 1992; van 
Iterson, 1997a, 1997b). Du tch MNCs set u p their subsidiar ies t h roughou t the world 
th rough t h e process of internat ional isat ion. This s t ra tegy repea t s w h a t they had 
done dur ing t h e colonial period. Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC—Dutch 
United E a s t India Company) t h a t h a d existed between 1602-1718 is the world's first 
MNC (van I terson, 1997a, 1997b). Dutch MNCs h a d become internat ional ised m u c h 
earlier t h a n British, American a n d J a p a n e s e ones . 
Because of in ternat ional ism and adaptabil i ty a re the prime character is t ics of 
b u s i n e s s life in t h e Nether lands, Dutch MNCs tend to both play down their 
nat ional i ty a n d localise their overseas operat ions. Leading Dutch MNCs, s u c h a s 
Shell, Unilever a n d Philips a re well-known for empowering their overseas 
subs id iar ies . Their local managemen t , no t Du tch expatr ia tes predominant ly r u n 
these subs id iar ies . Their HQs often refrain from direct involvement in marke t ing 
affair abroads , so m u c h of t he au tonomy devolves on local affiliates. Each 
subs id ia ry is t rea ted a s a profit centre . Each of t h e m t e n d s to p u r s u e i ts s trategies 
according to local set t ings. Because there h a s been no plan for world-wide 
operat ions, each subs id iary in each count ry canno t co-ordinate i ts activities a n d 
t r ansac t ion a m o n g each other . A typical Dutch corporate form is a mult i-domestic , 
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n o t global firm. Because Dutch MNCs do no t t ransfer their m a n a g e m e n t style to 
their subsidiar ies , thei r decentral ised s t ruc tu re limits co-operation, t ransferr ing a n d 
sha r ing skills, resources , information activities a n d uniformity among subsidiar ies 
t h roughou t the world (Eppink & van Rhijn, 1988; Lawrence, 1991; Hampden-Turner 
& T r o m p e n a a r s , 1994; Olie, 1996; Brouthers , K D & Brouthers , L E , 1997). 
Nonetheless, the globalisation of the world marke t h a s m a d e the mult i -
domestic s t ruc tu re of Dutch MNCs ineffective. Shell a n d Unilever a re going well 
with th i s kind of s t ruc tu re , b u t Philips is not. To fight J a p a n e s e c o n s u m e r 
electronics g iants whose s trategy and s t ruc tu re a re more globalised, Philips needs to 
adopt more global s trategy to i ts mult i-domestic s t ruc tu re . So far it h a s been 
problematic for Philips. To shift their s trategy from a mul t inat ional to a global 
focus, these Dutch MNCs have to reconcile their central ised corporate strategy a n d 
s t ruc tu re with their responsiveness to local marke t s . Since t he beginning of 1990s, 
mos t leading companies in t he world have been undergoing res t ruc tur ing , re-
engineering, r e t renchment , rat ionalisation, downsizing a n d reorganisat ion and so 
on. The pu r su i t of these p rogrammes is to m a k e these companies more heal thy a n d 
profitable while sus ta in ing competitive advantage. Dutch MNCs a re no exception. 
Many of t h e m a re now either m a t u r e or declining organisat ions , so they need to 
revitalise themselves in order to compete their rivals more vigorously (Eppink & van 
Rhijn, 1988; Hampden-Turne r & Trompenaars , 1994; Volbeda, 1997). 
E. Changing culture and management in Dutch MNCs a lso de termines t h e 
operat ion of Du tch companies in Thai land. The Nether lands is a n individualistic 
society, b u t always take p a r t in voluntary activities a round the world actively. 
However, the Dutch househo lds have recently changed remarkably in t e rms of 
household composit ion and role division between the sexes. These p h e n o m e n a s t em 
from demographic a n d cul tura l shifts directly a n d from the development of hea l th 
care, educat ion, employment a n d social securi ty indirectly. The Nether lands 
becomes less car ing society character ised by more conspicuous consumpt ion 
(Sociaal en C u l t u r e d P lanbureau , 1996). 
Ontzuiling (de-pillarisation). In the 1960s when economic growth a n d 
globalisation gained m o m e n t u m in t he Nether lands , a rapidly growing, increasingly 
affluent society became more mobile. The Dutch demanded more space to live a n d 
began to move ou t of t he s u b u r b s . This desuburban i sa t ion c a u s e s t h e m to less 
adhere to their living places . They are more willing to live outs ide their own 
confessional a r eas . The Dutch phenomenon of verzuiling began to diss ipate w h e n 
organisa t ions from different doctrinal l ines s ta r ted to merge for more barga in ing 
power. These organisa t ions include t rade un ions , employer 's federations a n d so on. 
With the exception of agra r ian associat ions, t he internat ional isat ion of t he 
Nether lands accelerated secular isat ion and ontzuiling in the wider society. This 
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p h e n o m e n o n of ontzuiltng prevails when the shifting power ba lance is in favour of 
global economic ac tors , s u c h a s MNCs (King, 1993; Sociaal en Cultureel 
P lanbureau , 1996; van Iterson, 1997a, 1997b, 2000). 
Du tch companies flourished dur ing the 1960s a n d the 1970s simply because 
of pos t -war high growth ra te r a the r t h a n excellence a n d professionalism. 
Managerial behav iours in t he Nether lands have dramatical ly changed since 1980s, 
b e c a u s e of t he general revaluat ion of industry , m a n a g e m e n t a n d weal th creat ion 
a n d en t repreneura l i sm. These changes were caused by (1) the government ' s policies 
towards economic liberalisation a n d deregulation, (2) t h e response to t he world 
recess ion a n d the consequen t multiplication of competi t ion, (3) t he consis tency with 
t h e development in o ther indust r ia l country and (4) t he development of educat ion 
a n d hea l th care sys tem. Because of the recent deregulat ion, more par t - t ime jobs a re 
available. The Dutch are more willing to work longer wi th their several par t - t ime 
j o b s a s thei r extra employment . They tend to have more t h a n one jobs , especially 
par t - t ime ones concurrent ly owing the declining of full-time employment in t h e 
Nether lands (Lawrence, 1991; Sociaal en Cultureel P lanbureau , 1996). 
Because the Dutch government becomes less generous for social welfare, the 
Du tch become more willing to live on their own. They nowadays are more flexible 
a n d less concerned abou t job securi ty t h a n they used to be . Dutch companies have 
lately become less sympathe t ic with thei r ill or hand icapped employees. These 
companies s t a r t to focus on efficiency. The manager ia l job performance is more 
recognisable in t he Nether lands . Individual dist inct ion is p ronounced t h a n before. 
The e m p h a s i s on r emunera t ion is prevalent . The Du tch become less cordial with 
weaker a n d more willing to accept inequality. Mobility between companies now 
becomes more accepted. Because Du tch companies a re still r e luc tan t to compare 
performance a m o n g their employees, their a s s e s s m e n t of a n appropr ia te calibre with 
special isat ion in job is still alright, b u t i ts accentua t ion is p u t on social skills, 
m a n a g e m e n t expert ise or goal internal isat ion (Lawrence, 1991; Sociaal en Cultureel 
P lanbureau , 1996). 
In r e sponse to t he globalisation of bus ine s s a n d management , it s eems t h a t 
Dutch m a n a g e m e n t will lose i ts nat ional idiosyncrasy somehow in the future. 
In terna t ional i sm is compelling Dutch m a n a g e m e n t to conform to the in ternat ional 
n o r m s . These changes may not be absolu te because m o s t Dutch m a n a g e r s still 
have some reservat ions a b o u t th i s t rend . The acceptance of t he new t rend is 
condit ional b e c a u s e some old hab i t s die ha rd . Typical Dutch m a n a g e m e n t is still 
worthwhile because it can cope with complexity a n d deal with a n u m b e r of fronts 
concomitant ly (Lawrence; 1991). 
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APPENDIX HI: THE CURRENT SITUATION OF JAPANESE MNCS 
J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land are a pa r t of the global operat ion of 
J a p a n e s e MNCs. The global s t ruc tu re of J a p a n e s e MNCs part ly s h a p e s their foreign 
affiliates a n d operat ions everywhere. The s t ruc tu re of J a p a n e s e MNCs de termines 
the relat ionship among their p a r e n t companies in J a p a n , their Thai subsidiar ies a n d 
their global operat ions . To u n d e r s t a n d t he character is t ics of J a p a n e s e MNCs, t he 
investigation into t he impac t of t he J a p a n e s e Commercial Code on J a p a n e s e MNCs, 
the cross-shareholding u n d e r keiretsu system, t he J a p a n e s e corporate governance 
system, the s t ruc tu re of J a p a n e s e MNCs and changing cul ture and m a n a g e m e n t in 
J a p a n e s e MNCs in general a re pivotal. 
A. Legal incorporation really de termines t he governing body of J a p a n e s e 
MNCs. The mos t common corporate form of J a p a n e s e MNCs, s u c h a s Toyota, 
Matsushi ta , Sony a n d so on is Kabushiki Kcdsha (KK-a jo int s tock company). Under 
the J a p a n e s e Commercial Code, mos t J a p a n e s e KKs depend largely on all iances in 
equity ownership . The shareho lders of KKs can be ei ther a s t a tu to ry or a na tu r a l 
person, b u t not t he s a m e legal enti ty a s t he company. However, J a p a n e s e Anti-
monopoly Act of 1947 h a s prohibited b a n k s and other financial ins t i tu t ions to hold 
more t h a n 5% s h a r e s in a single KK (Gerlach, 1987; Whitehill, 1991; Lassere, 1992; 
Whitley, 1992; Weimer, 1995; Bostock & Storey, 1997). 
The J a p a n e s e board sys tem is a mixture of Anglo-Saxon a n d Germanic 
sys tems . The th ree governing bodies in KKs comprise t he board of directors, t he 
office of representat ive directors a n d the office of aud i to rs . The board of directors 
formally m a k e s corporate decisions. The representat ive directors carry ou t these 
decisions. The audi tors have to moni tor the activities of both t he directors a n d the 
representat ive directors . Under t he code, all th ree corporate bodies m u s t r epresen t 
t he shareholders , so t h e general assembly of shareholders de jure appo in t s and 
dismisses these governing bodies fWhitehill, 1991; Weimer, 1995). 
De facto, the interlocking ownership among inst i tut ional shareho lders 
enables t he outgoing c h a i r m a n or pres ident to appoint the directors, t he 
representa t ive directors and the audi tors . Typically, the board cons is t s 
overwhelmingly of both cu r r en t a n d former top a n d middle manage r s . The board of 
directors can have a s u b - s t r u c t u r e reflecting hierarchical r a the r t h a n functional 
division. External directors a re ra re except t he ex-bureaucra t s from amakudari, 
allied companies a n d lending b a n k s . The external directors from t h e b a n k s are no t 
considered a s outs iders . The external appo in tment is a barometer of re la t ionship. A 
typical board in J a p a n e s e companies can have a s m a n y a s twenty-five to thir ty 
directors, so it is large. Even if the code does no t compel the board to represen t t he 
interes t of t he companies ' all s takeholders , the directors are supposed to consider 
t he in teres ts of t he s takeholders a s a whole including their fellow employees (Aoki, 
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1991; Whitehill, 1991; Hoshi, 1994; Chen, 1995; Weimer, 1995; Wesney, 1996; 
Bostock & Stoney, 1997). 
B. Enterprise group or keiretsu also de te rmines t he corporate governance 
of J a p a n e s e MNCs. The large n u m b e r of J a p a n e s e KKs is organised a s a 
constel lat ion of firms called keiretsu (enterprise groups). The large b u s i n e s s groups 
in J a p a n a re organised in two ways: (1) horizontally connected g roups or kinyu 
keiretsu (financial lineage) or kigyo shudan (corporate group) a n d (2) vertically 
integrated g roups or kyorokukai (Gerlach, 1987; Whitehill, 1991; Lassere, 1992; 
Whitley, 1992; Bostock & Storey, 1997). 
The horizontal keiretsu opera tes in mult iple indus t r ies . It is no t organised 
hierarchically along t he suppl ier-dis t r ibutor linkage, b u t it is a ne twork of firms 
connected by reciprocal financial a n d commercial in te res t s . It is a descenden t of 
pre-war zaibatsu (a conglomerate of financial cliques). After the Second World War, 
S u p r e m e Command of Allied Power (SCAP) dissolved all zaibatsu b ecause of their 
involvement in t h e J a p a n e s e military expansion both before a n d dur ing the war . 
After J a p a n r e s u m e d its sovereignty in 1951 , some of these zaibatsu began to be 
reorganised a s horizontal keiretsu. Wi thout t he existence of family-controlled 
holding companies a s in zaibatsu, l inkages among these firms can be identified by: 
(1) p res iden t c lubs , (2) financial suppor t s , (3) interlocking ownership , (4) board 
m e m b e r s ' exchanges , (5) t r ansac t i ons in in termedia te p roduc t m a r k e t s a n d (6) jo in t 
projects. The cross-ownership h a s evolved ou t of ins t i tu t ional sharehold ing among 
these firms a n d h a s created a s t r u c t u r e of s teady m u t u a l relat ions a m o n g them. 
The six largest corporate groups in J a p a n a re Mitsubishi , Mitsui, Sumi tomo, Fuyo, 
S a n w a a n d Dai-Ichi Kangyo. The first th ree g roups are t he r e m n a n t s of t he 
d ismant led zaibatsu of the s a m e n a m e s . Fuyo is t he re incarna t ion of Yasuda 
zaibatsu. S a n w a a n d Dai-Ichi Kangyo have developed o u t of large city commercial 
b a n k s . Each kigyo shudan comprises a m a i n in -house b a n k a n d other financial 
firms, a general t rad ing firm (GTF or sogo shosha] a n d a highly diversified range of 
large manufac tu r ing firms (Gerlach, 1987; Namiki 6k Sethi , 1988; Eli, 1990; Lassere, 
1992; Whitley, 1992; Hoshi, 1994; Miyashita 6k Russell , 1994; Chen, 1995; Bostock 
6k Stoney, 1997). A commercial bank , i n su rance a n d o ther financial firms act a s a 
financial a r m for access to financial a n d capital ma rke t s . A GTF ac t s a s a marke t ing 
a r m for access to in ternat ional m a r k e t s a n d information ne tworks . A variety of 
manufac tu r ing firms ac t a s a n indust r ia l a r m for R6kD a n d product ion. 
The policy-making body of keiretsu is shacho-kai (president club). The 
decisions a n d t h e policies m a d e in t he club known a s collective guidance . This 
gu idance u sed to affect the whole group dur ing the 1950s-1960s, b u t it is no t so 
impor t an t nowadays . T h u s , t he club h a s nei ther control over nor economic 
implication for t h e member firms. To exchange views a n d information a n d to reduce 
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incentives a n d informational problems, the cha i rmen, t he pres idents a n d the vice 
p res iden ts in charge of corporate p lann ing and R&D in the core companies , such a s 
m a i n b a n k s , sogo shosha, meet in t he club monthly. The club meet ing is informal 
a n d merely facilitates the interact ion a n d the flow of information t h a t e n h a n c e the 
group coherence. Indust r ia l firms within the s ame ketretsu may form a jo in t ven tu re 
if they have to take pa r t in large projects and to promote jo int technological 
development (Gerlach, 1987; Namiki & Sethi, 1988; Eli, 1990; Lassere, 1992; 
Whitley, 1992; Hoshi, 1994; Miyashita & Russell, 1994; Chen, 1995). 
Albeit the pres ident c lub is held monthly, each fellow firm can relatively 
au tonomous ly carry out i ts s t ra tegies and operat ions. As a rule, the club h a s never 
intervened in t he operat ions of i ts m e m b e r s even in a crisis. Under th i s rule, 
J a p a n e s e MNCs can specialise in their own core activities wi thout the interference of 
i ts fellow Arms (Namiki & Sethi , 1988; Whitley, 1992; Chen, 1995). 
The vertical ketretsu have evolved ou t of the network of subcont rac tors , 
suppl iers , cus tomers and offshoot affiliates in the supplier-dis tr ibutor cha in . These 
vertical independent g roups usua l ly operate in a single indus t ry . A single company 
who creates t he cha in is a pa ren t firm, and it domina tes the chain t h rough 
subs tan t i a l s h a r e s of i ts subsidiar ies . The vertical g roups are bigger a n d more 
common in manufac tu r ing indus t r i es especially car a n d electronics t h a n o thers . 
The famous vertical g roups include Toyota, Sony, Matsushi ta , Honda, NEC, Hitachi, 
Toshiba a n d so on. The groups ' affiliates a re usual ly small . While t h e p a r e n t firm 
focuses on core activities, s u c h a s R&D, it affiliates concent ra tes on o ther functions 
or activities of thei r specialisation. T h a t is why the p a r e n t firm is comparatively 
small a n d lean (Whitley, 1992; Miyashita & Russell , 1994; Chen, 1995; Westney, 
1996). 
Nearly all companies in t he six largest corporate groups in J a p a n have their 
own vertical ketretsu, especially in manufac tu r ing indus t ry . Plenty of t he largest 
vertical keiretsu, mostly also in the manufac tu r ing sector rely on t he financial 
facilities of t he ma in b a n k in the horizontal group. As a result , both k inds of 
ketretsu overlap to a considerable degree (Miyashita & Russell, 1994). 
C. Corporate governance is largely determined by legal incorporat ion a n d 
relat ions among companies in the enterpr ise groups . Like firms in m a n y countr ies , 
J a p a n e s e KKs have bo th individual a n d inst i tut ional shareholders . Inst i tut ional 
shareho lders c an be categorised into two types: (1) portfolio investors including ma in 
b a n k s a n d i n s u r a n c e firms a n d (2) relational investors, s u c h a s affiliated firms, 
ma in suppl iers a n d top cus tomers . The former prefers long-term growth to shor t -
t e rm gain a s a resu l t of growth s trategies . The lat ter r ep resen t s the symbolic 
relat ions with o ther firms. The majority of both types a re the fellow m e m b e r s in the 
s a m e keiretsu. Albeit KKs' ownership in J a p a n is widely dispersed, allied 
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ins t i tu t ions hold more s h a r e s t h a n individual shareho lders . Ideally, t hese 
ins t i tu t ions a r e supposed to wield more influence on t h e m a n a g e m e n t of MNCs t h a n 
personal sha reho lders . Actually, ne i ther type of shareho lders exerts m u c h influence 
on the managemen t . As long a s bo th of t h e m steadily receive their dividend, they do 
n o t in tervene in t he corporate affairs. T h u s , J a p a n e s e executives enjoy a great 
degree of manager ia l discretion. Even if the individual holders of ordinary s h a r e s 
have bo th economic a n d voting r ights u n d e r J a p a n e s e Securi ty a n d Exchange Act, 
they normal ly are the las t pe r sons who know their firms' financial problems 
(Gerlach, 1987; Namaki & Sethi , 1988; Aoki, 1991; Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfs ten, 
1991; Sheard , 1994; Bostock & Stoney, 1997). 
Under antei kabunushi (stable shareholding ar rangement) , inst i tut ional 
sha reho lders usual ly have a s t rong commitment no t to selling s h a r e s to especially 
hosti le take-over b idders . These shareholders a re usua l ly sympathet ic to t he 
i n c u m b e n t m a n a g e m e n t . The relat ions u n d e r th i s a r r angemen t a re implicit. As 
bo th a n ins t i tu t ional shareholder and a creditor, the in -house b a n k is the m a i n 
source of funds of i ts member firms. It ac t s ei ther a s a gua ran to r of these firms 
w h e n they have to borrow money from the outs ide source or a s a manage r of 
syndicated loans . It holds subs tan t i a l s t akes in i ts member firms. Its member 
firms' activities a re u n d e r i ts supervision because it normally s ends i ts senior 
employees to be these firms' di rectors b u t seldom vice versa . If these firms perform 
well, it will n o t s tep in. If they perform badly, it is likely to intervene. If they a re 
financially dis t ressed, it often provides both capital a n d manager ia l suppor t for 
t hem. This is the way to reduce cost of financial d is t ress . Because of r i sk-shar ing 
between t h e m a i n b a n k and i ts cl ients th rough cross-ownership, the b a n k generally 
moni tors t he se clients (Gerlach, 1987; Namaki & Sethi, 1988; Aoki, 1991; Hoshi, 
Kashyap & Scharfs ten, 1991; Hoshi, 1994; Sheard , 1994; Tselichtchev, 1994; 
Bostock & Stoney, 1997). Some J a p a n e s e firms none t he less have weakened their 
t ies with their m a i n b a n k s recently (Hoshi, 1994). In case of vertical ketretsu, the 
p a r e n t firm controls financial resources and diversifies t he sources of capital for t he 
whole group (Westney, 1996). 
Because of inter-firm cross-ownership, capital m a r k e t s canno t discipline t he 
m a n a g e m e n t of J a p a n e s e MNCs. As a group, the inst i tut ional shareholders in 
J a p a n seem to m a k e a long-term commi tment to t he ketretsu whose they a re 
m e m b e r s . The J a p a n e s e corporate m a n a g e m e n t is able to p u r s u e aggressive long-
t e rm growth s t ra tegies . However, being in charge of a senior executive position 
concurrent ly , J a p a n e s e directors a re difficult to review the performance of the 
m a n a g e m e n t including themselves impartially (Gerlach, 1987; Aoki, 1991; Whitehill, 
1991; Chen, 1995; Weimer, 1995; Bostock & Stoney, 1997). Bostock a n d Stoney 
(1997) a rgued t h a t J a p a n e s e board of directors a re accountable to no one, b u t Chen 
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(1995) contended t h a t these directors, part icularly the pres ident a re answerable to 
the executives of o ther fellow firms in t he president c lub. In practice, t he boards are 
accountab le to t he indust r ia l groups , notably the ma in b a n k th rough r isk-shar ing, 
b u t no t to the individual shareholders (Hoshi, 1994). 
Under t he sys tem of inter-firm capital l inkage, hostile take-overs aga ins t the 
will of company 's executives is a lmos t impossible. Though J a p a n e s e MNCs tend to 
hold s h a r e s of each other, they except b a n k s , t ry ne i ther to interfere with nor to 
moni tor t he opera t ions of each other. This practice further separa tes the 
m a n a g e m e n t from the will of the owners (Gerlach, 1987; Aoki, 1991; Sheard , 1994; 
Tselichtchev, 1994; Chen, 1995; Westney, 1996; Bostock & Stoney, 1997). 
D. The structure of Japanese MNCs is a resu l t of J a p a n e s e b u s i n e s s 
history. To ca tch u p with the West, J a p a n e s e companies began to be 
internat ional ised in a few las t decade of the n ine teen th century . J a p a n set u p a lot 
of shipping a n d t rad ing companies to extract a n d ship back overseas n a t u r a l 
resources to J a p a n because mos t i ts manufac tu r ing b a s e s were located in J a p a n . 
To extract more resources , mos t J a p a n e s e companies suppor ted the War of 
Aggression dur ing 1931-1945. Thus , these companies se t u p their overseas 
subsidiar ies mainly for resources extraction (Whitehill, 1991; Chen, 1995). 
The m a i n pu rpose of J a p a n e s e foreign inves tment h a s been manufac tur ing , 
no t t rad ing s ince t he 1950s. This purpose reflects t he J a p a n e s e pa t t e rn of s trategy 
a n d internat ional isa t ion after t he Second World War . J a p a n e s e modern indus t r i es 
s ta r ted from buying Western technology and emula t ing Western p roduc t s with some 
improvement a n d modification unt i l 1990 w h e n they were able to innovate. From 
the 1950s to mid 1970s, J a p a n e s e MNCs competi t iveness had primarily been in 
cheap labour- intensive indus t ry . Dur ing th is period, they thrived merely because of 
post-war J a p a n ' s mi racu lous economic growth. They h a d exported low-cost a n d 
low-quality goods unt i l they gained sufficient foreign marke t s h a r e s a n d 
accumula ted adequa te capital . Then, the ongoing wage escalat ion in J a p a n forced 
t h e m to diversify their products , develop high-technology goods and move upmarke t . 
They have exported their p roduc ts to industr ia l ised na t ions since the 1960s. After 
the growing protect ionism in these na t ions , notably t he US a n d the EU since t he 
1980s, they have begun their direct inves tment into these count r ies . To main ta in 
their competitive price concurrent ly, they have shifted their manufac tu r ing 
capabilities to t he low-wage count r ies in S ou thea s t Asia a n d exported p roduc t from 
there to t he US a n d the EU. Nowadays they sell high-quali ty p roduc t s t h roughou t 
t he world. Because they become internat ional ised later t h a n Western European and 
American MNCs, they t end to adopt a global s t ruc tu re t h a t can help t h e m to cope 
with the globalisation of the world marke t . Recently they have challenged Western 
European a n d American MNCs in m a n y spheres in the world b u s i n e s s (Chen, 1995). 
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Because mos t J a p a n e s e MNCs represen t t he goodwill of J a p a n , they are 
unlikely to play down their nat ional i ty and localise thei r overseas subsidiar ies easily. 
They often t ransfer t he whole concept of m a n a g e m e n t to the hos t count r ies . Leading 
J a p a n e s e MNCs s u c h a s Matsush i ta , Sony, a n d Toyota empower their foreign 
affiliates to some extent, b u t t he J a p a n e s e , no t local m a n a g e r s m a n a g e these 
affiliates. All subs id iar ies a re no t allowed to par t ic ipate in the major decisions a t t he 
HQs t h a t affect the local employees. A typical J a p a n e s e corporate form is a global 
firm having a high degree of operat ional co-operat ions a m o n g affiliates t h roughou t 
t he world. J a p a n e s e companies a re very specialised one, so they are unwilling to 
diversify themselves into unre la ted activities (Whitley, 1992). If they w a n t to do so, 
they tend to hive off some d e p a r t m e n t s by set t ing u p a new company. Because of a 
high degree of specialisation in J a p a n e s e MNCs, their executives often prioritise 
manager ia l functions in their firms according to specialist capabilit ies. If the 
overseas m a r k e t s a re large enough or they face t r ade protect ionism from the hos t 
country, they will export manufac tu r ing capabilit ies to t h a t country. They prefer 
direct inves tment by set t ing u p new factories or b r a n c h e s (green-field) to portfolio 
inves tment by acquir ing the existing companies . If the costs of product ion in J a p a n 
is rising owing to wage escalation, they will relocate thei r product ion l ines to t he 
low-wage count r ies a n d then export the finished p roduc t to the high-wage countr ies . 
However, they often br ing their own network overseas. Wherever they invest, ei ther 
indust r ia l ised or industr ia l is ing countr ies , they have to co-ordinate thei r global flows 
of money between J a p a n a n d m a n y hos t countr ies a n d ac t a s the portfolio investors . 
T h u s , J a p a n e s e MNCs employ global strategy. If they adopt a mult i -domest ic 
s t ruc tu re , which devolves m u c h of thei r au tonomy on a subsidiary, they canno t 
hand l e these flows of money effectively. To accumula t e more financial a sse t s , they 
repea t the cycle of these sequent ia l s trategies, thereby redeploying profits to invest 
in o ther count r ies (Burton & Saelen, 1987; Smothers , 1990; Hedlund & Nonaka, 
1993; Chang, 1995). Because of t he replication of their s trategies in m a n y 
countr ies , t he pa t t e rn of J a p a n e s e MNCs penet ra t ion into the foreign m a r k e t s is 
more or less t he s a m e a round the world. 
E. Changing management and culture in Japanese MNCs really s h a p e the 
operat ion of J a p a n e s e companies in Thai land. J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t is a produc t 
of t he J a p a n e s e society. Since the downfall of J a p a n e s e bubble economy in 1991, 
J a p a n h a s been undergone volatile social changes a n d economic s tagnat ion . So far 
J a p a n h a s been unab le to cure i ts economic wound yet. Aside from its s t a g n a n t 
economy, J a p a n h a s encountered bo th domestic p res su res , s u c h a s a n ageing 
populat ion, economic res t ruc tur ing , a n unimpress ive internat ional image a n d a n 
anxiety syndrome, a n d internat ional p ressures , s u c h a s criticism on protectionism, 
competi t ion from the NICs a n d foreign d i s t rus t (Whitehill, 1991). 
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When the economy t u r n s bad, J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t does not work well. 
Three componen t s of J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t comprising s takeholder capital ism, 
consensua l decis ion-making a n d the closed labour sys tem of enterpr ise union , 
lifetime employment a n d seniority wages have become a h ind rance to growth and 
survival. Under t he s takeholder capitalism, J a p a n e s e m a n a g e r s a re too complacent , 
because J a p a n e s e companies a t t ach impor tance to their employees firstly, t hen t he 
ret irees, thirdly to their b u s i n e s s par tners—suppl ie rs and dealers , fourthly to their 
m a i n b a n k s a n d finally to their shareholders . The consensua l decis ion-making 
process in J a p a n e s e companies canno t cope with t he accelerat ing pace of change in 
the global environment . Because of bo t tom-up management , J a p a n e s e top 
executives a re not expected to m a k e a tough decision. The closed labour sys tem 
c a u s e s J a p a n e s e companies to avoid re t renching their core workforce, t he white-
collar male staff a t all costs . Dur ing the recession, mos t companies c a n n o t 
r e s t ruc tu re themselves with r edundanc ies . They prefer cut t ing salary a n d freezing 
rec ru i tment to sacking core employees. Hence, Japanese -s ty le m a n a g e m e n t needs a 
complete overhaul (The Economist , 1995, J u n e 24, 1999, November 27; Harney & 
Abrahams , 1998, November 12). 
Under both domestic a n d global p ressures , b u s i n e s s a n d manager ia l 
behaviours in J a p a n have drastically changed s ince the bubble bu r s t ed . J a p a n ' s 
financial l iberalisation a n d the globalisation of capital flows since t he mid-1980s 
have p ressur i sed J a p a n e s e corporate governance to change . The in ternat ional 
shareho lders d e m a n d more accountabi l i ty and dividends from J a p a n e s e MNCs. 
This t ransformat ion poses some t h r e a t s to the c u r r e n t sys tem of s takeholder 
capital ism. To cope with t he quickly changed global environment , some J a p a n e s e 
companies have begun to u s e more top-down a n d less bo t tom-up decision-making. 
The length of t he consensua l decis ion-making process becomes shor ter . These 
companies have begun to s t reaml ine their boa rds a n d organisa t ions a n d cu t down 
the workforce (Gerlach. 1987; Chen, 1995; Bostock & Stoney, 1997; The Economist , 
1999, November 27). 
Merger a n d acquisi t ion in b a n k i n g sector a re gaining cur rency in J a p a n even 
if the consolidation of th i s sector will take longer t ime t h a n in t he West. In October 
1999, the announced merger between Dai-Ichi-Kangyo Bank (DKB), Fuji Bank and 
Industr ia l B a n k of J a p a n , a n d the o ther one between Sumi tomo Bank a n d S a k u r a 
Bank signify t h e potential change . These two mergers inevitably affect the 
interlocking ownership in horizontal keiretsu, because DKB, Fuji, Sumi tomo a n d 
S a n w a a re t h e m a i n b a n k of DKB group, Fuyo group, Sumi tomo group a n d Mitsui 
group respectively. The lines between companies from different horizontal 
enterpr ise g roups become less divisive and the old keiretsu will fall away from its 
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borrowers (Financial Times, 1999, November 10; The Economist , 1999, November 
27). 
The adven t of information technology (IT) a n d globalisation causes J a p a n e s e 
MNCs to t ransform themselves from manufac tur ing-based companies to service-
based ones . E-bus iness will loosen vertical keiretsu t ies because J a p a n e s e 
m a n u f a c t u r e r s can build supply-chain m a n a g e m e n t a n d a product ion network wi th 
companies a r o u n d the world. Because of deregulat ion in the 1990s, the new 
retai lers can u s e IT to b r e a k the vertical system. These retailers become bigger a n d 
u s e their knowledge abou t cus tomers to bargain with suppl iers and manufac tu re r s 
(Whitehill, 1991; The Economist , 1999, November 27). 
To cope with the new environment, J a p a n e s e management needs to be 
modified to a certain degree. This modification means t ha t J a p a n e s e management will 
lose its nat ional un iqueness somehow in the future. It will not become more and more 
like Western managemen t a s far a s we know, b u t it will be modified in its own way 
u n d e r the p ressure of international norm. This transit ion may not be absolute, b u t it 
might be a mixture of old and new ideas (Whitehill, 1991; Chen, 1995; The Economist, 
1995, J u n e 24, 1999, November 27; Westney, 1996; Bostock & Stoney, 1997). 
Table m. 1 The comparison between old and new elements of Japanese 
management 
Japanese Management Persistence Transformation 
Corporate Governance -Multi-layer and large board of 
directors 
-Overwhelmingly Inside and 
Japanese male directors, but 
outside director from the 
bureaucracy and the allied firms 
-No interference from 
shareholders 
-Cross-shareholding 
-More merger and acquisition 
between the allied firms 
-More vice-presidents 
-More outside directors 
-More interference from 
shareholders 
-Less cross-shareholding 
Structure -Tall organisadon -More important corporate 
planning department 
-Smaller head office 
-More decentralisation with 
general management committee 
(GMC) 
Strategy -Long-term growth orientation 
-An evoluUonary series 
-An alliance 
-More diversification 
-More use of external resource 
Management Style -Old-boy network and jinmiyaku 
-Intuitive leadership 
-Paternalism 
-Group emphasis 
-Consensual decision-making 
-More autocratic and faster top-
down decision-making 
-Empowerment to lower level 
employees 
HRM -Lifetime employment 
-Job transfer, frozen new 
recruitment and early retirement 
preferable to lay-off 
-Nenko Joretsu 
-Modest remunerative disparity 
-Prerequisites on an individual 
bas is 
-Long-term merit appraisal 
-Job rotadon 
-Enterprise union 
-Corporate loyalty 
-More possible lay-off 
-More early retirement and job 
transfer 
-More mid-career recruitment 
-Simpler recruitment 
-More heterogeneous human 
resources 
-More elements of merit-based 
promotion 
-Less family allowance 
-Weaker commitment between 
employees and employers 
-More militant enterprise unions 
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APPENDIX IV: LETTER OF INQUIRY 
655 Soi 22 Karnkeha 
Nawamin Rd 
Klongjan Bangkapi 
Bangkok 10 240 
2000 
Dear Sirs 
I, Keatkhamjorn Meekanon, am a doctoral student at Maastricht School of 
Management in the Netherlands. I am currently doing research on: 
'The cultural impact on strategy process: A comparison between Dutch and Japanese MNCs 
in Thailand' 
My research is a part to fulfil the requirement for a PhD degree. The design of this 
research project involves an interview with the executive in charge of Thai operation. Your 
company is chosen as a case study of my doctoral dissertation. I, therefore, would like to ask 
for your cooperation in giving me an opportunity to interview you at your convenience. 
Your valuable time and assistance will be helpful in my research findings. The 
outcome of my research is expected to help scholars to delve into the field of international 
management, strategic management and comparative management. In dealing with a 
cultural impact on their strategies, this outcome is also expected to enhance the knowledge 
and awareness of international managers and expatriates. Thus, the research findings will be 
beneficial to your company in Thailand in overcoming cultural problems of strategies, 
operations, and localisation. 
Your response to the interview will be strictly confidential. All personal 
identification will be anonymous. All data and information will be analysed and utilised for 
the academic purpose only. When I complete my doctoral programme, I am pleased to 
present a summary of my research findings at your request. 
Enclosed are an interview schedule and a copy of letter of certification for your 
examination. If you are willing to give me an opportunity or have some more questions 
about my research project, please feel free to contact me at: 
Phone: 377-5581 
Fax: 733-2276 
e-mail: kt .meekanon@hotmail.com or kt meekanon@vahoo.com 
I look forward to your cooperation and an opportunity to interview you. 
Yours faithfully 
Keatkhamjorn Meekanon 
PhD Candidate 
235 
APPENDIX V: CASE PROTOCOL 
Purpose 
Key Fea tu re s of t he Case S tudy Method 
Organisa t ion of th i s Plan 
I. Procedure 
A. Initial Schedul ing of Preliminary Interview 
Preliminary Interview 
Conclusion 
B. Review of Documenta t ion and Archival Records 
Verification of Documenta t ion and Archival Records with J o u r n a l i s t s 
Verification of Documenta t ion and Archival Records with Key Informants 
Verification of Access Procedures 
Special Document s 
C. Determinat ion of Persons to be Interviewed and Other Sources of 
Information 
Executive Funct ion 
H RM Funct ion 
Rank-and-file Involvement 
S u m m a r y 
II. Case S tudy Protocol and Ques t ions 
A. Envi ronmenta l Scann ing 
Topic 
S u m m a r y of Ques t ions for Section A 
B. Strategy Formulat ion 
Topic 
S u m m a r y of Quest ions for Section B 
C. Strategy Implementat ion 
Topic 
S u m m a r y of Quest ions for Section C 
D. Evaluat ion and Control 
Topic 
S u m m a r y of Ques t ions for Section D 
III. Analysis Plan a n d Case S tudy Reports 
A. Individual Case S tud ies 
Descriptive Information 
Explanatory Information 
Outl ine of Individual Case S tudy Reports 
B. With in-cul ture Cross-case Analysis 
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Descriptive Information 
Explanatory Information 
Within-cul ture Cross-case Reports 
C. Cross-cul tura l Cross-case Analysis 
Descriptive Information 
Explanatory Information 
Cross-cul tura l Cross-case Reports 
Reference for Case S tudy Plan 
237 
APPENDIX VI: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
I Background Information about the Respondent 
1. Please specify your educat ion qualification (the h ighes t diploma you earned): 
2 . How long have you been working with t he company? 
3 . How long have you been working with the company in Thai land? 
4 . Before your c u r r e n t posit ion in Thai land, h a d you ever worked with t he company 
in o ther count r ies? 
If yes, where? 
(Please specify all) 
5. Before your cu r r en t position in Thailand, w h a t was your last position in the 
company? 
6. Please indicate your nationali ty: 
If your nat ional i ty is no t D u t c h / J a p a n e s e , please answer 13-15. If no, please skip 
7 
7. Have you ever worked in the company 's h e a d q u a r t e r s in the 
N e t h e r l a n d s / J a p a n ? How long ? 
n Background Information about your Company 
8. W h a t is t he legal s t a t u s of t he company in Thai land? 
Sales office 
Representat ive office 
Branch 
J o i n t ven tu re 
Wholly own subsidiary 
9. How did the company en te r Thai marke t ? 
Set t ing u p sales office/representative of f ice /branch/subs id ia ry on its own 
Forming a joint ven tu re with Thai pa r tne r s 
_ A c q u i r i n g Thai companies 
__Acqu i r ing o ther foreign companies in Thai land 
10. How m a n y d iv i s ions /depa r tmen t s the company h a s in Thai land? 
11 . Is the company in Thai land organised in t he s ame way a s h e a d q u a r t e r s t he 
N e t h e r l a n d s / J a p a n ? 
If yes, why? . 
If no, why? 
12. Is the company in Thailand organised in the same way a s its national organisations 
in other countr ies? . 
If yes, why? 
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If no, why? 
III The Influence of Dutch/Japanese Culture 
13. Do you u n d e r s t a n d D u t c h / J a p a n e s e cul ture? 
Very well Well Somewhat Not really Not a t all 
14. Please identify the p rominen t character is t ics of t he D u t c h / J a p a n e s e cul ture a s 
m u c h a s you can 
15. Please identify the influence of the Dutch / J a p a n e s e cul ture on the company 's 
operation in Thai land 
IV Questions about the Company's Strategy Process 
Environmental Scann ing 
16. How often you perceive strategic i s sues from environment? 
17. Do you employ consu l t an t s or researchers to collect information for the 
company? 
18. How you categorise strategic i s sues into ' th rea ts ' and 'opportunit ies '? 
Wha t are t he criteria for th i s categorisat ion? . 
19. How you analyse the envi ronment? 
20 . Wha t are possible 'opportunit ies ' or ' th rea ts ' to t he company in Thai land? 
2 1 . Which information related to strategic i s sues do you regularly collect a n d 
analyse? 
How you u s e these da t a and ana lyses for formulating strategy or mak ing a 
strategic decision? 
22 . Is any change in the bus ine s s envi ronment ei ther th rea t or oppor tuni ty for the 
company? 
2 3 . Wha t do you th ink abou t the t rend of the indus t ry in which the company 
opera tes for the next few years? 
24 . Wha t are mobility a n d diversification bar r ie rs of the indus t ry in which the 
company opera tes? 
2 5 . How can you forecast the future of the company? 
26 . Wha t are key success factors of the company? 
27 . Who appra i ses and minimises political risks? 
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Strategy Formulat ion 
28 . Who formulates a strategy for Thai operations? 
Headquar ters in the Ne the r l ands / J apan 
__Asia -Pac i f i c Regional Head Office 
Thai office 
2 9 . Wha t a re the company's goals in Thai land? 
30 . How the company's se ts i ts corporate goals? . 
3 1 . To achieve such goals, how the company's generates alternatives for making 
strategic decisions? _____ 
32. How the company's headquar te r s author ises Thai office to make strategic decision 
for Thai land? 
33 . Under delegated authorisat ion from the headquar te rs , if you do not make a crucial 
decision alone, how many persons will be involved in the decision-making process? 
Who? _ _ _ _ _ 
34. Does t he company use a committee (in case of Dutch companies) or ringi and 
nenuavashi (in case of J a p a n e s e companies) for making a strategic decision? 
Who are the members of the committee (in case of Dutch companies) or involved in 
ringi a n d nernawashi (in case of J a p a n e s e companies)? 
Wha t is your perception of such a strategic decision? 
3 5 . Does the company in Thailand write down a strategic decision? 
Is it a confidential document? 
36 . If you used to work in t he head office, how decision-making process of the company 
in Thailand differs from tha t in its headquar te r s in the Ne the r l ands / Japan? 
37. Does t he company prefer a consensus to a majority vote? 
38 . Do you need advice from subordinates before making a strategic decision? 
39. Do you have to negotiate with subordinates before making a strategic decision? 
40. Do you need to disseminate strategic i ssues before making a strategic decision? 
4 1 . How did you deal with t he economic crisis in Thai land? 
Can you explain your experience dur ing the crisis? 
Strategy Implementat ion 
42 . Who se ts programmes/policies after making a strategic decision? 
4 3 . Who se ts budget after making a strategic decision? 
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44. Who approves budgets and short- term plans after making a strategic 
decision? 
45 . Who sets forth corporate rules and procedures after making a strategic decision? 
46. Who determines organisational s t ruc ture after making a strategic decision? 
47. Who manages its manpower/workforce after making a strategic decision? 
48. How the company recrui ts and t ra ins new employees after making a strategic 
decision? 
49. Who mobilises the company's managers in Thailand after making a strategic 
decision? _ 
50. Does the company employ special techniques, such as MBO, TQM, J IT and so on? 
Do these techniques really work? . 
5 1 . How the head office or regional headquar te rs involve the implementation of the 
company's strategy in Thai land? 
To wha t degree? 
Evaluation and Control 
52. Who establ ishes criteria a n d s tandard for evaluation and control in the company in 
Thai land? 
What are the criteria and s tandard for evaluation and control in the company in 
Thailand? 
How you assess the company's performance in Thailand? 
53 . Who takes corrective act ions if actual performance is unsatisfactory in comparison 
with its s t andard? 
How? 
54. Who assess your performance? 
How? 
55 . How often you report to the head office or regional headquar te rs? 
56. How often staff from the head office or regional headquar te rs comes to visit the 
company in Thai land? 
57. Does the company compare its performance with t ha t of its competitors? 
If yes, how? 
58. Can the headquar te r s or regional head office afford a loss in the company in 
Thailand within a next couple of years if the company makes a loss? 
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If yes, how m a n y years they can? 
If no, w h a t are they going to do? . 
59. Can the headquar t e r s or the regional head office afford to lose the company's 
marke t sha re in Thailand within a next couple of years if the company loses marke t 
share? 
If yes, how many years they can? 
If no, w h a t are they going to do? 
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Samenvatting. 
Het onderwerp van deze dissertat ie is de invloed van nat ionale cu l turen op he t proces van 
strategievorming in bu i ten landse vestigingen van mul t inat ionals . Preciezer gezegd de invloed 
van de nat ionale cu l tuu r van he t land van he rkomst van de mult inat ional . 
Het doel van he t onderzoek is he t ontwikkelen van een model a a n de h a n d waarvan 
sys temat ische vergelijkingen gemaakt k u n n e n worden t u s s e n vestigingen van mul t ina t ionals 
u i t verschallende landen van he rkomst 
Het onderzoek n a a r dit onderwerp is uitgevoerd met behu lp van een exploratief vergelijkend 
onderzoek. Drie vestigingen van bekende Nederlandse mul t ina t ionals en drie 
overeenkomstige vestigingen van bekende J a p a n s e mul t ina t ionals in Thai land zijn met 
e lkaar vergeleken. 
Als eerste is met behu lp van een l i tera tuuronderzoek een theoret ische verkenning gemaakt 
n a a r de drie aspec ten die een hoofdrol in dit onderzoek spelen: 
het proces van strategievorming, 
nat ionale cu l tu ren 
bedrijfsresultaat (corporate performance). 
Het l i tera tuuronderzoek produceerde ook de theoret ische bas i s voor de onderzoeksaanpak 
en m a a k t e he t mogelijk om elf conceptuele vooronderstell ingen te formuleren. 
De syn these van he t na t ionale-cul tuurmodel van Hofstede (1984a, 1991), he t beschri jvende 
model voor strategievorming van Wheelen en Hunger (1995) en het Competing Value Model 
van Quinn en Rohrbaugh (1983), m a a k t e he t mogelijk een referentiemodel voor dit 
onderzoek op te stellen. Aangevuld met l i tera tuuronderzoek n a a r Nederlands en J a p a n s 
m a n a g e m e n t w a s he t mogelijk de relevante conceptuele vooronderstell ingen te formuleren. 
Het h ierna volgende empirische onderzoek, gebaseerd op he t referentiemodel is kwalitatief 
van aa rd . De a a n p a k van het onderzoek volgt een meervoudige case s tudy ontwerp. De 
keuze van de bedrijven is op theoret ische gronden gebeurd, niet door een (aselecte) 
steekproef. Paarsgewijs zijn vestigingen van Nederlandse en J a p a n s e mul t ina t iona ls gekozen 
ui t de sectoren consumen ten electronica, banken en luchtvaar tmaatschappi jen . Ter 
bevordering van de validiteit zijn verschil lende dataverwervingsmethoden gebruikt . De 
confrontatie van de theoret ische conceptuele vooronderstell ingen met he t empir ische 
onderzoeksmater iaa l leidde tot he t opstellen van empir ische hypothesen, die gebruikt 
k u n n e n worden voor verder onderzoek. 
De onderzoeksresul ta ten onde r s t eunen de veronderstell ing da t nat ionale cu l tu ren van de 
moedermaatschappi jen invloed hebben op s trategievormingsprocessen van bu i ten landse 
vestigingen. Niet alle d imens ies ui t he t model van Hofstede bleken relevant te zijn, zodat het 
referentiemodel a a n p a s s i n g behoefde. 
In he t laa ts te hoofdstuk van de disser tat ie wordt he t belang van he t ontwikkelde model en 
de gevonden hypothesen , en de toepassingsmogeli jkheden bediscussieerd. De 
onderzoeksresu l ta ten zijn zowel van theoret isch als p rak t i sch belang. Ze k u n n e n 
behu lpzaam zijn bij he t werk van strategiespecialisten, van (internationale) m a n a g e r s en 
andere prakti jkbeoefenaren op he t gebied van strategievorming. Bovendien k u n n e n ze van 
n u t zijn voor werknemers in bu i t en landse vestigingen om he t proces van strategievorming te 
begrijpen. 
Keatkhamjorn Meekanon, born in Bangkok, Thai land in 1967, studied bus ine s s 
adminis t ra t ion , with a major in in ternat ional market ing a t the Chulalongkorn University in 
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following elaboration of the da t a w a s of a qualitative origin. 
Keatkhamjorn is specially interested in internat ional management . This interest became the 
topic of the disser tat ion. The ma in body of the disser ta t ion was devoted to the influence of 
nat ional cu l tu res on the subsidiar ies of MNCs. The resea rch which w a s qualitative a n d 
concept-oriented led to conclus ions abou t the impor tan t a spec t s of nat ional cu l ture with 
respect to strategy making. Star t ing with the well-known Hofstede's model of na t ional 
cu l tu res , one of t he conclusions w a s t h a t only a limited n u m b e r of the variables in th i s 
model were relevant for s trategy making. Besides the impor tance is varying according to the 
p h a s e in the strategy making process . 
